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This dissertation explores, from a transnational viewpoint, the historical relationship 
between war veterans and fascism in interwar Europe. Until now, historians have been 
roughly divided between those who assume that ‘brutalization’ (George L. Mosse) led 
veterans to join fascist movements, and those who stress that most ex-soldiers of the 
Great War became committed pacifists and internationalists. This dissertation 
overcomes the inconclusive debates surrounding the ‘brutalization’ thesis, by proposing 
a new theoretical and methodological approach, and offering a wider perspective on the 
history of both fascism and veteran movements. Drawing on a wide range of archival 
and published sources in five different languages, this work focuses on the interrelated 
processes of fascistization and transnationalization of veteran politics in interwar 
Europe. Firstly, it explains the connection between Italian Fascism and war veterans as 
the result of a process of symbolic appropriation of the notion of the ‘veteran’. Then, it 
demonstrates that the cross-border circulation of the stereotype of the ‘fascist veteran’, 
and the diffusion of the ‘myth of the fascist veterans’, originating in the March on 
Rome, were crucial factors in the transnationalization of fascism and the fascistization 
of veteran politics in the 1920s. Furthermore, in the 1930s, networks of fascist veterans 
point to the existence of a transnational fascism, while new wars in Ethiopia and Spain 
strengthened the symbolic connection between veterans and fascism. Finally, the 
dissertation demonstrates that by 1939-1940, the fascist model of veteran politics was 
transferred into the new Spanish and French dictatorships. It is not ‘brutalization’, 
therefore, but rather a combination of mythical constructs, transfers, political 
communication, encounters, and networks within a transnational space that explain the 
relationship between veterans and fascism. Thus, this dissertation offers new insights 
into the essential ties between fascism and war and contributes to the theorization and 
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This dissertation analyses the transnational relationship between war veterans and 
fascism during the European interwar period (1919-1940).1 Over decades, historians 
have strived to explain why the European continent, only twenty years after a 
cataclysmic war of unprecedented murderous dimensions, became involved in a new, 
even more horrendous, world conflagration. Although there were important democratic 
experiences and remarkable advances in many facets of human life, the interwar period 
saw the progressive demolition of the peaceful order that many people had hoped for in 
the wake of the Great War. While at the beginning of 1919 democracies clearly 
dominated Europe, by June 1940 they were the very exception. And violent conflicts 
and civil wars marked this agitated transition. The eclipse of democracy cannot be 
understood without placing fascism at its centre. Fascism was a product of the First 
World War experience, and fascism can also be considered the trigger of the Second 
World War. In this scenario, explaining the links between fascism and war veterans, the 
men who were also a direct legacy of the Great War, remains crucial. 
One can easily find a plethora of superficial evidence to suggest that the First 
World War veterans had a lot to do with the origin of fascism. For example, it is a 
truism to say that Hitler was just one among millions of demobilized soldiers of the 
defeated German army. Moreover, Mussolini was also a serviceman during the Great 
War. As we will see, historians have mentioned on innumerable occasions that 
paramilitary groups in the early postwar period, such as the Freikorps and the early 
Italian fascist movement, were composed of many former combatants. Furthermore, 
during the 1920s and 1930s, fascist movements in practically every single European 
country rose to prominence while displaying their members dressed in uniforms, 
martially parading with medals that had usually been obtained in the trenches. 
Militarism characterized fascism. Seemingly, war and fascism walked hand in hand. 
Yet, were these facts mere circumstantial coincidences, or do they reveal a substantial, 
quintessential connection between the fascist phenomenon and war veterans? Historians 
have given different (and often contradictory) answers, but a definitive response to the 
question remains, as yet, elusive. 
                                                
1 In this dissertation, fascism with lower case refers to the transnational phenomenon, and Fascism with 
upper case refers exclusively to the Italian original movement and regime.  
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This dissertation aims to provide a new account of the highly complex 
relationship between veterans and fascism, by employing an innovative theoretical and 
methodological approach. By examining processes of fascistization and 
transnationalization, analysing the cultural, sociological and political origins of fascism, 
I intend to resolve persisting historiographical contradictions, and to fill wide gaps in 
historical knowledge. Although much has been said about the interwar veteran 
movements, and the historiography on fascism is vast, only a limited number of works 
have directly dealt with their historical interconnections. Most of these studies have 
revolved around the controversial ‘brutalization’ thesis of the historian George L. 
Mosse. Yet they have not reached any universally valid interpretation, and in the 
meantime, many aspects of this historical reality have been neglected. Drawing on the 
extensive bibliography on fascism and on war veterans, and carrying out a detailed 
analysis of primary sources from different countries, this dissertation aims to provide 
not only a fresh historical account of inter-war European veterans, but also new and 
innovative insights into the history of fascism. 
 
Historiographies 
This dissertation is built upon a broad historiographical background, which can be 
roughly divided into two different areas, namely, studies on war veterans and studies on 
fascism. Assessing the state-of-the-art on the relationship between veterans and fascism 
requires, therefore, following two different historiographical traditions intertwined in 
this work. In this section I shall survey the relevant literature in these two areas, 
devoting special attention to those works that have particularly addressed the 
relationship between veterans and fascism. 
 
War veterans 
The history of war veterans constitutes a research field in and of it itself. Veterans have 
existed in all epochs, insofar as war has riddled human existence.2 The figure of the 
returning warrior is universal since Homer and his Odysseus. Probably, as scholarly 
works drawing on other disciplines such as psychology and anthropology suggest, all 
veterans from all periods may share a set of common traits, based on a comparable 
                                                
2 David A. Gerber (ed.), Disabled Veterans in History, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 
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experience of combat.3 This dissertation is concerned with the inter-war veterans, or in 
other words, with the history of veterans of industrialized warfare. 
To shed light on the history of the interwar-period veterans, it is useful to briefly 
observe the precedents. After the French Revolution and during the early nineteenth 
century, modern warfare and mass conscript armies developed; war veterans, pensioners 
and disabled ex-soldiers became a constant presence in popular culture, and legislation 
to reward their services was developed.4 Since ex-combatants were accustomed to the 
hardships of military life and the cruelties of combat, civilians deemed them as 
potentially conflictive individuals whose reintegration into ‘normal’ life was anything 
but easy. Conversely, people viewed veterans as virtuous citizens, whose service to the 
nation should be recognized. Subsequently, important historical developments further 
complexified the issue. During the nineteenth century, the centralization and 
nationalization of politics, the expansion of modern armies, and the consolidation of 
state bureaucracies heightened the political and ideological implications of military 
service. Revolutionary wars and forced conscription catalysed nation-building 
processes.5 It was not by chance that, in 1832, the German military theorist Carl von 
Clausewitz wrote that war was an instrument of policy, ‘a continuation of political 
intercourse, with the addition of other means’.6 Participation in war became an initiation 
to politics. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the European armies embraced 
new roles, shaping the social and political function of the veterans. Armed forces fought 
for a variety of objectives: to expand and retain colonial empires; to further national 
unification processes; to resolve internal civil wars. The state authorities often endowed 
the military with public order duties. In different countries, such as France, Italy, 
Germany or Spain, the state relied on military troops to repress working class protests, 
                                                
3 Claude Barrois, Psychanalyse du Guerrier, Paris, Hachette, 1993; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, 
Combattre. Une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne, XIXe-XXIe siècle, Paris, Seuil, 2008; see 
also: Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, 
New York, Basic Books, 1999. 
4 Isser Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1979. 
5 Theda Skocpol, ‘Social revolutions and mass military mobilization’, World Politics, 40 (1988), pp. 147-
168; regarding the United States, see John Resch, Suffering Soldiers Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral 
Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 
1999. 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605. 
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and to defend property.7 Thus, the figure of the soldier became associated with the 
defence of the establishment, with nationalist or imperial aggression, and with 
coercion.8 Forced conscription became highly unpopular.9 Meanwhile, in this context, 
ex-soldiers created associations, as civil society developed. These organizations 
embodied the memory of national wars, and performed functions of mutual assistance; 
they were closely linked to the military. In Italy, for instance, veteran patriotic groups 
from the wars of Independence were socially influential.10 And beyond patriotism, 
certain war veteran associations, such as the Deutscher Kriegerbund (Kyffhäuserbund) 
in Wilhelmine Germany —created in 1899—, became bulwarks of social conservatism 
and anti-socialism.11 And yet, the number of former soldiers in proportion to the 
population was miniscule, as was the weight of veterans in political life. This would 
drastically change with the First World War. 
Much can be learnt about the veterans of the interwar period by looking into the 
experiences of the Great War soldiers. Since the 1970s, historians of the First World 
War have increasingly turned their attention to the men who actually endured trench 
warfare. Scholars examined the soldiers’ written cultural production, as well as the 
experience of the illiterate, lower-ranked servicemen.12 Robert Wohl talked about a ‘war 
generation’, characterized by ‘a unity of experience, feeling and fate that transcended 
national borders’.13 The members of the ‘generation of 1914’ were young, bourgeois 
men who volunteered and sometimes returned from war believing that they had become 
different and better individuals. Yet, Wohl identified no unitary pattern of political 
response to the war experience.14 Furthermore, the war experience differed sharply 
                                                
7 Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1975; Giorgio Rochat and Giulio Massobrio, Breve storia dell’esercito italiano dal 
1861 al 1943, Torino, Einaudi, 1978, pp. 37-65, 131-135, 160-162; John Gooch, Army, State and Society 
in Italy, 1870-1915, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1989; Eduardo González Calleja, La razón de la fuerza. 
Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1875-1917), Madrid, 
CSIC, 1998, pp. 551-552; Anja Johansen, ‘Violent Repression or Modern Strategies of Crowd 
Management? Soldiers as riot police in France and Germany, 1890-1914’, French History, 15 (2001), pp. 
400-420. 
8 See, for example, Gérard de Puymége, Chauvin, le soldat-laboureur: contribution à l'étude des 
nationalismes, Paris, Gallimard, 1993. 
9 Rafael Núñez Florencio, Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España, Madrid, CSIC, 1990. 
10 Marco Fincardi, ‘I reduci risorgimentali veneti e friulani’, Italia contemporanea, 222 (2001), pp. 79-83. 
11 Alex Hall, ‘The War of Words: Anti-socialist Offensives and Counter-propaganda in Wilhelmine 
Germany 1890-1914, Journal of Contemporary History, 11, 2-3 (1976), pp. 11.42. 
12 Mario Isnenghi, Il mito della Grande Guerra, Bari, Laterza, 1970; Paul Fussell, The Great War and 
Modern Memory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975. 
13 Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 3. 
14 Ibid., p. 222. 
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according to the social class and conditions of the actors.15 This heterogeneity posits a 
conceptual issue. For if we cannot speak of the soldiers, combatants or servicemen as a 
unitary seamless whole, how can we take ‘the veterans’ as a homogeneous, firmly 
defined historical actor? 
Some historians believe that all veterans share a set of characteristics that reflect 
the nature of their war experience. Eric J. Leed’s anthropological analysis of the 
experience of Great War trench-soldiers shed light on essential features of veteran 
identity. According to Leed, the war experience can be best understood as a rite of 
passage, which transforms the combatants into self-differentiated individuals upon their 
reintegration into society.16 The war was marked by three phases on an experience of 
radical discontinuity in the lives of soldiers. First came the experience of separation; 
then, a stage of ‘liminality’ where the combatant was confronted with death; and finally, 
a process of reintegration.17 Leed argues that the frontline soldier, after his ‘voyage 
along the margins of civilization’, becomes ‘an initiate in a field of force who has, 
apparently, no demands except to be allowed to be used as a tool of some future 
destiny’.18 For this reason, veterans are conflictive as they strive to find their place in a 
postwar society that no longer needs their services. They only find relief and 
reassurance in the comradeship they keep alive by meeting their equals in a ritualized 
associative life. Recently, Martin Crotty and Mark Edele have argued that, after the 
First World War, veterans in very different societies shared a ‘sense of entitlement’.19 
These authors have suggested that, although only in certain circumstances did veterans 
succeed in becoming a privileged group; the experience of ‘twentieth century warfare’ 
created a ‘strong sense of entitlement among former warriors’ regardless of their 
specific postwar contexts. 
 Taking into account such characterizations, it would not be surprising if many 
veterans found fascism very attractive, since it was a new ideology and a form of 
political practice that provided them with a gratifying sense of pride. Throughout this 
dissertation, it will be interesting to keep in mind Leed’s interpretation of veteran 
                                                
15 See Richard Bessel, ‘The Front Generation and the politics of Weimar Germany’, in Mark Roseman 
(ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany, 1770-1968, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 121-136. 
16 Eric J. Leed, No Man’s Land. Combat & Identity in World War I, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1979. 
17 Ibid., p. 3. 
18 Ibid., p. 199. 
19 Martin Crotty and Mark Edele, ‘Total War and Entitlement: Towards a Global History of Veteran 
Privilege’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 59, 1 (2013), pp. 15-32. 
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identity, but it is also important to remark that this historian reached his conclusions by 
providing, as evidence, the writings of several fascist, national-socialist and extreme-
right veterans, sometimes at face value. It is true that veterans most commonly 
represented themselves as an ‘entitlement group’, but also that this claim implied 
culturally constructing and appropriating the category of ‘veteran’. Most importantly, it 
would be wrong to maintain that veterans, though sharing certain sentiments, shared 
also the same political instinct. Even if we assume that all ‘veterans’ were united by 
certain common characteristics, to categorize them simply along ideological trends is 
untenable. 
However, historiography on the interwar veterans has often tried to discern their 
predominant political orientation. In the 1950s and 1960s, the first scholarly works on 
French and British veterans came from political scientists, who tended to stress the role 
of veteran associations as pressure groups (lobbies) in both national and international 
spheres.20 During those decades, some of these works recalled the affinity of veteran 
associations with right-wing and fascist parties, and the published memoirs of veteran 
leaders who had collaborated with fascist movements and regimes corroborated this 
impression.21 Furthermore, the paramilitary groups that emerged after the war, many of 
them composed of ex-combatants, were viewed as the ‘vanguard of Nazism’, as Robert 
G. L. Waite suggested in his book on the Freikorps.22 Within the context of the Cold 
War, veteran associations were still very active in the public sphere of many European 
countries. And as an analyst once wrote, these organizations had ‘offshoots which 
occasionally reflect the memories of former Nazi military formations’.23 The Cold War 
context reinforced the perception of veterans as potential fascists, but a developing 
historiography would revise this idea. 
The opening of archives with records of the fascist and Nazi past enabled 
historians to provide the first crucial contributions on the topic. Today, some of these 
books remain useful to approach the relationship between veterans and fascism. In 
                                                
20 René Remond, ‘Les anciens combattants et la politique’, Revue française de science politique, 5ème 
année, 2 (1955), pp. 267-290; Graham Wootton, The Politics of Influence. British Ex-Servicemen, 
Cabinet Decisions and Cultural Change (1917-57), London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; Elliott 
Pennell Fagerberg, The ‘Anciens Combattants’ and French Foreign Policy, Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Université de Genève, 1966. 
21 See Theodor Duesterberg, Der Stahlhelm und Hitler, Wolfenbüttel & Hannover, 1949. 
22 Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism. The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923, 
Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1952. 
23 Taylor Cole, ‘Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and Italy’, The American Political Science Review, 
49, 1 (1955), 131-143, here 139. 
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1966, based on a wide range of archival evidence, Volker R. Berghahn’s book on the 
Stahlhelm demonstrated the complex political links of this German veteran paramilitary 
movement with Nazism.24 This was, however, an historical analysis solely focused on 
Germany, and the connexions of this veteran association with Italian Fascism, as well as 
the veterans’ relation with generic fascism in more theoretical terms, were only 
marginally approached. German historians were aware that the inter-war veterans had 
created politically diverse associations, such as the republican Reichsbanner,25 the 
communist Frontkämpferbund,26 and the Jewish Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten.27 
Juxtaposing these groups with the mainstream conservative and pro-monarchist 
traditional veteran societies,28 a more complex picture of the Weimar veterans emerged. 
Even though a wider comparative perspective was still lacking, this kind of well-
documented, serious enquiries about the past represented the standard that other 
historians also put in practice during the 1970s. 
In Italy, 1974, Giovanni Sabbatucci published an important book that still is the 
most detailed account on the Italian veterans’ postwar history. I combattenti nel primo 
dopoguerra tells the story of the ambitious, albeit failed, project for a political ‘renewal’ 
of Italy (rinnovamento) that the veterans pursued during 1919-1920. When Sabbatucci 
started to investigate this topic in Italy, there still existed a general belief that the Great 
War veterans had been the precursors of fascism; the references to this issue in the 
works of scholars such as Renzo de Felice did not debunk that common idea.29 
Sabbatucci himself was surprised to discover, instead, the profoundly democratic 
inspiration of many early veteran leaders, who on some occasions joined the anti-fascist 
resistance.30 According to Sabbatucci, it was only after the political failure of the 
veteran movement that Fascism was able to occupy the political space left by the 
veterans upon their withdrawal from politics. 
                                                
24 Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm. Bund der Frontsoldaten, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1966; almost 
simultaneously, Alois Klotzbücher, Der politische Weg des Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten in der 
Weimarer Republik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ‘Nationalen Opposition’ 1918-1933, Inaugural-
Dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1964, told the same story, yet 
without employing important documents to which Berghahn had access. 
25 Karl Rohe, Das Reichsbanner Schwarz Rot Gold: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der 
politischen Kampfverbaende zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1966. 
26 Kurt G. P. Schuster, Der Rote Frontkämpferbund 1924-1929, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1975. 
27 Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten 1919-1938. Geschichte eines jüdischen 
Abwehrvereins, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1977. 
28 C. J. Elliot, ‘The Kriegervereine and the Weimar Republic’, Journal of Contemporary History, 10, 1 
(1975), pp. 109-129. 
29 See Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 1965; Ferdinando 
Cordova, Arditi e legionari Dannunziani, Padova, Marsilio, 1969. 
30 I interviewed Giovanni Sabbatucci in Rome, 10 April 2014. 
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Although a masterful piece of historical research, Sabbatucci’s book still has 
certain shortcomings in the face of today’s research agenda. It is, first of all, a forty-
year-old study that obviously could not take account of all the research on fascism that 
was published in the following decades, nor find inspiration in the cultural studies on 
the First World War that gained momentum later. The focus of the book was the main 
Italian veteran association, the Associazione Nazionale Combattenti, during its two first 
years of existence; its contacts with fascism were only briefly described. Furthermore, 
the author’s thesis, stressing the abortive democratic potential of the veteran movement, 
led him to underrate the veteran element inside the early fascist movement, and to 
disregard some points in common that Italian veterans and fascists shared. Sabbatucci 
all but overlooked the rise of Italian Fascism during 1921-1922; and he accurately but 
broadly surveyed the history of the ANC until its fascistization in 1925. The author also 
excessively diminished, in my opinion, the relevance of the fascist ANC from 1925 to 
the end of the fascist regime, a period which was not studied in his book. My 
dissertation aims to compensate for these flaws by providing a new and updated 
analysis of the veteran-fascist relationship and a more complete history of the 
Associazione Nazionale Combattenti and other veteran associations during the interwar 
period. 
In the 1970s, however, the history of the First World War veterans was 
attracting the interest of other historians, and the volume edited by Stephen R. Ward in 
1975, The War Generation, pooled the knowledge on the topic.31 The contributors 
examined the veterans’ activities in postwar Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and the 
United States. Michael Ledeen showed that some veteran groupings in Italy, such as the 
arditi and many fascists, understood war as a ‘style of life’.32 James M. Diehl explained 
the different positions of German veteran paramilitary groups in their struggle against 
the Weimar Republic, a topic that he further developed in a later book.33 However, in 
general terms, the authors agreed that ‘the actions of veterans were determined more by 
their national experiences than by the impact of the war experience’,34 and that no clear 
                                                
31 Stephen R. Ward (ed.), The War Generation. Veterans of the First World War, Port Washington (NY) 
and London, Kennikat Press, 1975. 
32 Michael Ledeen, ‘Italy. War as a Style of Life’, in: Stephen R. Ward (ed.), The War Generation, pp. 
104-134. 
33 James M. Diehl, ‘Germany: Veterans' Politics under Three Flags’, in: Stephen r. Ward (ed.), The War 
Generation, pp. 135-186; James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1977; see, too, Id., The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the 
Second World War, Chapel Hill & London, University of North Carloina Press, 1993. 
34 Ibid., p. 5. 
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political orientation could be ascribed to them; veterans embraced not only rightist but 
also leftist causes, and different organizations within a single country often were 
political rivals. In the place of a general tendency to see the veteran groups as 
predominantly right-wing and potentially fascist, these works produced a more nuanced 
picture. 
Shortly afterwards, a further blow came to the idea that war veterans had been 
pre-eminently pro-fascist. Published in 1977, Antoine Prost’s exhaustive study of the 
interwar French veteran movement is one of the most comprehensive analyses of 
veterans’ history ever realized.35 Prost not only discussed veteran politics, but also the 
sociological composition of the movement, veteran ideology and the culture of 
remembrance.36 Probably, the French veteran associations had been the most numerous 
in Europe, gathering perhaps 60% of ex-soldiers (3.620.000 held the ‘veteran card’).37 
Prost, in contrast, did not overstate the influence of the veterans over French society, 
even if he argued that they had indirectly contributed to the country’s political 
moderation and stabilisation. In the end, the veterans’ overall commitment to the 
republican institutions and to international peace turned out to be fruitless. What was 
clear for Prost, however, was that the French veterans had represented no fascist threat; 
they, instead, had constituted a bulwark against the expansion of fascism in France. 
Today, this interpretation seems less convincing. It was rooted in the tendency, 
criticized though still prevalent at that time, of denying or underrating the menace of 
fascism and authoritarianism in France.38 
Paradoxically, as we see, two of the most influential works on the European 
interwar veterans, that of Sabbatucci and that of Prost, were inclined to underestimate 
the weight of fascism on the veteran politics of two countries where, in reality, fascism 
had been greatly influential over certain veteran groups. When they were written, 
Sabbatucci’s and Prost’s books were revising the widely held opinion that ex-
combatants had been prone to joining authoritarian, right wing or fascist movements. 
However, while arguing in the direction opposite to this common belief, they would 
                                                
35 Antoine Prost, Les Anciens Combattants et la Societé Française 1914-1939, 3 vols., Paris, Presses de la 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977. 
36 See, too, Antoine Prost, In the Wake of War. The ‘Anciens Combattants’ and French Society, 
Providence and Oxford, Berg, 1992. 
37 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 22. 
38 Cf. Robert Paxton, Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
1972; Chris Millington, From Victory to Vichy. Veterans in Inter-war France, Manchester and New 
York, Manchester University Press, 2012. 
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remain the main references on the topic for a long time, thereby preventing other 
researchers from contradicting their optimistic interpretation. 
The importance of veteran politics and ideologies in the origin of fascism was 
not being ignored, however. The great significance of the former works on veterans 
combined with some important advances in the knowledge about Fascism and Nazism 
at that time. Shortly after Sabbatucci’s book, Emilio Gentile —another pupil of Renzo 
de Felice— offered an important study of the ideology of Italian Fascism. Le origini 
dell’ideologia fascista addressed the origins of fascism as a revolutionary and 
totalitarian ideology stemming from the First World War experience.39 It was during the 
Great War that Mussolini’s allegiance moved from socialism to interventionism, to call 
on the combatants to create a new way of politics. An aristocracy of ex-soldiers imbued 
with war myths, particularly the assault troops (arditi), understood the war as an 
initiation into politics. According to Gentile, Combattentismo, a kind of rebellious 
instinct that characterized the returning veterans, was one of the crucial ingredients of 
the fascist ideological syntheses. The fact that Gentile considered the main cause of 
fascism to lie in the Great War experience was laudable.  
This path-breaking work was part of a wider renewal in the field that strove to 
take fascist ideology more seriously, and not just as an irrational, violent reaction. Some 
years earlier, in the same fashion, George L. Mosse had investigated the cultural origins 
of the revolutionary national-socialist ideology.40 While stressing the intellectual crisis 
of the late nineteenth century as the starting point of this ideological evolution, Mosse 
had argued that völkisch nationalism acquired a mass-basis only after the Great War, 
and that veteran organizations (such as the Stahlhelm) had contributed to expanding 
such an ideology.41 Knowing what Italian historians were affirming about the origins of 
fascism, Mosse became increasingly convinced that the catalyst of Nazism had been the 
First World War. Based on this belief, he started to talk about ‘brutalization’.42 
                                                
39 Emilio Gentile, Le origini dell’ideologia fascista (1918-1925), Bari, Laterza, 1975. Three decades later, 
it was translated into English: Emilio Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 1918-1925, New York, 
Enigma, 2005. 
40 George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, New York, 
The Universal Library, 1964. This book, translated into Italian in 1968, had substantially influenced 
Gentile; see Donatello Aramini, George L. Mosse, L’Italia e gli storici, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2010. 
41 George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, pp. 254-257. 




The slow emergence of George L. Mosse’s famous ‘brutalization’ thesis was possible 
thanks to the historiographical foundations discussed above, and was in harmony with 
the new cultural history of war, emerging in the 1980s and 1990s.43 At that time, many 
historians were in agreement in interpreting the First World War as the matrix of 
modernity.44 What Mosse finally synthesized in his 1990 book Fallen Soldiers had been 
appearing in previous minor contributions.45 In the post-1989 context his ideas found 
ample audience, since historians of fascism were showing a greater interest in the 
question of violence.46 
 In his book, Mosse defined the inter-war persistence of violence as the 
‘brutalization’ of politics. The postwar violent practices and discourses, derived from 
the war experience, resulting in a generalized indifference towards the persecution of 
political and racial enemies. Mosse argued that the experience of trench warfare, with 
its everyday confrontation with death, was the origin of a dehumanizing trivialization of 
violence during the interwar period, which ultimately led to genocide. The political 
right and the war veterans appeared as the chief agents of the ‘brutalization’ of politics. 
The right had monopolized the Myth of the War Experience, which made the memory 
of war acceptable, by means of worshipping the fallen soldiers and exalting the alleged 
comradeship of the youthful combatants. As a reviewer of Mosse’s book insightfully 
noted, ‘brutalization’ ‘occurred not simply because people became brutal but also 
because people learned to see the brutal as beautiful’.47 Even though it described 
cultural processes present in other European countries, Mosse’s interpretation addressed 
German history, and it was, in a sense, an affirmation of the German ‘special path’ 
(Sonderweg). However, by situating the origin of such ‘brutalization’ on the very 
                                                
43 Diego Leoni and Camillo Zadra, (eds.), La Grande Guerra: Esperienza, memoria, immagini, Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 1986. 
44 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1989; Antonio Gibelli, L’officina della guerra. La Grande Guerra e le trasformazioni 
del mondo mentale, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991; cf. Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995.  
45 See, George L. Mosse, ‘Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 21, 4 (1986), pp. 491-513; Id., Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the 
World Wars, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
46 See, Emilio Gentile, Storia del partito fascista. 1919-1922. Movimento e milizia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 
1989. 
47 Robert Weldon Whalen, review of Fallen Soldiers, in: The Journal of Modern History, 64, 2 (1992), p. 
381. 
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experience of war, it was inevitable that historians posed the same question to analyse 
the consequences of war in other countries. After all, combatants from all sides, not 
only the Germans, had been confronted with the deadly horrors of the front. Had all the 
veterans been the potential driving force of ‘brutalization’ all over Europe? 
 The ensuing debate around the ‘brutalization’ thesis continues to the present day. 
It is astounding how the notion of ‘brutalization’ has become an almost indispensable 
analytical tool for some historians to understand the interwar-period violence. In the last 
two decades, while the historiography on the ‘culture of war’ has expanded —
particularly in France—,48 different contributions have gone further in arguing that the 
Great War was the matrix of totalitarianism, and that there was a continuum of violence 
from the First World War to the Second World War (and beyond); they often point at 
the war veterans as important conveyors of violence.49 Other scholars, in contrast, are 
sceptical regarding the long-term destructive consequences of the Great War 
experience, and even deny that such ‘brutalization’ ever existed.50 Some of them reject 
the arguments of the ‘war culture’ school.51 Normally, they assert that the French 
veterans, as Prost argued, remained committed to pacifism —although this thesis has 
been recently revised—.52 Richard Bessel, carefully analysing the situation of Germany 
in the aftermath of the Great War, noted that the reintegration of the frontline soldiers 
was effective and peaceful; only a tiny minority of them joined the mercenary 
Freikorps.53 Benjamin Ziemann, indeed, has recently highlighted the importance of a 
                                                
48 Jean-Jacques Becker, Jay Winter, Gerd Krumeich, Annette Becker, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Guerre 
et Cultures 1914-1918, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994; Jean-Jacques Becker (dir.), Histoire culturelle de la 
Grande Guerre, Armand Colin, Paris, 2005. 
49 Omer Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction. War, Genocide, and Modern Identity, Oxford et al., Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 16-22; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18, retrouver la 
Guerre, Paris, Gallimard, 2000, pp. 313-314; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker, Christian 
Ingrao, Henri Rousso, La violence de guerre 1914-1945. Approches comparées des deux conflits 
mondiaux, Paris, IHTP-CNRS, 2002; Bruno Cabanes and Édouard Husson (coords.), Les sociétés en 
guerre 1911-1946, Paris, Armand Colin, 2003; Angelo Ventrone, La seduzione totalitaria. Guerra, 
modernità, violenza politica (1914-1918), Roma, Donzelli, 2003; Pietro Causarano et. al., Le XXe siècle 
des guerres, Paris, Les Éditions de l’Atelier, 2004; Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and 
Mass Killing in the First World War, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007; Enzo 
Traverso, A ferro e fuoco. La guerra civile europea, 1914-1945, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007; Alexander 
Mesching, Der Wille zur Bewegung. Militärischer Traum und totalitäres Programm. Eine 
Mentalitätsgeschichte vom Ersten Weltkrieg zum Nationalsozialismus, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2008. 
50 Dirk Schumann, ‘Europa, der Erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit: eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?’, 
Journal of Modern European History, 1, 1 (2003), pp. 24-43; Antoine Prost, ‘Les limites de la 
brutalisation. Tuer sur le front occidental, 1914-1918, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 81 (2004), pp. 
5-20. 
51 See Pierre Purseigle, ‘A very French debate: the 1914-1918 “war culture”’, Journal of War and Culture 
Studies, 1, 1 (2008), pp. 9-14. 
52 Chris Millington, From Victory to Vichy. 
53 Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993. 
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republican, democratic culture among German veterans, maintaining that the war 
experience engendered rather pacifist feelings among ex-combatants.54 
 Helping to lessen the polarization of positions in this debate, the concept of 
‘cultural demobilization’ has permitted to explain why the traumatic, violent war 
experiences, whilst being similar for all the combatants, had ‘brutalizing’ effects only in 
some countries.55 By focusing on the processes of demobilization, historians have 
offered insights into the separate paths that the veterans of different countries walked 
after 1918.56 In Britain and France, the population in general, and veterans in particular, 
abandoned war mentalities and attitudes more easily than, for instance, in Germany or 
Italy.57 In the latter countries, the circulation of postwar myths, such as the ‘stab in the 
back’ (Dolchstoß) and the ‘mutilated victory’, probably thwarted the demobilization of 
the minds.58 Victory and defeat were not necessarily decisive for the success or failure 
of demobilization. The case of Italy, victorious in 1918 but suffering from 
‘brutalization’ of politics, is crucial to understand the context where Fascism was born. 
The prevalent interpretation says that the Italian liberal state and the political left failed 
to demobilize and welcome returning troops; therefore, some veterans turned into 
fascists or into supporters of D’Annunzio in Fiume, while the army officers’ neutrality 
and obedience to the state weakened.59 In the first part of this dissertation, I will revise 
that interpretation, by looking into demobilization from a transnational point of view. 
 Recent studies on the upsurge of political violence and paramilitarism in postwar 
Europe, while inspired by the ‘brutalization’ thesis, have provided more complex and 
evidence-based explanations. The German and Austrian Freikorps, as well as the 
counter-revolutionary army in Hungary, were composed of many veterans, particularly 
ex-officers, together with younger nationalist students. Yet rather than the war 
                                                
54 Benjamin Ziemann, War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914-1923, Oxford/New York, Berg, 2007, 
pp. 211-268; Id., Contested Commemorations, Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture, 
Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
55 John Horne (dir.), ‘Démobilisations culturelles après la Grande Guerre’, 14-18 Aujourd’hui, Today, 
Heute, 5 (2002). 
56 Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace. Demobilization and the Urban Experience in Britain and 
Germany, 1917-1921, Farnham, Ashgate, 2009; see, too, Stéphane Audoin Rouzeau and Christoph 
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57 Bruno Cabanes, La Victoire endeuillée. La sortie de guerre des soldats français (1918-1920), Seuil, 
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58 See Boris Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration. Das Trauma der deutschen 
Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933, Düsseldorf, Droste, 2003. 
59 Marco Mondini, La politica delle armi. Il ruolo dell’esercito nell’avvento del fascismo, Laterza, Roma-
Bari, 2006; Marco Mondini and Guri Schwarz, Dalla guerra alla pace. Retoriche e pratiche della 
smobilitazione nell’Italia del Novecento, Verona, Cierre edizioni/Istrevi, 2007, pp. 23-113. 
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experience, it was defeat and revolution that catalyzed their violent reaction.60 The 
formation of a ‘culture of defeat’ in those regions explains the uneven distribution of 
violence across Europe.61 Thus, between 1917 and 1923, above all in the defeated 
countries, ‘military or quasi-military organizations and practices […] either expanded or 
replaced the activities of conventional military formations’ as ‘part of a larger cycle of 
violence that predated an outlasted the Great War itself’.62 In line with the new research 
agenda, several studies have tested the ‘brutalization’ thesis, concluding that postwar 
violence was not the direct consequence of the war experience. Violence was, in fact, 
the result of the collapse of state authority, and of the political radicalization of many 
different social groups —not only the war veterans— as a consequence of the war 
mobilization and demobilization.63 
 Recent studies on paramilitarism and postwar violence, though offering 
important insights, also overlooked certain elements. While it is laudable that they have 
opened the scope of research to countries previously understudied, they still ignore or 
analyse superficially the history of some important regions. For example, Spain is 
virtually never introduced in these perspectives, even if the period 1917-1923 was 
marked by social unrest and political violence.64 (Not participating in the Great War did 
not mean Spain was unaffected by paramilitarism). Besides, we still do not learn 
anything really new about the important case of Italy. Collaborative research projects 
and publications still rely on classical works about Italian Fascism, to show how Italy 
was ‘the only one of the victorious states that underwent a process of the “brutalization 
of politics”’.65 It is also interesting to note that, with notable exceptions, researchers still 
                                                
60 Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, 
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owe much to the ‘brutalization’ thesis, even if they disagree with Mosse.66 The debate 
around ‘brutalization’ seems exhausted; hence developing a new and better 
interpretative model, escaping from the paradoxes of the ‘brutalization’ paradigm, is a 
necessary step forward. Furthermore, if researchers have occasionally introduced truly 
transnational perspectives, their results are still greatly shaped by the nation-state 
framework. And, last but not least, the studies mentioned above do not answer the 
questions of how, and to what extent, postwar paramilitary violence and war veterans 
were connected to the new fascist ideas, movements and regimes of the interwar period; 
they are studies on postwar violence rather than fascism. 
 Closely related to these studies, a different set of works has highlighted, instead, 
the pacifist and internationalist tendencies of important veteran movements of the 
interwar period.67 Recalling the activities of international veteran organizations in their 
quest for peace and reconciliation, Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman have 
argued that the majority of veterans harboured pacifist feelings, and that they ‘were not 
responsive to radical right ideology’.68 In doing so, these historians challenge the 
dominant ‘brutalization’ thesis. However, they do not contradict that ‘Italian Fascism 
and German National-Socialism used the legacy of the First World War and war 
veterans as a means of legitimizing their authority’.69 While they cast doubts on the core 
of the ‘brutalization’ thesis, they do not challenge the idea that many veterans in 
Germany and Italy supported fascism. To explain the causes of this inclination toward 
fascism, they employ the concepts of ‘culture of victory’ and ‘culture of defeat’. After 
the First World War and Versailles, the ‘culture of defeat’ had been the origin of 
revisionist claims. In contrast, the ‘culture of victory’, these historians argue, ‘favoured 
the emergence of an inter-Allied veteran internationalism’. The ‘culture of victory’ 
ultimately ‘transformed by a process of cultural demobilization into one of attempted 
reconciliation and peace’.70 
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 This contraposition between ‘cultures of victory’ and ‘cultures of defeat’ stems 
from the confrontation between ‘brutalization’ on the one hand, and veterans’ pacifism 
and internationalism on the other hand. Yet this proposition does not resolve the 
unremitting theoretical contradictions involved in the ‘brutalization’ paradigm, nor does 
it explain the relationship between veterans and fascism. Were the fascist veterans 
inspired by a ‘culture of defeat’ or by a ‘culture of victory’? We still do not know 
enough about the case of Fascist Italy to answer this question.71 And, similarly to the 
studies on paramilitarism, the results of the research on veterans’ internationalism are 
still shaped by nation-state frameworks. Again, the validity of this interpretation falters 
if we introduce new comparisons, for example with the case of Spain, where 
undoubtedly a ‘culture of victory’ animated Francoist ex-combatants of the Spanish 
Civil War to support a fascist regime.72 
 It seems therefore that studies on interwar veterans have not provided any 
convincing general explanation about the relationship between veterans and fascism, 
even if paramilitary violence has been widely analysed. Besides, historians of the 
veteran movements tend to focus on other questions, such as the fight for pensions, the 
problems of disability, rehabilitation and its consequences for masculinity. On these 
subfields exists a vast and ever-increasing literature in several languages, which is not 
directly related to the study of fascism.73 Nevertheless, this bibliography helps to 
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comprehend the overall context of the interwar period, by pointing at the anxieties of 
postwar societies in the process of coming to terms with some of the worst 
consequences of warfare, such as mutilation and mental disorder. In this way, whereas 
the struggle of the war victims can be seen as a symptom of democratization, historians 
have also argued that, in Germany, the National Socialist movement successfully wooed 
the victims by giving them honour treatment, therefore succeeding in transforming them 
into supporters of the Third Reich.74 This line of inquiry has recently yielded important 
results for the understanding of how Nazism dealt with war disability and mutilated ex-
soldiers.75 I am aware that there is also work in progress regarding the history of 
disabled veterans under Italian Fascism. However, in all these cases, no transnational 
perspective has been significantly applied, and while focusing on disabled veterans, 
they leave ex-combatants, in general, aside. 
 In conclusion, the existing bibliography on inter-war veterans, and on the 
cultures of violence and paramilitarism in the aftermath of the Great War, including 
works on ‘brutalization’, have not explained the long-term, transnational relationship 
between veterans and fascism during the European interwar period. Next, I shall 
examine the extent to which scholarship on fascism has contributed to understanding 
this issue, and argue that a transnational perspective is best suited to reaching more 
convincing explanations. 
 
(Transnational) Fascism and theory 
My dissertation is an innovative contribution to the history of both fascism and war 
veterans, not only because the relationship between veterans and fascism remains 
unexplained, but also because my transnational perspective offers new insights into the 
history of fascism. Whereas the existing bibliography on fascism is truly immense, there 
remain not only unresolved debates but also important gaps in knowledge. A prime 
example is the relationship between fascism and war —as Stanley G. Payne recently 
suggested.76 It is known that the fascist aesthetics were permeated by references to 
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war.77 In a very interesting book, Thomas Kühne has shown how the mythical construct 
of the notion of Kameradschaft (comradeship), emerged during the 1920s in Germany 
to mould Wehrmacht soldiers’ attitudes during the Second World War, thereby 
sustaining the Nazi goals.78 Yet historians have only begun to understand how fascist 
symbols, myths and discourses about war were translated into social practice and 
politics. 
In particular, the relationship between veterans and fascism has not been 
sufficiently studied. Whereas many works on fascism have pointed to the important 
presence of ex-combatants and soldiers within the movements,79 deeper quantitative and 
qualitative analyses are the exception.80 In general, the relationship between veterans 
and fascism has been investigated by assessing how many war veterans became fascists 
and how many did not, basing their conclusions on this information. But this 
perspective neglects many other aspects of this important relationship. Insightfully, 
recent studies have taken the notion of the combatant as a cultural construct that was 
manipulated by the fascist movements and regimes.81 In this sense, scholars have 
stressed the seminal importance of the war experience for fascism,82 and in particular 
for German National-Socialism.83 However, these new works usually place themselves 
within the ‘brutalization’ debate,84 and seldom provide transnational and long-term 
perspectives. Much more can be said on this topic. Reconstructing the history of the 
fascist veteran organizations and discourses in interwar Europe is a task that remains to 
be done, and it is from a comparative and transnational perspective that we can reach 
new insights. 
But what do I mean when I talk about fascism in this dissertation? The 
conceptual debate around fascism is still so heated that one is obliged to take a position. 
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The wider perspectives on ‘generic’ fascism have been usually oriented towards 
reaching a ‘definition’, grasping the ‘nature’, or offering a ‘typology’.85 Currently, there 
is an increasing tendency to consider ‘fascism’ as a rather vague and contradictory 
category that historical actors utilized to pursue their objectives within a transnational 
context.86 In this dissertation, following the latter trend, I assume as a premise the 
existence of a nonspecific, transnational fascism phenomenon, in which different 
movements and regimes were involved, starting with Italian Fascism and German 
National-Socialism. I do not intend, therefore, to take fascism as a static object or 
abstract category whose essential core should be identified. ‘The category of fascism is 
the product of the actions, struggles and the self-identification of the political actors 
themselves’, as Michel Dobry has put it.87 If the main task of the historian is to explain 
how things changed over time, the only way to fully understand fascism, in my opinion, 
is situating it inside its historical context and rendering visible its evolution and 
diffusion throughout Europe. I will, therefore, observe fascism in action, as a fast-
evolving and expanding process that took place fundamentally in the transnational 
context of Europe during the interwar period.  
 Other historians’ theoretical reflections on fascism are useful here. Although the 
transnational dimension has been absent in the most relevant attempts to offer a full and 
all-embracing explanation of fascism, some of these syntheses have stressed its mutable 
and conveyable qualities. In this sense, Robert O Paxton has distinguished five stages of 
fascism. ‘(1), the initial creation of fascist movements; (2) their rooting as parties in a 
political system; (3) the acquisition of power; (4) the exercise of power; and, finally, in 
the longer term, (5) radicalization or entropy’.88 (In this dissertation, I will discuss the 
role of veteran organizations and discourses during these different stages —particularly 
the first four of them— roughly between 1919 and 1940.) Furthermore, to understand 
how fascism expanded in Europe during these decades, one must be aware of the phases 
of this development. Philip Morgan’s has differentiated two waves in the history of 
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fascism; the first during the 1920s, in which Italian fascism and the First World War 
consequences were the key issues; the second during the 1930s, in which the Great 
Depression and the example of National-Socialism marked the emergence of new 
fascist movements in other European countries.89 Thus, historians who observe the 
fascist phenomenon in action have highlighted its historical versatility and dynamism.  
Also, in relation to the protean nature of fascism, the concept of ‘fascistization’ 
facilitates a better understanding of historical change. It must be taken into 
consideration that fascist movements and regimes were never hermetically isolated from 
authoritarian, para-fascist, and other counter-revolutionary political manifestations.90 
Hence, Aristotle Kallis has retrieved the category of ‘fascistization’ to make sense of 
the process by which fascist leaders, ideas and organizational structures amalgamated 
with traditional elites and conservatism, in Italy, Germany and in other European 
countries.91 As we will see in this dissertation, the co-optation of fascist leaders and the 
adoption of fascist commodities, either forced or voluntary, occurred in the realm of 
veteran politics as well —not only in Italy and Germany, but also in France and Spain. 
Indeed, in my view, it is possible to talk about a transnational fascistization of war 
veterans’ discourses and organizations. By and large, this dissertation is as a piece of 
research on processes of fascistization from a transnational perspective, since the 
transnational allows us to grasp the dynamism of fascism in a wider perspective. In 
short, this is a thesis on ‘transnational fascism’. But what does the transnational 
perspective imply? 
Transnational history emerged as a discipline during the 1990s as the result of 
theoretical and methodological progress in the fields of comparative history and the 
history of ‘cultural transfers’. If comparative history usually examined two static nation-
state units of analysis, understanding them as parallel phenomena, thus providing 
unhistorical explanations only capable of exposing differences and similarities; the 
theory of transfers allowed historians to recognize how such units culturally 
intermingled over time.92 In a moment when globalization has made historians 
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increasingly aware of the global interdependence and intermixing, new perspectives 
have allowed scholars to understand historical processes that transcended the usual 
national histories.93 Thus, aiming to abandon the nation-state as the main unity of 
analysis, transnational history looks ‘beyond national boundaries and seek[s] to explore 
interconnections across borders’; it ‘focuses on cross-national connections, whether 
through individuals, non-national identities, and non-state actors, or in terms of 
objectives shared by people and communities regardless of their nationality’.94 
Historians have worked on a variety of topics within the field of transnational history. 
Migrations, international communities of experts, humanitarian organizations, border 
spaces, or cultural identities are typical examples of their objects of study. This 
dissertation aspires to represent a contribution to the practice of transnational history, by 
observing not only the role of political networks, international institutions and migrants, 
but also the cross-border transmission of myths and stereotypes that condensed the 
fascist ideology, as we will see. 
In much the same way as the rather fashionable field of transnational history, 
‘transnational fascism’ is a promising research area. Nevertheless, studies on 
‘transnational fascism’ are still in their infancy, and, most frequently, have relied also 
on comparative history.95 Comparison allowed us to conceive of Italian Fascism, 
German National-Socialism, and other fascist movements as manifestations of the same 
phenomenon.96 Yet this method was unable to fully account for their dissimilarities and 
affinities. The latest great efforts to carry out detailed comparisons of the cases of 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany have largely failed to provide new insights.97  
In recent years, the real theoretical advancement has come from transnational 
perspectives. Studying an ideology and a political movement, such as fascism, from a 
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transnational point of view, implies observing the ‘multidirectional transfer’ and 
circulation of ‘ideas, information, resources’.98 Certain works have focused on the 
interconnectedness, the contacts, and sometimes the rivalries between Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany, leading to the entanglement of the two powers at the end of the 1930s.99 
Therefore, the results have not only shown the similarities and the differences between 
both regimes, but also their kinship, bonds, and mutual influence. Fascist movements 
and regimes simultaneously were ultra-nationalist and transnational phenomena. And by 
focusing on connections and exchanges, historians have demonstrated the wide —even 
transatlantic— circulation of fascism during the interwar period.100 What seems clear 
now is that, during the 1920s, Italian Fascism became the model and the inspiration for 
different right-wing, nationalist and counter-revolutionary groups abroad.101 By 1934, 
nonetheless, Hitler had overtaken Mussolini as the lodestar of the European extreme-
right; the first attempts of cooperation and the fight for leadership between fascists and 
national-socialists ended in the consolidation of National-Socialism as the new model 
for the European fascists, and as the leading force of the Axis.102 This strong 
interpenetration reveals the extent of the fascist phenomenon in interwar Europe, and 
provides a glimpse into its complex ‘nature’. The transnational perspective promises a 
redefinition of fascism,103 yet little empirical research has actually been conducted in 
this field. 
If the idea of transnational fascism is a very recent historiographical 
development, a transnational analysis of the historical relationship between veterans and 
fascism is an entirely new and original endeavour. It is true that previous contributions 
have suggested the importance of the international contacts of fascist veterans, and 
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approached the transnational dimension of veteran politics during the interwar period.104 
A number of publications have examined the international contacts and mutual 
influences of fascist, national-socialist and other veteran leaders from different 
countries.105 Nevertheless, these works have remained focused on bilateral encounters, 
and on single nation-state cases; the wider transnational phenomenon has remained 
unexplained. My dissertation aims to trace the web of major connections, encounters, 
transfers and entanglements that shaped the historical relationship between veterans and 
fascism in Europe. This perspective will provide a picture of the ‘transnational political 
space’ in which fascism took shape and evolved during the interwar period.106 In this 
manner, this dissertation will contribute to define the innovative concept of 
‘transnational fascism’, by testing through actual empirical research the recent 





Having mapped the historiographical and theoretical background that forms the basis of 
this dissertation, it is time to propose a set of research questions. Analysing the 
transnational relationship between fascism and war veterans during the European 
interwar period, requires us not only to assess how many ex-combatants turned into 
fascists after the First World War experience. This is not the crucial issue; neither is the 
question did the process of ‘brutalization’ transform soldiers into violent fascists. This 
debate can be considered exhausted. We should primarily wonder, instead, why 
historians have felt compelled to discern whether the war veterans were truly fascists or 
not! The first question to ask, therefore, should be why and how the figure of the war 
veteran became associated with the emerging fascist ideology and movement. And only 
then, to what extent was veteran politics really relevant for Italian Fascism (and 
National-Socialism)? How did this relevance evolve over time? Most importantly, were 
the war veterans agents of a transnational fascistization in (Western) Europe during the 
1920s and 1930s? If this is true, why and how did it occur? 
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 The state of the art in the subject indicates that it is not possible to talk about a 
generalized inclination of the war veterans towards any fixed style of politics or any 
ideological option, although there were national and international veteran organizations 
that talked and acted in the name of the veterans’ community, adopting specific political 
stances. Being fully conscious that many actual ex-soldiers never felt part of such 
imagined groups, I will observe the veteran associations and their leaders as historical 
actors. Furthermore, what most interests me is to understand how the pervasive idea of 
the ‘fascist veteran’ was constructed and circulated throughout Europe over time. As we 
will see, the ‘veteran’ was a cultural construct; its meaning was defined through 
discursive and organizational struggles. 
 The main hypothesis that I aim to verify is, therefore, that the manipulation of a 
complex of transnational, culturally-constructed and mythical ideas of the war 
veteran(s), 1) allowed Italian Fascism to become a distinct, original and influential 
political movement; 2) contributed to its rise, seizure of power and consolidation within 
Italy; 3) permitted the transformation of Italian Fascism into a transnational 
phenomenon in Europe —fascism, in the lower case—; 4) paved the way for the 
creation of a fascist international entente between —fundamentally but not only— 
Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism; 5) became a crucial element for fascist 
military expansion and for the imposition of new fascist and fascist-inspired regimes in 
Spain and France. 
 
Geographical and chronological framework 
One of the most interesting results of introducing a transnational perspective is the 
possibility of breaking free from traditionally established national units of spatial 
analysis and from conventional chronological frameworks. History does not always 
recognize borders, nor its forces vanish at particular dates. Even if the history of fascism 
during the interwar period was substantially shaped by nation-state contexts, the 
processes that I will describe worked across borders. Furthermore, cultural elements, 
discourses and representations around the fascist war veteran, and also the veterans’ 
organizations themselves, had deep roots in a period that preceded the birth of fascism. 
Moreover, the working hypotheses of this dissertation requires me to finish my 
historical analysis at a historical conjuncture that does not correspond with any date that 
would conventionally be considered significant for most of the countries in question. 
My dissertation’s spatial and chronological framework is also worth examining. 
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 This dissertation studies historical processes taking place within a porous 
geographical space that mainly corresponded to four countries: Italy, Germany, Spain 
and France, but not only to them. Fascism was born in Italy, and therefore events taking 
place in this country will be of the utmost importance to my analysis, in particular 
regarding the initial historical period. The German case demands attention not only for 
the 1930s, but also going back to 1919. Also, Spain and France were countries deeply 
affected by what happened in their vicinity. In these two countries, new fascist-inspired 
dictatorships were imposed towards 1939-1940. Cross-border transfers and contacts 
between fascists and veterans occurred in several directions, particularly within the 
above-mentioned four-countries region. Yet the events that determined these processes 
also took place far from this crucial space of communication. In other words, what was 
happening at particular moments in —for example— Russia, Romania, Britain, or the 
United States is, at some points of my explanation, as important as what occurred in 
Milan 1919, Rome 1922, Berlin 1933, Paris 1934 or Madrid 1939. Intermediate regions 
geographically situated between the four main poles —such as Austria— deserve 
attention as well. I hope that an intelligent reader will not take my unconventional 
narrative leaps from one country to another as a symptom of methodological 
inconsistency. On the contrary, this particular geographical framework adjusts to the 
transnational political space of fascism. 
 Chronologically, establishing fixed time-limits has proven relatively difficult. I 
cannot ignore the pre-war era, especially as it comes to identify ideological trends that 
contributed to shape the fascist ideal conception of the war veteran. Nonetheless, as we 
will see, 1917 can be identified as the key year in which the history of the relationship 
between veterans and fascism started, though in the nebulous realm of ideas. The 
interwar period can be understood as a process by which democracies —present in most 
of the European continent towards January 1919— were gradually replaced by 
authoritarian or fascist dictatorships until the bleak situation of June 1940. It is roughly 
in the summer of 1940, therefore, that I stop my analysis. In reality, the relationship 
between war veterans and fascism continued after this date. Yet by this point in time, I 
hope to have replied to my main working question, which set outs to consider the 
responsibility that can be imputed to the link between veterans and fascism in the 
complete failure of a peaceful post-Great War order. 
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Some conceptual tools 
‘Fascism’, ‘war veterans’ and ‘fascistization’ are three key concepts of this dissertation 
—I have discussed them above. Being familiar with the notions employed in 
transnational analyses, such as ‘transfers’, ‘entanglement’, ‘circulation’ or 
‘connections’, will facilitate the understanding of my arguments.107 Yet some other 
conceptual tools that I will employ in this work need previous clarification. In this 
section, I will make clear these concepts. 
As I reject the notion of ‘brutalization’ to explain the connection between 
veterans and fascism, I shall set up a different interpretative framework to explain the 
process of cultural manufacture and transnational communication of the ‘fascist 
veteran’ symbolic complex. Understanding the origin and circulation of this constructed 
ideal is important, because it marked the veterans’ organizational and discursive 
struggles of the postwar period in Italy, and then in other regions. I will explain these 
processes through the concepts —some of them borrowed from other social sciences— 
of ‘symbolic appropriation’, ‘framing’, ‘stereotype’, ‘myth’, and ‘fascist model’.  
 Symbolic appropriation is a notion usually employed by social and cultural 
anthropologists. Here, it refers to the process by which symbols, cultural materials or 
objects acquire a specific meaning, becoming associated to a human group or political 
power. In particular, I am assuming that the ‘war veteran’ was an existing transnational 
symbol that acquired new meanings as a result of the First World War experience. This 
redefinition was possible, in part, because certain political groups succeeded to a greater 
extent than others in ‘framing’ veteran politics, thereby making ‘people develop a 
particular conceptualization of [this] issue or reorient their thinking about [this] 
issue’.108 In the first chapter, I will discuss the particularities of the transnational process 
of symbolic appropriation that took place roughly between 1917 and 1919 in Western 
Europe, the outcome of which was the widespread consolidation of a set of beliefs about 
what I call the ‘anti-Bolshevik veterans’. In this sense, I will analyse the veterans-
related discourses and representations employed at that time in different countries, in 
particular in postwar Italy. My objective is to assess to what extent Italian Fascism —
and National-Socialism— benefited from the symbol of the ‘anti-Bolshevik veteran’, 
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and whether the stereotypical notion of the ‘fascist veteran’ which emerged was also the 
result of symbolic appropriation. 
 The concept of ‘stereotype’ will allow us to observe the beginning of the 
European circulation of fascism. The relevance of the anti-Bolshevik veteran symbol 
notwithstanding, the rise of the fascist movement in Italy succeeded in consolidating a 
stereotype: the fascist veteran. It is worth briefly discussing the theory behind this 
assertion. ‘A stereotype is a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a social 
group’.109 Although stereotypes often are negative, they are also ‘aids to explanation 
[…], energy-saving devices, and […] shared group beliefs’; they always contain a 
kernel of truth.110 The process of stereotype formation occurs in three steps; first, ’a 
group of people are identified by a specific characteristic’; then, we ‘attribute a set of 
additional characteristics to the group as a whole’; finally, ‘on identifying a person as 
having the identifying meaningful characteristic […] we then attribute the stereotypical 
characteristic to them’.111 It is striking to see how the theory of stereotyping is 
applicable to the formation of the conviction that many Italian fascists were war 
veterans, and vice versa. The stereotype of the fascist veteran, thereafter, circulated 
throughout Europe by means of communication processes that according to the theory 
‘may play a major part in the spread and perpetuation of social stereotypes’.112 In this 
way, the fascist veteran became one of the most iconic incarnations of fascism. As we 
will see, this stereotype greatly influenced politics, since not only the fascists were 
believed to be —for the most part— war veterans, but also because on many occasions 
veterans in general were either distrustfully or enthusiastically seen as fascists, at least 
potentially. Understanding this phenomenon is extremely important because in reality, 
as historians know, a negligible proportion of ex-soldiers became fascists (at least at the 
beginning).  
 The existence and circulation of the ‘fascist veteran’ stereotype might have been 
innocuous had the fascist movement never conquered power; but, as the March on 
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Rome succeeded, an important myth crystallized. This widespread belief that the Italian 
veterans had been the core of a political movement that had swiftly conquered power, 
destroying the Bolshevik menace and bestowing on the community of ex-combatants 
the leading role to which they were allegedly entitled, I will call the ‘myth of the fascist 
veterans’. Historians have employed the concept of ‘myth’ on countless occasions. A 
political myth does not just refer to an episode that probably never occurred in reality as 
it is commonly believed. A myth is also a narrative that helps make sense of events, 
providing them with significance.113 Myths are legitimizing processes that justify 
human relations and institutions; they can be employed for mobilizing purposes, to push 
people to adopt certain ideas and attitudes. Historically, wars and violent events have 
proved an excellent breeding ground for myths.114 During the interwar period, Georges 
Sorel’s reflections on the power of myth and irrationality in politics were fully assumed 
by fascist movements. As I will analyse, certain groups of ex-combatants in different 
countries, inspired by the myth of the fascist veterans, pictured ‘their coming action as a 
battle in which their cause [was] certain to triumph’.115 
 The concept of ‘fascist model’ serves to understand the last period of the 
relationship between veterans and fascism. As a result of a primary symbolic 
appropriation and a framing process, the transnational stereotype of the fascist veteran 
and then the myth of the fascist veterans facilitated the consolidation of Italian Fascism. 
The myth and the stereotype also fuelled the circulation of fascism throughout Europe 
by means of cultural transfers, and through the personal contacts between veterans. 
Transnational history has normally focused on the circulation of migrants and on the 
contacts between individuals, experts’ communities or political elites. Whilst taking into 
account these perspectives, we will also be able to understand how the fascist ideology 
and its political practice travelled throughout interwar Europe, encapsulated in 
stereotypes, myths and political models. In fact, during the 1930s, it is possible to talk, 
about a ‘fascist model’ of veteran politics that was transferred to other countries through 
a process of political communication. This fascist model included not only a set of 
changing discourses and representations of the war veteran, but also a particular 
organizational structure that evolved over time. Taking these characteristics into 
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consideration, I will show how the Third Reich veteran organizations and discourses 
were deeply rooted in the Italian fascist model, whilst presenting a number of particular 
characteristics. I will also analyse how other groups in France and Spain adopted this 
fascist model during the second half of the 1930s. The fascist model of veteran politics, 
as we will see, was a manifestation of the highly complex and versatile phenomenon of 
transnational fascism. By observing the historical relationship between veterans and 
fascism in inter-war Europe, we can come to grips with the transnational circulation and 
multidirectional transfer of fascism. 
 
Sources 
This dissertation draws on a strong empirical basis. I have used both archival and 
contemporary published sources —such as newspapers and books— from different 
countries, especially Italy, Germany, France and Spain. Other historians have already 
consulted most of this material. However, I have analysed these records from new 
points of view —searching for traces of the often-neglected transnational dimension—, 
seeking a different kind of information. In addition, I have retrieved a set of published 
sources —particularly in Italy— that had never been systematically used before. 
 As I am concerned with political discourse and self-representation, the principle 
type of evidence in this dissertation comes from the fascist and the veteran press of 
different countries. In order to analyse the fascist discourse on veterans, I have fully 
reviewed the microfilmed collection of the fascist Il Popolo d’Italia (Milan) between 
1916 and 1940, and a great part of the Munich and Berlin editions of the national-
socialist Völkischer Beobachter between 1920 and 1939. In Italy, ex-combatants and the 
war disabled published a great number of bulletins and papers, particularly during 1919-
1922;116 I have carefully analysed the most important of them (I combattenti, Il 
bollettino, etc.), and systematically reviewed many other provincial newspapers. Most 
of them were progressively transformed into fascist organs, particularly after 1925. 
Furthermore, in order to reconstruct the fascist political views on the veteran’s issues, I 
have analysed a number of important Italian fascist newspapers and reviews, such as Il 
Fascio, Critica fascista, Roma fascista or Cremona Nuova, to name but four. Since 
1929, the fascist veteran press in Italy was reduced to a few publications; most 
importantly, I have retrieved L’Italia Grigio-Verde, later named L’Italia combattente, 
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which were official organs of the fascist ANC. For the German case, I have focused on 
the extreme-right veteran review Der Stahlhelm, but eventually looked for information 
in other German veteran newspapers, and right-wing and national-socialist journals. 
Above all, I have examined the publications of the Nationalsozialistische 
Kriegsopferversorgung. In the case of France, I have employed the organs of the two 
most important veteran associations, La Voix du Combattant (Union Nationale des 
Combattants) and La France Mutilée (Union Fédérale); furthermore, I have studied 
relevant fascist league’s journals, for example the Faisceau’s Le Nouveau Siècle, and 
the Croix de Feu’s Le Flambeau. After June 1940, Vichy promoted the publication of 
various journals for war veterans, such as La Légion. During the interwar years, 
international veteran organizations also published bulletins, which have proved to be an 
interesting source of information to observe the transnational circulation of the fascist 
veterans’ discursive and organizational model. As for Spain, I have analysed the main 
journal of the fascist party FET-JONS, Arriba. All this material reveals the extensive 
impact of fascist veteran politics during the European interwar period. 
 I have not only examined veteran and fascist periodical publications, but also 
other varieties of published sources —such as memoirs, reports, etc.— and specially the 
general press of different European countries. For this task, several digitalized on-line 
libraries have been an extremely useful tool. Gallica, the free-access digital library of 
the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, provides access to most of the main French 
newspapers of the interwar period, offering the possibility of searching for particular 
keywords across the vast breadth of the contemporary press. The Biblioteca Digital 
Hispánica (Biblioteca Nacional de España) also facilitates this kind of digital research 
for hundreds of Spanish publications of the 1920s and 1930s. In Austria, the 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek runs ANNO, a digital archive of Austrian 
newspapers. In Germany, the Staatsbibliothek (Berlin) offers access to a few digitalized 
historical newspapers of the 1919-1940 period, although no text search is possible. In 
Italy, however, there is only one important paper fully digitalized on-line: La Stampa. I 
have reviewed some others —such as the socialist Avanti!— in their microfilmed or 
printed version, and there are several minor digitalized libraries where some Italian 
newspapers and reviews of the interwar period are available. In any case, the possibility 
of consulting a huge amount of digitalized text has made this dissertation qualitatively 
different from any other work that might have been finished, say, ten years ago, when 
most of these digital tools and resources did not exist. 
 31 
 The situation with archival documentation is very different. The quantity of 
digitalized sources from national archives is negligible. Therefore, I have visited, in the 
different countries, those archives that conserve useful records for the study of fascist 
movements and regimes, and inter-war veterans organizations. Many other historians 
have previously seen most of this material. The records held by the Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato (Rome) are, since the 1960s, the indispensable archive for historians of 
Italian Fascism, and hence for this dissertation as well. In Germany, the Bundesarchiv 
(Berlin) contains precious and abundant material from the Stahlhelm and the NSDAP 
archives. In France, the Archives Nationales (Paris) hold records of invaluable utility 
for research into history of fascism in France. And in Spain, the Archivo General de la 
Administración (Alcalá de Henares, Madrid) preserves documents from the party FET-
JONS and its veteran organization. Apart from visiting these key institutions, I have 
accessed the historical archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Italy —the Archivio 
Storico Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Rome)—, and its French equivalent 
—the Archives Diplomatiques (La Courneuve). Evidence drawn from all these archives 
will allow me to explain not only the Italian fascistization of the war veterans’ 
discourses and organizations, but also the overall process of transnational fascistization 
of veteran politics in Western Europe, including the circulation of ideas, international 
contacts and transfers.  
 
Structure 
The explanation of the structure of this dissertation goes beyond the mere exposition of 
the chapters’ content. At a glance, the table of contents will show that I have 
emphasized the chronological over the thematic perspective. This is not the result of any 
predilection for a traditional, narrative way of writing history. Rather, the stress on 
chronology is intended to fully insert the factor of time into my historical analysis. The 
deep forces of History can be also understood through the exposition of the intricate and 
transnationally-interrelated evolution of events. In my opinion, this choice does not 
mean disregarding the question of why things happened, while preferring to explain how 
they happened.117 As I shall show with this dissertation, showing how things happened 
can provide a convincing explanation of why they happened. Historical events, such as, 
say, 1917 Mussolini’s conception of the war veterans as the harbingers of a new 
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ideology, cannot be fully understood without taking into account a context marked by 
important simultaneously-occurring events. This interconnectedness is better unravelled 
by taking chronology into account. 
 Furthermore, transnational history cannot be done without stressing the factor of 
time. Sometimes, due to the fairly rapid circulation of ideas, words and persons that 
already characterized human civilization by the Great War era —thanks to inventions 
such as the telephone or the plane—, if we had no method to establish a chronology, it 
would be impossible to discern when and in which direction a cultural transfer took 
place. As an ideology, fascism was born in Italy between 1917 and 1919; it was the 
result of the confluence of different ideas within a specific context. Only by stressing 
chronology can we demonstrate that the emergence of other fascist phenomena in 
Europe was mainly the outcome of a process of political communication in which the 
veterans —I insist— had a key role. 
 Having said that, the structure of the dissertation is uncomplicated. There are 
three parts, each composed of two chapters. The first part deals with the beginning of 
the transnational relationship between veterans and fascism; the first chapter examines 
the origins of this link during the Great War and its aftermath; the second chapter 
focuses on Italy to show how Italian Fascism was constructed on that basis, making 
deep impact abroad. The second part examines the 1920s; chapter three analyses the 
fascistization of veteran politics in Italy, and chapter four shows how the mythical link 
between veterans and fascism circulated in Europe contributing to the emergence of 
other fascist movements. The third part deals with the 1930s; chapter five explains the 
highly complex process of entanglement of the fascist veteran politics in Western 
Europe, and chapter six discusses the final events of the transnational relationship 
between veterans and fascism, namely new wars and the imposition of dictatorships in 
Spain and France. In the conclusions of this dissertation, it will be interesting to discuss, 






Fascism and Veterans after the Great War 
 
This section analyses the origins of fascism, by investigating why and how a link 
between Italian Fascism and the symbol of the war veterans was established. After 
discussing the origins of the ideological relationship between fascism and veterans, I 
turn to the concepts of ‘symbolic appropriation’, ‘transnational stereotype’ and ‘myth’, 
in order to explain the symbolic and practical role of war veterans in the rise, the seizure 














































The Great War Veterans and the Origins of Fascism (1914-1919) 
 
This chapter examines the origins of the historical relationship between veterans and 
fascism, starting with the history of the Italian participation in the Great War. The 
primary origin of both European ‘generic’ fascism and Italian Fascism lay in the First 
World War, which was simultaneously a global and European event and a cluster of 
disparate national experiences. If we consider the First World War as a seminal event 
that brought an epoch to an end whilst opening a new era, the participation of Italy in 
the Great War was not radically different to that of other belligerent countries. 
However, if we try to understand the particular outcome of war in the Italian postwar 
period, it is necessary to take into account some particularities of the Italian 
involvement in the European conflict. As the war experience was fundamental for many 
future fascists, Mussolini’s trials and tribulations during the First World War were 
determinant in the process of ideological genesis of the fascist movement. I will address 
this issue in the first section. I will show how, in the critical context of 1917, while the 
Bolshevik revolution was taking place in Russia, and Italy suffered a grave military 
setback at Caporetto, Mussolini began to conceive a new ideology in which the war 
veterans would play a crucial role. 
 The birth of Fascism and its early relations with the ex-soldiers of the Great War 
were not an isolated Italian phenomenon. The deep postwar crisis that affected the 
country was part of a wider trend. Italy, like all the European nation-states, experienced 
multiple manifestations of social unrest, economic distress, political instability and 
varying degrees of cultural ferment. Paramilitarism and the formation of veteran 
movements were transnational consequences of the First World War. In the second 
section, therefore, I will offer an analytical overview of the background into which the 
Italian case must be inserted. By focusing on international events of the year 1919, I 
will portray the European context in which the birth of Fascism must be understood, 
including the appearance of veteran organizations and paramilitary movements. The 
interconnectedness of all these historical forces must be kept in mind, since the 
historical evolution and deepening of the connection between veterans and fascism can 
only be explained on that basis. 
 The two last sections of this chapter focus on the Italian postwar experience, for 
I argue that the link between fascism and veterans was originally established in Italy. In 
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Italy, the emergence of veterans’ associations had certain distinguishing characteristics, 
as the Italian Great War experience had been, to some extent, particular. This set of 
differentiated characteristics interplayed with the perception of momentous European 
events, such as those of the central European counterrevolution. Transnational factors, 
therefore, explain the appearance of the original fascist movement in Italy, as well as 
the fascists’ drive to absorb veterans into their ranks. The long process of politicization 
of the Italian veterans will be analysed here as a conflictive process of symbolic 
appropriation, taking place above all in the discursive and ideographic realm, with 
transnational origins and consequences. The consolidation of a common, albeit 
unhistorical, perception of the veteran as an anti-Bolshevik, nationalist figure was a 
crucial precedent for the future symbolic fusion of war veterans and Fascism. 
 
The Italian First World War experience 
The social and intellectual climate that fermented in the European societies before the 
outbreak of the war, as well as the participation in the system of international alliances 
among European states, were also features in Italy. In the country there were 
representatives of the new bellicose nationalism, linked to the French revolutionary 
rightist ideology typical of the years previous to the war.1 However, despite its uneasy 
Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Italy did not immediately join the 
slaughter in August 1914: the expectations of those Italians who saw the war as the 
catalyst for a new and better world remained temporary unfulfilled. If one wants to 
understand why Fascism was born in Italy, and why veterans were related to this birth, 
the inquiry should start at this point. 
The roots of Fascism lay in the Italian interventionist movement. While the 
young volunteers and soldiers of Germany, France and Britain started to kill each other 
along the European Western front, in Italy writers like Giuseppe Prezzolini and 
Giovanni Papini through the review La Voce and poets like Gabriele D’Annunzio and 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti spurred on the Italian ‘war generation’, attributing an 
existential meaning to war.2 These apostles of intervention, together with young 
politicians, revolutionaries and republicans advocated joining the war on the side of 
France and Britain. Most Italian intellectuals agreed with this belligerent stance, yet for 
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different reasons. Some saw the war as a historical opportunity to complete the 
Risorgimento and Italian unity, others as the long awaited chance to redeem the 
proletariat and overthrow the old political elites. War —they believed— would be a 
palingenetic experience for the Italian nation. Diverse groupings and organizations from 
the nationalist far right to the revolutionary left converged in interventionism, a 
movement that acquired antidemocratic traits. Although all this agitation would be 
presented as successfully imposing its will against the decadent bourgeois nation during 
the ‘radiant days’ (radiose giornate) of May 1915, the decision to enter the war on the 
Entente side had been carefully negotiated; the Italian government had secretly reached 
an agreement with the British, the French and the Russians in the Pact of London.3 
 A significant particularity of the Italian Great War experience was the social and 
political division that intervention provoked, especially within the socialist party. The 
fact that Italy would receive territories of Tirol and Dalmatia —among others— in case 
of victory was of no interest to the massive majority of the Italian population, whose 
feelings were, in general, utterly opposed to war. Whereas the interventionists were 
usually young middle-class educated men, the working class reasonably feared that the 
war would bring scarcity and worse living conditions. The national truce of the ‘Sacred 
Union’ that took place in France and Germany in 1914, involving the socialists of these 
countries to support the war effort, did not exist in Italy. In France and Germany, the 
antimilitarist socialists were marginalized; Jean Jaurès was soon assassinated, and Karl 
Liebknecht would be expelled from the German Socialist Party. In contrast, 
antimilitarism and internationalism prevailed in Italian socialism, where it was the 
interventionists who were the dissidents. Thus, if the so-called ‘Spirit of 1914’ was a 
myth in Germany,4 May 1915 was not a time of enthusiasm and voluntary enlistment 
across Italian society. There was no consensus throughout Italy about entering the war. 
Nevertheless, the political left was not a firm and univocal pacifist, internationalist and 
neutralist block. Socialists like Leonida Bissolati and Gaetano Salvemini, as 
representatives of democratic interventionism, seeking to fight Germanic imperialism, 
advocated Italian entry to war. 
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Benito Mussolini’s attitude at this time must be understood in the context of 
interventionism. He had been a revolutionary socialist and editor since 1912 of the 
socialist newspaper Avanti! in Milan. His political ideas had sat uncomfortably with 
socialist orthodoxy, but it would be with the interventionist movement and the war that 
his passage towards the political right took place.5 Mussolini, coherently with his 
particular version of the revolutionary ideology, and galvanized by his readings of the 
intellectuals of La Voce, supported intervention in the autumn of 1914. He founded his 
own interventionist paper —Il Popolo d’Italia. Quotidiano socialista—, and broke with 
the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in November. Later on, in January 1915, he participated 
in the founding meeting of the Fasci d’azione rivoluzionaria, a group that strived for a 
revolutionary intervention. After repeated bitter confrontations with the socialists in the 
pages of his newspaper, Mussolini welcomed the declaration of war and was called-up 
by the Italian army as a simple conscript at the end of August 1915. Like him, many 
other young men followed similar paths towards the war experience; some volunteering, 
but the overwhelming majority obliged to serve by conscription. 
 The Italian army of the First World War recruited almost six million people who 
had to be persuaded to fight and make sacrifices in the name of the nation. Peasants 
composed 45% of the army, whereas industrial workers escaped frontline service more 
often. Extremely hierarchical relationships between soldiers and officers marked 
military life. Officers and junior officers typically came from a middle-class 
background and constituted a military elite of around 250,000 men; at least 200,000 of 
whom were not professional military men. Although the figure of the peasant soldier 
(contadino soldato) was cultivated in the propaganda as a model of obedience, devotion 
and resignation, this myth, developed by middle-class officers, contrasted with the harsh 
realities of the front. Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and soldiers often shared the 
risks and the horrors of the muddy and snowy trenches; therefore, the perceptions, 
discourses and expectations of both NCOs and the unranked were similar, and divergent 
with those of the officers.6 Severe discipline was applied to recruits in cases of desertion 
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or cowardice. During the first years of war, there was no consensus about the war effort 
among Italians, although the socialists adopted an ambiguous position, expressed in the 
motto ‘neither support, nor sabotage’ (né aderire, né sabotare). The struggle against the 
Austro-Hungarian forces seemed pointless for many men exasperated by the minuscule 
but exhausting front-line advances and retreats, in the region of the Alps, along the river 
Piave, on Mount Grappa, across the rocky plateau of the Carso, or in the repetitive 
battles of the river Isonzo.7 It was on this river that Mussolini had his own baptism as a 
soldier. 
How did Mussolini’s interest in the combatants as future political actors 
materialize? His belief in war as a revolutionary event was already clear in 1914, but his 
faith in the soldiers and veterans as political agents would mature over time. In reality, 
although the war experience conferred the aura of a warrior on Mussolini, his combat 
record was far from heroic. He spent a long time hospitalized in the rearguard, and saw 
his last action in February 1917 when he was accidentally wounded. Yet, although he 
could not fulfil his desire of becoming a junior officer because of his socialist past, 
Mussolini identified himself with the officers, and the junior officers became the main 
readers and contributors to his newspaper.8 His nationalist commitment to attain Italian 
territorial demands pushed him to exalt the front soldiers as the spearhead of the war 
effort. Therefore, in December 1916, he argued that the front soldiers —in contrast with 
the pacifist feelings of the Italians on the home-front— were reluctant to accept an 
agreed peace with the Germans. Moreover, he wrote that he was witnessing the birth in 
the trenches of a new and better elite that would govern Italy in the future: the 
‘trenchocracy’ (trincerocrazia).9 However great his enthusiasm for the trench soldiers 
may have been, after February 1917, he definitively returned to Milan as a journalist 
and editor of Il Popolo d’Italia. It would be later, during the critical year 1917, when 
Mussolini’s ideology underwent a crucial turn. 
The revolutionary process in Russia was the first and most consequential factor 
of Mussolini’s evolution towards a new ideology that would espouse the future veterans 
as champions. When the Russian revolution of February 1917 took place, the 
interventionists of Il Popolo d’Italia believed that the alleged revolutionary nature of 
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the war was giving positive results.10 But soon they feared that the revolution could 
bring the withdrawal of Russia from the war.11 Mussolini abhorred such a possibility, 
since this ‘treason’ would be detrimental to Italy and the allied countries, and also —
more importantly— because the outcome of an agreed peace in Russia as the result of 
the revolution would severely contradict his own interpretation of the revolutionary 
nature of war. Il Popolo d’Italia insisted that the war was revolutionary; the Russian 
front soldiers, especially the young officers, backed the revolution; but Russians must 
carry on the war until victory.12 In July 1917, Mussolini was euphoric because Russian 
soldiers were advancing against the Germans, and he supported the possibility of a 
Kerensky dictatorship.13 Mussolini’s inclination clearly was towards continuing war at 
all cost, so he subordinated any social improvement for the population —including the 
masses of soldiers— to the superior interests of the war effort and the nation. When the 
last Russian offensive failed due to the soldiers’ lack of enthusiasm to fight, he held the 
Bolshevik agitators responsible for it. In general, for the interventionist bourgeoisie, the 
bad turn taken by the revolution in Russia offered a worrisome example of what could 
happen in Italy. This parallel was extremely present in the minds of many like 
Mussolini when the Italian army, after years of brutal struggle, nearly collapsed in the 
autumn of 1917. The twelfth battle of the Isonzo, the so-called disaster of Caporetto, 
was a traumatic defeat that threw the Italian army and society into crisis.14 
Caporetto was the second factor that, combined with the ongoing Russian 
revolution, drove Mussolini to designate the veterans as the harbingers of a new 
emergent ideology. It is important to realise that when this massive retreat happened —
between October and November 1917— not only were other belligerent armies like the 
French experiencing problems of mutinies and weariness among the troops,15 but also in 
Russia a profound second revolution was taking place. The Bolsheviks had succeeded in 
gaining the allegiance of Russian soldiers who, enthusiastic about peace, were the 
protagonists of a revolution at the front.16 Meanwhile, in Italy, the divisions among 
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socialists became more acute, shocked as they were by both the Russian events and the 
invasion of national territory. The Italian socialists, scrutinized through the lens of the 
Russian example, were blamed for debilitating the morale of the troops and for having 
provoked the disaster at Caporetto. General Cadorna, who scapegoated the Italian 
socialists for the debacle, was, nevertheless, substituted by General Armando Diaz as 
the new Chief of General Staff. But this change would not be enough to renew the 
Italian war effort, nor would it stop anti-socialist discourse. At any rate, this context not 
only influenced Mussolini’s ideological evolution, but also provoked a set of 
transformations that lay the foundations for the political manipulation of the symbol of 
the war veteran. 
After Caporetto, an array of urgent measures were taken in order to motivate the 
soldiers once more, maintaining their discipline and commitment to the national cause; 
this effort would affect the mentalities and expectations of the future war veterans.17 
Now, the military sought a new model soldier, who should be a motivated combatant 
rather than just an obedient serviceman.18 To achieve this objective, the authorities drew 
extensively on a persuasive patriotic and nationalistic propaganda that demonized the 
enemy and exalted aggression. These discourses implied making extensive promises to 
the combating soldiers. It was said that the Fatherland was enormously indebted to its 
saviours. Propagandists depicted a future of absolute moral recognition from the entire 
society. They promised ‘love’, ‘respect’, ‘honour’ to the combatants. ‘The soldier will 
be the first also in rights’, it was stated. Propaganda predicted that ‘the returning 
soldiers will see everyone happily doff their hats to them’.19 These promises may have 
helped to improve the fighting spirit of the front soldiers, but surely contributed to 
creating unrealistic expectations for their homecoming too. 
The ideal of a new self-motivated soldier found expression in the new assault 
troops: the arditi. The army intensely developed these units, whose offensive actions 
would be sudden and extremely violent, even in hand-to-hand combat. The tough arditi 
became a differentiated elite of soldiers who enjoyed high morale and certain concrete 
privileges (better food, higher pay, more comfort, and more extensive rest periods). The 
limited arditi assault units (reparti di assalto) numbered approximately 35,000 
members. They equalled the battalions of the alpini in prestige and reliability on the 
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battlefield, even though their contribution to the war operations cannot be considered 
decisive. The main significance of the arditi was that they represented a new kind of 
war mentality, elitist, violent and intransigent; thus intersecting with the wishes of 
intellectuals like the futurists, who stressed action and violence as means to an end.20 
 From 1917 on, while the Russian revolution evolved, remobilizing measures to 
enhance the soldiers’ morale were needed in all belligerent nations,21 and Italy was no 
exception. It is true that, to some extent, the patriotic discourses had also permeated the 
lower social classes of countries participating in the war, providing them with a sense of 
honour to confront a probable death on the battlefields, but the average soldier 
experienced the war as an unwanted imposition.22 In order to generate consent among 
the masses of soldiers and their families, social assistance and promises of material 
rewards intertwined with state propaganda. In Italy, home-front committees, and new 
trench newspapers expanded the spirit of interventionism, as well as hatred against 
shirkers, draft dodgers (emboscati), opportunists (profittatori), pacifists, and 
defeatists.23 The authorities were profoundly worried regarding the events in Russia, 
where soldiers fuelled the revolution by joining workers’ and soldiers’ councils 
(Soviets).  
Mussolini was an observer of all these developments. In November 1917, when 
Georges Clemenceau was appointed Prime Minister in France, Mussolini praised the 
energetic attitude of the French statesman, who was committed to a greater national war 
effort. According to Mussolini, the democratic way of waging war would ‘fatally’ lead 
—as in Russia— ‘to the regime of the Soviets, to committees of workers and soldiers, 
and to soldiers’ assemblies that would debate and reject the generals’ strategy plans’.24 
On 20 November 1917, while discussing the needs of the front soldiers, Clemenceau 
stated that ‘they have rights over us’ (ils ont des droits sur nous); a sentence that 
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became famous among French soldiers and veterans, and even generated a sense of 
superiority among them. Meanwhile, in Italy, Mussolini was enthusiastic about the first 
legislative initiatives to create a supportive fund for the combatants’ families.25 Since 
peasant workers formed the bulk of the Italian army, the Italian state promised land to 
those who were fighting at the front. This measure had already been promoted by the 
Kingdom of Romania, which had entered the war belatedly on the Allies’ side. An 
agrarian reform in Romania would create a greater number of landowners. It is 
interesting to note that the Romanian King made this promise in the spring of 1917 —at 
a time when the revolution had just toppled the Tsar in Russia. Nevertheless, it probably 
contributed to improving the performance of the Romanian rank and file on the 
battlefield for the rest of the war. In Italy, Mussolini’s newspaper relayed and applauded 
this decision, asserting that the Romanian soldiers would then combat with 
overwhelming enthusiasm.26 
 In Italy, December 1917, two main measures tackled the problem of reinforcing 
the soldiers’ motivation to fight. Firstly, the Orlando government issued a decree 
establishing the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (ONC). This institution addressed the 
endemic problems of Italian agriculture and the development of the South 
(Mezzogiorno), as well as the reintegration of soldiers after the war. The ONC 
transformed the old motto ‘land to the peasants’ (la terra ai contadini) into the 
catchphrase ‘land to the combatants’ (la terra ai combattenti), but detailed regulations 
would not be published until January 1919. Also in December 1917, the minister of the 
Treasury Francesco Saverio Nitti created free insurance policies for the soldiers (with a 
value of 500 Lira) and junior officers (1000 Lira) to be paid either in case of the 
serviceman’s death from war-related injuries/illness, or after the war if the money was 
invested in productive activities. Even more advantageous policies were later created 
for officers (1,500 and 5,000 Lira).27 The bigger reward given to the higher ranks was 
justified as a measure to encourage the combat performance of the lower ranks, since 
the latter would be encouraged to reach the better-rewarded ranks.28 
 Most importantly, as happened in other countries during 1917, the Italian state 
resolutely approached the problem of the disabled soldiers, and this early attention 
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succeeded in maintaining the veterans’ loyalty to the war effort. As soon as seriously-
wounded men started crowding the hospitals, meeting each other and complaining about 
their situation, the authorities put them under control. An official institution, the Opera 
Nazionale Invalidi di Guerra, took charge of the care of the war disabled in March 
1917. At the same time, the mutilated veterans started to organize themselves to defend 
their interests. Several newspapers —especially Il Popolo d’Italia— reported the 
activities, meetings and statements of disabled veterans’ groups. The disabled set up the 
National Association of the War Maimed and War Wounded (Associazione Nazionale 
fra Mutilati e Invalidi di Guerra – ANMIG). This association would count on the 
benevolence of the authorities, since it adopted a patriotic stance unconnected with the 
socialists or any other party. In fact, the ANMIG became the interlocutor of the 
government in regard to pensions. In the period of Caporetto, other groups of disabled 
soldiers went further in their support to the war effort; they created Committees of 
Action (Comitati di Azione fra mutilati, invalidi e feriti di guerra) in line with the 
interventionists, showing an extreme zeal in persecuting internal enemies.29 Thus, the 
symbol of the disabled veteran acquired meanings that precluded the formation of the 
kind of socialist or democratically-oriented disabled veterans’ organizations that existed 
in France or Germany.30 
 During 1917, discourses and representations around the disabled veterans in Il 
Popolo d’Italia foreshadowed the mythic role that the war veterans would play in 
Fascism. In the spring of 1917, the newspaper argued that the veterans should not only 
be offered pensions and assistance, but also the honour and respect of the fatherland. 
Furthermore, whereas it was admitted that the state had acquired duties in relation to the 
disabled, it was said that these men were not exempted from the obligation of 
contributing productively to the nation —that veterans were not allowed to be 
‘parasites’. The interventionists were enthusiastic about the disabled veterans’ 
commitment to the war effort.31 The ideal that these patriotic disabled veterans 
represented thus became an element of the proto-fascist worldview of Mussolini. 
 Mussolini’s article ‘Trincerocrazia’ in Il Popolo d’Italia outlined the mythic 
role that veterans would have in the ideology of early Fascism. It is crucial to take into 
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account the context in which Mussolini wrote that text. It happened in December 1917, 
after Caporetto, when zones of northern Italy still remained under enemy occupation. 
The ANMIG was consolidating in several cities, and groups of agitated disabled 
veterans incited the fight against external and internal enemies through their 
newspapers. But sacrifices were also engendering prospects for the future. For example, 
in La Voce dei Reduci, a wounded soldier wrote that, after the war, if he would go on to 
become a Minister, he would uphold the rights of those who were fighting: ‘new rights 
of new people’.32 Mussolini most probably read this publication.33 Inspired by this spirit 
he picked up the notion of trincerocrazia. This concept now allowed him to delineate 
the role that he attributed to the veterans. Mussolini stated that a ‘new aristocracy’ —a 
concept formerly invented by Prezzolini— was being formed in the trenches: 
‘Trenchocracy is the aristocracy of the trench. It is the aristocracy of tomorrow’. 
According to him, Italy was going towards a division between those who had fought 
and those who had not —the idea of two Italies was another Prezzolinian creation—, 
and he pointed out as evidence the disabled soldiers’ activities. The mutilati were the 
vanguard of the great army that would soon return home. Mussolini stated that the new 
spirit of the returnees would grant a new meaning to words now devoid of sense, like 
democracy or liberalism. The veterans —depicted as workers who returned from the 
furrows of the trenches to the furrows of the land— would synthesise the notions of 
class and nation, thereby producing a kind of ‘anti-marxist’ and ‘national’ socialism.34 
 Historians have pointed to the article Trincerocrazia as the first clear evidence 
of Mussolini’s abandonment of socialism.35 This turn to the right has been explained as 
a consequence of Caporetto, and also as the result of Mussolini’s perception that the war 
had profoundly changed the country whilst transforming the front soldiers into a 
completely new political force for the postwar period.36 However, in my opinion, 
Trincerocrazia must be considered as more of a self-fulfilling prophecy, than as an 
accurate, clairvoyant prediction of the future. The article was, indeed, an early 
manifestation of fascist ideology, yet, at the same time, it was the revelation of a 
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political ambition. Mussolini was proclaiming the new style of politics that he aspired to 
witness; a new society in which the war veterans would play an essential role. He was 
clearly targeting the combatants as potential readers of his paper, and probably thinking 
of them as future supporters of a new political movement. At that moment, the 
legendary connection between veterans and Fascism was born. But why had Mussolini 
become so interested in mobilizing the veterans? 
There was a crucial motivation. It is clear that the course of the Russian 
revolution since spring 1917 pushed Mussolini to position himself violently against the 
Italian socialists.37 Let us remember that Mussolini supported intervention because he 
believed in the revolutionary nature of war. The Russian revolution confirmed this 
principle, but with undesired consequences. Overwhelmingly supported by Russian 
front soldiers, the Bolsheviks were willing to stop the fight and make peace with the 
Central Powers, therefore betraying the allied countries. Having become an 
uncompromising nationalist, Mussolini feared this scenario. By mid-December 1917, 
Mussolini’s disappointment must have been total. For on the same day the 
Trincerocrazia article was published, the armistice between Russia and the Central 
Powers paved the way for peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. Thus the Russian peace 
destroyed the myth of the revolutionary war in which Mussolini had believed. War did 
lead to revolution, yes, but revolution led to the most feared consequence for the 
interventionists: a peace that was not a victory. When this contradiction was revealed, 
Mussolini chose to support war, thus rejecting socialism and focusing on the struggle 
for the nationalist aims. This choice required looking for a new political clientele: the 
war veterans. They would represent in Fascism the revolutionary, albeit nationalist, role 
that would reverse the ex-soldiers’ role in the Bolshevik revolution. Thus, the 
Trincerocrazia article shows the broad extent to which the conception of a new political 
phenomenon, Fascism, was entangled with the belief in the war veterans as a new 
political driving force. In a sense, the nascent fascist ideology was a strategy to ensure 
that war veterans, in contrast to what happened in Russia, would remain loyal to the 
nationalist struggle to the very end. Originating in the revolutionary wing of the Italian 
interventionist movement, the idyllic connection between Fascism and veterans was 
first catalysed by the frustrating and unexpected outcome of the Russian revolution. 
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Mussolini was not alone in his ideas about the war and the future role of 
veterans. At that time, for instance, the interventionist intellectual Agostino Lanzillo 
went as far as to argue that war had defeated socialism.38 Lanzillo had translated the 
work of the theorist of revolutionary syndicalism Georges Sorel into Italian. During the 
war, Lanzillo had served at the front, and been wounded. At this time, Lanzillo believed 
in the revolutionary nature of war, but despised the Russian events as a ‘revolution that 
masked defeat’.39 In his book The Defeat of Socialism, finished in January 1918, 
Lanzillo affirmed that the generations who had fought at the front would come out of 
the war ‘renovated’, with a ‘new mentality’, and with ‘improved individual qualities’. 
This human force would be a determining factor in future events. And in any case, its 
actions would take a ‘national sense’. According to Lanzillo, the returning soldiers 
would instinctively give value to (valorizzare) their sacrifice. Therefore, it would be 
improbable that veterans would adopt any ‘revolutionary attitude’; instead, they would 
‘fight to replace the ruling class, in the name of the power and the courage they 
represent’.40 Lanzillo’s predictions might be retrospectively seen as correct. However, 
they should be observed as part of the same interventionist set of beliefs as Mussolini’s 
trincerocrazia. This mind-set was the blueprint of a developing political programme 
and strategy for the postwar period. 
Thus, after Caporetto and the confirmation of the Russian ‘revolutionary’ peace, 
the interventionists’ identification with the fighting soldiers increased. Il Popolo d’Italia 
changed to present itself as the defender of the combatants’ rights. This shift became 
evident during the last phase of the war, when the polarization of Italian society became 
sharp, and ‘defeatists’ were persecuted as the internal enemy. As Prezzolini put it, the 
biggest enemy was ‘at home’, but the combatants would come back from war to 
‘renovate’ the country.41 Il Popolo d’Italia called for the establishment of a dictatorship 
that would militarise Italian society until victory. The newspaper made space for the 
material claims of the ‘trenchmen’ (trinceristi); junior officers found in it a forum for 
expressing their concerns.42 Yet the idea of distributing expropriated land to the peasant 
soldiers was played down; Mussolini foresaw a very easy reintegration of two million 
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agricultural workers from the front.43 Finally, in August 1918, the adoption of a new 
subtitle —‘Journal of the combatants and producers’ (Quotidiano dei combattenti e dei 
produttori)— symbolized Mussolini’s definitive rejection of socialism. Now, Mussolini 
distinguished his notions of ‘combatants’ and ‘producers’ from the common concepts of 
‘soldiers’ and ‘workers’, which were tinged with socialism.44 By doing so, Mussolini 
was constructing symbols to counteract the pervasive idea of the soldiers’ and workers’ 
councils of the loathed Bolshevik revolution.  
There was not yet a coherent political program or fully developed ideology for 
the veterans, but Mussolini had sown the seeds of the fascist veteran symbol. It is not 
surprising that some leaders of the nascent veteran movement adopted the seductive 
idea of trincerocrazia. Some Italian veterans publically depicted themselves as the 
‘great vanguard’ of those who would return from the front.45 Until the end of the war, 
Mussolini and Il Popolo d’Italia paid attention to the soldiers’ expectations, and 
advocated a rapid demobilization of most men as soon as possible.46 Yet Mussolini’s 
group was an observer of the emerging veterans’ movement rather than its promoter, 
and the question of the trincerocrazia remained undeveloped. After the Italian victory 
of Vittorio Veneto —later established as a national myth—47 and Armando Diaz 
Victory’s bulletin (Bollettino della vittoria) on 4 November, Mussolini’s enthusiastic 
message was that of a fully nationalistic and anti-socialist interventionist, which is 
exactly what he had become by virtue of the war experience.48 The First World War 
ended two weeks later. Yet there would be no real peace in many parts of the European 
continent. 
 
Veterans and the aftermath of war in Western Europe 
The outcome of the First World War was traumatic for both belligerent and many non-
belligerent European countries. National experiences normally differed depending on 
the military result of the confrontation —either victory or defeat. Regardless whether 
they suffered defeat or not, all participants had suffered massive human losses (10 
million deaths in total), and their populations emerged from the war profoundly 
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transformed. Despite victory, some countries —for example Italy— went through a long 
and unprecedented period of social unrest and violent conflict. In the context of defeat, 
the dismemberment of Central Empires meant the birth of new democratic nation states, 
such as the German Weimar Republic. The spectre of social revolution and civil war, as 
was happening in Russia since 1917, was present everywhere. Historians have studied 
the transition from war to peace as a complex process that led to very different results 
for the states involved; yet the division between war and peace was anything but clear.49 
In 1919, the international-relations system struggled to find a new balance of power in 
Versailles; and in the economic sphere, the shift from a ‘total war’ to a peace economy 
provoked turbulence. Returning to the pre-1914 order was impossible. The ordeal of 
demobilizing millions of ex-combatants marked the history of the belligerent nations. 
All these countries witnessed the emergence of veteran associations. During the war, 
disabled veterans had created organizations; now, very politically diverse veteran 
groups mushroomed. The issue of reintegrating veterans was an unavoidable task that 
concerned politicians and civil society. The veterans stood out as a new actor in the 
public sphere, one impossible to ignore after the kind of experience they had endured in 
the name of the nation. Many returned home hoping to transform the promises they had 
heard during the war into reality. 
In the postwar period, cultural demobilization was a necessary task for countries 
aspiring to return to normality after a ‘total’ war experience.50 This process, which in 
general implied the development of an appropriate memory of the war and the dead,51 
was crucial for reintegrating war veterans, as well as to pacify the most aggressive 
warmongers in every country. The results of this common endeavour were once again 
disparate depending on countries, regions, social or age groups, and gender. To some 
extent, the cultural dynamic of the war lasted beyond its end; nations responded in 
different ways to the collective trauma of war.52 This permeability between wartime and 
postwar cultures is clearly evident if we look at soldiers’ mentalities during the long 
process of finishing the war: victorious French soldiers of the First World War held on 
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to the set of inculcated violent discourses and representations of the German enemy 
long after the armistice, even though the Germans had already been vanquished.53 
The issue of veterans’ reintegration and the problematic cultural demobilization 
must be linked with the fact that paramilitarism flourished across Europe in the 
aftermath of the First World War.54 Violence persisted in several countries, especially in 
Eastern and Central Europe, where the emergence of armed ‘home guards’ correlated 
with the perception of a Bolshevik threat. Ex-soldiers usually joined these quasi-
military formations. But the emergence of civic guards occurred even in countries that 
had not fought in the Great War, like Spain.55 This widespread reaction was therefore 
transnational; it went beyond national boundaries and took place independent of defeat, 
victory or participation in the First World War.56 This was the wider European 
background into which the fascist movement was born. In this section, I shall approach 
the contextual elements that are crucial to understand how and why a linkage between 
Fascism and war veterans was established in Italy, to be later extended to other 
countries. I shall also examine the emergence of veteran organizations that became 
important historical actors in the following years, in relation to Fascism. 
 
Germany 
Germany was a dramatic and unique case due to its weight in both Western and Central 
Europe, its defeat in the Great War, and its Revolution, all of them having far-reaching 
consequences on the Continent. The aftermath of war in Germany was marked by a 
complex of social, political, economic and psychological processes.57 The uneven and 
chaotic return of the German soldiers, aside from creating a serious economic problem, 
conditioned the trajectory of the German Revolution. After the Kaiser’s abdication and 
escape, soldiers’ councils (Soldatenräte) quickly proliferated across Germany, with 
soldiers waving red flags and wearing red armbands.58 Power fell to the Social 
Democrats. Many officers were appalled as the imperial army crumbled; they often 
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ripped off their own rank badges; in some cases they were publically humiliated.59 
Between November and December 1918, while the Spartacus League was the driving 
force behind a communist insurrectionary movement, 1.5 million German front soldiers 
(Frontsoldaten, commonly called Frontschweine) returned home. Although the 
population normally welcomed them, they eventually employed violence against the 
revolutionaries, for example during the violent clashes in Berlin on 24 December 1918. 
Many of the revolutionaries were formerly demobilized veterans, rear-guard soldiers —
called Etappenschweine—, and rebel sailors. In order to restore internal ‘tranquillity and 
order’ (Ruhe und Ordnung), to repress the revolution, and to defend the Eastern borders, 
the social democratic government promoted the creation of mercenary units: the Free 
Corps (Freikorps). The ruthless and bloody mentality of these ultra-violent 
paramilitaries was firmly grounded in the imagery of the war.60 In the beginning, the 
bulk of their membership came from the front soldiers. Their combatant methods were 
employed against civilians, in a context of extreme anxiety and fear. In Berlin, 
Freikorps volunteers participated in the assault of the socialist newspaper Vorwärts —
occupied by the revolutionary rebels— and ruthlessly killed the Spartacist leaders Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on 15 January 1919.61 
These German events are of the utmost importance to comprehend the Italian 
context in which the fascist movement would be born and to connect its history with the 
war veterans. The shocking news of the fate of the Spartacist insurrection in Berlin soon 
crossed borders. In Italy, the socialist Avanti! announced that, in Germany, the 
‘militarist danger’ had been reawakened with the repression; the paper reproduced 
Liebknecht’s last message, which recognised that the revolutionaries had been 
abandoned ‘by the sailors and soldiers’.62 The rumours about the gruesome end of the 
German Communist Party leaders were confirmed. And soldiers returning from the 
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front, or governmental troops as they were still called, had crushed the communist 
insurrection. Seemingly, the Russian revolutionary events were not to be replayed. 
For Mussolini, what occurred in Germany was particularly meaningful; it most 
probably contributed to strengthening his own conception of the veterans’ political 
potential. After receiving the news, he rushed to write that Leninism was an Asiatic 
phenomenon unlikely to take root in the west. He also questioned what the exact role of 
the old regime’s representatives, such as the army officers, had been in the anti-
Spartacist reaction.63 Later, Il Popolo d’Italia published news about the support of some 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils for the German government. An unsigned comment on 
this news highlighted the importance ‘above all’ of the soldiers’ state of mind: ‘it is a 
fact, that the soldiers returned from the trenches do not want, do not tolerate disorder. 
They have lived through too much, in the tragic, terrible disorder of battles, as not to 
feel disgust for the internal disorder and repugnance for civil war’.64 As early as January 
1919, a transnational perception of the veterans as anti-revolutionary agents was being 
forged, thanks to the first actions of the German Freikorps. 
We should note that many rightist and nationalistic young people, students or 
cadets who had not actually fought the war soon joined these anti-revolutionary 
organizations; only a tiny portion of the German veterans joined them. Yet the 
Freikorps military performance in the Baltic region was characterised by an intense 
combat experience. The short-lived Soviet Republic of Bavaria between April and May 
1919 was also crushed by the Freikorps. Subsequently, Miklós Horthy in Hungary 
formed paramilitary units with the same counter-revolutionary traits of the Freikorps. 
These forces smashed the Soviet Republic of Hungary, inaugurating a period of ‘White 
Terror’. Having played this counter-revolutionary role, the Freikorps have been called 
‘heralds of Hitler’, although these mercenary units lacked a clear or coherent political 
ideology.65 
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Apart from the Freikorps phenomenon, other German veterans significantly 
contributed to the formation of conservative auto-defence groups during 1919. The 
Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet) was created by Franz Seldte in Magdeburg between 
November and December 1918, as one of those organizations willing to restore 
tranquillity and social order.66 While the Stahlhelm was exclusively a group of ‘front 
soldiers’ (Bund der Frontsoldaten), most civic guards were composed of civilians in 
general. In February 1919, Wolfgang Kapp, a nationalist politician in close contact with 
the military and the Junkers, was suggesting that, to counteract the imminent ‘civil 
war’, the wealthiest landowners of every rural district should ‘buy cars, and fill them 
with machineguns and hand-grenades […], with young [patriotic] people […] 
preferably officers or students’.67 The ‘civic defence’ groups (Einwohnerwehren) were 
particularly important in Bavaria. Furthermore, the conservative Kyffhäuserbund, an 
anti-socialist but allegedly apolitical veterans’ organization rooted in the tradition of 
Wihelmine Germany, counted on more than 2 million members.68 
However, some of the biggest veterans’ organizations that appeared in Germany 
were not paramilitary leagues, but rather welfare entities. Alongside the nationalists, 
stood pacifist veterans’ groups. The Peace League of Ex-Servicemen (Friedensbund der 
Kriegsteilnehmer) reached 30,000 members in 1919, although it would dissolve in 
1922. A Social Democratic Reich League of Disabled War Veterans, Ex-Servicemen 
and War Dependants (Reichsbund der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegsteilnehmer und 
Kriegshinterbliebenen), founded in 1917, would reach 830,000 members in 1922. 
German Jewish Veterans created their own veterans’ association in February 1919, 
committed to defend the memory of their German patriotism during the war, and to 
fight anti-Semitism.69 The majority of German veterans did not join any political 
organization; ‘the wartime experiences of the veterans set limits to paramilitary 
mobilisation rather than underpinning it’, as Benjamin Ziemann has put it.70 Yet the 
German veterans were an active factor of the social unrest of this period. In the cities, 
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demobilized soldiers agitated against the authorities for compensation for their war 
sacrifice. The problem posed by war veterans was part of the wider question of the war 
victims (Kriegsopfer) in Weimar Germany, which included a shocking number of war 
widows and orphans.71 
After June 1919, when the treaty of Versailles was signed and made public, the 
German army and many veterans perceived it as a humiliation. The treaty imposed very 
harsh conditions on Germany, the country that was considered to have sole 
responsibility for the war. In this context, the ‘stab in the back’ (Dolchstoß) myth was 
born: the German defeat had supposedly been provoked by a bunch of —depending on 
the version— disloyal saboteurs, communists or Jews, whereas the German soldiers had 
remained unbeaten at the front.72 The Stahlhelm became an increasingly anti-republican 
group; its growing members adopted the monarchist black-white-red flag, and 
maintained contacts with other nationalistic groupings. The implementation of the treaty 
entailed the substantial reduction and disarmament of the army, as well as the 
dissolution of Freikorps units. This measure drastically ruined the possibilities of 
following a military career for many young ex-soldiers who had learnt no other 
profession. The Weimar Constitution, promulgated in August 1919, furthered the 
alienation of these military sectors from the Republic. Although a set of new national 
symbols were introduced, breaking with the monarchist tradition, the constitution 
allowed soldiers to use medals and decorations won through war service. Still, the anti-
revolutionary military despised the new uniforms and flags. Within months, both 
officers and soldiers had become united in their opposition to the government.73 
In was in this context of the chaotic demobilization, revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary agitation, dramatic political transformations and violence that the 
very first Nazi organisation emerged. In Munich, January 1919, Anton Drexler’s created 
the German Workers’ Party (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). In October 1919, an embittered 
and disturbed war veteran, called Adolf Hitler, introduced himself as a Frontsoldat 
(though he had in fact been an Etappenschwein during most of the war) and applied to 
join the party.74 In 1920, the party changed its name to the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - NSDAP). Hitler, who 
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had served as an army propagandist giving anti-Bolshevik talks to the soldiers, started a 
political career.75 The chief concern in his mind was the purportedly pernicious 
influence of the capitalist, Anglo-American Jewry, who had imposed the humiliating 
peace treaty.76 Yet the NSDAP’s first programme did not contain a word about war 
veterans; its main characteristics were anti-Semitism and völkisch nationalism. The Nazi 
movement remained confined to Bavaria, and it was a distinct phenomenon to the 
German veteran organizations.  
The reaction of army officers and anti-revolutionary volunteers against the 
young Republic resulted in the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch in March 1920, which aimed to 
impose a military dictatorship.77 This attempt was prevented by the mobilization of the 
working class through a strike that saved the Weimar Republic, but subsequent violence 
between communists and right wing groups reached a peak. In this situation, there were 
calls for the formation of a front soldiers government (Frontsoldatenregierung) as a 
political option beyond the polarized ‘national’ and ‘social’ political sectors;78 but this 
project remained vague. The anti-republican threat was neutralized, though it became 
clear that important military and paramilitary sectors were utterly opposed to Weimar. 
In Bavaria, the putsch facilitated the imposition of a militarist government headed by 
Franz Ritter von Kahr, who remained on good terms with the paramilitary 
organizations, and would sponsor commemorations to honour the veterans and the 
fallen soldiers.79 Hence, Munich would become the centre of the anti-republican 
agitation. The Reichsbund, one of the biggest veterans’ organizations, clearly 
condemned the putsch,80 but anti-republican groups like the Stahlhelm would continue 
to grow and consolidate in its aftermath. Shortly after the putsch, militaristic circles 
were also displeased by the National Pension Law (Reichsversorgungsgesetz), 
promulgated in April 1920, as it meant the full demilitarization of the veterans’ and war 
victims’ care. Yet, the disabled were not completely satisfied with the public assistance 
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and pensions they were awarded.81 The Weimar Republic was superficially 
consolidating, but important groups of veterans had not been fully reintegrated into the 
system. 
All these German events, however, do not imply that German veterans were 
precursors of fascism; neither were they harbingers of Hitler or the Nazi movement. By 
1920, certain army officers and groups of demobilized soldiers, as well as in the anti-
revolutionary armed volunteers, had become the most active and flamboyant wing of 
the unreservedly anti-republican German extreme right.82 Nevertheless, the reactionary, 
defensive political projects and programmes of these groups cannot be defined as 
fascism. There were no plans for the transformation of the war veterans or front soldiers 
into a political vanguard, either. And the NSDAP was still a very small organization, 
struggling to gain membership and an audience, not focused on the veterans as its 
primary target. Finally, despite the fact that the symbol of the ex-soldier was 
increasingly linked to right-wing politics —thanks to the success of the Freikorps in 
smashing the communists—, it is clear that the German veterans did not act as a group 
committed to a singular political orientation —either left or right, revolution or counter-
revolution. This reality of veteran diversity is also confirmed by the French example. 
 
France 
In France, 1918 was a year of neither defeat nor revolution, but rather victory, and the 
history of its 6.4 million war veterans contrasted to that of the German veterans in the 
aftermath of war. France had been invaded by the enemy and suffered considerable 
destruction. While the war was still being fought, French disabled veterans were the 
first —as in Italy— to forward their interests, organizing associations with the aim of 
improving their lives through legal means. During 1919, the French veterans created a 
constellation of associations drawing on the associative tradition of the French 
Republic. The principal two veterans’ associations expanded rapidly. The republican, 
centrist Union Fédérale (UF) was founded in February 1918, with Henri Pichot as its 
main leader. Charles Bertrand led the conservative Union Nationale des Combattants 
(UNC), created in November 1918. The loyalty of these groups to the Republic 
contrasts with the lukewarm attitude that many German veterans’ associations displayed 
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towards the Weimar Republic.83 But the French Republic had won a great war, and the 
Weimar Republic had been the outcome of defeat. 
Different political sectors in France developed their own programme for the 
returning soldiers. The posture of the French left regarding the veterans was incarnated 
by the writer Henri Barbusse, who had written a best-selling novel about the war 
experiences of the poilus —Le Feu (1917). During the war, Barbusse had claimed that 
the soldiers fought against nationalism, against militarism, and for the republican ideals 
of liberty and justice. He criticized the French warmongers, and supported the project of 
the League of Nations. Barbusse founded a small, communist veterans’ association, the 
Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants (ARAC), ready to defend the 
material interests of the disabled veterans. Furthermore, Barbusse intended to 
participate in politics, aiming to achieve social justice and international peace.84 At the 
beginning of 1919, the Italian socialists echoed these ideals.85 In contrast, the French 
anti-republican extreme right, the Action Française led by Charles Maurras with men 
like Léon Daudet and Georges Valois among his collaborators, was, above all, 
interested in compensating the veterans. Their programme was fundamentally based on 
the idea of giving to the veterans their ‘share of the victory’ —‘the veterans’ share’ (la 
part du combattant)— to which they held a right.86 This idea of the ‘veterans’ share’ 
had been developed since 1916 and was maintained after victory, although to make it 
real —it was said— the Germans should pay the reparations in full. Thus, the indemnity 
to the veterans should come directly ‘from the hands of the aggressor’ —Germany.87 In 
any case, during 1919, the political stance of the French veterans was far from being 
unambiguous: while some groups desired tougher governmental action against 
Bolshevism, others heralded the creation of the ‘international of the veterans’ 
(l’internationale des combattants) that would carry out the revolution.88 
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In general, apart from their growing discontent about their social and economic 
situation and their opposition to politicians, the French veterans commonly felt that the 
war had transformed them into new men with a new spirit, who should be charged with 
guiding the country morally. According to Antoine Prost, in the long term, the leitmotif 
of the French veterans’ movement would be the attempt to create a large unified 
association, apolitical and committed to the maintenance of internal and international 
peace.89 This commitment is not surprising, since the Treaty of Versailles had been very 
favourable to the French interests. Yet the two main associations had clear political 
divergences.90 The UNC, in contrast to the UF, distrusted the League of Nations and 
feared the German threat. In order to defend their interests on the Continent, the UNC 
created the Fédération interaliée des anciens combattants (FIDAC) in November 1920, 
with Charles Bertrand as its first president. (The UF would later create its own 
international entity —the Conférence internationale des associations de mutilés et 
anciens combattants —CIAMAC—, in 1925). Correspondingly, the ARAC maintained 
early international contacts with other leftist veteran associations. The deeply-rooted 
conviction that veterans constituted a group with a shared identity and shared interests 
quickly led to international contacts among veterans of similar ideology. 
 
The other allies and Spain 
To complete this picture of the early postwar period, it is necessary to mention other 
countries that, after the First World War, either had to deal with postwar demobilization 
or suffered the social and economic crisis of 1918-1921. Canada, for example, was 
faced with the reintegration of some 500,000 veterans, who formed associations as early 
as 1916. The Canadian government soon created an agency to ease the rehabilitation of 
the 70,000 disabled, and the veterans would start imposing some of their aspirations 
through the activities of their organizations.91 Canadian veterans sought to unify, and in 
1925 they would create the Canadian Legion, which mirrored the American Legion. 
Likewise, in the United States, the veterans, displeased by what they encountered after 
returning from Europe, started to organize themselves in 1919 to protect their interests 
and reaffirm their identity. In the United States the veterans had traditionally been 
venerated civic figures; after the war, new associations became influential political 
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platforms that made it easier for veterans to move into traditional American politics. In 
both extra-European countries, Canada and the United States, veterans created active 
organizations as they did in Europe; however, fascist movements would not emerge to 
woo them, and they achieved unification more easily and integrated peacefully into the 
political system and the civil society.  
Even in Britain something comparable happened. Already during the war, four 
different organizations were set up to defend the disabled veterans’ cause, obtaining 
some victories in their struggle. In the elections of December 1918 —the so-called 
khaki elections, as the khaki soldiers’ uniforms symbolized the relevance of postwar 
issues— the veterans’ ticket obtained poor results. Only one ex-servicemen’s 
representative was elected, probably because most soldiers, still not discharged, could 
not participate in the voting. When the demobilization took place, the returnees did not 
find the ‘land fit for heroes to live in’ which had been promised by Lloyd George during 
the electoral campaign. Soldiers rioted and veterans protested vehemently. In 1919, they 
created new associations, the National Union of Ex-Servicemen, and the International 
Union of Ex-Servicemen, although they still lacked a clear direction. At the highest 
point of unrest, they boycotted the national peace celebrations of July 1919. Finally, in 
late 1919, the government sponsored a set of measures in favour of veterans, so that the 
agitation decreased: the widespread fear of ‘brutalization’ was mainly unfounded. 
Finally, in 1921, the merger of different veterans’ groups resulted in the formation of 
the British Legion; under Field Marshal Earl Haig’s leadership, it would be a 
collaborative, prestigious and respectable organization to mediate between the veterans 
and the state.92 
In the Iberian Peninsula, in contrast, the veterans’ issue had only an indirect 
impact on politics during 1919-1921. Nevertheless, Portugal and Spain experienced the 
turbulence of this period. Portugal had participated in the First World War on the allied 
side, and sent a small contingent of soldiers to the Western front. A veterans’ 
association formed very late, in 1921, when the League of the Great War Veterans (Liga 
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dos Combatentes da Grande Guerra) was created.93 Spain had not participated in the 
First World War, but its internal politics during this time were profoundly influenced by 
what happened on the Continent. During the war, there was an acute division between 
supporters of the Allies (aliadófilos), and supporters of the Central Empires 
(germanófilos). In 1917, serious military, social and economic disturbances pushed the 
country into a political crisis.94 The period between 1917 and 1923 in Spain was marked 
by social unrest, parliamentary crisis, syndicalism and violence, which were particularly 
destructive in Barcelona.95 Furthermore, armed conflict broke out once more in the 
Spanish protectorate of Morocco in 1919: the struggle against the tribes of the Rif led to 
a severe military disaster for the Spanish troops in Annual, July 1921. This scandal 
further undermined the fragile liberal political system, despised by the ‘Africanist’ 
(africanistas) officers. The Africanists, a corporatist military group forged in the 
Moroccan war, had a bitter rivalry with the officers of Peninsular Spain who organized 
military councils (Juntas) and were opposed to promotions based on combat 
experience.96 All these conflicts marked later political developments, as we will see. 
However the transnational nature of the historical challenges of this period, the 
only Western European country in which the postwar crisis ended with the 
consolidation of a fascist mass movement was Italy. Italian Fascism was the first fascist 
movement capable of establishing a dictatorship and destroying a liberal democracy in a 
European country during the interwar period.97 Fascism appeared, as an ideology, in 
Italy 1919, and the Fasci di combattimento developed as a mass movement during 1920 
and 1921, transforming into a political party —the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF)— 
in November 1921. As early as October 1922, after the so-called March on Rome, 
liberal democratic legality was smashed in Italy. Italian Fascism was the first, the 
original and most influential European fascist movement during the twenties, and its 
origins are rooted in the legacies of the First World War experience. 
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Veterans and the birth of Italian Fascism 
Despite victory, 1919 was a year of deep crisis throughout Italy.98 After forty-one 
months of ‘total’ war, the country had to confront the further shock of the sudden end of 
the hostilities. During the first year of peace, while Europe was trying to settle down in 
the new context, Italy undertook the demobilization process.99 This task was carried out 
while the cost of living significantly increased; peasants began occupying land by 
themselves; while workers’ strikes, disturbances and protests traversed the peninsula; 
meanwhile the complicated international peace negotiations developed in Paris. Italian 
society was far from morally unified by the achievement of November 1918. The bitter 
confrontation between the interventionists and the pacifists, blending with the class 
struggle, intensified. Both fascist and veterans’ movements appeared in this year. With 
the prospect of demobilization, the time had come for the would-be fascists to test their 
predictions about the veterans. In this section, I will analyse the origins of the fascists’ 
engagement with the war veterans.  
The Italian War Ministry dealt with the burdensome demobilization of 
approximately 3,700,000 front soldiers. Between November and December 1918, the 
oldest classes (those born between 1874 and 1884) were sent home. The demobilization 
of the rest of the conscripted (those born between 1885 and 1900) underwent a 
noticeable slowing down between January and March 1919. By this month, almost two 
million soldiers had recovered their civilian clothes, but the ongoing demobilization 
process would come to a stop between March and June, due to the tortuous peace 
negotiations that were taking place in Paris.100 The deceleration in the demobilization 
process, together with the problems of reintegration for ex-soldiers in the labour market, 
were the motives of embitterment for many veterans.101  
It was during the first half of 1919 that the veterans’ movement began to acquire 
a concrete shape, something that happened under the close observation of Mussolini and 
his collaborators. When the armistice came, the ANMIG issued a ‘Manifesto to the 
Country’ (Manifesto al paese), detailing a moral, socio-economic and political 
programme for the renovation of the nation, and took the initiative of creating a larger 
veterans’ association, which would be called Associazione Nazionale Combattenti 
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(ANC).102 Il Popolo d’Italia supported this idea, and underlined that the veterans 
considered every old party to be defunct; at the same time, the paper insisted that the 
nation should welcome those workers who returned from the front.103 However, it did 
not explicitly express agreement with the veterans’ measured, democratic and reformist 
program;104 so the newspaper soon began to outline its own policy regarding the 
returning veterans. 
Il Popolo d’Italia started preparing the homecoming of the so-considered leaders 
of the new Italy (I quadri della nuova Italia), namely the officers and junior officers, 
who were named ‘trenchorarchs’ (trincerarchi) on the newspaper pages. The new 
concept of trincerarchi was an evolution of the earlier trincerocrazia, and seemed to 
have been conceived to praise those young men who had commanded troops during the 
war. It was said that these leaders had slowly matured during the war, acquiring the 
conscience of new rights, and opening their minds to new horizons. While nobody in 
the country seemed to defend their interests, Il Popolo d’Italia presented itself as the 
advocate of 200,000 officers, whose particular aspirations were equated with the 
national interest. The newspaper called on society to ‘make space for the 
trincerocrazia’. By collecting the complaints of these men, a programme demanding a 
fast and efficient demobilization was produced. Veterans’ aspirations were connected 
with the project of a Constituent Assembly (la Costituente dei Combattenti). As the 
trincerarchi had been the men who had led the troops to the victory (inquadratori della 
vittoria), they must be the leaders of new Italy, and for this reason it was necessary to 
discharge them quickly. This kind of discourse was predominantly adopted by certain 
officers and by arditi, who viewed themselves as trincerarchi and understood the 
trincerocrazia as a government made of veterans. For instance, Italo Balbo, in those 
days still a young Lieutenant of the alpini, was one of those veterans who wrote to Il 
Popolo d’Italia, making explicit their support for the Costituente. However, this 
Costituente never took place; Mussolini’s plans in line with the interventionist and 
nationalist groups remained unrealised.105 
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At this stage, the elitist arditi were the only defined veterans’ group that adhered 
to the Mussolini’s movement. Mussolini had enthusiastically paid tribute to the arditi 
during the victory celebrations organized on 10 November 1918 in Milan. He said they 
represented the ‘marvellous young warriors of Italy’.106 In September 1918, the ardito 
Mario Carli and the writers Marinetti and Emilio Settimelli founded the futurist review 
Roma futurista. Spurred on by the futurist revolutionary discourse that proclaimed the 
‘supremacy of the combatant’,107 discharged arditi were roaming uncontrolled around 
Milan and other northern regions, exerting violence against civilians, particularly 
against the socialists.108 In January 1919, the Italian Arditi Association (Associazione 
fra gli Arditi d’Italia) was created as an expression of the spirit of these assault troops. 
On 11 January 1919, the arditi provoked disturbances at La Scala theatre in Milan, 
which marked the rupture of the interventionist block. Mussolini’s group attacked those 
interventionists —such as Bissolati— who renounced certain territorial aspirations. 
Ferruccio Vecchi, one of these ex-arditi maladjusted to civil life, defined their 
aggressive and daring mind-set and behaviour as arditismo.109 The symbol of the arditi 
was already a prominent element of the interventionist, anti-socialist mythology. 
Following its own agenda, in the first half of 1919 the veterans’ movement 
started to grow and expand. While discontented demobilized soldiers demonstrated in 
central and northern Italian cities, the ANC extended geographically, and set up a dense 
network of local veterans’ newspapers from provincial and local sections.110 The 
foundation of both ANC and ANMIG cells, their assemblies, and the incipient activity 
of social assistance was mentioned and briefly commented on Il Popolo d’Italia.111 
Simultaneously, other veterans’ associations appeared, displaying a wide range of 
ideological orientations and uneven territorial presence.112 In Torino, the Operational 
Zone National Veterans Association (Associazione Nazionale Reduci Zona Operante – 
ANRZO) was set up with a vaguely Mazzinian programme; its members employed a 
revolutionary but anti-Bolshevik rhetoric.113 Predominating in rural and traditionally 
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Catholic zones like the Veneto, the National Union of War Veterans (Unione Nazionale 
Reduci di Guerra - UNRG), close to the new Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare 
Italiano - PPI), represented the social and pacifist inclinations of the Catholic Church.114 
In the mountainous northern regions, the Alpini National Association (Associazione 
Nazionale Alpini), based on the alpini military units, displayed a rather conservative 
discourse. All these entities emerged from the widespread optimistic belief in the 
veterans’ potential to change the country, but also amidst worries and conflicts due to 
the worsening social and political situation. 
Most importantly, the phenomenon of veterans’ associations expanded amidst 
the growing fear about the spread of Bolshevism, which affected the Italian middle and 
upper classes. At the end of the war, the maximalist trend of the PSI —inspired by the 
Russian revolution— became hegemonic. Simultaneously, a socialist organization for 
disabled veterans and ex-soldiers was created: the Proletarian League (Lega proletaria 
fra mutilati, invalidi, orfani e vedove di guerra), tied to the socialists.115 This 
association was determined to defend the veterans’ interests from a class-oriented point 
of view, and tended to treat them as war victims —with the same consideration as war 
disabled, orphans and widows— rather than as heroes or as ex-servicemen. Therefore, 
the Lega Proletaria employed a pacifist and anti-militarist discourse that emphasized 
the horrors of warfare: war was represented as a useless massacre, as fratricidal 
madness. Its membership grew —especially in the socialist strongholds of the north— 
reaching more than 50,000 affiliates by the spring of 1919. The examples of Henri 
Barbusse and the French ARAC were an inspiration for its activities. 
Within this agitated context of the proliferation of veteran groups, Fascism 
emerged as a formal organisation. The call for the foundation of the Fasci de 
combattimento at the beginning of March 1919, published in Il Popolo d’Italia, was 
specially directed at the veterans —‘combatants and ex combatants’ (combattenti, ex 
combattenti). Assertions about the veterans’ potential to oust the old ruling classes 
followed the announcement. Agostino Lanzillo —the interventionist intellectual had 
joined Mussolini’s newspaper— appealed to ex-combatants to ‘intervene and take over 
the government of the state’, establishing an ‘energetic regime’ that would confront the 
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current critical moment.116 The initiative of Il Popolo d’Italia was not very successful, 
however. Only some local groups of veterans pledged their support in response.117 As is 
now well known, the ‘picturesque’ foundational fascist meeting in the Milanese Piazza 
San Sepolcro on 23 March 1919 passed almost unnoticed.118 Perhaps half of the three or 
four hundred attendees (revolutionary interventionists, students, journalists…) were war 
veterans, but they were mostly arditi such as Ferruccio Vecchi, along with Marinetti’s 
futurists. The radical and contradictory nationalist claims and anti-Bolshevik diatribes 
aside, no clear fascist programme emerged; yet it is worth noting that the first point 
raised by Mussolini was supporting the demands of the associations of combattenti. 
Over the course of the spring of 1919, several events demonstrated that officers 
and ex-soldiers could constitute a reactive force against the left, even if the 
overwhelming majority of the Italian war veterans was not interested in joining 
nationalist demonstrations. News about the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics, 
established respectively on the 21 March and 6 April, was circulating throughout 
Europe. Meanwhile, in Italy, veteran journals and organizations proliferated 
independent of each other. For instance, the minuscule but overtly anti-Bolshevik 
Officers and Soldiers’ National Union (Unione Nazionale Ufficiali e Soldati – UNUS), 
led by nationalist officers such as Giovanni Giuriati, launched a manifesto on 7 April.119 
Mussolini criticized this dispersion of forces: a few days after the meeting of San 
Sepolcro, he called for the unification of all the ‘national’ veteran forces in one all-
powerful body, which would confront the internal socialist danger.120 In Rome, the 
socialists held a general strike on 10 April; but the same day an anti-socialist counter-
demonstration took place, with the participation of many army officers. The futurist ex-
ardito Mario Carli ventured that, in this anti-Bolshevik demonstration, all kinds of 
combatants had taken part, showing a unified spirit.121 On 15 April 1919, following a 
similar dynamic of strikes and demonstrations in Milan, the fascist arditi assaulted and 
destroyed the office of the socialist newspaper Avanti!. The use of firearms and knives 
in these clashes left four dead. This has been considered the first historical squadrist 
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action.122 The destruction of the Avanti! offices had fateful repercussions; it was 
followed by a set of violent attacks by arditi against socialists in different places.123  
However, it should be underlined that the authors of the assault on the Avanti! 
premises in Milan were part of a very small radicalized —if exceptionally active—
minority of Italian veterans. The diverse members of the huge Italian army held very 
disparate political opinions. Moreover, the experiences of demobilization sharpened the 
contradictions between the expectations of the common soldiers, on the one hand, and 
the mentalities of the command and the officers, on the other. In this context, a crucial 
historical paradox emerged. For while the war veterans were an extremely diverse and 
heterogenic group of individuals, contemporaries had a limited range of concepts at 
hand to make sense of this variety. 
Many professional military and bourgeois ex-officers expected to maintain 
privileges obtained during the war, and to receive the respect and honour of the country. 
They also expected that the peace conference would satisfy the national objectives for 
which the army had fought. Soon, they were very disappointed, for the nation seemed 
cold and hostile towards them.124 Since the end of the war, interventionists had 
demanded that the promises of the Pact of London be fulfilled, and the ‘Italian’ city of 
Fiume added to Italian territorial gains. Ardent interventionists —like Mussolini and Il 
Popolo d’Italia group, the ex-arditi, or the nationalist officers of the UNUS— virulently 
scorned those politicians who ‘renounced’ certain territorial claims. The Italian 
representatives at the Peace Conference defended the interventionist aspirations (Pact of 
London and Fiume), although these claims contradicted the Wilsonian spirit that 
underpinned the conference. The result of the negotiations, therefore, was disappointing 
for the Italians, who would receive neither Dalmatia, nor Fiume. This diplomatic failure 
took place at the end of April 1919, and shattered the hopes of fervent nationalists and 
irredentists like D’Annunzio, who felt that the victory had been lost. In reality, the 
emerging myth of the Mutilated Victory was actually a half-truth.125 However, rumours 
about a military coup started to circulate. 
These elevated patriotic preoccupations only shaped the minds of educated 
middle-class veterans and officers; young men who had been the promoters of 
                                                
122 Fabio Fabbri, Le origini della guerra civile, pp. 38-49; Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 
pp. 519-521. 
123 Fabio Fabbri, Le origini della guerra cvile, pp. 54-59. 
124 Marco Mondini, La politica delle armi. 
125 H. James Burgwyn, The Legend of the Mutilated Victory. Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace 
Conference, 1915-1919, Westport, Greenburg Press, 1993. 
 67 
intervention. Meanwhile, the common ex-soldiers returned to civil life were instead 
concerned about the material promises that the Italian state had made to them. Peasants 
who suddenly found the promise of land unfulfilled showed little patience. The masses 
of contadini ex combattenti played a major role in mutinies against the high cost of 
living (carovita) between June and July 1919 in the Mezzogiorno and especially in 
Sardinia.126 Since the beginning of 1919 in Lazio, and during the summer and the 
autumn in several provinces of the south (Puglia, Calabria, Caltanissetta), there were 
land occupations by veterans who aspired to a more just redistribution of land, if not to 
a social revolution.127 Although at those demonstrations it was not rare to see 
proletarian ex-soldiers still wearing military clothes, it is true that the socialists did not 
systematically recur to the symbol of the veteran to legitimate these protests. In contrast, 
as the nationalists were ready to materially reward the soldiers’ service, they denounced 
the socialists’ attempts to foment the feeling that answering the call of duty had been 
useless.128 
 What were the positions of the fascist movement and the ANC regarding the 
masses of veterans? As the historian Giovanni Sabbatucci pointed out, the Fasci di 
combattimento, despite the efforts of Mussolini’s collaborators, were unable to attract 
many ex-soldiers; it was the ANC that absorbed the greatest number of them.129 The 
ANC would reach around 300,000 affiliated members in the autumn of 1919. The mass 
base of this veterans’ movement was in the Mezzogiorno, and thus was composed of 
peasants, while the middle class veterans from the northern and central cities usually 
dominated the ranks of the leadership. Although the dominant political discourse within 
the ANC lacked a clear and defined shape, the organization attempted to crystallize 
politically. All the ANC veterans seemed to share an instinctive anti-governmental 
attitude and a sense of patriotism, fused into the idea of renovation (rinnovamento). The 
leaders and representatives of sections from all over Italy met at the first ANC congress 
in Rome between 23 and 28 June 1919: over the course of six days of heated 
discussions, the key issue was whether the organization should adopt a political or an 
apolitical stance. It was very difficult to agree on a political standpoint shared by all 
sides. In the end, they approved a very abstract program written by Renato Zavataro. It 
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was indicative of the pacifist and democratic preference of the majority of members, but 
also a symptom of the inexperienced leaders’ lack of competence, and a proof of the 
impossibility of defining a clear political ideology for the combattenti.130 
 The most interesting aspect of the veterans’ congress of Rome is that the fascists 
tried to impose their political orientation onto the ANC. In the days leading up to the 
congress, it was claimed that Mussolini and D’Annunzio would attend (in reality only 
Mussolini was in Rome). The political atmosphere in the capital was quite heated, since 
a new government headed by Nitti had just been formed, following the Italian failure at 
Versailles. As early as the first session of the congress, Francesco Giunta, an 
interventionist, fascist-friendly ex-officer representing the ex-combatants from 
Florence, championed violent action against the recently formed government. Standing 
on a table, he defended a radical motion (ordine del giorno) demanding the organization 
of a large insurrectional movement.131 Despite this attempt, which had aimed to 
organize a veterans’ demonstration on the spot with the objective of toppling Nitti, 
moderation prevailed. Moreover, just after this failure, the ardito Ferruccio Vecchi was 
forcefully expelled from the sessions, due to his inflammatory declarations. For his part, 
Agostino Lanzillo argued that the veterans should use their force to seize power and 
establish, ‘instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the 
combatants’ (in luogo della dittatura del proletariato, la dittatura dei combattenti). But 
the majority of delegates received this statement rather coldly. In the end, seeing the 
ANC leaders’ lack of sympathy for these seductive attempts, Mussolini’s posture was to 
stress the common features existing in the fascist and veterans’ programmes: ‘their 
oneness is absolute’.132 Likewise, the arditi also pointed out the similarity of their 
program to those of the ANC and the Fasci, and advocated for a collaboration.133 
Despite these overoptimistic assessments, the truth was that the ANC had reaffirmed its 
autonomy, differentiating itself from other organizations, particularly from the Fasci. 
The symbol of the veterans was still far from being the preserve of the fascists. 
 
The anti-Bolshevik veterans: a symbolic appropriation 
If the first half of 1919 showed that the symbol of the veteran was not yet politically 
defined, during the second half of this year, following the signature of the Versailles 
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treaty, a process of symbolic appropriation took place, leading to the final consolidation 
of a transnationally-forged and widely-spread representation of the ex-soldier: that of 
the anti-Bolshevik veteran. In Italy, this cultural construction conditioned the origin of 
Fascism. However, this result was far from inevitable. Here, I will argue that the alleged 
anti-socialist orientation of the Italian veterans was a contingent and constructed 
phenomenon, the product of a long evolution of discourses and representations, in 
which Fascism played a crucial role. I will show that the adhesion of the Italian veterans 
to Fascism was only a relative phenomenon; it was above all a cultural construction, the 
outcome of a process of symbolic appropriation, in which the summer of 1919 was a 
key moment, as we will see. 
The fascists, despite their lack of success at the ANC congress of June 1919, did 
not scale back their efforts to attract veterans to their organization. They were interested 
in recruiting war veterans to their movement for ideological and political reasons. Since 
1917, Mussolini had based his projects on the mobilization of ex-combatants. The 
historian Emilio Gentile has explained that young lower-middle-class Italians 
influenced by the myth of the war experience, especially those who had fought in elite 
corps like the arditi or had been junior officers, had experienced the war as an initiation 
into politics, and had returned from the trenches convinced that ‘they had a mission to 
complete in the name of the nation’.134 Therefore, men like Giuseppe Bottai 
(interventionist, war volunteer and ex-ardito) joined the Fasci. They believed in the 
myth of the ‘two Italies’, one of revolutionary interventionists and combatants and the 
other of neutralist traitors, deserters, profittatori, liberal politicians, and Bolsheviks, 
who were perceived as the internal enemy. These mentalities pushed them to embrace 
the fascist movement, considered as an ‘anti-party’ (antipartito). All these ideological 
elements had been developed by the Florentine avant-gardists before the war and were 
later recycled by Mussolini. It is interesting to note that Florence was the city where 
fascists, futurists and veteran leaders were most interconnected.135 However, the ANC 
congress of Rome had revealed that these radicalized veterans were an eccentric 
minority in the country.136 The Italian veterans as a mass were not the anti-Bolshevik, 
national-revolutionary men of action that the fascists imagined. 
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However, when the Versailles treaty was being signed, the nationalist bourgeois 
sectors intensified the struggle to take possession of the symbol of the veterans. Their 
anger against Nitti’s government, and their frustration with the ‘mutilated victory’ led to 
moments of great tension. On 30 June 1919, after a nationalist protest meeting in the 
Augusteo theatre of Rome, there were violent confrontations between police and 
demonstrators. Among the most aggressive protesters there were many young officers 
in uniform; some of whom were arrested or injured in the struggle. The next day, the 
nationalist journal L’Idea Nazionale passionately claimed that the reprehensible 
government had attacked the ‘veterans’ (combattenti).  
Referring to these groups of officers and nationalist students as ‘the veterans’ 
was manipulative. They were men, for example, like Giovanni Giuriati (irredentist 
decorated ex-captain) and Nino Host-Venturi (ex-captain of the alpini and the arditi), 
who, in contact with D’Annunzio, had started to drum up support for a voluntary 
military force to occupy Fiume. These ex-combatants were very different to those 
veterans’ representatives that had met in their congress one day before. Even so, 
members of the ANC and the ANMIG condemned the government and joined the 
nationalist outrage about the state aggression against the ‘veterans’. Even D’Annunzio, 
in an accusatory article against the government, depicted the stylized image of the 
protesting one-legged disabled soldier, beaten by the police.137 D’Annunzio’s literary 
recourse to this indignant representation of the veteran served his purpose of calling for 
the disobedience of the army. Thus, before the socialists were able to develop policies 
and discourses regarding the return of the soldiers, the nationalists and the fascists were 
already violently fighting over the symbol of the veteran. Yet the frustration of the 
nationalist aspirations was only one factor of the attempted monopolization of the 
veteran symbol; the other ground was anti-Bolshevism. 
At this early stage, the adhesion of ex-officers and arditi to the fascist movement 
must be understood as part of the burgeoning anti-socialist and anti-governmental 
reaction. The young fascist movement strived to readdress politically the seemingly 
prodigious veterans’ force.138 For veteran activism still lacked a clear political 
orientation. In Rome, several army officers still wearing uniform attended the 
assemblies of the Fascio, where the arditi agitated to provoke violent anti-Bolshevik 
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and anti-governmental action.139 Yet this climate of unrest also saw the rise of anarchist 
ex-combatants (subversives —sovversivi— as they were called by the authorities), who 
conspired against the government. In July 1919, the anarchist ardito Argo Secondari 
organized a failed complot against Nitti in the Roman fortress of Pietralata.140 And in 
Verona, for instance, anarchist workers joined a majority of veterans and ex-arditi to 
found the Fascio.141 According to the authorities in Florence, the combined agitation of 
veterans, fascists and arditi was ‘impressive’.142 In this city, veterans set up the Fascio 
in the local headquarters of the ANC.143 But this case can be considered exceptional. 
There was no general pattern of veteran proximity to the fascist movement. This 
relationship was still limited to the northern and central Italian regions. But even in a 
town such as Ferrara, the veterans shared their loyalties between the ANC and the 
socialists; only some local arditi were favourable to Mussolini.144 In Bologna, 
divergences among the veterans led to a split; some of them joined the ANC and an 
anti-Bolshevik local league, and some officers remained within the Fascio.145 In light of 
these complications, the fascist leaders opted not to recruit combatants exclusively, but 
also non-combatants. According to its organizer Umberto Pasella, the Fascio was ‘a 
very different thing from the veterans’ association’,146 but it is very significant that he 
had to express this distinction. 
By mid-1919, the veterans’ movement had attracted the interest not just of the 
fascists and nationalists, but also of the left. In this explosive situation, in which all 
sides used the motif of the combattenti in their political rhetoric, it is not surprising that 
the representatives of democratic interventionism —such as Gaetano Salvemini— tried 
to mobilize the veterans in order to motivate a wide movement of social and political 
renovation, particularly in the Mezzogiorno. Although many socialists were sceptical 
about such strategies,147 the Lega proletaria held its own national congress, in which 
demobilization and amnesty were the chief slogans. The fear that men released from the 
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army would fall prey of Bolshevik agitators was widespread in Germany at that time.148 
The Italian military authorities were conscious of this problem, as well as of the role of 
volunteers and ex-officers in the German reaction.149 As a result, Italian military 
propaganda for the soldiers stressed that the combatants (combattenti) desired ‘peace, 
work and order’ —it was said that the disturbances were provoked by ‘masses of 
working class people who did not fight in the war’, while ‘combatants, officers and 
soldiers’ were confronting them.150 Meanwhile, the socialists believed in the sharp 
divide that existed between proletarian soldiers and bourgeois officers; the 
revolutionary instinct of the former contrasted with the conservatism of the latter. And 
news of the counter-revolutionary reaction against the Hungarian Soviet Republic —
directed by military officers— seemed to confirm this interpretation.151  
It is clear that the antagonism between the socialists and the military heightened 
as a consequence of the war, but did the broad group of the war veterans also become 
enemies of the Italian socialists and therefore inclined towards Fascism? The 
retrospective evaluations in this sense made by socialists like Giovanni Zibordi, Pietro 
Nenni or Angelo Tasca, assumed as accurate by many historians,152 should be taken 
cautiously.153 Zibordi pointed out that the ex-military element, young ex-junior-officers 
and ex-officers who felt displaced and economically threatened, were inclined towards 
Fascism; however, according to him, the fault lay with the socialists, who had done 
nothing to ‘demobilize’ that attitude.154 He was forgetting his own speeches celebrating 
returning disabled veterans, and his early publicised calls to ‘demobilize the brains’ of 
the people.155 Assuming that the socialists were against ‘the veterans’, implies 
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149 Report ‘Situazione militare della Germania’ (Berlin, 5 August 1919), AMAE, Affari Politici 1919-
1930, Germania, b. 1125. 
150  (‘I combattenti vogliono pace, lavoro, ordine’, ‘masse operaie che non hanno fatto la guerra […] E 
la opposizione a loro è stata fatta da combattenti, ufficiali e soldati’) [Sezione ‘P’ del Governo della 
Dalmazia], Battute di propaganda. Per i giovani Ufficiali nelle conversazioni coi soldati, Ancona, 1919. 
151 Avanti! (Turin), 1, 2, 3, 4 July 1919. 
152 For example, Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, p. 428; Giovanni Sabbatucci, I 
combattenti, p. 47; Marco Mondini, La politica delle armi, passim. 
153 Cf. Salvatore Lupo, Il Fascismo. La politica in un regime totalitario, Roma, Donzelli, 2000, p. 49. 
154 Giovanni Zibordi, Critica socialista del fascismo, Bologna, Cappelli, 1922, pp. 15-28, now in Renzo 
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Movimento sovversivo’. 
 73 
obscuring and simplifying a crucial part of the story. In reality, by the summer of 1919, 
even the prominent socialist thinker Antonio Gramsci was arguing that the experience 
of the trenches had positively transformed the masses of Italian peasant-soldiers into 
potential agents of a revolution similar to the Russian one.156 
The postwar myth of socialist attacks towards the ‘veterans’ (reduci) is still 
approached rather uncritically by historians.157 Angelo Tasca affirmed that the Lega 
proletaria practiced sectarian maximalist politics which chased away the combattenti: 
the call ‘down with war!’ (abbasso la guerra!) would have been interpreted as ‘down 
with the veterans!’ (abbasso i combattenti!).158 The combattenti would have reacted —
as the army did— in defence of the victory, protecting a honourable version of the war 
experience, and therefore against socialism and in favour of Fascism. There is truth in 
this explanation, but it is insufficient. It uncritically assumes the constructed concept of 
the ‘veteran’. Not supported by comparative research, this interpretation criticises the 
socialist approach to veteran politics as essentially inappropriate, and diminishes the 
offensive role that the anti-socialist veterans and the fascists had played from the very 
end of the war. In reality, the socialist anti-militarist campaign stepped up after the 
socialists had been victims of the attacks from the fascist arditi and military officers. 
And most importantly, the symbolic construction of the anti-Bolshevik veteran, a 
consequence of the counter-revolutionary reaction in Germany and Hungary, had started 
earlier. And yet, as we will see, the anti-militarist campaign was not directed against the 
Italian ex-combatants. If the anti-socialist groups affirmed the contrary, they were 
misappropriating the symbol of the veterans.  
It is true that the socialists’ disdain for war, linked to the unrealistic appeal to a 
social revolution, outraged the military and the interventionists, who saw in the 
socialists the hated enemy within. The publication of the inquiry about the military 
responsibilities for Caporetto, just when press censorship was lifted, fuelled the socialist 
campaign against militarism in the summer of 1919. Through the pages of the Avanti!, 
the socialists argued that the war had been an atrocious deception, that it had only 
benefited a few bourgeois capitalists while impoverishing, mutilating and killing 
millions of people (Image 1). The extreme repressive conduct of officers towards their 
                                                
156 L’Ordine Nuovo (Turin), 2 August 1919. 
157 Sabrina Sgueglia della Marra, ‘Le aggressioni agli ufficiali nel primo dopoguerra’, Nuova Storia 
Contemporanea, 3 (2012), pp. 117-134. 
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own soldiers (punishment and executions) was thoroughly denounced. All the horrors of 
war were unmasked (Image 2). 
 
 
Image 1: ‘The fruits of war’, Avanti!, 4 August 1919. Image 2: ‘We have stripped the war of its 
cardboard mask!’, Avanti!, 14 August 1919. 
 
It is important to note that whereas the socialists insulted and scorned the army officers, 
this campaign —as its promoters stated— did not intend to ‘denigrate either the 
soldiers, or those who fought, convinced that they were fulfilling a honourable or sacred 
endeavour’.159 It was directed against those who ‘desired the war, against those who 
conducted it badly, and against those who, even worse, glorified it’.160 Instead of 
attacking the soldiers, the socialists condemned the terrible experience of the trenches, 
and contrasted it with the distorted image that the nationalist war propaganda had 
constructed (Image 3). It was suggested that the warmongers had quickly forgotten the 
soldiers after the war, in contradiction with the adulation and obsequiousness offered to 
the soldiers in 1915 (Image 4). The socialists deplored the fact that, while the officers 
did not fight in the trenches, they now enjoyed high pensions; in contrast, the 
conscripted had been suffering at the front, and now suffered persecutions and 
imprisonment. 
 
                                                
159 (‘non è intesa a denigrare nè soldati, nè coloro che si sono battuti nella convinzione di compiere 
opera onesta e santa’) Avanti!, 19 August 1919. 
160 (‘contro quanti hanno voluto la guerra, contro chi l’ha condotta male, contro chi l’ha glorificata 
peggio’) Avanti!, 4 August 1919. 
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Image 3: ‘The soldiers at the front. How they were described by the journalists and how they 
really were’, Avanti!, 24 August 1919. Image 4: ‘1915. 1919’, Avanti! 17 August 1919. 
 
In general, the exposure of these realities was not particularly offensive for most of the 
veterans. Neither did these representations of the veterans’ experiences substantially 
differ from those of certain French veteran groups that carried out their propaganda in 
order to obtain material benefits (Images 5 and 6). The Italian nationalists envied the 
successful French celebration of the victory on 14 July 1919, but the French left was 
very critical of this commemoration, and employed antimilitaristic terms close to those 
of the Italian socialists.161 
 
    
Image 5: ‘8 months later’ and Image 6: ‘Now let us enjoy the fruits of the Victory’, Journal des 
mutilés et reformés des anciens combattants et des victimes de la guerre (Paris), 14 June and 19 
July 1919. 
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However, the antimilitarist campaign provoked indignation not only among the army 
officers, but also among certain leaders of the veterans’ movement. Arditi such as 
Ferruccio Vecchi felt outraged, and clearly took the side of the army officers, through 
articles in L’Ardito and Il Popolo d’Italia. They planned new aggressions against the 
socialists,162 and distributed pamphlets inviting supporters to attack those parties or 
persons who conducted that campaign to discredit ‘those who desired the war and those 
who made it’.163 Different press organs of the ANC published harsh articles against the 
socialists, who were depicted as ‘ravens’ that stirred the memory of the dead for 
partisan objectives. The socialists were ‘defeatists’ who tried to ‘devalue the victory’.164 
The fascists and the veterans’ organization converged in their use of these 
representations.165 Moreover, as the investigation about Caporetto resulted in some 
administrative measures against generals, and thousands of men accused of desertion 
were amnestied, the army’s loyalty to the government weakened. 
The deterioration of the neutrality and discipline of the armed forces facilitated, 
on 12 September 1919, the poet and war hero D’Annunzio’s mobilization of troops and 
volunteers to occupy the city of Fiume. With this action, D’Annunzio became the point 
of reference for the national-revolutionary veterans, arditi and futuristi, who answered 
his call.166 Among the Fiuman legionaries were some who would play an important role 
in the fascist regime —such as Giovanni Giuriati—, and future fascist ANC leaders —
such as Nino Host-Venturi. In fact, some of the fascist veterans left their cities to join 
the venture, and the ANC newspapers generally supported D’Annunzio.167 This action 
aimed to provoke the fall of Nitti’s government, but it was unsuccessful in this 
objective.168 The Prime Minister made a harsh declaration against this case of ‘sedition’ 
(sedizione), but at the same time, closed the debate about the responsibilities for 
Caporetto by highlighting the inevitability of the war and the righteousness of the 
                                                
162 Document from the prefetto of Milan (9 September 1919), ACS, MI, PS (1920), b. 104, f. ‘Milano. 
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army.169 Later, Nitti moderated his position and showed sympathy for the veterans. Yet 
his policy on the Fiume problem was repugnant to the Italian ultra-nationalists, and 
unsatisfactory for the veterans’ leaders. Mussolini did not miss the opportunity to praise 
the predominant orientation of the veteran organizations in favour of D’Annunzio and 
against Nitti.170   
Although the occupation of Fiume was a failure in its immediate political 
objectives, it had decisive consequences, given that it amplified the transnational 
process of symbolic appropriation of the war veteran. Now, foreign observers regarded 
the Italian veterans as a homogeneous part of the overall militaristic, anti-government 
and anti-socialist reaction. On 4 October 1919, a report sent from Italy to the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs depicted a bipolar political panorama, in which the veterans 
(combattants), the fascists, and almost the entire army were opposed to Nitti, whereas 
the socialists supported the Prime Minister: ‘the socialists organise demonstrations 
against the veterans’.171 The occupation of the Adriatic city lasted until the end of 1920, 
and during that time D’Annunzio’s forces received the support of interventionists and 
sectors of the veteran movement. Furthermore, the Fiume episode would precede 
Fascism in areas such as political aestheticization and ritualization.172 The symbol of the 
veteran was by now engendered with a set of implicit meanings that the fascist 
movement would later exploit. 
In this critical situation, it is understandable that Nitti did not promote any 
official commemoration of the victory of 4 November, as was demanded by the 
nationalists and ANC sectors.173 It is not certain that an official celebration would have 
helped to appease the interventionist groups; but its absence did not relieve the 
frustrations of army officers and nationalists, either. A more transcendental event drew 
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close: the Italian elections of November 1919, which would be another major 
disappointment for veterans, fascists and interventionists.174  
There were important symbolic differences in the way fascists and combattenti 
tackled the electoral process. In discursive terms, the political position of the ANC 
veterans —as suggested by the leader Renato Zavataro— was against those who had 
desired the war but had not fought it (the interventionist and nationalist elites), and 
against those who had not desired the war and sabotaged it (the ‘anti-national’ leftist 
forces). Implicitly, the veteran movement represented those who had not desired the 
war but loyally fought it (the majority of soldiers). The ANC’s participation in the 
electoral struggle was obstructed by the socialists, criticised by the fascists, and seen 
with hostility by other political sectors, even the interventionists.175 This was a matter of 
rivalry: in Milan the fascists presented a list of 19 candidates —headed by Mussolini— 
in which almost all members were introduced as veterans. The fascists intended to 
represent those who had desired the war, and also fought it.  
Apart from a very vague programme aiming for the renovation of the political 
elites, the actual alignment of veterans varied much depending on the region and the 
electoral alliances they established. The self-representations they chose to identify their 
candidacies suggest certain diversity (Images 7 to 10). Most of them adopted the helmet 
as a symbol, which remained as the identifying veterans’ icon for the elections of 1921. 
The helmet mirrored an essentially defensive understanding of the role of the 
soldiers.176 Different veteran tickets from the South, in contrast, chose a ladder as the 
representation of their aspirations of social improvement. The fascists’ identifying 
symbol was the fascio, which was rather rooted in the interventionist experience. 
(Though this symbol was also employed by the veterans’ ticket formed by members of 
the ANRZO in Turin). In any case, by the time of the elections, the veterans were 
symbolically confronting the left. The electoral tickets of the socialists were marked by 
the hammer and sickle; they intended to represent the war victims, widows, orphans and 
bereaved people. 
 
                                                
174 For a detailed account, see Giovanni Sabbatucci, I combattenti, pp. 203-223. 
175 For example, see Mussolini, ‘Rilievi elettorali’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 16 October 1919. 
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Images 7 to 10: Veteran and fascist electoral emblems (1919) 
 
The electoral adventure of the combattenti was based on the hope that their moral 
authority over the nation would be enforced by votes, but the veterans’ tickets obtained 
very poor results almost everywhere. The two very clear winners of the elections were 
the socialists (who obtained 156 seats) and the Catholic popolari. The ANC-promoted 
veteran parliamentary group, a heterogenic platform without a clear political direction, 
had only obtained 232,923 votes (4.1%) —20 seats in the Parliament.177 The fascists’ 
results were even more disappointing. This outcome contrasted with the victory of the 
conservative Bloc national in France: 44% of the membership of the so-called Chambre 
blue horizon were veterans. The Italian Camera dei Deputati was composed of 27.97% 
ex-servicemen. Ironically, the Italian Socialist Party was the group with the highest 
percentage of veterans among its Parliamentary representatives (47.4%), who placed no 
stress on their veteran status.178 To make matters worse, it was clear that most Italian 
veterans, even members of the ANC, had voted for the anti-militarist and revolutionary 
options. Many in Italy understood this situation as a victory of pacifist socialism over 
the veterans, who now were represented as embittered and defeated (image 11). In fact, 
in certain veteran journals the results were presented as a new ‘general rehearsal for the 
Bolshevik revolution’.179 
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Image 11: ‘So, it’s me who is defeated!’ (I Combattenti, 6 December 1919) 
 
The fascists went through very critical moments after the elections, but the symbol of 
the veteran acquired further anti-socialist meanings. The day the new Parliament 
resumed its sittings, a demonstration of monarchist military officers in Rome provoked 
clashes with groups of socialists. The ‘patriotic’ demonstrators punched at least one 
socialist MP. Outraged, the socialists immediately called a general strike. Subsequently, 
in many cities, such as Rome, Milan, Turin, Florence, Bologna and Mantua, socialist 
strikers violently attacked officers in uniform.180 This fierce left-wing reaction 
highlighted the wide support enjoyed by the socialists, but the news of attacks against 
officers fuelled the anxiety and hatred of the bourgeoisie. As a result, the anti-socialist 
myth of the ‘abused veteran’ started to circulate. Meanwhile, fascist leaders were 
arrested, accused of threatening public order. The combination of these events helped 
feed the image of veterans being brought into jail, while deserters entered the 
Parliament (image 12).181 Both nationalist veterans and fascists had to come to terms 
with the debacle, but actually they had achieved a determining victory: the symbol of 
                                                
180 La Stampa, 2, 3 and 4 December 1919; Corriere della Sera (Milan), 2 and 3 December 1919; Avanti!, 
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the war veteran had become associated with them, as individuals and organized groups 
essentially opposed to the political left. 
 
 
Image 12: ‘The deserters to Montecitorio… and the veterans to the police van’, I Combattenti, 
21 December 1919. 
 
The socialists, however, conscious that they had gained the support of many ex-soldiers, 
were delighted, and thought that the revolution was within reach. In October, the 
socialist party had confirmed its maximalist direction, aiming at the establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat; they had considered the possibility of using violence 
against the bourgeoisie. They planned to conquer the local councils (comuni) through 
the provincial administrative elections during 1920, and the veterans and the war 
victims would have to play a role.182 Although the socialists lacked a coherent program 
to create a ‘red army’,183 some of them attributed a revolutionary mission to the 
veterans.184 The Lega proletaria would organize them: the apparent revolutionary 
nature of this organization seems clear even from the title of its newspaper: Spartacus. 
This name was not only a reference to the German communist faction, but also an 
allusion to the slave of the first century BC who, after being forced to fight as a 
gladiator, broke his chains to organize a rebellion against his masters. This symbol of 
emancipation figured on the front page of the paper (Image 13), and was representative 
of the socialist understanding of the soldiers’ war experience.  
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Image 13: Spartacus. Organo della Lega Proletaria (Milan, 15 January 1920). 
 
Yet the suggested parallelism with the Italian proletarian soldier was not translated into 
action. In fact, Lega proletaria activities during 1920 remained non-revolutionary. 
Moreover, internal divisions between communists and socialists weakened the 
organization, particularly after 1921. In reality, the political right and the nationalists 
had practically monopolized the symbol of the veteran. At the beginning of 1920, when 
the Italian maximalists launched the project of creating revolutionary soviets, this 
strategy was not based on the old example of ‘soldiers’ and workers’ councils’ that had 
marked the origins of the Russian and German revolutions. The age of the ideal socialist 




War Veterans and the Rise of Italian Fascism (1920-1922) 
 
If some form, however limited, of historical fusion between fascism and veterans did 
indeed take place, its foundations must be sought in Italy. As fascism was born in Italy, 
the link between veterans and fascism was for the first time established in Italian 
Fascism, which would determine the overall relationship that transnational fascism 
maintained with the veterans. In this chapter, I will begin with an assessment of the 
extent to which fascist veterans —particularly the arditi— were the forebearers of 
squadrism, a violent fascist political strategy that overturned the unsuccessful version of 
Italian Fascism born in San Sepolcro. I will then examine the process whereby two 
different historical actors —the fascist movement and the veteran movement— 
interweaved in Italy between 1920 and 1922, showing how this complex relationship 
contributed to the rise of Fascism. My explanation will be based on the simultaneous 
analysis of both movements, the Italian veteran associations ANC and ANMIG on the 
one hand, and the fascist movement and party on the other hand. I will contrast their 
respective organizational and discursive features, highlighting their commonalities and 
intersection points, to assess the nature and depth of their amalgamation until the fascist 
conquest of power in October 1922. 
 In the third section, I argue that the consolidation of the stereotype of the ‘fascist 
veteran’ was one of the most important consequences of the amalgamation between the 
fascists and the Italian ex-soldiers. Historical actors widely employed this constructed 
image, helping to disseminate the interpretation of Fascism as a veteran phenomenon. 
As we will see, at the beginning of 1921, external observers, such as diplomats and 
journalists, transmitted this stereotypical representation of the members of the fascist 
movement to other geographical spaces. This cross-border dissemination justifies 
questioning whether the perception of the fascist veteran stereotype influenced the 
development of the early NSDAP in Germany. I will discuss whether Italian Fascism, 
encapsulated in the symbol of the fascist veteran, was an inspiration for the early Nazi 
movement. 
To conclude, the last section of this chapter will explore the transnational impact 
of the March on Rome. I will ask how the symbolic link established between the war 
veterans and Fascism in October 1922 was perceived, interpreted and employed in other 
countries. To answer this, I will recreate the complex and multi-layered European 
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context, showing how discourses and representations of the fascist veterans influenced 
politics in France, Spain and Germany. The March on Rome was the fascist founding 
myth and, in a sense, it can be considered the birth date of transnational fascism. As we 
will see, the war veterans had an important symbolic role in this foundational event.  
 
From arditismo to squadrismo 
After the November 1919 elections, both the veteran and the fascist movements entered 
into a deep crisis. During 1920, the veterans’ parliamentary group was relatively 
inactive.1 It was in the streets that the veteran movement was most effective, organizing 
protests to obtain an extension of the policies and a greater number of reserved jobs for 
the disabled from the Nitti government. The fascists supported this agitation.2 The ANC 
reached circa 500,000 members this year (the ANC absorbed the ANRZO); the 
organization of agricultural cooperatives was another important field of its activity. But 
bitter internal divisions drove different leaders of the movement apart. Some of them 
made clear their opposition to the socialists.3 The workers’ movement uncovered anti-
patriotic tendencies, when militants attacked the tricolour national flag or —more 
often— replaced it with the red one.4 Throughout the country, at the local level, there 
were occasional conflicts around the commemorations of the war dead soldiers.5 
Bourgeois ex-officers were horrified by the rebellion of the masses. Even if they knew 
that strikers and protestors were ex-soldiers they had formerly commanded in the 
trenches, they appropriated the symbol of the ‘veteran’, complaining that now ‘veterans 
received not only indifference and oblivion, but also sarcasm and acrimony’.6 The anti-
socialist reaction would slowly take shape, and the symbol of the veteran would play an 
important role. 
The ANMIG, for its part, concentrated on obtaining from the government legal 
improvements for the disabled veterans, although the results were unsatisfactory. Its 
leadership was fully renovated: rightist men like Giuseppe Caradonna (later a fascist 
veteran leader from Foggia) and a patriotic propagandist, Carlo Delcroix (a one-eyed, 
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 85 
double amputee from Florence), became more influential. The new leaders insisted that 
the ANMIG maintain on a non-political position, although the anti-government attitude 
was clear. They adopted a rigid ‘apoliticità’ (non political stance) as the precondition of 
any kind of action, while preserving the liberty of thought to the ANMIG members. 
Nevertheless, the fascists did not divert their attention from the activities of the disabled 
veterans.7 
Inside the ANC, political efforts to constitute a real political party of veterans 
were unsuccessful, and in fact led to a double scission of the association. During both 
the ANC and Partito del Rinnovamento (the projected veterans’ party) congresses in 
Naples, August 1920, no precise political project was able to gather consensus. Firstly, 
a group of leaders from northern Italy —the fascists Agostino Lanzillo y Edoardo 
Malusardi among them— abandoned the sessions, since they endorsed for the apolitical 
nature (apoliticità) of the ANC.8 Subsequently, some southern and Sardinian 
representatives separated from the congress, and opted for their own political project, 
which would result in the creation of the autonomist Sardinian Action Party (Partito 
Sardo d’Azione - PSdA) in 1921.9 Significantly, the PSdA would be the only example 
of a successful democratic party of veterans across the country. The southern ANC 
leaders remained isolated, and thus the ‘political’ phase of the nation-wide veterans’ 
movement culminated in a blind alley. As it was said in a very judgmental article 
written by an ANMIG leader, the veterans’ pretension of making politics had been 
completely unfruitful; this kind of ‘veteranism’ —combattentismo, as it was called at 
that moment for the first time—, was considered to be a thing of the past.10 
The attempt to transform the mass of veterans into the basis of a new 
democracy, by introducing profound changes into social and political life and enacting a 
complete change of the ruling classes, was definitely extinguished by the autumn of 
1920. This failure, according to Giovanni Sabbatucci, contributed to deepening the 
political void that made fascist success possible.11 In fact, the fascist movement took 
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advantage of the political and organizational conflicts of the Italian veterans. 
Furthermore, as we will see, the fascists largely benefited from the symbolic 
construction of the anti-Bolshevik veterans, the alleged anti-socialist proclivity of the 
veterans that was embedded in the mentalities of many people. The fascists were going 
to exploit this asset. 
During 1920, Fascism embarked on a path towards the extreme right, pushed by 
a series of events at home and abroad that helped to transform the fascists’ relationship 
with the veterans. Given the paltry results that fascists had obtained by highlighting 
their status as veterans, and the modest electoral performance of veterans themselves, a 
revision of the fascist programme and strategy was needed. As the agitation and strikes 
of the workers escalated forcefully, the veterans’ movement simultaneously developed 
its protest campaigns. Whereas Fascism opposed the workers’ protests, displaying a 
violent anti-socialism, Il Popolo d’Italia observed the veterans’ vindications 
benevolently.12 But the fascists were far from having a dominant influence on the 
veteran movement. At that time, the failure of the Kapp putsch in Germany mirrored the 
widening gap between leftwing workers on the one hand, and the people allegedly 
shaped by the war experience on the other. As events in Germany developed in March 
1920, Mussolini had been well informed about the participation of Freikorps’ returning 
soldiers from the Baltic in the anti-republican coup.13 However, the German working 
class —almost mirroring the Italian reality— emerged victorious once more in its 
conflict with the army and the nationalists. This source of disappointment, however, 
was less disturbing than the problematic occupation of Fiume. The city was not being 
annexed to Italy, and the politics of D’Annunzio was advancing towards a kind of 
revolutionary syndicalism. Furthermore, futurists like Marinetti disliked the 
increasingly anti-popular fascist stance, and preferred to return to a non-political 
position.14 How was Fascism going to reconstruct its veteran politics? 
In the bleak situation of 1920, Fascism resorted to a specific element of the 
veterans’ world: arditismo. This war mentality, conveniently wielded and transmitted, 
would contribute to the recovery of the fascist movement. At the beginning of 1920, in 
the pages of L’Ardito, the political isolation of the fascists and the arditi was 
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acknowledged: the elitist ex-officers had been incapable of attracting the masses of 
veterans, left in the hands of the Bolshevik enemy. Yet Ferruccio Vecchi argued that 
they were not yet tired of the struggle. In fact, he pointed to another element available to 
continue the fight: the young. There were Italian young men, whose desire to fight in 
the war had been frustrated. According to Vecchi, arditismo —adapted to civilian life as 
arditismo civile— would be the tool to educate this new Italian generation, on which all 
hopes were placed. Based in values like courage, fatherland, victory, genius, ‘schools of 
arditismo’ would help to instil the war knowledge and energies into very young Italian 
men (between 15 and 20 years old) for the progress of the country.15  
 
 
Image 14: ‘- What will you teach me in your schools? – To liberate your Fatherland from the 
defeatists and not to dishonour the institutions with deserters…’, L’Ardito, 25 April 1920. 
 
In practical terms, this project implied the transmission of discourses and practices of 
violence to younger generations, and the result would be the revitalization of the fascist 
movement. The target of the violent reaction were the socialists, labelled as ‘defeatists’ 
and ‘deserters’ (Images 14 and 15). Although the aims and mechanisms of this 
                                                
15 Ferruccio Vecchi, Arditismo civile, Milano, 1920; L’Ardito, 4, 11, 18, 25 January, 22 February, 14, 28 
March 1920. 
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‘educational’ project seemed very vague and clumsy, Mussolini fully endorsed it in the 
pages of Il Popolo d’Italia, and actual ‘schools of arditismo’ were opened for the youth 
in the offices of the arditi association in Milan.16 As one of those newly-recruited young 
fascists described in his diary, in the Fascio of Florence —situated in the ANC 
offices—, older ex-arditi instructed them how to throw bombs and attack with daggers 
to dissolve demonstrations of the ‘reds’.17 Meanwhile, fascist ex-arditi like Giuseppe 
Bottai and Piero Bolzon furthered the politicization of their association.18 The 
boundaries between these arditi and the fascists had been blurred since the end of the 
war, but now the ethos of arditismo was systematically injected into young Italians that 
joined the fascist movement. 
 
 
Image 15: ‘We are waiting for you Lenin… come. What is coming, though, is not precisely 
Lenin…’, L’Ardito, 25 April 1920. 
 
Although the fascist characterization of political violence as arditismo was a new 
discursive and symbolic strategy, in Italy the social and political struggles actually were 
increasingly violent.19 The agitation and multiple strikes of the working class sometimes 
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were aggressive. State repression was bloody, and produced a considerable number of 
deaths among the protesting workers and peasants, particularly from the spring of 1920 
on. As we know, in some zones like Lazio, it was the ANC veterans who carried out the 
occupation of land.20 But many bourgeois armed guards were created to confront the 
disturbances across Italy, and veterans were the organizers. For example, in Palermo, in 
April 1920, a group of ex-NCOs suggested the local ANC leaders create a force to 
protect ‘public order’ against the ‘subversive parties’; they would act together with the 
police, even participating in expeditions to other troublespots.21 On one occasion, a 
group of ‘arditi and citizens’ from Naples wrote a letter to the Italian Prime Minister 
Giolitti  —who had been called to substitute Nitti— to express in extremely virulent 
terms the ‘necessity of combating also with violence the internal enemies’.22 Faced with 
the workers’ occupation of factories in August 1920, the Fascio of Venice offered the 
services of ‘around two hundred young veterans from the trenches’ to the prefetto, 
claiming that they would follow the orders of the authorities.23 Although among the so-
called ‘subversives’ there were men who had fought the war, it was only the defenders 
of ‘order’ who depicted themselves as ‘veterans’ (combattenti) or as arditi. 
Meanwhile, Mussolini was moving the fascist movement towards the political 
right, a transformation that alienated important groups of arditi. Whilst relying on a few 
veterans and on the discursive tool of arditismo, the fascists appealed to new social 
groups, namely the well-off young Italians, and any citizen ready to employ violence 
against the left. Thereby, Mussolini made clear that, to join Fascism, there was ‘no need 
to have been a combatant’.24 Fascism was concretely set on a new path, one that was 
fully anti-leftist and ultra-nationalistic. As the ex-arditi were not a monolithic block, a 
crisis broke out in the key Roman section of the arditi association. Revolutionary and 
futurist arditi abandoned Fascism, turning to the left. Ferruccio Vecchi himself would 
be expelled from the association and from the Fascio. The arditi became splintered in 
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very divergent political tendencies.25 D’Annunzio had been Mussolini’s rival in leading 
nationalist veterans, so when Giolitti decided to put an end to D’Annunzio’s adventure 
of Fiume (as a consequence of the Rapallo treaty) in the ‘Bloody Christmas’ of 1920 
(Natale di Sangue), Fascism did not do anything to impede it. In November 1920, 
Mussolini had finalized a pact with the Prime Minister Giolitti that marked the 
definitive stance of Fascism in defence of the social order.  
 The fascist turn to the right provoked an abrupt renovation of the rank and file of 
the fascist movement on the basis of the myths of arditismo and the youth. Whereas 
many syndicalists, interventionist socialists and anarchists fled the Fasci they had 
joined in 1919, it is interesting to note that ‘veterans’ (combattenti) usually maintained 
their allegiance to the movement. And now, many young men and students adhered to 
Fascism. This phenomenon had begun as early as October 1920, for example, in 
Bologna and Ferrara, where the reconstituted Fasci acquired a distinct anti-leftist 
character, and veterans composed the core.26 Likewise, in Sesto San Giovanni, near 
Milan, the board (direttorio) of a new fascist section was formed by all veterans —
including one ex-Fiuman legionary— alongside enthusiastic young people.27 This new 
element, middle-class youngsters who had not fought in the war, composed the ranks of 
the movement.28 They were sons of land proprietors and urban bourgeois families who 
were ready to obey the orders of admired men with military experience. They had only 
a mythic and indirect knowledge of the reality of war, but influenced by the fascist 
discourse that exalted youth and action, desired to emulate the way of life of the daring 
arditi. Thus, as a few fascist veterans had anticipated, many Fasci became schools of 
arditismo.29 
From the end of 1920 on, Fascism fostered the development of what would be 
historically its most decisive political instrument: squadrism (squadrismo). Squadrism 
would provide a very important cultural reference for the rest of its history, easing the 
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way to totalitarianism.30 Landowners, above all in the central and northern agrarian 
provinces, promoted and financed this form of political violence, supported also by the 
petty bourgeoisie. Squadrism was employed to ruthlessly destroy socialism and its 
network of civic and political centres, since socialist agitation was believed to constitute 
a revolutionary threat to the dominant social classes.31 Apart from being a by-product of 
arditismo, squadrism had other connections with the constructed symbol of the veteran. 
An example of this is provided by the violent events of Palazzo D’Accursio in Bologna, 
21 November 1920, considered as the starting point of agrarian squadrism. The killing 
of a nationalist veteran —a councillor of the city— presumably at the hands of socialists 
was an excuse for the Fascist squads —composed of many ex-servicemen— to launch a 
wave of violent reprisals against ‘Bolsheviks’.32 
Officially, after the Bologna events, the ANMIG condemned violence and made 
a public call for calm. Carlo Delcroix poetically talked about love and forgiveness. But 
at the same time, the association had entered into a dynamic of anti-governmental 
radicalization, and was preparing a wide protest campaign to obtain material 
improvements for the disabled. The anger against the socialists had spread. In an 
ANMIG meeting in Milan, the mere suggestion of collaborating with the socialists 
during the protests was received with an overwhelming hostile response from the 
majority of the 2000 attendees; after that, the disabled organized a demonstration that 
ended in a fight against the Royal Guards. Three days before, in a meeting of the 
Milanese Fascio (where Mussolini discussed accepting the Rapallo treaty), Piero 
Bolzon had called for support for the agitation of the ‘glorious disabled veterans’ 
(gloriosi mutilati); consequently, the Fascio decided to provide the veterans with any 
kind of resources they would need. There were more, similarly aggressive, protests of 
disabled veterans during December 1920. Finally, the disabled demonstrated in Rome, 
in front of the Parliament, the same day that in the Chamber some socialist, liberal and 
popolari MPs came to blows in a quarrel motivated by the news of the aggressions 
against the socialists in Bologna. As the disabled violently threatened to invade the 
Chamber, a draft bill to reform the pensions system was urgently approved. The 
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socialists voted favourably, as a proof of their recognition to the disabled, but they 
shouted ‘Down with war!’ during the session, while the MPs of the veterans’ group 
yelled back ‘Long live the war!’. As we see, the disabled veterans’ campaign 
intertwined with the initiation of the fascist offensive of violence, and in both conflicts 
the socialists were seen as the enemy of the veterans.33 
By the end of 1920, the Fiume occupation had been terminated, the veterans’ 
movement was divided and without a clear political orientation; but Fascism had again 
the opportunity to gather veterans’ support through the use of violence against the 
constructed enemy of the veterans —the socialists. Initially, some ANC leaders, who 
blamed the socialists for the ‘devaluation’ (svalutazzione) of the victory, saw in the 
fascist reaction another evil phenomenon. Later, opinions clearly sympathetic to the 
fascists proliferated inside the ANC. Fascist violence was considered a spontaneous 
manifestation against the previous socialist violence and ‘anti-national’ attitude. Pride 
for having fought the war, in addition to sorrow stemming from the ‘devaluation’ of the 
victory, made it likely —according to those commentators— that ‘unremorseful 
veterans’ would join the fascist movement. The phenomenon was believed to be a 
‘noble and legitimate reaction’.34 
The symbol of the veteran offered the fascists a justification, and also a pretext 
to carry out their squadrist actions. In the fascist argumentation, violence was now 
exerted against the socialists because they had previously brutalised army officers, 
because they had disturbed veterans’ meetings and commemorations of the fallen 
soldiers, because they had dishonoured the national flag.35 However, in fact, the 
emerging fascist movement was not just a reaction against previous socialist abuses, 
even if many contemporaries understood it as such. Very few veteran leaders realised 
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later that Fascism was something more: a very serious threat to the authority and 
stability of the state.36 
Squadrism, the key of the fascist success, has been widely studied by historians, 
who have assessed the real and symbolic role of war veterans within it.37 In fact, the 
overwhelming majority of the provincial fascist leaders who commanded the squadre 
had fought in the First World War (70%), comparatively more often in the arditi (22%). 
This was the case of Dino Grandi, Italo Balbo, Roberto Farinacci, Cesare Maria De 
Vecchi, Giuseppe Bottai, Achille Starace, Augusto Turati and several other future 
politicians of the Fascist regime. Certain squadrist leaders —such as Aurelio Padovani 
in Naples— had already played a political role in the ANC. Local studies show that 
within the squadre the percentage of people who had been conscripted during the war 
fluctuated between 56% and 68%; these figures should be considered as a high 
involvement of veterans, thus confirming the statements of the fascists themselves and 
the perceptions of the authorities.38 It was, above all, the youngest front generation 
(born from 1890 onwards) that was most prone to become squadrists. In Sven 
Reichardt’s opinion, this was because the younger men, who had a stronger need to give 
a meaning to their war experience, had probably been more highly influenced by the 
patriotic war propaganda, particularly developed after Caporetto. In addition to this, 
since the squadristi typically did not come from a proletarian background and attained 
officer status during the war, they had experienced war in a less horrifying way, even 
though it had marked them deeply.39 It should also be noted that these younger men had 
waited more time than others to be demobilized during 1919, thus remaining longer 
under the influence of the army and its officers.  
Whilst Fascism unleashed the squadrist offensive, the divided ANC made some 
halting attempts to reorganize and reunify. The fascist leadership was not interested in 
interfering in the ANC leaders’ quarrels, but rather in maintaining the apoliticità of the 
association as long as possible, so that it would not hinder the campaign against the left. 
It was not by chance that the northern ANC leaders wanted to consolidate the apolitical 
essence of the association, since Fascism was growing as a mass movement in the north. 
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Paradoxically, some of those northern ANC leaders were either fascists or fascist-
friendly (i.e.: Agostino Lanzillo in Milan).40 Yet the ANC did not wish to become a 
victim of what actually was a civil war situation. In fact, many anti-fascist veterans 
were members of the ANC sections, and even more of them would join it later, seeking 
a refuge from the fascist aggressions. Not all the fascist ras (local fascist leaders) were 
tolerant towards veterans. In Cremona, the intransigent fascist Roberto Farinacci, whose 
veteran credentials were even less heroic than those of Mussolini, had his first dispute 
with the veterans at the end of February 1921: he accused the veterans of being the 
combatants of the bourgeoisie.41 
The rise of the fascist movement paved the way for quarrels between fascist and 
non-fascist veterans of the ANC. While playing the card of apoliticità in the north, in 
other southern regions the fascist veterans exerted pressures to debilitate and disband 
the leftist or democratically-oriented ANC sections. This was the case of Puglia, where 
the ex-interventionist socialist Gaetano Salvemini, a member of the Parliamentary 
veterans’ group, led the veteran movement. The fascists labelled him as a ‘renounciator’ 
(rinunciatario) in relation to the Dalmatian question. Within the space of a few months, 
the fascist Araldo de Crollalanza succeeded in expelling Salvemini from the ANC 
section.42 In Naples, March 1921, the local ANC elections for a new board also gave 
victory to the fascist veterans.43 The fascist infiltration into the ANC was a route for 
Fascism to expand in the Mezzogiorno. Conversely, some veteran leaders of the ANC 
opted to join the Fasci; this was the case for Giacomo Acerbo in the Abruzzo 
province.44 Fascists and veterans walked on the streets of Teramo chanting patriotic and 
fascist hymns together, having just inaugurated the new local ANC section with a 
speech by Acerbo.45 In Florence, the collaboration of the ANC section was most clear; 
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squadrists were seen leaving the local ANC offices before committing their attacks.46 
(The criminal actions of the Florentine fascists led to a popular uprising in the city, 
between late February and early March 1921, which was reported in numerous 
international newspapers). The ambiguous stance of the ANC and its members 
regarding the fascist movement was a cause for the increasing fascistization of the 
symbol of the anti-Bolshevik veteran. 
The contacts of disabled veterans with the fascists contradicted the officially 
non-political posture of the ANMIG. During the spring of 1921, the disabled veterans 
launched a set of actions in the main cities, pressuring the authorities to favour the 
veterans’ employment in different administrations, especially the state railway 
(Ferrovie dello Stato). Disabled veterans assaulted and occupied the state railway 
offices in Rome, obstructing the work of the women that they wanted to replace. 
Although the left argued that this conflict was another example of the class struggle, the 
disabled did not assume this discourse, and expelled the communist agitators from their 
demonstrations. In contrast, in many cities the disabled required the help of the fascists, 
and thus the agitation increased. Their actions succeeded in Rome, Florence, and other 
northern cities. In Brescia, for example, a group of disabled, along with veterans, 
fascists and ex-Fiuman legionnaires occupied the post offices, expelling all the women 
working there. In Padua a similar action was ended with the hoisting of the Italian flag 
(tricolore) over the occupied offices building —a gesture that contrasted with the use of 
the red flag in the socialist comuni. In Milan, the fascists and disabled veterans erected 
barricades and fought against the Royal Guards (guardia regia). All this agitation 
actually pushed the authorities to discuss new measures in favour of the disabled 
veterans, who therefore saw in the fascists their successful defenders. An ANMIG 
message regarding the agitation alleged that it had not required the help of any 
organization, but, in fact, cooperation between fascists and disabled veterans had been 
widespread.47 
This initial goodwill of some veterans towards Fascism could be traced to the 
process of appropriation of the war memory that the fascists undertook as squadrism 
was coming into force. In this endeavour, the fascists took advantage of the difficulties 
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of the Italian state in developing a commemorative settlement. Finding a shared 
symbolic framework for a national commemoration of the Italian victory was an 
extremely onerous mission.48 Firstly, because in all belligerent countries the 
construction of the war memory —including the role of veterans within it— was always 
marked by contradictions, struggles, negotiations and fractures.49 In this sense, the 
boycotts perpetrated by the Italian socialists and revolutionaries against several patriotic 
celebrations should not be considered as an exclusive characteristic of postwar Italy. 
Furthermore, celebrating victory in Italy was more controversial than in other countries, 
since the persistent divisions between interventionists and neutralists converted the war 
memory into a clearly divisive issue. The disappointing outcome of Versailles had 
prevented the Italian state from emulating the celebrations of the allies in 1919. Still, 
during 1920 the state did offer a variety of symbolic rewards to the authors of victory, 
as other victorious nations did. Medals were created and bestowed on veterans, namely 
the Commemorative Medal of the Italian-Austrian War —created in July 1920 for 
practically all Italian ex-soldiers—, and the Interalleate Medal —coined in December 
1920 and given to many veterans of the victorious nations. Italy belatedly (in 
comparison with its former allies) celebrated the war victory for the first time in 1920. 
Although the ANC had been an interlocutor of the authorities in the development of 
many of these initiatives, the veterans still did not have a central role in the official 
ceremonies. The ANMIG leaders bitterly lamented that the celebrations came too late.50 
The fascists made the most out of the gaps in the Italian symbolic approach to 
the war memory, and a set of symbols linked to the veterans were the first elements that 
the fascists misappropriated. The squadre adopted militaristic pennants as a sign of their 
unity and faith.51 Since so many members of the squadre were ex-soldiers, the veterans’ 
most easily recognizable identifying symbols —the soldiers’ helmet and medals—, 
overlapped with the symbolic squadrist garments —the black shirt and the black beret. 
By examining photographs of the squadrists and fascist leaders, it is possible to verify 
that fascist veterans frequently bore, attached to their uniforms, the commemorative 
medals created in 1920. Using the helmet during a squadrist action was less a physically 
protective measure than a means of self-representation for the fascist veterans. 
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The amalgamation between the veterans’ and the fascists, whose power became 
overwhelming in certain provinces —especially in the Po valley—, raised concerns 
among some of the veterans’ leaders. The fascists were proud, on the contrary, to 
highlight the alleged general sympathy and fraternity between both entities, owing to 
their common programmatic points. The fascists patronizingly reassured the veterans 
clarifying that they ‘never had the whim […] of reducing the ANC sections to nothing 
more than local branches of the Fasci di combattimento’.52 This arrogance was possible 
when the national elections of May 1921 had given Fascism an important victory. After 
the first bloody squadrist wave, Fascism entered in the Parliament, walking hand in 
hand with the Italian conservatives of Giolitti’s National Bloc. In the new legislature, 
the fascist group was composed of 35 MPs; 28 of them (80%) were war veterans, 
although this time —a lesson learnt after the failure of the November 1919 elections— 
the veteran credentials were exhibited with moderation. In contrast, the Nationalist 
Parliamentary group was composed of 9 MPs; 8 of them were veterans. The so-called 
Partito dei combattenti still survived, but with only 10 seats. In total, in the Chamber 
there were 135 veterans, 25’76% out of 524 seats.53 
 
The fascist veterans: a travelling stereotype 
Fascism was booming, and violence was the key to its success; the violent symbolic 
appropriation of the veteran by the fascist movement produced a stereotype: the fascist 
veteran. Once this emblematic figure became recognisable to foreign observers, the 
perceived meaning of the fascist movement started to be communicated to other 
geographical spaces. The agents of these transfers were, above all, diplomats and 
journalists from different countries; witnesses who chose to accentuate the veteran 
element of Fascism, to define its essence. In this sense, France and Germany, adjacent 
countries with an enormous number of war veterans, were highly exposed to Fascism. 
The French government was well informed about the Italian disturbances 
through its ambassador in Rome. At the end of October 1920, for example, the 
ambassador described the Italian nationalist reaction as something produced by the 
arditi associations, and by ‘fasci di combattimento’ that ‘grouped war veterans and 
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nationalist militants’.54 On 22 March 1921, having sent a number of reports about the 
fascist anti-revolutionary, violent reaction, the ambassador Barrère wrote to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affaires suggesting it would be ‘convenient’ to devote a press 
article about Fascism in the French journal Temps.55 The French diplomats had a very 
positive opinion of the movement,56 in part because of the perceived importance 
veterans played in it. Hence, the fascist deeds attracted the attention of French 
journalists as well. Among the first foreign explanations about Fascism was an article 
published in the Parisian Le Figaro at the end of March 1921.57 There, it was 
highlighted that the ‘fascio di combattimento, has been constituted after the war by 
veterans who wanted to safeguard their interests. They soon assumed the task of 
fighting all the saboteurs of the victory’. Thus, a hegemonic interpretation of the origins 
and causes of Fascism, which was related to the Italian veterans, consolidated in France. 
Not only biased French journalists assumed this judgment. In April 1921, after 
the Italian Parliament had been dissolved and new elections had been called, the Swiss 
ambassador in the capital city transmitted the following description of Fascism:58  
 
The word comes from ‘fascio’, faisceau or league. In the aftermath of the war, leagues of war 
veterans were constituted everywhere with the aim of maintaining solidarity among the veterans 
and defending their interests. These leagues very quickly took on a political character as a 
consequence of the violent antimilitaristic campaign unleashed in the country by the socialists 
and the frequent attacks against officers and other soldiers. In small villages, for example, there 
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were cases where the local socialists refused to honour with a monument the memory of the 
fallen soldiers. Decorated military or junior officers during the war were insulted or relegated by 
the socialists to some form of public contempt. These facts would produce a reaction, which 
was very slow to take shape. […] 
 
This document and the above mentioned press article, apart from containing a 
misleading simplification of the veterans’ role in the origin of the fascist rise, show two 
things. Firstly, they demonstrate that by the spring of 1921, Fascism had been 
successful in imposing a perception: that of Fascism as the reaction of the war veterans 
against the pacifist and anti-militarist socialists. And secondly, they testify that this 
constructed image started to transcend national boundaries. In addition, these French 
and Swiss examples illustrate the widespread satisfaction of conservative circles 
regarding fascist violence, understood as a simple reaction against the revolutionary 
leftist ‘excesses’. The reality rather was that Fascism was attacking the same alleged 
internal enemy of the war period: pacifists, neutralists and rinunciatari whose 
annihilation was a step necessary to resume the fight for the nationalist objectives. The 
veterans who were protagonists of this reaction were violent, although their numbers 
were very limited in overall terms —only those who, apart from believing in the 
expansionist aims, saw their primordial class enemy in the left. But most foreign 
spectators did not capture the complexity of the origin of Italian Fascism. 
 In this manner, the stereotype of the fascist veteran began to circulate outside 
Italy, influencing extreme right and veterans’ associations. Taking as true the 
dominating belief that the Italian First World War veterans were a seamless nationalist 
and anti-Bolshevik collective, observers were ready to assume the characterization of 
the fascist as a war veteran. This assumption might have been also a conscious 
discursive strategy of right-wing groups, to conveniently convince the public that 
veterans were inclined to conservative and counter-revolutionary positions. In any case, 
the example of Italian Fascism contributed to give relevance to the inclination of 
veterans towards conservative and reactionary politics. In other words, it furthered the 
symbolic appropriation of the veterans by the right in other countries. In France, 
nationalist students and ex-officers were elements of existing rightist groups, but after 
the example of Fascism, this reality was increasingly highlighted and put in relation 
with the Italian case. 
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Paradoxically, the left was also giving relevance to the veterans’ input into 
Fascism. Maurice Pottier, a war veteran and member of the leftist French group Clarté 
(founded by Barbusse), realised that the Italian veterans had quite diverse political 
orientations, but that ‘a certain number’ of them, ‘above all ex-officers’ had sided with 
the ‘conservative elements’. This commentator considered that this phenomenon was 
also happening in France, and in other countries. He thought that the ‘conservative and 
violently anti-proletarian attitude’ of some veterans was a ‘dangerous aberration’.59 But 
his article was actually a concession to the fascists’ self-characterization as veterans. 
Leftist Italian observers also detected the participation of war veterans in the 
fascist movement, and this perception contributed to the European circulation of the 
prototypic image of the fascist veteran. As the primordial target of fascist violence, the 
Italian socialists were among the first people who rationally analysed the origins and 
nature of Fascism. One of those intellectuals was the moderate socialist Giovanni 
Zibordi. Like other Marxists, Zibordi sought the causes of the fascist reaction in the 
economic and social contradictions of the postwar period, yet without underestimating 
the role of the war experience. At the beginning of April 1921, Zibordi’s article on the 
‘elements and motives’ of Fascism, published in the review Critica Sociale, argued 
about the participation of ‘professionals of violence’ within the fascist movement. 
These people, ‘maladjusted from war’, were young men who had gone to war at less 
than 20 years old, and now they were unable to resume their studies or jobs.60 He 
claimed that, during the war, the petty-bourgeoisie had experienced the capacity to give 
orders, as well as the adventure of combat, and now they were reluctant to return to 
their humble civil occupations. Later on, socialists’ analyses of the fascist violence in 
different regions insisted on the role of ex-arditi, ex-officers, and ex-combatants in the 
movement.61 These leftist perceptions were likely to be transferred outside Italy. 
 In Germany, socialists and communists paid attention to what was happening on 
the Italian left, particularly since the beginning of 1921.62 German newspapers of every 
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political hue had transmitted information about important postwar Italian events. As 
early as January 1921, the social-democratic paper of Munich, Münchener Post, 
reproduced an article about Fascism, recently published by the Austrian Arbeiter-
Zeitung. It was a first-hand report about the fascist violence, where it was noted that the 
fascists’ support was ‘based on the returning soldiers and their discontent’.63 However, 
the author argued that the fascists were the responsible for having forced the Italian 
Parliament to discuss and approve a new disabled veterans’ benefits law. This 
misapprehension proves that veterans and fascists were sometimes undistinguishable to 
foreign observers. Shortly after, a communist paper in the Bavarian capital mentioned 
the existence of the ‘white guard terrorist organization of the fascists’.64 Die Rote Fahne 
explained that the Fasci main programmatic point was the ‘glorification of the front 
combatant’.65 And reports about the fascist violence followed in other leftist papers, and 
later in liberal ones as well.66 At the beginning of May 1921, an article written by the 
Vorwärts correspondent in Italy vividly described the fascist violence that had disturbed 
the normal electoral process.67 Some days later, a translation into German of the above 
mentioned Zibordi’s article about the components of Fascism was published in 
Vorwärts, and the editors of this socialist paper suggested that such political 
phenomenon could be found also in Germany, not only in Italy.68 Revealing the 
veterans’ input to the fascist movement, this translated article contributed to simplifying 
the German perceptions of Fascism, which hereafter would be based on recognisable 
stereotypes. 
Thus, the German public became aware that Fascism was a phenomenon of 
young ex-combatants and ex-officers, groups of individuals widely present in Germany. 
As the German anti-republican terrorist organisations led by ex-officers, such as the 
Orgesch and the Organisation Consul, committed deadly attempts to assassinate 
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politicians in mid-1921, German left-wing opinion qualified these actions as ‘fascist’.69 
At the same time, perceiving the outrage that the fascists provoked on the German left, 
the anti-republican extreme right might have tended to stress the distinguished common 
features with Italian Fascism —namely, the veteran factor. 
 The hypothesis that early German perceptions of Italian Fascism may have 
played a crucial role in the evolution of the Nazi movement has been underexplored by 
historians. The NSDAP, as we know, was born later than the Fascist movement, and its 
growth as a mass movement was posterior to the expansion of squadrism in Italy. I have 
demonstrated that the violent practices of Italian Fascism were known in Bavaria at 
least since the beginning of 1921; hence it is reasonable to believe that Italian Fascism 
did influence the evolution of the early Nazi movement, even if this influence was not 
based on direct contacts. While taking into account that Nazism was a product rooted in 
German extreme right traditions, and that the German post-war experience was of 
paramount importance in the origins of Nazism, here I will assume that the early Nazi 
movement was also influenced by its predecessor, Italian Fascism. Particularly, I will 
explore the role of veterans in the transfer of the fascist political example into Germany. 
As the stereotype of the fascist veteran had reached Germany in January 1921, at the 
very latest, it is important to observe how the Nazi movement’s stance regarding the 
war veterans changed around this time. 
By January 1921, the NSDAP had around 3.000 members, most of them 
inhabitants of Bavaria attracted by Hitler’s oratory during his propaganda tours.70 
Although veterans might have made up a substantial part of the membership and 
leadership, the party did not have any particular programme regarding them. In the 
Völkischer Beobachter, there had been invocations to the youth (Jugend) as the last 
heroic resort to save the Fatherland.71 At the end of 1920, when this journal became the 
official organ of the Nazi movement, the veterans’ issues were rather absent from its 
pages. At that time, in a brief description of the veterans’ organizations published in 
their paper, the Nazis just showed preference for the so-called Frontkriegerbund, a 
small veterans’ group from Munich that was opposed to the socialist, communist and 
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Jewish veterans’ associations.72 But there was no direct connection between both 
organizations yet.73 Hitler obtained the control of the NSDAP in July 1921. 
Immediately, he took the initiative to reform the party’s ‘sports section’, to create what 
later would be known as the Sturmabteilung (SA). Even though it is difficult to give an 
empirical demonstration, it is plausible that Hitler, who used to read the Munich press, 
were inspired by the descriptions of the squadrist’s violence to create the SA. Would the 
veterans in the early SA play the same role as in Fascism? 
Although the Bavarian context determined the lower inflow of war veterans into 
the Nazi movement, the circulating stereotype of the fascist veterans most probably 
contributed indirectly to shaping the membership of Hitler’s party. According to 
NSDAP sources, the first group of the SA was composed of 25 men, but only 8 of them 
were veterans or disabled veterans.74 However, in June 1921 the government took the 
decision to dissolve the Bavarian Einwohnerwehren. Apparently, many of the members 
of this paramilitary organization, as well as returning volunteers of the dissolved 
Freikorps Oberland, flocked to the SA.75 At that time, Freikorps members (like Rudolf 
Heß and Ernst Röhm), as well as other ex-soldiers, trained and directed the younger 
men of the SA.76 Yet the Nazi calls for membership were still directed towards the 
youth, rather than towards the veterans.77 It is true that veterans were given free 
entrance to some Nazi meetings,78 and invited to join the party, but this does not mean 
that they were the primary target of the NSDAP mobilizing discourse. The Nazi party 
was still a minor anti-Semitic organization, without any special interest in the war 
veterans. Therefore, even if some German veterans joined the NSDAP in the Bavarian 
environment, this was not the result of a conscious political strategy, but the 
consequence of the German and Bavarian contexts. Still, as has been said, the Italian 
example of the fascist veterans was an element that already circulated, and was part of 
such a political environment. 
Foreign policy was another factor that predisposed the Nazi movement towards 
Italian Fascism. In general, among the German extreme-right groups, the perception of 
Italian Fascism was not positive, given the fascist aggressions towards the German 
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minority in Südtirol, which had outraged the German nationalists.79 In contrast, Hitler 
had shown, already in 1920, his preference for an alliance between Germany and Italy.80 
As he explained in a meeting of war veterans, this rapprochement would drive a wedge 
between Italy and France, thus debilitating Versailles status quo.81 The Völkischer 
Beobachter usually expressed support for the Südtirol Germans; but in November 1921, 
when for the first time the violent actions of the Italian fascists in Südtirol were 
mentioned, the paper emphasized the ‘patriotism and spirit of sacrifice’ of the fascists to 
defend the fatherland from Bolshevism, as a positive facet of the movement. Yet no 
particular relevance was given to the participation of veterans in the movement.82 
The NSDAP of 1920-1921, therefore, was neither a simple imitation of the 
Italian fascist movement, nor a party that oriented its politics and programme towards 
the veterans. It is very difficult to know when exactly Hitler knew about Fascism, and 
how this knowledge influenced his political conduct. In the first half of 1921, the 
stereotype of the fascist veteran had started to circulate in Germany and Bavaria, and it 
is likely, albeit difficult to prove, that it became an inspiration for the early Nazis. At 
any rate, during 1921, the example of Italian Fascism was not yet decisive for the 
trajectories of the German extreme right and war veterans’ paramilitary organizations. 
However, as Italian Fascism continued its violent and successful path towards power, 
this political model, conveyed by the symbol of the fascist veteran, would become 
crucial to understand future German developments. 
 
Italian war veterans and the fascist seizure of power 
Despite the symbolic appropriation of the veteran by the fascist movement, we should 
not believe that the majority of Italian veterans were either fascists or sympathisers of 
Fascism. In fact, the open armed confrontation between fascists and socialists can be 
seen as a civil war between veterans. Lega proletaria centres and meetings, as a part of 
the socialist network, were systematically attacked.83 The fascists made no distinctions 
between socialists and communists, even if in January 1921 an important scission in the 
PSI had taken place, whereby the Italian Communist Party was born. Veterans had also 
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set up leftist defence organizations (guardie rosse). The Arditi del Popolo appeared in 
the summer of 1921, at the initiative of the anarchist ex-ardito Argo Secondari, ready to 
defend the working class from fascist aggression. This anti-fascist organization spread 
quickly, reaching 20.000 members in the summer, most of them in the region between 
Rome and Ancona, Lazio, Umbria and Le Marche.84 Despite being immediately 
persecuted by the authorities and attacked by the fascists, their achievements cannot be 
overlooked. In discursive terms, for a short period, this leftist reaction was successful in 
snatching the symbol of the arditi and the ethos of arditismo from the fascist dominion. 
Among Italians, the notion of arditismo would become a category to make sense of the 
overlapping violence between the fascists and the left.85 
 In this increasingly worrying situation, the ANC officially welcomed the so-
called ‘pact of pacification’ (patto di pacificazione) between fascists and socialists in 
the summer of 1921, which had been promoted —among others— by Acerbo.86 At the 
local level, sections of the ANC worked to reach an agreement, though during these 
efforts they blamed the socialists for their ‘hate propaganda’; the conditions proposed 
for the pacification meant concessions to fascist objectives.87 Soon, the official ‘pact of 
pacification’ became a dead letter. Fascist violence did not stop, but increased during 
the autumn of 1921 and 1922, beyond Mussolini’s control. 
Amidst this turmoil, the northern ANC group —endorsed by the fascists— was 
able to impose the thesis of the apoliticità of the veterans’ organization, marginalising 
the dissident ANC splinter groups. Through a series of internal struggles, the fascists 
gained a presence within the veteran organization.88 In Rome, Adolfo Schiavo, an ex-
officer from an aristocratic background and a member of the Fasci di combattimento, 
took over the ANC provincial section, and launched a set of actions to debilitate the 
national directing board of the ANC situated in Rome.89 When the III Congress of the 
ANC was organized in the Augusteo of Rome, in November 1921, the old directing 
board was expelled, and the association reconfirmed its non-political nature. It is 
eloquent by itself the fact that, just a few days after this declaration, the fascist congress 
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in the same place transformed the fascist movement into a party: the PNF. Although 
Fascism had neither absorbed nor subjugated the veteran movement, there had been a 
palpable displacement of the centre of gravity of the political action of the Italian war 
veterans.90 In other words, Fascism had become the main expression of veteran politics. 
The reason why the ANC and the fascist congresses coincided in Rome in 
November 1921 is that on this date, Italy performed the transnational ceremony of the 
entombment of the Unknown Soldier (Milite Ignoto) in the Roman Vittoriano (Altare 
della Patria).91 The ANMIG was very critical of the government, considering that the 
celebration came too late.92 Although the entombment ceremony of the Milite Ignoto 
had the potential to transcend political divisions, the fascists presented themselves as 
defending the commemorative process from the subversives’ attacks. After this 
celebration succeeded in Rome, Mussolini took the opportunity to declare at the fascist 
congress that the Milite Ignoto rested in peace thanks to the fascist movement. Thus, in 
November 1921, the fascists took a further step in the appropriation of the veterans’ 
symbolic representation. Fascism had decided to impose its own version of the victory, 
and it would not allow the country to transform the next celebration of the 4 November 
into a date of national reconciliation. 
Throughout 1922, the PNF continued its efforts to absorb the support of 
veterans, while the ANC increased its protests to obtain benefits and privileges from the 
government. In April 1922, the national council of the PNF requested to the Fasci that 
the veterans, mutilated, and the mothers of fallen soldiers be given the highest honours 
in every national celebration: the fascists were allowed to employ ‘any means’ to force 
the authorities to fulfil this measure.93 At the time, in many cities the ANC veterans 
were expressing their determination to make real once and for all their aspirations; it 
was time, they said, to give justice to the ‘heroes of yesterday, atrociously mocked 
today’; they announced a wide protest campaign.94 The fascists tried to offer the 
veterans the recognition they craved. In order to widen the antithesis between the 
veterans and the left, Il Popolo d’Italia used the misleading image of the heroic but 
crippled war veteran (Image 16).  
 
                                                
90 Giovanni Sabbatucci, I combattenti, pp. 357-358. 
91 Bruno Tobia, L’Altare della Patria, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998, pp. 61-86. 
92 Il Bollettino, 1 November 1921. 
93 (‘qualsiasi azione’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 6 April 1922. 
94 (‘eroi di ieri, oggi atrocemente beffati’) Ordine del giorno of the ANC (9 April 1922), ACS, MI, PS 
(1922), b. 99, f. Massa e Carrara. 
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Image 16: ‘The Shadow of the Hero – Scoundrels!’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 27 May 1922. 
 
This discursive and symbolic dynamic, fostered above all by Fascism, served to 
exacerbate the frustrations of the veterans. The fascist position in defence of a patriotic 
and nationalist version of the war memory, together with the fascist defence of the 
alleged special rights of the ex-soldiers, and the PNF stance in favour of social order, 
seemed to facilitate further recruitment from the veterans to the fascist movement. By 
May 1922, the PNF would reach 322,310 members, the majority from the centre and the 
north of Italy. The middle classes were predominant. Workers composed 40% of the 
Party membership, and 24% were agriculture workers; these groups being most 
probably attracted to the party as war veterans imbued by myths like that of the peasant-
soldier. 88 out of 136 national and provincial fascist leaders were war veterans; and 
among these, 32 had been war volunteers, 73 had been officers, 31 hold silver medals 
and 40 hold bronze medals.95  Many Italian men who felt moved to political action as 
veterans did so by joining the PNF, thereby supporting squadrism.  
However, violence was the factor that contributed the most to the consolidation 
of the symbolic link between the fascists and the veterans. From the summer of 1922 
on, veterans literally assaulted the offices of public and private institutions where they 
wanted to be employed, expelling women from their jobs. In an echo of the disabled 
veterans’ protests of the spring of 1921, the fascists joined the veterans’ demonstrations, 
threatening the authorities and trying to impose the veterans’ will. In August 1922, this 
                                                
95 These data from Emilio Gentile: Storia del partito fascista, pp. 556-557, 562-563. 
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strategy especially succeeded in cities where the fascists had a bigger influence on the 
veterans: Bologna, Florence, Pisa, Rome.96 In Genoa, the veterans’ ringleader stated 
that if their energetic action —the occupation of offices— yielded no results, they 
would ‘also have recourse to violent means, requiring the participation of the fascists 
and nationalists’.97 Still, in many other provinces, particularly in the Mezzogiorno, the 
fascist tactics found no followers. 
Not only was violence the key to forging a sense of community among veterans 
and fascists; violence also served to destroy the leftist veterans’ organizations. The 
arditi del popolo offered strong resistance to the fascists in Livorno, Genoa, Ancona; 
they were largely involved in the combats of the 24 May 1922 in Rome, and in the 
defence of Parma from fascist assault in August 1922.98 Yet the connivance of the army 
and the police with the fascists made resistance hopeless. After the failure of the leftist 
strike movement of August 1922, the organization of the arditi del popolo faded. 
Furthermore, the squadrists attacked any organization that challenged their 
monopolization of ‘patriotic’ politics and symbols: even the headquarters of the 
Catholic ex-servicemen association, the UNRG linked to the PPI, were vandalized, and 
its members brutalised.99 This strategy foreshadowed what would happen in the 
following years to the whole of the ANC.  
Considering the influence that several fascists had attained inside the ANC, it 
does not seem a mere coincidence that, while rumours and comments about a fascist 
‘March on Rome’ (Marcia su Roma) freely circulated since August 1922,100 the fascist 
veterans decided to step up their agitation. Special veterans’ committees were formed, 
and violent actions continued; for example, the occupation of bank offices. A large 
demonstration of ex-servicemen teachers took place in Rome.101 In Tuscany, in Ancona, 
and other places, action squads (squadre di azione) of veterans appeared decked out in 
helmets and green-grey shirts.102 At the end of September 1922, the national board of 
the ANC planned to launch a simultaneous campaign of agitation across Italy to tackle 
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Livorno; Il Combattente. Settimanale. Organo dei Combattenti Mantovani (Mantova), 21 September 
1922. 
 109 
the problem of veteran unemployment.103 On 2 October 1922, the ANC, in accord with 
the ANMIG, sent a memorandum giving instructions to prepare a wide coordinated 
demonstration that should take place at some point after the 20 October 1922. This 
document was signed, in the name of the ANC national board, by the secretary [Angelo] 
Zilli, and by [Nino] Host-Venturi, both members of the fascist movement.104  
Although there was no direct connection between these preparations by the 
veterans and fascist plans to carry out the March on Rome (they started to take shape 
later in mid-October), the veterans’ agitation contributed to destabilizing public order. 
The veterans were, at the same time, taking advantage of the state crisis to push for 
special privileges. In doing so, they did not refrain from replicating fascist methods or 
—at the local level— directly asking the fascists for help. Furthermore, their presence in 
the public sphere, many times in tandem with the fascists, helped to consolidate the 
perception that the fascists had the support of the Italian veterans. Undoubtedly, 
however, the masses of Italian ex-soldiers had very diverse opinions about Fascism, 
ranging from opposition to indifference and full support. But the struggle of the 
veterans and the fascist campaigns were combining and mixing in the symbolic realm. 
During the fascist mass meeting of Naples prior to the March on Rome, the 
fascists publicly clarified their political plans in relation to veterans. Giacomo Acerbo 
was in charge of detailing this programme. (As we know, Acerbo was a provincial ANC 
leader). Firstly, he declared that the problems of the veterans had a substantial 
importance for the PNF, because —according to him— the great majority of the 
veterans were fascist militants, and because Fascism placed the valuation 
(valorizzazione) of the war ideals and the victory at the core of its doctrine. Acerbo said 
that Fascism would definitely resolve the veterans’ problems. Fascism would not place 
veterans in syndicates, since the PNF actually was ‘the true party of the Italian 
veterans’. He said that Fascism was the only movement capable of enforcing veterans’ 
rights. He predicted that soon all the Italian veterans would flock to Fascism. In the 
subsequent discussion, several veteran leaders who were present raised more precise 
questions. It was predicted that the ANC would soon constitute one of the biggest forces 
of the PNF. It was suggested that the PNF contact the organizations of the veterans 
abroad, because they regarded Fascism as the ‘purest interpreter of their feelings’. 
                                                
103 ACS, MI, PS (1922), b. 99, f. Affari Generali.  
104 Copy of ANC memorandum, transmitted by the prefetto of Rome (17 October 1922), ACS, MI, PS 
(1922), b. 99, f. Roma. 
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Another attendee, Vittorio Arangio Ruiz, an ANC northern leader, stated that the ANC 
desired to come into contact with the PNF, to ensure that the ANC remained free of 
‘antinational’ members, and to avoid conflicts with the fascists.105 After each side made 
these promises, the expected veterans’ agitation did not take place. 
The involvement of certain groups of veterans, sometimes as an emanation from 
ANC sections, in preparing the final fascist assault on the state, seems unquestionable. 
Apart from the inaction of the army in front of the fascist challenge, not only the myth 
of the war experience and the squadrist ethos, but also the military training acquired 
during the Great War by the squadrist veterans —transmitted to younger generations—
paved the way for the March on Rome. For example, in Florence, a group of 13 
members of the ANC section, led by the fascist veteran Fernando Agnoletti, had been 
responsible for squadrist actions in the Tuscan countryside since 1920. They had grown 
in numbers, and formed the so-called ‘Cesare Battisti’ squad (named after the irredentist 
martyr). By September 1922 this veteran group was equipped with military gear (grey-
green shirts), and in October they participated in the March on Rome.106 The ANC 
federation of Bologna, where veterans like Angelo Manaresi (ex-alpino) and Umberto 
Guglielmotti (nationalist) were influential, also participated in the operation with a 
group of men.107 For their part, the arditi of the Federazione Nazionale Arditi d’Italia 
(created by Mario Carli that month to gather the fascist arditi) declared their interest in 
finding an agreement with the PNF, to further their collaboration prior to the March on 
Rome.108 The ANC section of Naples, similarly, decided to join the fascist action, even 
if the fascist leaders would not ultimately need their help.109 In total, they were a few 
small veterans’ groups, but their important symbolic presence cannot be overlooked. 
Meanwhile, the official apoliticità of the ANC made the members of the 
association bystanders in the conquest of power of October 1922. The guarantors of 
apoliticità within the ANC boards exhorted the rest of the veterans to maintain 
themselves silently outside of the struggle, invoking the veterans’ loyalty to the king 
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Vittorio Emanuele III.110 We have seen that despite the official neutrality of both the 
ANC and the ANMIG, a certain rapprochement and collusion between important groups 
of veterans and the fascists had already started before the March on Rome.111 What 
historically was far more decisive, however, is that in the symbolic realm, the veterans 
had become an imaginary subject not clearly differentiated from the fascist 
phenomenon. 
 
Veterans and the transnational impact of the March on Rome 
The emblematic images of the fascist regime’s founding myth, the March on Rome, are 
tough men dressed in a militaristic manner, wearing the black shirts of the squadrists, 
their chests ostentatiously covered with medals, martially parading along the streets of 
Rome and other Italian cities. The four men who led the March on Rome (Michele 
Bianchi, Emilio De Bono, Cesare Maria De Vecchi and Italo Balbo) clearing the way 
for Mussolini, could be perceived as victorious war veterans imposing their will to 
rescue the country from the hands of decadent liberal politicians and from the 
revolutionary communist threat. Photographs and illustrations of this kind slowly 
flowed into the European information networks, after the fascist seizure of power 
(Image 17).112 
 
                                                
110 La Nuova Giornata, 1 November 1922. 
111 This fact introduces nuances to the conclusion of Giovanni Sabbatucci, I combattenti, p. 360, that the 
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Image 17: ‘The Fascist coup in Italy’, Wiener Bilder. Illustriertes Familienblatt (Vienna), 5 
November 1922.  
 
In fact, the fascists auto-represented themselves in their proclamations as ‘mostly the 
combatants of the Carso and the Piave who wanted to liberate Italy’.113 When the 
seizure of power was celebrated in several Italian cities, war veterans joined the fascist 
parades.114 Observing the fascists’ ordered processions and their ‘patriotic chants’, 
people recalled the ‘glorious ranks of our valorous combatants’.115 The fascists claimed 
to have achieved victory on behalf of the fallen soldiers (caduti). An illustration in Il 
Popolo d’Italia represented the squadrists raising their arms in Roman salute to the 
resurrected corpses of the trenches, who responded with a military salute (Image 18).  
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Image 18: ‘Comrades’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 7 November 1922. 
 
In reality, the March on Rome had not strictly taken place: the fascist seizure of power 
was due to Mussolini’s double strategy of violence and political intrigue, and the entry 
of the fascists to Rome was a violent dramatization to convince the public that the 
blackshirts had conquered power through their march on the capital.116 Besides, the 
manly icon of the quadrumviri represented squadrism, not the veteran movement. On 30 
October, the king appointed Mussolini to be the new Prime Minister (presidente del 
Consiglio). Mussolini broadly presented himself as representative of the Italy of 
Vittorio Veneto rather than as the war veterans’ voice. In the government he formed 
together with other political parties, two thirds of the members were military personnel 
or veterans. Half of the Undersecretaries of State, nine in total, were fascists. But there 
were only three fascist ministers, plus Mussolini who assumed both Interior and Foreign 
Affaires Ministries. In any case, the war and the victory were the shared legitimizing 
symbols of the coalition.117 
Despite the symbolic role of war veterans in the rise of Italian Fascism, 
practically none of the main contemporary commentators interpreted the March of 
Rome as solely a ‘revolution’ or coup d’état of the Italian veterans. Indeed, some ANC 
leaders were sceptical regarding the fascist ‘revolution’; they did not consider the 
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triumph of Fascism a product of the veterans’ will. They intelligently realised that —as 
historians nowadays confirm— Fascism was able to succeed because of the 
opposition’s errors, because of the Italian liberal state’s weaknesses, and because 
Fascism had enjoyed the benevolence and support of the Italian armed forces.118 At that 
time, inquisitive observers such as Antonio Gramsci identified in the original Fasci the 
same ‘petty-bourgeois character of the veterans’ associations’. During the fourth 
congress of the Communist International, celebrated shortly after the March on Rome, 
the Italian representative Bordiga explained that ‘Fascism assembled all the discharged 
soldiers who could not find their place in society after the War and put their military 
experience to work’.119 Yet the internal debate about Fascism within the Italian and 
international left was rather focused on the class struggle, and around the interpretation 
of Fascism as the ‘white guard’ (guardia bianca) of capitalism. Other analysts 
recognised the role in the fascist movement of the war-experienced petty-bourgeoisie, 
but this factor was just part of a broader and much more complex phenomenon.120 The 
German socialist journalist Oda Oldberg put it clearly: without the war, Fascism would 
have been unthinkable, but this relationship was not in the sense the fascists affirmed: 
‘Many of today’s fascist leaders’ had not fought in the trenches; ‘the ratio of combatants 
and shirkers in Fascism should coincide on the whole with the overall national 
average’.121 For the Italian people, and for some intelligent external observers, the 
veterans’ input to squadrism and their participation in the March on Rome did not 
constitute the explanatory key of the phenomenon, but only a constituent element of its 
wider origins. Yet from outside Italy, commentators often highlighted the veteran 
presence at the core of the movement when they explained Fascism to a non-Italian 
public. 
The symbol of the victorious war veteran was a powerful means to spread the 
idea of Fascism in Europe, but the multiple perceptions of this myth were conditioned 
and modelled by those to whom it was communicated. As we will see, the impact of the 
March on Rome was deeply felt by public opinion and political forces in France, 
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Germany and Spain. In these and other countries the awareness of the veterans’ role in 
Fascism manifested at different levels and manners, shaped by the prism of the 
domestic situations, thus contributing to different political consequences in the course 
of 1923. We already saw how, very soon, external observers characterised fascism as a 
veteran phenomenon, and as a reaction against the left. Thus, in Belgium, for example, 
as the Italian diplomatic representative transmitted to Rome, the March on Rome was 
seen positively by all political Belgian groups except the socialists, because it had been 
carried out by a ‘party created by the veterans of the common war in order to annihilate 
the Bolshevik efforts dangerous for the whole Europe’.122 These perceptions were 
relevant even in Portugal, where eminent personalities immediately visited the Italian 
ambassador to consult with him on the possibilities of creating a Portuguese fascist 
party.123 I will discuss how these discourses and symbols circulated through France, 
Spain and Germany. 
 
France 
In France, public opinion generally believed that the Italian veterans were the precursors 
of the fascist movement. This opinion consolidated when Fascism obtained its violent 
victories against the left, which provoked reflections about whether fascism was also 
possible in France. The conservative French press appreciated Fascism basically as a 
reasonable reaction against leftist excesses.124 In L’Action Française, Léon Daudet 
wrote that, in Italy, there was a wide middle-class, ‘comprising numerous war veterans’, 
who resisted the socialist threat; it was said that the same social dynamic could be found 
in France.125 In fact, after the March on Rome, the Action Française member Georges 
Valois started to contact economic lobbies that were searching for a French 
Mussolini.126 For his part, the French ex-socialist Gustave Hervé —who since 1914 had 
gone through an ideological and political evolution parallel to that of Mussolini—127 
also considered that the fascists were the Italian war veterans organized against the left. 
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According to Hervé, in the elections of 1921, the fascists had contributed to the victory 
of the Italian national bloc —the ‘brother’ of the French Bloc national.128 During the 
March on Rome days, Hervé again praised the nation-saving fascists: ‘They were 
militarily organized with a strong discipline […] Between the workers —who remained 
during the war in the factories, completely castrated by the bleating pacifism of 
defeatists— and the legions of veterans who had stood during four years in the infernal 
trenches, the street battle did not last long’.129 Hervé stated that the lesson of Fascism 
should be taken not only by the weakly-governed Germans, but also by the French 
government, which had to reinforce its internal politics.130 The perception that the 
Italian veterans were involved in Fascism inspired sympathy among different rightist 
sectors in France. And this awareness made the French right believe that a similar 
movement was possible in France as well. 
By 1922, the powerful and diverse French veterans’ movement could not ignore 
the Italian veterans’ involvement in the fall of democracy. When the dust of the March 
on Rome had settled, serene commentators in the French veterans’ press still affirmed 
that Fascism had been, ‘originally, the veterans’ armed protests against the antinational 
forces that wanted to “sabotage the peace”’.131 This view was also sustained by the 
accounts of writers like Paul Hazard, a traveller who had gone to Italy in 1921 and 
1922. Hazard had seen first-hand the rise of Fascism. His depictions of the Italian 
fascists included reflections on the particular fascist psychology and style.132 According 
to him, the fascists were ‘young people full of vehemence or war veterans’, whereas the 
‘extremists’  —meaning the leftists— were recruited among the ‘bad soldiers, deserters 
and cowards’. For this author, the March on Rome was a positive and youthful 
achievement, and a characteristically Italian phenomenon.133 Would the French veterans 
and extreme right groups feel pushed to follow this Italian model? 
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The attitude of the large numbers of French veterans and their vigorous 
associations remained unchanged. Despite the sympathy of many veterans, the main 
organizations, the UNC and the UF, kept their distance and preferred to point out that 
Fascism was a purely Italian product, which would not resonate in the French 
environment. They thought Fascism was not something to ‘export’, or ‘import’. The 
chief reason for this detachment was to avoid frightening the authorities, as French 
veterans were protesting to get material improvements. Furthermore, the French 
veterans were initially suspicious of Fascism, because they were striving to maintain 
international peace and the status quo of Versailles. This concern dominated the FIDAC 
congress of November 1922.134 In this situation Mussolini soon appeared as a potential 
destabilizing —revisionist— weight in the international relations system. Following the 
March on Rome, the resignation of the Italian ambassador in France, Carlo Sforza —
hated by the fascists—, was polemical. The Italian fascists were a very different and 
aggressive force in the international sphere. In November 1922, the opening of the 
conference of Lausanne made the allied statesmen believe that Mussolini could be a 
gentleman, but in the summer of 1923 the Italian occupation of Corfu revealed the real 
fascist impulses. From October 1922, Mussolini tried to achieve his imperial goals, 
though he did not follow the most direct path to achieving his dreams of Empire.135 
Hence, at the beginning, Fascism was a controversial label from which the 
French veterans needed to dissociate themselves. Paul Vaillant, administrator of the UF, 
clearly stated ‘We shall not wear the black shirt’.136 Subsequently, over the course of 
the first year of the Fascist dictatorship, the French veterans’ movement became 
accustomed to referring to Fascism as a point of reference in the political debate. For 
instance, Henri Pichot employed it in a negative way to criticize the veterans’ 
inclination towards political actions. Nevertheless, on other occasions, fascism was 
wielded as a veiled menace to exert pressure on the French authorities.137 As the Italian 
example proved, discontented veterans could be the harbingers of a dictatorship, but the 
French veterans did not expect this outcome.  
The extreme right, Action Française, did not change its old approach to veterans 
either. The theme of the veterans’ right to a ‘share of the victory’ (la part du 
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combattant) —allegedly unrecognised by the Republic—, continued unchanged.138 
Veterans’ representations were not transformed (Image 19).  
 
 
Image 19: The French veteran and the “veterans’ share” (“Part du combattant”). “– Are there 
olives already in my armistice olive branch? – But, Marianne, you are wrong: they’re nèfles!”, 
L’étudiant français. Organe mensuel de la Féderation Nationale des Étudiants d’Action 
Française, November 1922. 
 
In Action Française meetings, when Georges Valois addressed the bourgeois students, 
he mentioned that the veterans should impose their spirit of victory onto the state, but he 
did not employ any powerful mobilizing discourse.139 The fascist model for the 
veterans’ political mobilization against the internal enemy —the left— was not being 
adopted in France yet. For many, some actions of the Action Française paramilitary 
branch, the Camelots du Roi, in 1923 mirrored fascist violent techniques,140 but, as it 
was noted in a confidential report for the French Ministry of Foreign Affaires, ‘violence 
had been always the line of conduct of the Camelots du Roi’, and the programme of 
Action Française remained very different from that of the PNF.141 
 
Spain 
If in France the myth of the fascist veterans did not provoke any consistent reaction 
mimicking the Italian model over the course of 1923, in Spain any threat to the liberal 
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order lacked a mass base of veterans to mobilize. Yet the March on Rome did play a 
catalysing role in Spanish politics.142 When Fascism took power in Italy, Spain had not 
yet overcome the postwar crisis. Violent confrontations between anarchists or 
syndicalists and ‘civic guards’ like the Somatén or Acción Ciudadana persisted during 
1922. In this context, the news of the rise of the fascists was interpreted through the lens 
of the Spanish conflicts. For the Spanish left, the ‘Italian fascists are nothing more than 
the somatenistas or civic guards from that country’.143 It is not by chance that at the end 
of 1922 the first rumours about a military coup started circulating in Madrid, and in 
Barcelona politics by the pistol (pistolerismo) resumed, as a symptom of the crisis that 
lasted during 1923.144  
In this period, the Spanish press captured the connection between the veterans’ 
agitation and the rise of Fascism. A concerned Spanish observer witnessed and reported 
on the assaults to institutional headquarters by the fascist veterans in Rome in a Spanish 
newspaper.145 At the same time, there were correspondents in Italy transmitting a very 
positive image of the fascist movement to the Spanish newspapers. The journalist 
Rafael Sánchez Mazas, writing for the conservative and monarchist paper ABC, was 
enthusiastic about the fascists; he vividly depicted the fascist acts of aggression and 
parades as festivals, and described the fascists as disciplined anti-communist men, 
‘virile, funny and generous’. During the March on Rome, Sánchez Mazas represented 
the Italians as cheering the cohort of ‘100,000’ fascist volunteers, along with ‘war 
disabled and athletes’ who were ‘recreating the blood fraternity of the dark days of the 
trenches’.146 Although the relevance given to the veterans’ responsibility in the fascist 
movement was smaller than in France, the diverse Spanish press did not overlook this 
reality. Therefore, the impression that Fascism was mainly a veterans’ movement would 
become commonplace among Spaniards. Some years later, a regional republican paper 
continued to explain the ‘incredible fascist rise’ by saying that ‘the capitalist 
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strongboxes had been opened to arm thousands of unemployed veterans who —just by 
the fact of having taken part in the war— believed they were supermen’.147 
 In Spain, as in Italy, the relationship between the military and the liberal state 
experienced a period of crisis. The Spanish army remained profoundly divided between 
junteros and africanistas. In 1921, to recover from the military setback of Annual, the 
army had created an elite corps, the Legión; its promoters were the Africanist officers 
José Millán Astray and Francisco Franco.148 The Legión was based on the French 
Foreign Legion model. Its members largely mirrored the Italian arditi, often ex-convicts 
or adventurers. And the young Franco, holding ‘heroic’ combat decorations, became an 
idol for the colonialist and rightist opinion.149 The Legión became a patriotic reference 
for the nationalist groups, antagonistic towards the Peninsula-based military officers 
(junteros). In November-December 1922, General Picasso’s report on the responsibility 
for the disaster of Annual raised bitter discontent among the africanistas. At that 
moment, the extreme right backed Millán Astray and portrayed him as the Spanish 
Mussolini. In November 1922, while Millán Astray’s legionnaires paraded in the 
metropole, he lobbied the government to resolve the military crisis in favour of the 
africanistas. He was able to gather support among students, and after a series of riots 
the government agreed to dissolve the Juntas.150 The tough legionnaires were not war 
veterans, and Spanish returning soldiers from Morocco played no role in these 
developments. But the political use of the soldiers mirrored the Italian case. The 
philosopher Miguel de Unamuno affirmed: ‘the bare-chested men of Millán Astray are 
like the blackshirts of Mussolini’.151 
Furthermore, the March on Rome provoked other anti-liberal reactions in Spain. 
At the end of 1922 and in 1923, the first attempts to create a Spanish fascist movement 
saw the foundation of the obscure group La Traza and the one-single-issue review La 
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Camisa Negra. These short-lived organizations were promoted by army officers and 
supported by employers, but they only recruited some petty-bourgeois students. Some 
evidence suggests direct involvement of Italians in these political manoeuvres: already 
in December 1922 a fascist military officer gave a conference in the House of Italians 
based in Barcelona, for an audience composed of many Spanish sympathizers.152 Yet 
the fascist leadership did not promote this dissemination. It was said that Fascism was 
not transplantable. The rumours about a visit of Mussolini to Madrid were not 
confirmed.153 Those Spanish fascist cells would soon disappear. 
In any case, this agitation preceded the final collapse of the Spanish liberal state. 
In mid 1923, liberal politicians planned to foster a decisive reform, diminishing Spanish 
military involvement in the Moroccan Protectorate. General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s 
coup d’état on 13 September 1923 put an end to these detrimental changes for the 
Spanish africanistas military.154 Like in Italy, dictatorship was imposed with the 
connivance of the king. A few weeks later, in November 1923, the king and the new 
dictator paid a visit to Fascist Italy; by then, many were seeing the Spanish regime as a 
reflection of the Italian example.155 The dictator Primo de Rivera initially seemed 
interested in getting support from La Traza, but the more conventional Somatén, and 
later a party created from above —the Unión Patriótica—, would finally represent the 
much more conservative Spanish version of the blackshirts and the PNF during the 
1920s.156 
All these events, according to historians, demonstrate that a ‘real’ fascism was 
unable to take root in Spain, though there existed conditions for the imposition of an 
authoritarian nationalist regime.157 The predominance of Catholicism, the receding 
revolutionary menace, the influence of conservative militarism and, indeed, the absence 
of a strong veterans’ movement have been pointed out as the main causes of the failure 
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of the first wave of Spanish fascism.158 Moreover, it should also be mentioned that the 
arrival of the intellectual and cultural trends that fermented in all European Western 
countries before 1914 had not been galvanised in Spain by the cathartic ‘total’ war 
experience. The Spanish literary elites did not undergo the initiation to politics that was 
the First World War. The artistic vanguards came to Spain belatedly and devoid of the 
political inclinations of the Italian futuristi and arditi.159 But the question of the veterans 
needs further analysis.  
Despite this arid cultural ground, there were writers and intellectuals who, after 
an experience of war in Morocco, developed a set of discourses that represented in 
Spain the proto-fascist veterans’ worldview by 1922-1924. This was the case for the 
writers Luys Santa Marina and Ernesto Giménez Caballero, who would be promoters 
during the 1930s of the Spanish fascist party Falange Española. The poet Luys Santa 
Marina published Tras el águila del César, a book whose violent aesthetics served the 
purpose of singing the praise of the troops of the Legion, and reminds the prose of the 
ardito Mario Carli.160 It was his experience as a soldier in Morocco that motivated 
Ernesto Giménez Caballero, a student born in 1899, to compose his first important 
literary work, Notas marruecas de un soldado. In the last pages of this account, written 
in Madrid during December 1922 (he could not have been unaware of the agitation of 
those days in the Spanish capital), he offered a manifesto addressing other ex-soldiers. 
Giménez Caballero rejected the possibility of a silent reintegration, because he and his 
comrades had ‘common tasks in the new civilian life’. The veterans should influence 
national opinion about Morocco, and they should strive to obtain a purge of those 
responsible for the ‘thousand errors and dirty tricks’ that they had seen in the 
protectorate.161 As we see, writing in the wake of the March on Rome, Giménez 
Caballero launched a clear call to veterans to intervene in Spanish politics. 
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By the end of 1922 the image of Fascism in Spain was that of a nationalist anti-
leftist and anti-democratic movement whose members were first and foremost war 
veterans; a characteristic that endowed Fascism with a popular and revolutionary facet. 
However, the immediate imitative attempts to develop a Spanish fascist movement did 
not take root, due to the absence of a proper large group of veterans to form a mass 
membership, or rather due to the impossibility of any move to fully manipulate the 
symbol of the veteran. Primo de Rivera’s regime was rather conservative and Catholic 
reactionary. The dictatorship did not permit the diffusion of the nationalist books of 
both Giménez Caballero and Santa Marina due to their subversive potential.162 Yet the 
Italian and Spanish dictatorships shared many other features towards the end of 1923. 
Fascism continued to influence Spain, and the symbol of the fascist war veterans would 
play a role in the future. Furthermore, the events taking place in Spain during 1923 also 
had an impact on Germany. It is not unimportant that the Nazis understood the 
imposition of the military dictatorship in Spain as a ‘fascist solution of the Spanish 
crisis’, just two months earlier than their own putsch attempt took place.163 The anti-
democratic thrust after the March on Rome affected different European regions, and 
Bavaria was one of the most alarming cases. 
  
Germany 
In Germany, the March on Rome exacerbated the already tense politics. From January 
1923, the increasing problem of hyperinflation and the French occupation of the Ruhr 
intertwined with the war reparations issue. Thus the difficult conditions of the country 
worsened. As a reaction, there was a powerful revival of German nationalism. This 
situation represented a blow to the republican and pacifist groups, which had neither 
been able to consolidate an organizational network, nor to fully establish a pacifist 
discursive framework for the war remembrance.164 As in other countries, the public had 
attentively observed the March on Rome, perceiving the potential turn in the 
international relations that it implied.165 The situation of the German population in 
South Tirol (Südtirol or Alto Adige) would be especially worrying, for the fascists had 
                                                
162 Dionisio Viscarri, Nacionalismo autoritario y orientalismo. La narrativa prefascista de la guerra de 
Marruecos (1921-1927), Bolonia, Il Capitello del Sole, 2004. 
163 (‘fascistischer Einschlag der spanischen Krise’) Völkischer Beobachter, 15 September 1923. 
164 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations, pp. 36-39. 
165 See, for example, Vossische Zeitung, 28, 29, 30 October, 1 November 1922.  
 124
shown their intentions to pursue Italianization.166 Whereas the Weimar authorities 
distrusted the new political actor that was Fascism, the German nationalists now praised 
the fascist achievement, as potentially beneficial for themselves.167 The fascist rise to 
power October 1922 also led to a reassessment of the anti-parliamentarian threat in 
Germany, conceptualized as a fascist phenomenon that had taken its first steps since 
1919.168 
It is very clear that the March on Rome became the admired model that the 
German extreme right desired to imitate in order to overthrow the Weimar Republic.169 
This longing was captured by the Latin expression ‘Italia docet’ (Italy teaches), 
employed by the radical conservative review Gewissen.170 These anti-Semitic, völkisch 
nationalists wondered whether fascism was possible in Germany, and considered its 
causes. As they stressed the fact that the Italian young men had made possible a 
profound transformation of the Italian state’s ‘spirit’ (Staatgeist); they consequently 
appealed to the young Germans to follow the same goal of a conservative reaction. This 
counter-revolution would reinforce the state, order and discipline.171 It was the young 
people who were represented as the protagonists of Fascism, rather than the veterans. 
Nevertheless, in Germany the anti-republican stance was already hegemonic in the 
galaxy of the veteran associations. The March on Rome surprised the members of 
Stahlhelm in a moment of disorganization, due to the governmental preventive ban after 
Rathenau’s murder (June 1922); but by the end of January 1923 the association 
recovered its freedom and continued its progression, establishing close contacts with the 
military circles that were preparing a coup.172 The agitation and competition of anti-
revolutionary combat leagues like the Jungdeutscher Orden (Order of Young Germans), 
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virulently confronted with the communists, characterised the background where the 
Hitler’s putsch of November 1923 took place. 
Hitler was among those who saw in Fascism and Mussolini an example to 
follow. Common features between both movements were clear. In April and May 1922, 
the Nazis had organized special propaganda meetings for veterans, where Hitler decried 
the fact that the returning soldiers had been dishonourably received at the end of the 
war.173 Although the Bavarian press had pointed to the similarities between the fascists 
and the Nazis, the Nazis preferred to stress their own anti-Semitism as a singularity, 
regretting that the fascists did not undertake the fight against the Jews.174 Nonetheless, 
at the end of September 1922, Hitler sent an emissary to Milan, Kurt Ludecke, who 
made Mussolini aware of the NSDAP. According to Ludecke’s memoirs,175 in their 
conversation, the Duce appreciated the common anti-Marxism of both the fascists and 
the Nazis, but was intransigent regarding the Alto Adige question, and unconcerned 
about the Jewish ‘problem’. Even so, once he had returned to Munich, Ludecke 
confirmed to Hitler the many commonalities existing between both movements and, in 
fact, mentioned that both Mussolini and Hitler were war veterans, as a motive for an 
understanding between them.176 Hitler probably was delighted. 
After the March on Rome, the Nazi imitation of the fascist style became all too 
evident for increasingly anxious republicans in Munich.177 Both the German and 
Bavarian left, and some leading Nazis, saw in Hitler the ‘Bavarian’ Mussolini. As the 
Nazis saw how the resolute fascists finally imposed their will, Hitler’s speeches pointed 
to the exemplary Italian ‘fascist fight’.178 Hitler’s notion of heroism developed now, and 
he started to highlight the example of the frontline soldiers to his SA men.179 
Furthermore, the Italians’ alleged ‘national rebirth’ (nationale Wiedergeburt) pushed 
Hitler to reinforce his ideas for an agreement with Italy. He was even ready to abandon 
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the Südtirol question in order to construct a relationship with Mussolini, even if this 
attitude raised criticism among his Austrian followers.180  
Although the Nazis wanted to walk the same path as their successful Italian 
counterparts, in practical terms their strategy was conditioned by a different context, 
that of Bavaria during the year 1923.181 The symbol of the March on Rome, mixed with 
Hitler’s obsessions and prejudices, shaped the developments leading to the Beer Hall 
putsch. The March on Rome made clear for many rightist circles in Europe that the 
officers mobilizing anti-Bolshevik youths could build an imitation of the Italian fascist 
reaction.182 Accordingly, old German officers offered themselves as instructors for the 
Nazi assault troops. Yet Hitler preferred ‘instinctive young men, who possess 
recklessness and idealism’. Mussolini’s example simply meant for Hitler ‘willingness 
for action’, since fighting was necessary to reach victory.183 Despite this insistence on 
the youth and the allegedly stark differentiation from the army, the adoption of uniforms 
and symbols for the SA members, who publicly paraded in Munich at the end of 
January 1923 during the Day of the NSDAP Party (Parteitag), clearly emulated the 
fascist style.184 
While the Nazi movement grew in this fashion, external observers identified it 
as a part of a fascist German movement composed of war veterans and of people who 
fully assumed their image. This perception was predominant in Spain, where 
newspapers of every hue noted the uneasiness produced by the nationalistic groups in 
Bavaria, parading with their ‘Prussian helmets’ and ‘wearing the uniform of the German 
trench soldier’; the political manoeuvres of Hitler and Ludendorff were labelled as the 
‘fascist plot in Germany’.185 Certainly, in a parallel to the fascist movement of 1921-
1922, the protagonists of the Bavarian agitation were mostly young men, many of them 
veterans, trained and armed by military officers. In Spain it was explained that Hitler’s 
party was composed of veterans (excombatientes), employees and students.186 In Italy, it 
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was known and particularly reiterated that anti-Semitism was the main characteristic of 
the NSDAP.187 Yet the Italian left understood this phenomenon as fascism: as in Italy, 
German fascism recruited —apart from a few idealists— many opportunists, 
‘injudicious youngsters’, and ‘war detritus’.188 Again, the stereotype of the fascist 
veteran, now referred to the Nazi movement, circulated. 
The French veterans, in contrast, did not fully take this feature into 
consideration. Focused instead on the question of the reparations, the veterans’ of the 
UF longed for peace and rejected any imperialistic inclination; but at the same time they 
required that the peace were built on the France’s right to compensations.189 These 
French veterans avoided expressing support or rejection to the occupation of the Ruhr. 
Their first timid contacts with German veterans had completely stopped with the 
crisis.190 They seemed unaware of the nationalist agitation that spurred on their German 
counterparts. When Hitler’s putsch came, veterans of both the UNC and UF were 
absorbed by the celebrations of the French victory of 11 November and paid little 
attention to the events in Germany.  
At the beginning, this coup d’état was conceived as a March on Berlin. For this 
reason, by November 1923 the Italian public was expectant.191 Actually, such a 
manoeuvre did not take place: the military organizers understood that there had been 
insufficient preparation in northern Germany and that the cooperation of the regular 
army was unsure. In spite of these hesitancies, the pressure of Hitler’s fanatic followers, 
the brown shirts of the SA, precipitated action in Munich.192 A Nazi leader guaranteed 
to the Corriere della Sera that they would obtain success.193 But the putsch failed, and 
the press across Europe did not hold back in its depiction of this shameful adventure as 
a tragicomedy. This abortive imitation also embarrassed the Italian fascists, who 
consequently abhorred the disastrous Nazi venture.194 The fascists distanced themselves 
from the Nazis, stressing the important differences between them. They said that 
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Fascism was an essentially Italian phenomenon, and likewise, the Spanish example of 
Primo de Rivera dictatorship was another proof of this differentiation.195 However, it is 
difficult to deny that the fascist movement had liberated forces that did not respect 
national boundaries. Even if November 1923 saw the German attempts to overthrow a 
democratic regime in the fascist manner end in deadlock, the idea of a March on Berlin 
would remain present among the Nazis and the anti-republican groupings like the 
veterans’ Stahlhelm, as a notion that synthesized their fight for power until 1933.196 
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Part II 
Fascism and Veterans during the 1920s 
 
This section is devoted to contrasting, on the one hand, the complex and uneasy 
relationship between the veteran groups and the fascists within Italy, and, on the other 
hand, the wide and effective circulation of the ‘myth of the fascist veterans’ throughout 
Europe during the 1920s. The consolidation of the dictatorship in Italy and the 
apparition of groups that sought to emulate Fascism in France and Germany were 


































 The Process of War Veterans Fascistization (1923-1925) 
 
Having explained the stereotypical construction of the fascist veteran and the 
mythmaking process surrounding the ‘veteran’ March on Rome, it is necessary to assess 
the extent to which, in historical reality, the Italian veterans were transformed into 
fascists, and how this happened. A detailed observation of the actual relations between 
veterans and Fascism is needed, for it will allow us to understand the deep cleavage 
between reality in Fascist Italy and the mythic discourses that circulated in Europe at 
that time. This chapter analyses what I call the process of war veterans’ fascistization, 
which took place in Italy roughly between 1923 and 1925. Here, ‘fascistization’ refers 
to the process whereby social groups and institutions, willingly or forcibly, adopted, or 
acquiesced to, ideological and organizational fascist principles and commodities.1 The 
relationship between veterans and Fascism in this period should be conceptualized as a 
process of fascistization of Italian veteran organizations and discourses. 
The fascistization of Italian veteran politics must be understood in the historical 
context of 1923-1925. In Italy, things did not change suddenly after the fascist takeover 
of October 1922. Although the legal political order had been broken, this shift was, 
above all, a compromise between Fascism, the king, liberals and conservatives, to form 
a coalition government. The construction of the dictatorship was slow-paced, and the 
transformations that affected Italian war veterans progressively evolved from late 1922 
to early 1925.2 This period was a paradoxical context, full of contradictory situations, 
internal tensions and struggles. Its outcome —the establishment of a fully-fledged 
dictatorship that displayed totalitarian traits and would lead again to war— was not 
determined from the beginning, though there existed forces which steadily pushed 
towards a political radicalization.  
 In the first year of Mussolini’s government, two main impulses sought to shape 
the agenda, with the projected ‘normalization’ of the fascist movement struggling with 
the pressure from radical fascist sectors who aspired to the implantation of a full fascist 
state (Farinacci being the most important representative of them). While the Chamber 
functioned precariously with the sword of Damocles hanging over it, the squadrists 
                                                
1 Cf. Aristotle Kallis, ‘“Fascism”, “Para-fascism” and “Fascistization”’. 
2 Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power. Fascism in Italy 1919-1929, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1987 (1st ed. 1973); Salvatore Lupo, Il fascismo, pp. 115-180. 
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continued exerting violence in several provinces. In December 1922, the bloody events 
of Turin (fatti di Torino) demonstrated that it would be very complicated to appease 
Fascism. Unrestrained violence could endanger the order-restoring ambitions of the 
recently formed fascist government. In response, Mussolini and his close collaborators 
created the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN) in January 1923. 
This kind of partisan army inside the state was an attempt to bring squadrism under 
control, overcoming the resistance of intransigent provincial leaders like Farinacci. 
Thus many Italian veterans who had been squadrists now became MVSN members. 
70% of MVSN officers were between 24 and 38 years old, came predominantly from 
the central northern Italy, and had experienced the war as junior officers or NCOs.3 This 
institutionalization of squadrism can be understood as a demobilization of veteran 
groups, but it cannot be considered as a disarmament, and the tasks assigned to the 
MVSN, basically the persecution and surveillance of the internal enemy, did not imply a 
demobilization of the practices and discourses of violence rooted in the war experience. 
 Another step in the ‘normalization’ of Fascism was the creation of the Gran 
Consiglio del Fascismo (Great Council of Fascism), as the new supreme organ of 
Fascism at the end of 1922. Among its first members, surrounding Mussolini, were the 
four quadrumviri of the March on Rome —Balbo, Bianchi, De Vecchi, De Bono—  and 
men like Giacomo Acerbo, Achille Starace, Nicola Sansanelli or Pietro Bolzon, all of 
them fascist veterans. This decision-making institution remained an instrument in the 
hands of Mussolini, and its actual influence over the regional fascisms was reduced. In 
order to extinguish both the opposition and the resistance of dissident fascists, 
Mussolini relied on new prefetti, who represented the state in the provinces. 
The political left, persecuted both by the fascists and by the state authorities, was 
not the only victim of this situation. The Catholics were soon to meet a similar fate. The 
process of absorption of the Italian Nationalist Association by the PNF, especially 
relevant in the South, was not free of violence until its conclusion in February 1923. But 
voluntarily fusing with the powerful PNF yielded many advantages for nationalist 
politicians. ‘Normalization’ was also desired by political sectors ready to collaborate 
with Mussolini’s government in the restoration of social order. These groups were 
called fiancheggiatori (supporters), and they intended to collude with Fascism without 
                                                
3 Camilla Poesio, Reprimere le idee. Abusare del potere. La Milizia e l’instaurazione del regime fascista, 
Roma, Quaderni della Fondazione Luigi Salvatorelli, 2010, p. 21. 
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losing their own political identity and autonomy. Having absorbed these elements, the 
PNF saw its ranks swollen with new members.  
In this situation, towards the summer and autumn of 1923, ‘revisionism’ 
emerged as a new ideological fascist current, represented by Giuseppe Bottai and the 
review Critica fascista. The revisionists tried to develop a new fascist doctrine, adjusted 
to the changed context after the March on Rome. They considered the violent 
revolutionary phase over, and saw the necessity of creating a new state and an 
intellectual fascist class. The leading figure of the revisionist trend, Bottai, was himself 
an ex-ardito who now advocated for a sort of fascist attitudes that were far from the 
virulent arditismo. Bottai’s insistence on discipline, obedience and hierarchy 
symbolized the ‘normalization’ process, since it implied the transformation of former 
fascist values. With this shift, the militaristic ethos did not vanish. As Bottai said, 
discipline and hierarchy made Fascism something similar to a marching victorious 
army.4 Confronting revisionism, squadrism and intransigent Fascism were still active, 
embodied in Farinacci, and ex-arditi like Mario Carli and his review L’Impero.5 In the 
wake of the Matteotti crisis and in 1925, this intransigent trend would contribute to the 
imposition of the dictatorial fascist regime, under the rule of Mussolini and the PNF. 
It was against the background of this ideological and political ferment that the 
main Italian veteran organizations firstly sought to collaborate with Mussolini’s 
government, becoming progressively fascistized. I will analyse the process of 
organizational and political negotiation between the ANMIG, the ANC and the PNF, 
which lead to the fascistization of these veteran organizations, and, in response, to the 
apparition of anti-fascist veteran trends. Concurrently, ideological and discursive 
developments also interweaved in a powerful dynamic, which became a whirlwind in 
the context of the Matteotti crisis during the summer of 1924, leading to a drastic 
resolution in 1925. It was this year that saw the fascistization of the Italian veterans 
culminate. 
 
The beginnings of a relationship: veterans and Mussolini’s government 
Just after the March on Rome, the veteran associations celebrated the Victory of 4 
November. Il Popolo d’Italia stated that Mussolini had made the celebration possible.6 
                                                
4 Giuseppe Bottai, ‘Disciplina’, Critica fascista, 15 July 1923. 
5 Emilio Gentile, Le origini della ideologia fascista, pp. 323-396. 
6 Il Popolo d’Italia, 5 November 1922. 
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However, it had been the last liberal government that some weeks previous, had 
declared the 4 November as a national holiday, following a petition of the ANC. At that 
time, there had been plans for a demonstration of disabled veterans, with the 
participation of D’Annunzio and the collaboration of Aldo Rossini (ANC member and 
Undersecretary for War Pensions in the last liberal government). This was a pacifying 
and reconciling initiative, planned to pre-empt the imminent fascist assault on Rome. It 
might have been another steppingstone towards a nationally shared war memory, since 
D’Annunzio intended to talk about ‘peace, labour and faith’ (di pace, di lavoro, di fede). 
Some disabled veterans’ leaders, such as Delcroix, had offered their collaboration. But 
the March on Rome came too soon, allowing the fascists to appear as the main patrons 
of the celebration of 4 November 1922. In the end, many ANC and ANMIG leaders 
were equally enthusiastic about having the fascists in the government as the promoters 
of the 4 November anniversary.7 But Italian politics had changed dramatically. 
 The disabled veterans of the ANMIG were the first to experience the difficulties 
of a close relationship with Fascism.8 Beyond a common patriotism and nationalism, the 
particularities of the fascist ideology disturbed the harmony that the veterans expected. 
When the time came to transform the promises into concrete concessions, conflicts 
arose. A revision of the Pensions Law for maimed veterans had long been demanded by 
the ANMIG, and studied by government experts like Rossini in collaboration with the 
association. A law project designed by Camillo Peano (Minister of the Treasury) was 
already under discussion in October 1922.9 This new law intended to refine the levels of 
the pensions granted, not according to military rank (although some progressive 
percentage were maintained according to rank), but in relation to the seriousness of the 
wounds. Furthermore, disability caused by actual combat service —caused by enemy 
weapons— was to be better rewarded than those disabilities resulting from non-front-
line service. The ANMIG played a role in the discussion of these stipulations, which 
largely corresponded to the wishes of the organized disabled veterans. The dramatic 
arrival of the fascists to the government suddenly jeopardized this process. 
                                                
7 Antonino Répaci, La Marcia su Roma, Milano, Rizzoli, 1972, pp. 448, 794-795, 947-952; L’Idea 
Nazionale, 28 October 1922; Il Combattente Romagnolo (Ravenna), 1 November 1922; Il Combattente 
(Bologna), 4 November 1922; Bollettino della Sezione Provinciale fra Mutilati ed Invalidi di Guerra 
(Rovigo), 31 October 1922; Bollettino della sezione provinciale di Ferrara fra mutilati e invalidi di 
guerra (Ferrara), num. 1, January 1923; Emilio Lussu, Marcia su Roma e dintorni, Torino, Einaudi, 2002 
[1945], pp. 51-52. 
8 For a local account of this process see Francesco Zavatti, Mutilati ed invalidi di guerra: una storia 
politica. Il caso modenese, Milano, Unicopli, 2011, pp. 101-160. 
9 Il Mutilato (Cremona), num. 2, November 1922. 
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In fact, the fascist seizure of power made the fate of disabled veterans’ issues 
unclear. One of the fascist quadrumviri, Cesare Maria De Vecchi, was appointed to be 
the new State Undersecretary for War Pensions. De Vecchi was a military man and a 
squadrist, but despite all his ‘heroic’ records, he was not the appropriate person to deal 
with the delicate and complicated problems of the disabled war veterans. De Vecchi 
was more interested in setting up a militia from squadrism, and he would later become a 
general of the MVSN. Initially, he declined Mussolini’s offer, but finally, according to 
his account, and in honour of his monarchism, he accepted the post at the request of the 
king. He followed the instructions of Mussolini and worked together with experts in 
furthering the reform of the pensions. The main guiding principle was the removal of 
the alleged ‘demagogic principles’ of the previous law, revising the categorization of 
disabilities on the basis of the war sacrifices, and reducing the interference of the 
ANMIG in these affairs. Mussolini pointed to the scandalous situation of many 
deserters presumably living at the expense of the state.10 
 It is interesting to analyse how De Vecchi as Undersecretary for War Pensions 
approached disabled veterans after the fascist seizure of power, for this examination 
reveals the Fascist ideology, discourse and organizational projects regarding veterans by 
the end of 1922. In the first message delivered by De Vecchi to all the Italian veterans, 
he started by invoking the fallen soldiers and introducing himself as ‘an artilleryman, a 
bomber, an infantryman, an ardito’, a discourse that reflected the basic characteristics of 
the fascist approach.11 As we will see next, this new paradigm supposed a radical shift 
from the old discourses about the trincerocrazia, originally directed towards the 
disabled veterans, who in 1917 had been said to be the ‘vanguard of those who 
returned’ and supposedly bore the right to lead the new Italy. Mutilated veterans had not 
forgotten Mussolini’s speeches in 1919 demanding for them an authentic recognition 
and material reward to them. 
 Now, the fascists considered the state as a superior entity, to which disabled 
veterans owed obedience and service. The state, in De Vecchi’s words, was like a father 
and a master that had the ‘duty’ of assisting his sons. Thus, the disabled would conserve 
their ‘right to live’; their possibilities to still give and donate would be encouraged. The 
                                                
10 (‘spunti demagogici’) Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon, Luigi Romersa (ed.), Il Quadrumviro 
scomodo. Il vero Mussolini nelle memorie del più monarchico dei fascisti, Milano, Mursia, 1983, p. 86; 
De Vecchi’s letters to Mussolini (31 October, 1 November 1922), ACS, SPD, CR, b. 4, f. ‘Sen Prof 
Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon’; Il Popolo di Trieste (Trieste), 2 November 1922. 
11 (‘Artigliere, Bombardiere, Fante, Ardito di guerra’) De Vecchi’s message can be read in Il combattente 
romagnolo, 30 November 1922. 
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state had a moral duty but not an obligation: pensions should not be considered as a 
compensation for suffering. The state was not an entrepreneur, but a father. Hence, the 
state had the right to ask its son to sacrifice his life, and the son had the duty of 
cheerfully giving his life for the fatherland’s salvation and grandeur. On this basis, De 
Vecchi announced a full revision of all the pensions, which would inexorably proceed 
against profiteers such as disertori, autolesionisti, imboscati, who supposedly abused 
the system. The pensions would recover, therefore, their moral and integrative function. 
In pursuing these objectives, De Vecchi called for a consolidation and unification of the 
various entities that offered assistance. He suggested that spirit-corrupting organizations 
that represented the disabled (supposedly the ANMIG) would not be exempted from the 
reform.12 
 The debate among interest groups and specialists on the matter developed in 
December 1922. It was said that the revision would not yield much savings, and that it 
should be avoided, as it would sow discord among the persons affected.13 De Vecchi 
had to clarify his position. He reaffirmed the three guiding principles of the 
government: reform and revision of the pensions, and unification of services. Moreover, 
he pointed out that according to the fascist conception of the state, all citizens had the 
‘absolute, natural and indispensable obligation of offering themselves to the defence of 
the fatherland’; ‘therefore, no right to indemnity’.14 The disabled veterans’ leaders met 
this radical position with outrage. Since the fascist Undersecretary of War Pensions 
ignored their complaints, the ANMIG leaders —particularly Delcroix— personally 
visited Mussolini to inform him about their displeasure (rammarico) regarding De 
Vecchi’s outlook. This situation provoked the first serious clash between Mussolini and 
De Vecchi. Mussolini decided to yield to the disabled veterans’ pressure. Momentarily 
leaving fascist principles to one side, Mussolini said to De Vecchi that he considered it 
inconvenient to ignore the disabled veterans’ association, and that the representatives of 
the disabled should be accepted in the discussions on the law project. Significantly, De 
Vecchi justified his stance by saying that he wanted to precipitate the ‘purification’ of 
                                                
12 (‘padre e padrone’, ‘deve assistere’, ‘compito’, ‘diritto alla vita’, ‘spronata la loro possibilità di 
donare e di creare ancora’, ‘imprenditore’, ‘i suoi figli’), Ibidem. 
13 Corriere della Sera, 6 and 14 December 1922. 
14 (‘l’obbligo assoluto naturale e imprescindibile di offrire se stessi alla difesa della patria’, ‘Quindi 
nessun diritto al risarcimento dei danni’) Corriere della Sera, 19 December 1922. 
 137 
the ANMIG in a ‘national’ sense.15 The fascist Undersecretary was willing to renounce 
to his charge, but he continued his task despite the satirical criticisms of the disabled 
veterans, and the reproach of some fascists.16 
 And yet, the ANMIG leaders, particularly Delcroix, reaffirmed their confidence 
in Mussolini and the national government, while carping at De Vecchi’s technical 
ignorance and views.17 Disabled veterans’ leaders wrongly made a differentiation 
between Mussolini and his subordinate in the government. This contradiction was 
possible because in reality the orientation of the ANMIG was, on some ideological 
points, not different from that of the fascists. The association rejected the charitable 
character —labelled as ‘socialist’— of material benefits, even if the ANMIG wanted 
these advantages to be increased. During this period, the ANMIG section of Milan 
expelled 500 of its 5,000 members because they had not fought at the frontline or 
because they lacked a clean record.18 In any case, what seems evident is that Mussolini 
and most fascists highly valued the symbolic fact of having the disabled veterans behind 
them and not against them. The material and discursive negotiation between the 
disabled and the fascists can be seen as a step in the process of fascistization. 
Mussolini was very interested in stressing the common points between his 
government and the disabled veterans. He resorted to the concession of material rewards 
in order to obtain the support of the disabled veterans’ leaders, and thus transmit to 
them the fascist ideology. In March 1923, Mussolini inaugurated the new ANMIG 
Headquarters in Rome. This ceremony concluded with an embrace between him and 
Delcroix, who made the meaningful statement that ‘sacrifice’ was the first duty of every 
citizen. Mussolini, after introducing himself as a trench comrade, stated that he admired 
and respected the mutilated veterans, and that he considered all the ex-combatants and 
the families of the fallen soldiers as the aristocracy of the new Italy, whose rights would 
never expire.19 This symbolic union marked the beginning of a definitive collusion 
between the ANMIG and Mussolini’s government: in June the ANMIG was 
institutionalized as Ente Morale, the official Italian disabled veterans’ organization. 
                                                
15 (‘purificazione in senso nazionale’) Mussolini’s and De Vecchi’s letters (18 and 19 December 1922), 
ACS, SPD, CR, b. 4, f. ‘Sen Prof Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon’; see also Luigi Romersa (ed.), 
Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon, Il Quadrumviro scomodo, pp. 90-91. 
16 Corriere della Sera, 22 December 1922; L’Idea Nazionale, 23 February 1923. 
17 Il Popolo di Trieste, 6 December 1922; Il Popolo d’Italia, 3 January 1923; Corriere della Sera, 24 
February 1923. 
18 Corriere della Sera, 20 February, 1 March 1923. 
19 Il Popolo d’Italia, 13 March 1923; Corriere della Sera, 13 March 1923. 
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Soon after, in July 1923, the new pensions law was finally promulgated. By 
then, Mussolini had defenestrated De Vecchi for political reasons. In any case, as 
Mussolini said, the position of the Undersecretary for War Pensions could be abolished 
without concern.20 The task of drafting the pensions law was assigned to the nationalist 
lawyer Alfredo Rocco, and the final text, supported by the veterans’ associations, 
remained firmly grounded in the legislative tradition of provision for veterans.21 The 
only significant novelty in the law was the distinction between combatants and non 
combatants: to receive a pension, individuals should have either suffered physical injury 
at the hands of the enemy, or fallen ill in combat zone, or suffered damage in non-
combat zone by the effect of weapons —on condition that they had actually fought in 
combat zone at some moment. It was a rather broad definition of what was considered a 
combattente.22 And the Fiuman legionaries were also included in the benefits system. 
After this law was published, the position of the Undersecretary for War Pensions was 
abolished. In this period, the one-eyed poet and ANMIG leader Carlo Delcroix was 
publicly honoured and very kindly treated in the salons of the Milanese high society.23 
He had consolidated an amicable relationship with Mussolini, and the ANMIG had 
become fully integrated in the early fascist regime. Something similar was happening to 
the ANC. 
The ANC engaged in negotiations with Mussolini’s government during this 
early period as well, establishing a relationship that initially seemed easy-going and 
straightforward. Shortly after the March on Rome, on 9 November 1922, the ANC 
leaders (namely Giulio Bergmann) expressed their aspiration to Mussolini for a concord 
between Fascism and the war veterans.24 They requested that the government define the 
ANC as an Ente Morale (i.e.: an official entity). This quality would mean the 
recognition of the ANC’s specific role in the moral and economic management of the 
war veterans, and in their ‘education’ in relation to the patriotic cults.25 The ANC 
leaders were interested in safeguarding their clientele faced with a potential competitor 
—Fascism—, while also, simultaneously, they expected to take advantage of Fascism in 
power. The association boasted that it had expelled certain groups of veterans since 
                                                
20 Mussolini’s letter (1 May 1923), ACS, SPD, CR, b. 4, f.: ‘Sen Prof Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val 
Cismon’. 
21 Corriere della Sera, 5 July 1923. 
22 Giuglielmo Pocaterra, La pensione di guerra nella sua legge base (R. Decreto 12 luglio 1923 n. 1491) 
e successive integrazioni, modifiche e aggiunte (preparazione a un testo unico), Roma, 1936. 
23 Corriere della Sera, 6 and 8 July 1923; Il Popolo d’Italia, 6 July 1923. 
24 Il Combattente (Bologna), 15 December 1922; La Nuova Giornata, 30 November 1922. 
25 La Nuova Giornata, 30 November 1922. 
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1921. At the beginning of 1923 the main ANC regional sections, Lombardy and 
Liguria, unified their press organs in one unique newspaper that would often show 
satisfaction with the fascist government.26 With the expectation of a positive response, 
ANC representatives (Bergmann, Savelli, Host-Venturi, Zilli and others) visited 
Mussolini to specify their demands. Giacomo Acerbo, who had been an ANC provincial 
leader and now was a member of the government as Undersecretary of the Presidency, 
introduced them to the Prime Minister. The veteran representatives requested that the 
ANC be officially defined as an Ente Morale. If this was secured, the ANC would work 
in the fields of pre-military and post-military education, popular cultural education, 
production cooperatives, and social assistance particularly regarding migrants and 
agricultural zones. Mussolini agreed to pursue this transformation, and predicted that 
the ANC would become a sourcing ground for state officials.27 In fact, different 
legislative measures were undertaken during 1923 to promote war veterans’ privileges, 
reserving vacant positions for them at the state administration.28  
The ANC national congress of Naples in February 1923 saw important steps 
taken towards the political alliance between the fascist government and the veterans. A 
new directing board was appointed, joined by fascists like Nino Host-Venturi (ex 
Fiuman legionnaire) and Ponzio di San Sebastiano (Gold Medal and ex Fiuman 
legionnaire). A government representative, the moderate fascist Giovanni Giurati (ex 
Fiuman legionnaire) was also included in the ANC national committee. The leaders 
asserted the ANC’s ‘loyal, devoted, powerful and dignified adhesion’ to the fascist 
government. All these enthusiastic adjectives sharply contrasted with the declaration, at 
the same time, of the ANC’s non-political stance (apoliticità). Nevertheless, this 
apoliticità was understood purely as a non-partisan position, neither agnostic nor 
neutral.29 Despite the contradictions of the ANC position regarding the fascist 
government, it was very clear that there existed a compromise between Fascism and the 
veterans. 
 This mutual rapprochement was facilitated by Mussolini’s discursive abilities in 
dealing with ex-soldiers. The president addressed them in a very flattering way, and he 
always introduced himself as a comrade (camerata, commilitone, compagno). In 
                                                
26 I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata (Genoa), 18 January 1923. 
27 Il Bollettino dell’Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (Roma), num. 1-2, 15-30 January 1923.  
28 Giuseppe Colonna (ed.), Raccolta delle disposizioni di legge a favore degli ex combattenti, Siena, 
1954. 
29 (‘leale, devota, potente e dignitosa adesione’) Il Bollettino dell'Associazione Nazionale Combattent, 
num. 3-6, February-March 1923. 
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January 1923, when Mussolini received some veterans, holders of the Gold Medal 
(Medaglia d’oro), in the Palazzo Chigi, he called them the ‘highest aristocracy of the 
Nation’; he talked about a future ‘second victory’, a ‘second Italian mission’. This 
endeavour would come in the form of Italian expansion in the world, in which the 
veterans would be, once more, the craftsmen. After the ANC congress in Naples, 
Mussolini received the veterans’ leaders again and confirmed to them that he would 
deal with their demands. He also declared that he desired the combattenti and mutilati to 
be at the head of the Fasci. The ANC leaders were very satisfied with the resolution of 
the pensions crisis in favour of the disabled veterans. Mussolini predicted that he and 
the veterans still had ‘further to go together’. Likewise, the aristocratic veterans of the 
Istituto del Nastro Azzurro (an institution of highly decorated veterans) paid a visit to 
Mussolini and avowed their devotion to him. While visiting a work house for the war 
blind, Mussolini paid tribute to them by stating: ‘the Government will guard your sacred 
rights: it will meet your legitimate desires […] and as a trench comrade I exhort you to 
be confident in what the government will do for you’. Fascist propaganda depicted 
Mussolini constantly stressing his war accomplishments, with his war diaries published 
as a volume in 1923.30 The target of these discourses were the veterans’ elites and the 
maimed veterans, who theoretically composed the aristocracy of the nation in the fascist 
worldview. 
The period of mutual courtship between the ANC and the fascist government 
concluded with the decision, taken on April 1923, of institutionalizing the ANC as an 
Ente Morale. The same measure was taken regarding the ANMIG and the ad hoc-
created Families of Fallen Soldiers Association (Associazione fra le famiglie dei 
caduti). ANC leaders like Giulio Bergmann were very happy, since they believed the 
ANC acquired significant strength, assuring its own autonomous role and rights.31 With 
a decree on 24 June 1923, this transformation was definitive. The conversion of the 
ANC into an Ente morale meant granting official recognition of the ANC’s exclusive 
activity in the realm of social assistance. Tasks of this nature previously developed by 
the ONC were transferred to the ANC. However, in reality, the control of the three 
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31 Giulio Bergmann, ‘L'Associazione dei Combattenti verso la sua nuova potenza’, I combattenti. La 
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associations was handed to the Presidenza del Consiglio, namely to Mussolini. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the ANC and the ANMIG as the only official veteran 
associations implied the marginalization of others like the Catholic Unione Nazionale 
Reduci, and marked the death knell for the Lega proletaria. Any political orientation of 
the ANC was also omitted. It was clear that the veteran leaders were politically satisfied 
with Mussolini’s government, because after a succession of unpopular liberal prime 
ministers there was at last a war veteran at the head of the government.32  
During this time, the partial neutralization of the PSd’A can be considered as 
another achievement for Mussolini and Fascism regarding veterans. This Sardinian 
party had been the only successful outcome of the veterans’ failed attempt to set up a 
democratic party. Yet the party had remained limited to its autonomist aims defended 
by leaders such as Camillo Bellieni and Emilio Lussu. Although veterans had also set 
up the first Fasci of Sardinia (Cagliari and Sassari), most Sardinian veterans had 
manifested a predominantly anti-fascist attitude until the March on Rome. After 
October 1922, the Sardinian fascists insisted on attracting the veterans from the PSd’A 
to their own ranks, with renewed vigour. A first attempt to fuse the PNF and the PSd’A 
took place in January 1923, but remained incomplete. Lussu continued to direct the 
original PSd’A as an active political movement. Later, Mussolini himself visited the 
island in June 1923 to praise the Sardinian people with his speeches, emphasizing that 
they had demonstrated their patriotism in the trenches of the Great War.33 In the end, 
what allowed the gradual subjugation and fascistization of the veterans in Sardinia was 
a combination of the dominant trend among veterans towards apoliticità, together with 
the political manoeuvres of the prefetto designed by Mussolini, and the squadrists’ 
harassment.34 
The next steppingstone in the fascistization process was the symbolic staging of 
the faithful relationship between the veterans and the government. Veterans’ parades in 
some cities had marked the celebration of the 24 May (day of Italy’s intervention in the 
First World War). Later, on 26 June 1923, in Rome, a great demonstration of an 
estimated 30,000 war veterans commemorated the River Piave battle. It was the first 
                                                
32 Cf. Giovanni Sabbatucci, I combattenti, pp. 362-363. 
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time that veterans had the exclusive protagonist role in a ritual of this nature, but it was 
Mussolini who actually occupied the centre of attention. He stated that it was an honour 
for him to be among his trench comrades.35 Even if during the ceremony the anti-fascist 
veterans’ group L’Italia Libera gave its first signs of existence,36 this occasion can be 
considered the peak in the popularity of the fascist government among the Italian war 
veterans.  
Despite fissures in the allegedly indissoluble link between Fascism and the 
veterans, the principal ANC leaders continued to firmly endorse Mussolini. These 
leaders, filo-fascists and fascists included (Savelli, Ponzio di San Sebastiano, Arangio 
Ruiz), faithfully expected that the normalization and depuration of Fascism would be 
completed. They hoped that Fascism would be fully integrated into a reinvigorated 
Italian state. Some veterans’ leaders saw the Acerbo electoral law, discussed since the 
summer of 1923, as another step in this direction. But at the same time, there were 
concerns about the dictatorial thrust of the regime and the persistent squadrist 
intimidation and violence.37 From the summer of 1923 to the Fascist victory in the 
elections of April 1924, the political history of the ANC was marked by ideological 
debates and internal struggles. On the one hand, the ANC aspired to obtain high returns 
for its loyalty to Mussolini. On the other, Fascism progressively absorbed the ANC; the 
ANC suffered a loss of identity, influence and agency in favour of the PNF.38 In the 
next two sections I will focus on organizational, discursive and symbolic developments 
that marked the relationship between veterans and Fascism in this period and played a 
key role in determining its future. 
 
The struggle for organization: the ANC and the PNF 
While the solid discursive harmony between the fascist government and the veterans 
was very clear in the first half of 1923, the relationship between the ANC and the PNF 
had to be articulated in social and political practice as well. Veterans from the Italian 
provinces demanded solutions for their problems by directly visiting Mussolini.39 The 
                                                
35 (‘commilitoni delle trincee’) Corriere della Sera, 9 and 25 May 1923; I Combattenti. La Nuova 
Giornata, 21 and 28 June 1923; Il Combattente (Cremona), 30 June 1923. Initially organized for the 17 
June, the celebration of the Piave battle was postponed to match with the publication of the decree 
transforming the ANC into Ente Morale. 
36 Luciano Zani, Italia Libera. Il primo movimento antifascista clandestino 1923-1925, Bari, Laterza, 
1975, p. 3 
37 See, for example, I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 2 August 1923. 
38 Giovanni Sabbatucci, I combattenti, pp. 361-369. 
39 Il Popolo d’Italia, 20 May, 29 June 1923. 
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president appeared to the veterans as an approachable and brotherly leader. Yet on a 
daily basis the real issues that affected veterans had to be tackled through dealing with 
the provincial fascist authorities. And within this less visible sphere, the relationship 
ANC-PNF proved to be much more problematic. The first documented contacts 
established between ANC and PNF cells, particularly between the Lazio federations of 
both organizations, date from the end of April 1923.40 At the beginning of May, there 
were meetings in Rome and Milan between the ANC spokespersons (i.e.: Arangio Ruiz) 
and PNF leaders (most notably, the fanatical fascist Michele Bianchi, secretary general 
of both the PNF and the Ministry of Internal Affaires) to approach this question.41 They 
knew that some clashes between fascists and combattenti had taken place, but the 
leaders wanted to prevent such cases in the future, acting along the lines decided in the 
last ANC congress. Stressing that Mussolini’s government was that of the combattenti 
and the valorizzazione of the victory, the fascist and veteran leaders planned a closer 
collaboration. With this accord, the fascists secured a commitment from the veterans to 
effectively stop their activities in the sphere of syndicalism, transferring that task to 
Fascism. Both organizations should cooperate at the local level, and Bianchi announced 
that he would propose that all fascist federations would make their veterans become 
members of the ANC.42 
The fascists named these agreements the ‘pact of the trench’ (patto della 
trincea). Taking into account that ‘the best’ members of Fascism were veterans, and that 
Mussolini’s government had enhanced the victory, the fascists considered it logical that 
veterans identified with Fascism; their commonality of ideals would lead veterans to 
give Mussolini a loyal and unshakeable support.43 These views were widespread among 
the fascists. A member of the PNF hierarchy argued that Fascism, having emerged from 
the war, was closely related to the veterans; through them, Fascism should permeate the 
whole nation.44 ANC leaders also thought this link existed, but they rather implied that 
it was Fascism which should be integrated into the nation, instead of the nation being 
converted to Fascism.45 Furthermore, some veterans warned that any kind of 
collaboration with the fascist government should be based on two conditions: the 
                                                
40 They probably took place as a result of a proposal of the ANC: see Archivio della Camera dei Deputati, 
Archivio Ettore Viola, Corrispondenza, b. 3, f. 70. 
41 Il Popolo d’Italia, 1 and 2 May 1923. 
42 Il Popolo d’Italia, 8 May 1923; L’Idea Nazionale, 8 May 1923. 
43 ‘Il patto della trincea’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 8 May 1923. 
44 I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 19 July 1923.  
45 Arturo Codignola, ‘Ciò che è stata e ciò che rappresenta l’ANC, II’, I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 
5 Aprile 1923. 
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purification of the fascist ranks, and the respect of liberties.46 Beyond the myth of the 
trench community, the basis of the ‘pact of the trench’, there existed different opinions 
that complicated the relationship between the ANC and the PNF. 
It is not surprising that relations between fascists and veterans turned sour, even 
violent, if we take into account the agitation of the fascist movement in the Italian 
provinces. The party was riddled with internal disputes, such as the crisis in 
Alessandria, where Nicola Sansanelli was sent to impose order among the fascists.47 
New cases of fascist violence against veterans emerged in the province of Cremona, 
where Farinacci had harassed veterans since 1921.48 In some southern provinces like 
Agrigento (Sicily) or Terra di Lavoro (northern Campania) the confrontation also 
became a thorny issue.49 In Palermo, where the mutilati and combattenti were numerous 
and independent from the few fascist militants, the veterans buttressed Mussolini 
because they considered him as their equal rather than as a fascist.50 Furthermore, 
outright opposition to any ‘pact of the trench’ with the fascists appeared in September 
1923, because these pacts were actually subordinating the ANC sections to the Fasci.51 
In spite of this violence, the veterans’ leaders, dazzled by the fascist ‘revolution’, they 
would usually ignore these problems, downplaying them as ‘little disputes’ (piccole 
beghe). 
It was often said at the time that the fascists attacked the veterans because the 
ANC had become a refuge for anti-fascists in some places. There was a certain element 
of truth to this claim. However, the ANC grew in numbers during this time not merely 
due to the flow of anti-fascist and non-fascist veterans,52 but also thanks to the planned 
introduction of fascists into the ANC cells, which probably was more significant. 
Joining an organization whose national leaders were publicly connected with the fascist 
government and collaborated with the PNF was no safe option for anti-fascists; it was 
only possible in some occasions or in isolated localities. In some cases, anti-fascist 
veterans detached from the ANC and tried to create their own organizations, but the 
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48 Il Combattente (Cremona), 31 May, 21 June 1923. 
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prefetti moved to immediately disband them. In contrast, in newly-founded ANC 
sections, the fascists seemed to be predominant.53 
In this context, for the first anniversary of the March on Rome, the fascists 
obtained the participation of the veterans’ associations. For the fascists, it was very 
important to be on good terms with the veterans during the commemorative cycle of the 
March on Rome and the 4 November. The veterans’ involvement was possible thanks to 
the political orientation of leaders like Arangio Ruiz and Delcroix. The memorandum 
the ANC sent to its veterans gives some insight into their underlying reasoning. For 
them, the celebration of the March on Rome transcended the mere partisan ritual; it 
supposedly was an exaltation of values ‘emerged from the dual work of war and peace’. 
Therefore, veterans should solemnly partake in the rite, while this should not be 
understood as a challenge to the ‘untouchable political independence’ of the association. 
In fact, it was not by chance that this message included greetings to the ‘youth that 
realised the March on Rome and reached the vibrant national renovation coming from 
the indestructible glory of the trench’.54 This ambiguous sentence in the ANC message 
implied that —from the veterans’ point of view— the March on Rome had not been an 
achievement of the veterans but rather an act carried out by younger people, even if 
their inspiration had been the trench soldier’s wish for a renovation of the fatherland. 
For the subsequent celebration of the 4 November in Rome, the ANC and the 
ANMIG invited Mussolini to take part in the commemoration that they organized in the 
Augusteo, after the customary homage to the Milite Ignoto.55 In his speech, Delcroix 
justified the recent participation of the disabled veterans in the March on Rome 
celebration. The presence of mutilated veterans had given a colourful symbolic 
prominence to the fascist celebration.56 Delcroix associated the 4 November victory 
with the ‘historical necessity’ of intervention. In his view, veterans had the role of 
transmitting ‘new forces’ to the Italian people, and the mission of safeguarding the 
fatherland’s conquests.57 Beneath the high-flying rhetorical flourishes, Delcroix had 
established a symbolic link between interventionism, the victory and the March on 
Rome, and had bestowed upon the veterans the role of transmitters of Fascism. Rather 
                                                
53 ACS, MI, PS (1923), b. 75, ff. Lecce, Potenza and Livorno. 
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than Mussolini, it was a more publicly neutral figure, Delcroix, who was in charge of 
making such discursive connections. Meanwhile, anti-fascist veterans separately 
commemorated this date,58 but their impact was extremely limited, since the principal 
national symbolic spaces (Altare della Patria and the Campidoglio in Rome) were 
occupied by the official ceremony and by veteran associations friendly to Fascism. (The 
Istituto del Nastro Azzurro held its first national congress in the Campidoglio in those 
dates).59 The most prestigious military men (Badoglio) had also stood alongside the 
royal and governmental representatives, whereas a public appearance of Cadorna (the 
figure held responsible for Caporetto) around the same time in Florence was put in 
relation to the anti-fascist demonstrations.60 
It was in Cremona where the incomplete integration of the veterans into the 
commemorative fascist cycle provoked virulent reactions by Farinacci.61 His 
intransigent attitude deserves attention, since this approach would finally be imposed 
onto the ANC during 1925, as we will see. Farinacci presumed that the ANC section of 
his city was mainly composed of anti-fascist veterans, despite the fact that the ANC 
section had approved of the participation in the March on Rome commemoration, and 
wanted to establish a cordial relationship with the PNF in line with ANC national 
directives. The fascist ras proposed that the ANC local leader should dissolve the 
section, reconstructing it later without ‘anti-national’ (antinazionali) elements. Then, 
the fascists would grant the section with a truly national orientation (indrizzo veramente 
nazionale). As the circumstances in Cremona demonstrated, the ANC was maintaining 
an unstable dual position, with one attitude regarding Mussolini’s government, and 
another regarding Mussolini’s party. 
The situation was serious enough to urgently reopen the debate within the ANC 
and within the fascist Gran Consiglio to find a clear settlement for the ANC-PNF 
relationship.62 At the meetings between the main leaders of both sides, a new agreement 
was reached, although it now implied a set of important symbolic and discursive 
concessions made by the ANC under the fascist pressure. The ANC recognised that the 
‘fascist revolution’ had been the ‘concrete and definitive revaluation and re-
consecration of the victory’; for this reason the ANC loyally collaborated with 
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Mussolini’s government.63 For its part, the PNF just proudly recalled that it had 
emerged from the war experience. The party merely expressed ‘sympathy’ towards the 
ANC. In conclusion, it was agreed that both organizations would cordially continue 
developing their activities, and, in case of conflict, they would try to reach new 
agreements and to establish normality as soon as possible. However, the tasks of both 
ANC and PNF were not demarcated, and it was not clear how they would resolve 
disputes. Farinacci bluntly stated that his fascist veterans would just obey the orders of 
his party. Within the ANC, it was said that the ‘pacts of the trench’ were something 
ridiculous, since they would never permit to reach any sincere agreement at the local 
level.64 What attitude would the fascist members of the ANC adopt? 
Later, when the intention of creating a ‘fascist veterans’ association’ emerged 
from the intransigent fascist circles, the ANC had to yield again to the fascist pressure.65 
In mid-December 1923, the ANC national board (Arangio Ruiz) decided to expel the 
Italia Libera dissident group, which became an independent anti-fascist organization.66 
Moreover, the ANC reaffirmed once more its collaboration with Mussolini’s 
government, and ‘therefore, with the PNF, of which the government is an expression’.67 
In the new elected ANC national board there was a significant fascist presence (Host-
Venturi, Schiavo, Ponzio di San Sebastiano). Still, this was not enough for Farinacci, 
who even had a physical duel against Arangio Ruiz, which resulted in the ANC leader 
being injured. In Torino, the ANC provincial leaders said that implementing the 
collaboration with the PNF was extremely difficult, since they lacked precise 
instructions.68 Meanwhile, in the South, where the ANC-PNF pacts had never really 
functioned, the antagonism increased.69 In Lucca (Tuscany), the fascist leader Carlo 
Sforza pushed the fascist veterans to abandon the ANC en masse, creating an 
independent federation that only recognised the Duce’s orders.70 The alleged reason for 
these fascist steps was that, under the cover of the ANC apoliticità, the veteran 
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organization did not fully collaborate with the fascist government. These politically 
astute manoeuvres furthered the fascistization of Italian veterans. 
With the elections of April 1924 fast approaching, a resolution of the crisis was 
needed. Finally, Arangio Ruiz was removed from his leading position in the ANC, and 
the fascist captain Host-Venturi was imposed as the provisional president.71 Host-
Venturi stressed the ANC role of assistance in purely social and economic terms, while 
the political debates among veterans abated, or moved into the press of veterans groups 
that had divorced from the ANC (as it happened in Florence).72 Nonetheless, the 
drawing up of the fascist ‘big’ electoral ticket (listone) was another fascist method to 
attract relevant veteran leaders to the fascist plans, while marginalizing others. As some 
commentators noted at that time, mere inclusion on this listone represented a direct pass 
into the Chamber, thanks to the particularities of the Acerbo Law.73 The inclusion of 
several ANC and ANMIG leaders (like Delcroix) on the listone can be considered as the 
result of a long negotiation between the veterans and Fascism. They obtained a seat in 
the Chamber, but their associations lost their autonomy and political dimension. As the 
elections were an overwhelming success for the fascists, the new Chamber was finally 
full of war veterans, who occupied 264 out of 535 seats (49.34%).74 These electoral 
results persuaded many Italian veterans to consider Mussolini as the president ‘who 
made real the promises and aspirations of the trenches’.75 Furthermore, many veteran 
leaders probably believed that a process of political ‘normalization’ of Fascism would 
definitely begin.  
 
The struggle for ideology: combattentismo and apoliticità 
When analysing the Italian veterans’ movement until now, I have avoided employing 
the concept of combattentismo (‘veteranism’), although historians identify this 
phenomenon as typical of the Italian postwar period and as an ideological component of 
early Fascism. In the historiography, combattentismo has been described as a ‘state of 
mind’ —characterised by dissatisfaction and discontent— that found an expression in 
the rhetorical exaltation of war as a school for life, in the belief that veterans constituted 
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a privileged category of citizens with special rights and virtues, and in the idea that 
veterans would form an autonomous political force. These mentalities and ideals 
supposedly converged into Fascism, as did arditismo.76 However, if Fascism soon 
absorbed the ideology of arditismo as a codification of the arditi war mentality and 
demeanour, the word combattentismo practically does not appear in historical sources 
until 1923. This absence does not mean that the concept combattentismo would not 
serve, from 1923 on, to represent events that actually took place earlier. As I will 
demonstrate throughout this work, combattentismo had an extremely important role in 
the history of Fascism. Here, however, I will approach combattentismo as a discursive 
device that historical actors developed and utilized to interact with their context. I will 
historicize the notion of combattentismo to understand how a connection between this 
cultural element and Fascism was established, and what the consequences of this 
conjunction were. 
 The paradigm of the veterans’ apoliticità, which restricted the ANC agency to 
the realms of social assistance and commemorative ceremonies, was in crisis after the 
March on Rome. Earlier, as we know, the initial ANC ideological project of completely 
renovating Italian politics had failed by 1920. While the veterans’ movement went 
through its non-political phase, the fascist movement grew and took power. This alleged 
apoliticità became a blatant contradiction when the ANC collaborated with the fascist 
government and with the PNF. The institutional changes and the agreements between 
both organizations were part of a process of fascistization of Italian veterans, which 
raised concerns among veteran leaders across the country. Since the ANC was 
constantly performing political actions, it was absurd to define the association as a non-
political entity. For this reason some leaders suggested that the ANC should limit its 
activity to social assistance.77 This current of thought was increasingly adopted by the 
fascists inside the ANC and it would be imposed in the spring of 1924 (during Host-
Venturi’s temporary presidency). 
 However, at the beginning of 1923, a different line of thinking also emerged: the 
development and adoption of combattentismo as the ideology of the veterans. The 
origin of this notion is not clear. (The first mention in written sources dates from 1920, 
as we saw, used by Priamo Brunazzi). Apparently, after the March on Rome, people 
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started to use ‘combattentismo’ in a pejorative way to refer to the veterans’ new 
relevance in Italian politics, which was a product of Mussolini’s government and was 
noticeable in the disabled veterans’ agitation against De Vecchi’s pensions project.78 
During 1923, as the decrees and laws granting the veterans special privileges in the 
sphere of public employment proliferated, many professional bureaucrats considered 
these measures an injustice. They spoke about combattentismo. The veterans conversely 
saw a bureaucracy ranged against them.79 The notion of combattentismo had, therefore, 
materialistic and negative connotations. 
 Nonetheless, the first codification of combattentismo as an ideology of the 
Italian veterans can also be found in the spring of 1923, sometime after the ANC had 
declared its adhesion to the government in the congress of Naples. Lio Rubini, a war 
veteran writing in the pages of the most important veteran organ, tried to clarify the 
position of the ANC. He placed the veteran association into a tradition that came from 
1848 and was based on service to the Nation. According to him, the ANC had ‘a spirit, 
a mindset, a political base, an ideal’ that he would call combattentismo. He connected 
the hero of the Risorgimento Garibaldi, the poet Carducci, the irredentist martyr 
Oberdan, with the interventionist students of 1915. The ‘religion’ of combattentismo 
was ‘the style of Italy’, the guardians of which were the veterans. As a religion, 
combattentismo could be adopted by any party or government. Combattentismo 
represented the Nation with a human face; it was as ‘popular’ as the Italian ‘saints’ 
Garibaldi, Mazzini and even Mussolini and the king. The ANC was the institution 
incarnating the idea of combattentismo. For all these reasons, the fascist party should be 
‘loyal to combattentismo, feeling the blood of combattentismo coursing through its 
veins’. The ANC should not be dissolved into the fascist party.80 
 Having coined this notion —combattentismo—, it was possible to open a debate 
among the veterans’ educated elites. The new concept spread successfully, and the 
discussions that ensued were tinged with the controversy about the ANC-PNF 
relationship. The correlation between fascismo and combattentismo was the 
predominant question that many commentators approached (some of them coming from 
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the Salveminian veteran sector of the PSd’A).81 Yet, regardless of some generic 
assumptions, a single uncontested definition of combattentismo as an ideology of war 
veterans was not reached. The meaning of combattentismo varied widely in accordance 
with the context in which it was used, and depending on the political aims that the 
argumentation pursued. Thus, this concept became a symbolic framework to frame 
discussion around the relations between the PNF and the ANC. 
At the beginning of 1924 the debate was intense.82 The anti-fascist veterans of 
Italia Libera denied that Fascism emerged from combattentismo, whereas fascists 
within the ANC adopted the intransigent position of considering Fascism as the only 
faith of patriotic Italians. As one member of the Italia Libera wrote, the topic of 
combattentismo had been obfuscated, and combattentismo as an expression of ideals of 
liberty and justice had never crystallized. Instead, a different combattentismo, which 
was a continuation of the war, had clearly consolidated: Fascism. This connection was 
in no case positive, for Fascism had made use of the warlike characters of 
combattentismo to pursue a fratricidal fight. Unjustifiably naming its struggle as 
combattentismo, Fascism had obtained power and improperly defined itself as the 
government of the veterans. The Italia Libera veterans regretted that the fascist 
combattentismo had nothing to do with the fight for liberty, justice and for the end of 
the military oligarchies that had animated the soldiers during the Great War.83 The anti-
fascist veterans highlighted that the origins of combattentismo were pure, arguing that 
Fascism had abused it. But the democratic spirit of combattentismo had been removed 
from the ANC, and confined to a few independent veteran journals.84 The maturing of 
combattentismo as an ideology of the veterans came too late, when it was already in the 
hands of Fascism. 
 Since combattentismo became a discursive device likely to be employed in 
favour of Fascism, some critics endowed combattentismo with a completely negative 
meaning. The review Volontà, in which veterans like Camillo Bellieni had given life to 
their autonomist and reformist political projects, resumed publication at this time. In 
March 1924, this review published a very critical examination of combattentismo. The 
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key to the phenomenon —it was said— was the veterans’ appropriation of an allegedly 
essential role in the national political life, which had a set of appalling implications. In 
contrast with the veterans’ conceited pretensions, the actual political input of 
combattentismo was very marginal, limited to a certain political-military jargon, with 
which any political discussion ended in brawls and the launching of hand-grenades. The 
article denounced the veterans for holding a deceitful political attitude, ignoring the 
actual destruction of liberties. Lamentably, combattentismo was the sole political 
patrimony of those who had gone to the war without a previous moral and ideological 
background; these young people had been transformed into both combatants and 
political men during a unique spiritual process —war. Hence, combattentismo was their 
only politics. But it was a very flimsy ground from which to lead the country. 
Combattentismo was an expression of ingenuity and political virginity. The only form 
of combattentismo in force was Fascism, and the fascists had taken advantage of that to 
obtain power. Now, the veterans had to choose, either joining Fascism, or constructing 
their own political path.85 In a sense, anti-fascist veterans were renouncing to the 
concept of combattentismo, handing it over to the fascists. 
Alongside this aborted conception of combattentismo as a veteran ideology 
differentiated from Fascism, the reawakening of a political consciousness of the 
veterans themselves was silenced by the fascist victory in the elections of April 1924.86 
At this stage, the ANC preferred to underline its primordial role in social assistance. As 
Fascism seemed to consolidate with a Chamber full of veterans, the myth of apoliticità 
gained importance once more for different sectors of the veterans. In June 1924, a new 
ANC/ONC monthly review, Problemi d'Italia, was created (directed by Umberto 
Mancuso, Carlo Battistella and Domenico Galante). It was a publication devoted to 
technical and generically patriotic questions, where ideological and political debates 
were absolutely absent.87 The lack of public controversies in this journal suggested that 
a stable political settlement for the complex veterans-Fascism relationship had been 
reached. On the left, anti-fascism had renounced combattentismo. In the hypothetical 
centre, the ANC had been emptied of political meaning. In power, Fascism framed the 
activity of all those veterans willing to exert political action. The intransigent fascists 
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seemed content with this balance. Would this standstill allow the final ‘normalization’ 
of Fascism? A new important crisis would prevent this. 
The assassination of Giacomo Matteotti, a socialist MP that maintained a critical 
line of opposition to Fascism, badly affected the process of fascist ‘normalization’.88 
Historians have said much about the crisis that opened at this point. Its solution would 
imply the definitive establishment of the fascist dictatorship, with Mussolini’s infamous 
speech of 3 January 1925.89 In the following pages I will analyse how the accumulated 
discursive contradictions and organizational tensions in the veterans’ sphere found a 
difficult and drastic resolution in this context. 
Evidently, the Matteotti crisis had great impact on the relationship between 
Fascism and veterans. This crime outraged many of the ANC veterans that had fully 
supported Mussolini up until this point. Although some ministers resigned and 
Mussolini yielded the Ministry of Interior to the moderate nationalist Federzoni, many 
veteran leaders became conscious of the impossibility of a ‘normalization’ of Fascism 
within the existing stat structure. Fascism —it was said— seemed finished, and the 
fascist conceptions about the veterans came under harsh criticism. Anti-fascist veterans 
convincingly argued that the fact of being a veteran did not imply the right to exert 
political power; decorations and mutilations, if glorious, were not titles of professional 
or political competence; the ‘profession of veteran’ must disappear.90 Camillo Bellieni, 
disheartened, wrote a famous article in which he argued that the original project of the 
ANC —that of a renovation of Italian politics— had painfully failed.91 In contrast, 
within the ANC, few leaders were in favour of definitely withdrawing the political 
support to the government; some of them (like Manaresi in Bologna) were confident 
that Mussolini’s government could recover its prestige and restore order.92 Although 
ANC leaders like Savelli or Giulio Bergmann expressed severe criticisms against the 
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91 Camillo Bellieni, ‘L’Associazione dei Combattenti (Appunti per una storia politica dell'ultimo 
quinquennio)’, La Critica Politica, 25 July 1924, pp. 301-315. 
92 Cremona Nuova, 19 July 1924. 
 154
fascist illegality and violence, they did not join the opposition that abandoned the 
Parliament (the group of the Aventino).93  
The ANC Congress of Assisi at the end of July 1924 would hypothetically serve 
to clarify the veterans’ stance in this state of affairs. Members of the Aventinian 
opposition like Giovanni Amendola hoped that veterans would align in Assisi against 
the anti-democratic drift.94 There was also much expectation and nervousness among 
the fascists regarding the congress. Many fascists, Dino Grandi among them, went to 
Assisi, to be present at the sessions. The discussions were very heated and tumultuous, 
and especially bitter was the confrontation between the outgoing leaders Arangio Ruiz 
and Ponzio di San Sebastiano. Despite the weighty fascist presence, Giulio Bergmann 
presented a crude motion of condemnation of the government that attracted support of 
various representatives. In contrast, the representative of Udine, Luigi Russo, calmly 
talked about maintaining all confidence in Mussolini, admitting that the veterans had 
always collaborated with the ‘fascist revolution’. Finally, the convention passed a 
compromise conciliatory resolution (ordine del giorno), proposed by Ettore Viola —a 
former officer of the arditi, a fascist MP and a holder of the Gold Medal. The ordine del 
giorno of Assisi stressed the ANC’s autonomy above all else; support for the 
government was implicitly left in suspension pending the re-establishment of legality 
and sovereignty of the state. This ambiguity left room for interpretation, and even the 
subsequent formation of a new ANC Central Committee (Comitato Centrale) was 
complicated. In the end, Viola took over the presidency, together with other four 
fascists, including Luigi Russo. These fascist positions were counterbalanced by four 
anti-fascists such as Livio Pivano (a republican from Alessandria). The main leaders of 
the new Comitato Centrale were also members of the Parliament. The Aventinian 
opposition interpreted the ordine del giorno of Assisi as a symptom of the veterans’ 
anti-fascism. The fascists showed disappointment with its cold and distant tone. 
Farinacci stated that it was necessary to come out of this equivocal situation.95 
When, some days later, the National Council of the PNF met, Mussolini very 
clearly declared that he did not like the ordine del giorno of Assisi (l’ordine del giorno 
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di Assisi non mi piace). This reaction bore testament to the political turn that Fascism 
was experiencing at the time, linked to the ascension of Farinacci and the intransigent 
fascists. Importantly, Mussolini argued that the ANC owed a lot to him, and that it had 
been only after the March on Rome, during 1923, that ‘political manifestations of 
combattentismo’ had taken place; earlier there had not been such a phenomenon in Italy. 
The Duce’s argumentation claimed that the veterans’ movement had been weak 
between 1919 and 1922, and that only Fascism in power had made combattentismo 
possible, by benefiting the veterans and the ANC as their comrades of the trenches.96 
This was not an absolute rupture, but the situation was on the edge. Furthermore, 
whereas the debilitated moderate and revisionist fascist groups remained in the 
background, the most radical sector of Fascism aggressively broke into the veterans’ 
debates through the pages of new fascist newspapers. Roma fascista directly attacked 
the opposition’s speculations about the ordine del giorno di Assisi by clearly affirming 
that Fascism was equal to the veterans, and the veterans were equal to Fascism: there 
were no differences between them.97 Other fascist veterans and several leaders of ANC 
sections in the Lazio spoke in the same terms.98 The Roman fascio made clear that it 
was composed of more than 3,000 veterans out of more than 9,000 members; some 
holders of the gold medal among them (for example, Amilcare Rossi).99 A big 
demonstration of the veterans in Rome exhibited their confidence in Mussolini.100 The 
fascists were mobilizing resources to maintain their monopoly over the symbol of the 
veteran. 
Thus, the discursive struggle escalated. The term combattentismo, lacking any 
concrete definition, became polyvalent, and a source of dispute between anti-fascist 
veterans, the ANC, and the fascist veterans. The anti-fascist veterans of Italia Libera, 
expelled from the ANC, opted to continue their attacks on the idea of combattentismo, 
accepting that it already was a concept married to Fascism. As there were opinions that 
anti-fascist combattentismo was not different from fascist combattentismo, Italia Libera 
veterans renounced to the notion. By this time, they had come to understand this veteran 
ideology, not as positive political action, but as the plain demand of rewards in the name 
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of the war experience. Italia Libera veterans sought to carry out an anti-fascist political 
activity, but paradoxically they shared the fascist view that the ANC should recover its 
apoliticità and its exclusive function of social assistance.101 Meanwhile, some fascists 
also disowned the notion of combattentismo, disregarding it as a degeneration, and 
arguing that having fought the war did not give rise to rights, but rather to duties.102 All 
this complex and intertwined discussion is a proof of the unclear position that the 
veterans maintained at the time of the Matteotti crisis. Unsurprisingly, the Duce was 
hesitant, and seemingly preferred to wait until the general situation became clearer.103 
In 1924, as had happened the year before, the two symbolic dates of 28 October 
and 4 November served to test the level of the veterans’ commitment to Fascism. The 
commemoration of the March on Rome revealed profound divisions among the Italian 
veterans. Correctly considering that it was a partisan celebration, and for the sake of 
apoliticità, the ANC Comitato Centrale refused to join the fascist celebration. 
Confronting the ANC withdrawal, the fascist response was bitter and solemn. In Critica 
fascista, it was argued that the veterans were acting ‘outside of their historical function’. 
The fascists considered the hostile attitude of the veterans very disappointing, since ‘the 
historical function of the so-called combattentismo has been incarnated by Fascism for 
since the last four or five’. They stated that Fascism would complete its cycle even if the 
veterans were stood outside of this endeavour; it was not in vain that Fascism had 
emerged from the war to resume the Risorgimento.104 The veterans, disappointed with 
Fascism, argued the other way round: ‘the historical mission of Fascism —which was 
not a party but a state of mind— was completely finished’.105 In the days prior to the 
March on Rome anniversary, the fascists made important efforts to convince the 
veterans to join the celebration. Paradoxically, now the fascists attacked the concept of 
apoliticità (Image 20).106 
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Image 20: ‘The Veterans and the celebration of the March on Rome. – Why should I miss my 
brothers’ meeting?’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 24 October 1924. 
  
In reality, important sectors of veterans across the Italian provinces joined the 
ceremonies for the March on Rome regardless, as was the case in Rome and in several 
northern towns.107 Mussolini obtained endorsement from other veteran associations than 
the ANC, namely the war volunteers and arditi. It came as no surprise that Delcroix 
maintained his loyalty to him.108 Forty-four bearers of the Gold Medal publicly declared 
their full support to Mussolini.109 Likewise, many other combattenti wanted to reinforce 
the links with Mussolini instead of breaking with the government. Their disobedience of 
the ANC was ascribed to the view that its Comitato Centrale practiced an equivocal 
apoliticità.110 In other words, the decision of not participating in a celebration because 
of the apoliticità of the ANC was criticized precisely as a political reaction. 
Furthermore, the belief in the mythical link between Vittorio Veneto and the March on 
Rome was widespread. And many were convinced that the veterans had actually been 
‘pioneers of the fascist gospel’ by participating in the war propaganda, and that Fascism 
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was a phenomenon that had emerged from the war.111 But in general, veterans joined 
the 28 October celebration moved by their fascist membership rather than by their status 
as veterans. In any case, the fascists were disappointed.112 In the end, in many Italian 
cities, violence broke out between the fascists and the veterans who independently 
performed the 4 November commemoration.113 The commemorative cycle of October-
November 1924 provoked a violent conflict that reveals the deadlock at which the 
veterans’ ideological evolution had arrived. 
 In conclusion, the two fundamental discursive elements that entered into the 
ideological veterans’ world during this time, combattentismo and apoliticità, did not 
lead to any widely and uniformly shared political position, neither for the veterans 
organizations, nor for their members and leaders. Yet, at the same time, both themes 
favoured the fascistization process. The original 1919 project of rinnovamento was long 
since forgotten. The ideologies of the ‘anti-patriotic’ left had been rejected. The 
republican (Italia Libera) and the Salveminian trends (PSd’A) had been marginalised.114 
Therefore, by October 1922, Fascism was the main ideological and discursive 
framework that was left for those veterans who desired to exert political action. Soon 
displeased by the totalitarian impulses of fascist ideology (already present in De 
Vecchi’s project), most veterans tried to maintain themselves in an idiosyncratic 
discursive framework, or strived to find a new one, while they negotiated with Fascism. 
It was necessary to define an ideological position for the veterans, because otherwise 
their organizational independence was at risk. Combattentismo and apoliticità were two 
tools for this discursive negotiation, which would allow the accommodation of the 
veterans into Fascism. However, Fascism did not allow accommodation but only 
assimilation; or in other words, fascistization.  
Combattentismo and apoliticità did not help militate against the fascistization of 
war veterans for several reasons. Firstly, there was no consensus about what 
combattentismo meant, although it was clear for everybody that such a phenomenon 
existed. This protean concept allowed for the channelling of the political struggle 
around the war veterans’ organizations and the PNF; but its contradictions teach us that 
                                                
111 (‘pioneri del verbo fascista’) Il Combattente d’Italia, 5 September, 3 November 1924. 
112 Leo Polini, ‘Combattenti e fascisti’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 2 November 1924. 
113 La Stampa, 3 November 1924; I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 9 November 1924; Cf. Cremona 
Nuova, 6 November 1924; Marco Baldassari, ‘La memoria celebrata. La festa del 4 novembre a Lucca tra 
dopoguerra e fascismo’, Italia contemporanea, 242 (2006), pp. 23-43. 
114 In the south, veterans who wanted to pursue a reformist programme had to become independent from 
the ANC, creating their own press organs; see Il Combattente. Politico indipendente dell’Italia 
Meridionale (Naples), 20 October 1924. 
 159 
veteran ideology and politics, as well as the veteran organizations, were plural by 
nature. Combattentismo was a kaleidoscope through which it was possible to observe 
the veteran movement and its political role. Furthermore, combattentismo seemed to be 
a fruit of (and it was a consequence of) the fascist seizure of power. Either in its 
negative definition —as the exaltation of the veteran condition in order to obtain 
political and economic rewards—, or in its positive meaning —linked with the Italian 
fighting spirit coming from the Risorgimento—, combattentismo was soon characterised 
as an ideological feature related to Fascism. Yet the fascists themselves did not offer a 
singular interpretation or definition for this phenomenon either. 
Secondly, apoliticità was another polyvalent concept used by all veteran sectors 
in one way or another. It was much more clear what apoliticità meant (non-political 
action), but as any historian would understand, the actions of the veteran associations 
hardly could be seen as devoid of political consequences.115 Veterans soon realised that 
pretending to maintain an apolitical position was hypocrisy, even if apoliticità was 
understood as non-partisan action. However, the appeal to apoliticità inside of the 
organization was an effective means of restraining the political actions of rivals. 
Apoliticità initially allowed for the maintenance of political diversity inside the directive 
boards of the ANC, in spite of fascist pressure. It is a paradox that, after some time, 
apoliticità rendered unlikely the adoption of any political position independent of 
Fascism, and facilitated the full fascistization of the ANC directive boards, as we will 
see. In any case, in the years 1923-1924, both discursive tools —combattentismo and 
apoliticità— permitted the final consolidation of Fascism as the perceived real political 
manifestation of the veterans’ spirits and voices, even if this bond was far from being 
translated into reality. 
 
The fascistization of the ANC (1924-1925) 
Understanding the final stage of the Italian veterans’ fascistization is crucial, because it 
was integral to the imposition of the fascist dictatorship in 1925. Both the establishment 
of the dictatorship and the process of the fascistization of the veterans should be 
understood in the context of the political ascension of Farinacci —who would go on to 
become the General Secretary of the PNF on 15 February 1925— and in the climate of 
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the ‘second wave’ of fascist violence.116 Most importantly, Mussolini’s infamous 
speech on 3 January 1925 made the non-fascist veterans’ resistance highly difficult, 
since Italy was formally converted into a dictatorship. Thereafter, any opposition could 
be illegalized or completely marginalized. Despite the relevance of the Italian war 
veterans’ fascistization in the process of the formal installation of the fascist 
dictatorship, historiography has only provided concise accounts of Italian veteran 
politics in this period. Veterans’ memoires of this crucial moment are usually 
contradictory and tend to be self-justifying.117 In this section, I will provide a new and 
more detailed analysis of the process, offering a view from below, and also focusing on 
its discursive and symbolic features. This analysis will allow us to reassess the real role 
played by veterans in the consolidation of the fascist dictatorship during 1925. 
 
Unleashing fascistization 
The above-discussed events of 4 November 1924 represented a symbolic breaking point 
that unleashed the definitive offensive to fascistize the ANC. In the following weeks, 
some ANC leaders, such as Ponzio di San Sebastiano, broke off their relationship with 
the PNF; some of them even approached the anti-fascist parliamentary opposition.118 To 
reverse the situation, some fascists suggested a policy of a slow and pacific 
impregnation of the ANC. They recommended that fascist veterans, taking advantage of 
their superiority in numbers, enrol in the veteran association, frequent its headquarters, 
make themselves known; the objective was not to ‘conquer’ (conquistare) the ANC 
sections, but to make their ideals prevail within the association.119 Farinacci, in contrast, 
was in favour of a far more intransigent tactic to resolve veterans’ issue. As we know, in 
Farinacci’s Cremona the confrontation between veterans and fascists was particularly 
hostile.120 According to the radical ras, there was no space for intermediate positions; 
the veterans should be either with Fascism or against it. As we will see in this section, 
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the fascists not only pursued a strategy of silent infiltration, but also employed violent, 
ruthless methods to finally fascistize the veteran organization. 
The fascists launched a campaign of propaganda and local manoeuvres in order 
to discredit the ANC. For this purpose, they set up an alternative veteran platform, 
called Unione Nazionale Combattenti (UNCi). The UNCi emerged in Turin at the end 
of October 1924, promoted by the fascist veteran Aldo Bertelè, who was part of a group 
of fascists expelled from the ANC.121 The new association emanated from some local 
Fasci and tried to attract veterans who were unhappy with the political attitude of the 
ANC Comitato Centrale.122 Thus, during November and December 1924, the first 
sections of the UNCi appeared at the initiative of certain fascist leaders in the province 
of Turin, and in some villages near Florence; shortly after, UNCi cells emerged in 
Palermo and Rome.123 In the capital, Adolfo Schiavo reaffirmed the ANC section’s 
loyal collaboration with Mussolini’s government —‘donor of the greatest value to the 
Victory’ (valorizzatore della vittoria)— during a meeting attended by influential 
bearers of the Gold Medal such as Amilcare Rossi.124 Meanwhile, sections of the UNCi 
started to appear in many other Italian regions from January 1925, though it was a 
phenomenon confined to small towns. According to a circular sent by a fascist organizer 
in the Sicilian province of Caltanissetta, this strategy had to be very subtle, but the 
objectives were straightforward. The fascists saw that, due to the uncertainty of the 
veteran leaders’ political positions, the ordinary veterans were in a ‘state of mind’ that 
could be exploited ‘in the interests of the consolidation and development of the PNF’. 
In principle, the key issue was to depoliticize these veterans and to direct them towards 
welfare tasks only, and for this reason the UNCi veterans had to maintain very weak 
links with the PNF sections. In reality, however, veterans were not expected to continue 
being ‘agnostic’ in the political realm.125 Veterans had to be submitted to the fascist will 
across Italy. 
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Spaces of veterans’ fascistization 
Fascism launched a countrywide operation in January and February 1925, in order to 
debilitate the ANC and to reinforce the position of Mussolini, whose fully-fledged 
dictatorship had recently been installed on 3 January. In a subsequent swift repressive 
action, most groups of Italia Libera were dismantled.126 Having broken the anti-fascist 
veterans’ platform, the rest of Italian veterans would also be brought under the control 
of the regime. This process can be seen not just as a fascist mobilization against a 
neutral ANC, but also as the first campaign to gather support and manufacture consent 
to Mussolini’s dictatorship. However, the presence of fascist veterans was far from 
widespread in the country. It is, therefore, interesting to carefully examine the 
geographical distribution of the fascist support among the Italian veterans. 
The pages of Il Popolo d’Italia and other fascist journals testified to the 
constitution either of local UNCi sections or of sections that were independent from the 
ANC Comitato Centrale. The newspapers divulged the veterans’ declarations of fidelity 
to the Governo Nazionale, even if the sections remained linked to the ANC. In local 
meetings, the ANC sections decided to adopt an official position, stating whether a 
scission would take place. In Map 1, red dots show the provincial sections (big dots), or 
local sections/splintered groups (small dots), in which veterans either a) wholly or 
partially declared adhesion to the fascist government, or b) established UNCi sections, 
or c) made the ANC section split. This data can be confronted with the information —
given in the paper I Combattenti— about ANC sections loyal to the Comitato Centrale; 
green dots show these cases. In addition, the reports from the prefetti to the Ministry of 
Interior —Federzoni, a figure opposed to radical fascism— help us to gain an overall 
view of the situation in Italy. The resulting image yield an idea of the extent and depth 
of the fascist veterans’ campaigning by the end of February.127  
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Map 1: Local and provincial ANC sections wholly or partially aligned with the fascist 
government by 29 February 1925. 
 
Two poles of fascist agitation among veterans were especially important: one in 
Tuscany, between Florence and Pisa, and another around Milan. In addition, the fascist 
strongholds in Emilia-Romagna were muscularly opposed to the ANC Comitato 
Centrale. Unsurprisingly, the fascist veterans were powerful in these zones, where the 
fascist movement had been born and first flourished. These pro-governmental groups 
often mushroomed in medium-sized localities around urban centres. For example, in the 
case of Tuscany, the fascists controlled the veteran movement as early as 1919 or 1921 
in cities like Siena, Pisa and Florence. In the latter city, the first fascist reactions against 
the ANC had started towards December 1924 in certain neighbourhoods. From there, 
the fascists expanded their control to the urban centre, physically attacking rival veteran 
centres, then intervening in other villages. Veterans from Lucca also came under fascist 
control thanks to the aggressive actions of the squadrist leader Carlo Scorza. In the rest 
of the Tuscan region, the fascist expansion among veterans was also dependent on 
squadrist coercion (Map 2).  
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Map 2: Fascist (UNCi) and pro-government sections in Tuscany by 25 February 1925 
 
In the province of Cremona the process was similar. It started with a demonstration of 
fascist veterans promoted by Farinacci on 23 January 1925 in the capital city.128 
Subsequently, the fascists imposed their rule in a set of local veterans’ sections in the 
north of the province.129 The next step was expanding eastwards and westwards; 
members of the initial fascist veterans’ group from Cremona were responsible for 
creating the new fascist veteran sections, mobilizing veterans from these villages (we 
can notice this expansion through the Maps 3 to 6).130  
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Maps 3 to 6: Fascistization of veteran sections in the province of Cremona. 
 
These fascist offensives can be put in direct relation with the existence of previous 
conflicts between veterans and fascists. Such quarrels had arisen as early as 1922-1923, 
especially in Farinacci’s province. In other northern regions, there was a smaller need to 
mobilize veterans against the ANC, since the masses of veterans had already been 
brought under fascist control. For example, in Veneto there was less agitation, for 
Fascism had already dismantled the erstwhile predominant Catholic UNRG. In Brescia, 
the Catholic veterans of the countryside remained mainly loyal to the fascist 
government, while veteran leaders in the city remained loyal to the ANC Comitato 
Centrale; Augusto Turati —the fascist ras of Brescia— preferred to wait until the 
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decree of 2 March (see below) to dissolve this ANC section.131 All these cases 
(Tuscany, Cremona, Brescia) show that the fascist reaction against the ANC was not 
spontaneous; instead, it depended on the personal initiative of fascist leaders to mobilize 
the veterans. 
Seemingly, some zones remained only slightly affected by the fascist drive, 
especially in the centre and south of Italy. Veterans from Lazio and the Marche may 
have shown little sympathy for Fascism for several reasons. In these zones, the veterans 
had been involved in agrarian activism during the bienio rosso, and both the arditi del 
popolo and Italia Libera organizations were well rooted. Further south, the same causes 
for a less significant fascist penetration can be pointed out. In the Mezzogiorno and in 
Sicily, fascist veterans tried to drum up support in a generally hostile environment. In 
Sardinia, the masses of veterans of the PSd’A probably remained unconvinced by 
Fascism. Anti-fascist veteran leaders like Lussu were still influential. Several ANC 
federations from Campania, Calabria and Sicily declared their loyalty to the ordine del 
giorno of Assisi. However, in these regions, the fascists made efforts to mobilise 
veterans in different local sections, confronting the non-fascist groups.132 
In reality, the fascist veterans were present in the south as well. Several ANC 
section leaders from Lazio were among the promoters of the pro-fascist agitation in 
Rome.133 In the province of Lecce (Puglia), a local section adhered to the government 
on the grounds of rejecting ‘faction ideologies’, and denouncing the ‘disintegrating 
action of subversive forces’. At the end of February 1925, in this provincial federation, 
16 out of 36 local sections supported the fascist government, counting on 3,762 votes.134 
In the case of Trapani (Sicily), the veterans’ assembly had divided into four groups: 
fascists (69 votes), ‘pro-fascists’ (140 votes), and two anti-government groups (134 
votes in total).135 In Catanzaro, too, down on the sole of the boot-shaped Italian 
peninsula, a division between two trends was reported: one favourable, and the other 
critical of the ANC.136 In Cagliari (Sardinia) there was an important inclination towards 
Fascism among the veterans: 105 out of 115 sections (containing 12,000 out of 15,000 
                                                
131 Paolo Corsini, Il feudo di Augusto Turati. Fascismo e lotta politica a Brescia (1922-1926), Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 1988, pp. 243-250, 682-684. 
132 I Combattenti,  15 February 1925; Cf. Il Giornale dei Combattenti, 21 February 1925. 
133 L’Idea Nazionale, 3 February 1925. 
134 (‘ideologia di fazione’, ‘azione disgregatrice delle forze sovversive’) ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. 
Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Lecce. 
135 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Trapani. 
136 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Catanzaro. 
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veterans) supported Fascism.137 In general, in the South, whereas some urban, 
squadrism-connected veteran elites underpinned Fascism, the large numbers of peasant 
ex-soldiers did not. 
In the north, inversely, Fascism was a mass movement, but there were places 
with a predominantly anti-fascist tendency among the veterans (Alessandria, Genoa). 
For instance, writing from Imperia, on the Ligurian Coast, the prefetto reported that the 
ANC provincial section had voted in February in favour of an anti-fascist position, 
gathering 860 votes against 460 votes and 330 abstentions, though seven pro-fascist 
sections decided to create their own independent federation.138 On some occasions, the 
decision of the provincial or local section just depended on the personal choice of the 
leaders. Most veterans were indifferent or incapable of discerning any real differences 
between either supporting the Comitato Centrale or stating loyalty to the fascist 
Government. In Reggio Emilia, for instance, during a meeting in mid-February, a new 
pro-ANC committee prevailed over the fascist list of candidates by a difference of circa 
400 votes, but the prefetto noted that there were names common to both lists.139 It is 
difficult to discern the local political controversies that swayed the ANC sections to tilt 
towards the fascist government or towards the ANC Comitato Centrale. Beyond a 
superficial division between north and south, many other factors divided the Italian 
veterans. 
 
Discourses and symbols 
The kind of reasoning and discourse with which veterans legitimised their support for 
Mussolini’s government is easier to understand. As they launched their campaign to 
fascistize the ANC, the fascists were again taking advantage of the apoliticità motif, 
which was deeply engrained in the veteran discursive framework. Veterans were, in the 
fascists’ view, bound to the future task of safeguarding superior, national interests; for 
this reason, they should be controlled, tamed by the idea of apoliticità, until that 
exceptional moment arrived. In the fascist discursive strategy of this moment, it was 
only the attitude of the ANC Comitato Centrale and the ordine del giorno of Assisi that 
were considered perniciously political, whereas adhering to the Governo Nazionale and 
Mussolini as Presidente del Consiglio was considered a wholly national and patriotic 
                                                
137 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Cagliari. 
138 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Imperia. 
139 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Reggio Emilia. 
 169 
(non-political) position. Naturally, any real war veteran was expected to support 
Mussolini. For the fascists, ‘the combattenti worth of this name should not forget and 
should maintain their supportive help, their recognition and fidelity to the PNF and to 
its great leader’.140 
The manipulated notion of apoliticità and myths about the fascist seizure of 
power explain why many veteran sections sided with fascism, and stood against the 
ANC Comitato Centrale. The veterans’ statement in La Spezia on 2 February 1925, 
illustrates this point.141 According to them, the members of the Comitato Centrale, such 
as Ettore Viola, had abused the right to carry out a political action in the name of the 
veterans, thereby discrediting and dividing the ANC. By forgetting the statutory 
principle of apoliticità, the Comitato Centrale had favoured the victory-sabotaging 
political groups. In order to save unity, the veterans disavowed their leaders. In contrast, 
they considered that Mussolini’s government had ‘been always a jealous guardian and 
defender of their moral and economic rights’, and that ‘only after the coming of the 
fascist government the veterans saw their heroic sacrifice recognised’.142 For them, the 
national government had made real the victory and given sense to the heroic sacrifice of 
the soldiers.143 This kind of declaration proves that the fascist discourse had permeated 
veterans to a certain extent; that the measures taken by the Mussolini’s government had 
been received positively; and that the discourse of apoliticità was effectively benefiting 
Fascism. 
The fascists were the victors of the discursive and symbolic struggle of this 
period. At a moment when Fascism or anti-fascism were the only available political 
options, the pitfall of apoliticità was detrimental for the veterans.144 The ANC leaders 
were less successful than the fascists in employing the myth of the veterans’ political 
neutrality. The veterans wrongly thought that impartiality would lead to demands for the 
discontinuance of the fascist ‘revolution’. As a cartoon published in the ANC organ 
shows, the veterans tried to represent themselves as independent spectators in the 
‘theatre of Italian politics’; they overemphasized the typical veteran attributes, the grey-
                                                
140 (‘i combattenti degni di questo nome non dimenticano e mantengono al Partito fascista ed al suo 
grande Capo l’ausilio solidale della loro riconoscenza e della loro fedeltà’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 8 January 
1925. 
141 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Spezia. 
142 (‘é sempre stato geloso e vigile custode ed assertore dei diritti morali ed economici dei combattenti 
che solo dall’avvento del governo fascista videro valorizzate il loro eroico sacrificio’) ACS, MI, PS 
1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Spezia. 
143 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Ascoli Piceno. 
144 Cf. L’Idea Nazionale, 4 February 1925. 
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green uniform, the helmet and the medals strip, as something very different to the 
fascist model of squadrist political actor (Image 21). 
 
 
Image 21: ‘Theatre of Italian Politics. – They are right saying that we do not represent 
anything… In the theatre of war they allowed us a discreet role, but here they represent 
everything’, I Combattenti, 22 February 1925. 
 
However, after 3 January 1925, the anti-fascist veterans’ leaders had a very low 
probability of winning the symbolic and discursive struggle, given that the independent 
veteran press constantly suffered attacks and confiscations.145 Indeed, the fascists 
appropriated the same symbolic representation of the veteran. Their publications also 
represented the veterans without fascist traits, as well-behaved soldiers, whose loyalty 
was bound to the government and not to the vile, self-interested ANC leaders (Image 
22). Thus, during this process, a shared representation of the veteran consolidated: that 
of the loyal soldier. It was a symbol rather typical of the nationalist patriotic discourse. 
But now this symbol remained tied to Fascism in power. 
 
                                                
145 I Combattenti, 22 February 1925. 
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Image 22: ‘Here just one who obviously did not think of giving a little medal to Bavaro and 
Viola’, Roma fascista, 7 March 1925; the original drawing in L’Idea Nazionale, 24 June 1923. 
 
Actors, practices and strategies 
Who exactly were the agents of the process of veterans’ fascistization? Sociologically, 
this phenomenon was in essence the same as the fascist reaction of 1920-1922. It 
differed from squadrism in the nature of the actions they performed, although violence 
was eventually used. As mentioned above, the first pro-fascist veteran sections appeared 
in January 1925 in the centre-north of Italy.146 There is evidence to demonstrate that the 
protagonists were typical fascist veterans, officers, young junior officers, and ex-arditi. 
For instance, in Trieste, three former lieutenants and one frigate captain established the 
UNCi cell on 25 January.147 In Pavia, on 5 February, a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a 
captain, a major, and some professors, lawyers and doctors set up the local UNCi cell 
recruiting 200 members.148 Some groups of arditi were also involved in the UNCi 
associative operation.149 The anti-Bolshevik veterans of 1919 were again in action. 
Nevertheless, the fascist veterans did not rely on the violent squadrist practices 
during the campaign against the unbowed ANC. They made their voices heard, but they 
did not assault the ANC headquarters as they had done earlier to socialist centres. In 
Turin, on 19 January, after an assembly in the Fascio headquarters, there was a 
demonstration of fascist veterans in front of the ANC premises, which were guarded by 
                                                
146 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, ff. Firenze, Cremona, 
Ancona. 
147 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Trieste. 
148 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Pavia.  
149 Il Giornale dei Combattenti, 21 February 1925. 
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soldiers and carabinieri. They sang fascist and soldiers’ hymns (Giovinezza and Inno 
del Piave), but there were no incidents.150 In other towns, fascist veterans publicly 
protested, rallied and demonstrated against the ANC, but there were no physical attacks 
yet.151 In the biggest cities where anti-fascist ANC leaders still controlled important 
provincial sections, the division between fascists and veterans was more troublesome. 
This was the case of Milan, where Giulio Bergmann was the main leader. On 10 
February, tumultuous brawls took place during a veteran meeting, yet without 
bloodshed.152 On 15 February, the prefetto of Milan reported that another electrifying 
meeting ended with the approval of the fascist ordine del giorno by a narrow margin 
(2,165 against 2,039 votes). Giulio Bergmann defended the ordine del giorno of Assisi 
and protested, but the fascist commissaries occupied the ANC establishment without 
incidents.153 A common denominator of shared symbols and discourses prevented 
violence between the fascists and ANC veterans. 
However, violence was an important vector for fascist success, eventually 
exploding during clashes for the control of the ANC headquarters. The ANC 
establishments symbolized the control of the sections and, in fact, contained the 
archives, funds and materials necessary to carry out assistance tasks. The fascists never 
wanted to destroy, but rather to seize them. Nonetheless, in certain places throughout 
the Mezzogiorno, groups of peasant ex-soldiers either had socialist inclinations or had 
rivalled the fascists for the control of towns and syndicates. Here, the level of violent 
behaviour was higher. In fact, in Puglia, squadrist violence against veterans associations 
had continued after the March on Rome, and now conflicts stepped up.154 In Bari, for 
example, a provisional ANC committee riddled with internal controversies tried to keep 
the section united. The pro-fascist leaders, however, occupied the headquarters by force, 
and mobilized 43 out of 50 local sections in their favour. The prefetto of Bari believed 
that future violent skirmishes were likely.155 
Perhaps the most important confrontations took place in Rome, although 
physical violence did not yet break out. In the capital city the ANC central headquarters 
coexisted with the fascistized ANC local section. On 1 February 1925 a group of 200 
                                                
150 Il Popolo d’Italia, 20 January 1925. 
151 Cremona Nuova, 21 January 1925. 
152 Avanti! (Milan), 10 February 1925. 
153 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Milano. 
154 Salvatore Coppola, Conflitti di lavoro e lotta politica nel Salento nel primo dopoguerra (1919-1925), 
Lecce, Salento Domani, 1984, pp. 92-97, 104-105; Simona Colarizi, Dopoguerra e fascismo, passim. 
155 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Bari. 
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veterans organized a meeting in the Teatro Argentina to declare their hostility to the 
ANC Comitato Centrale. After this demonstration, they moved on to the Altare della 
Patria to venerate the tomb of the Milite Ignoto, stopping en route to protest in front of 
the ANC national headquarters en route (in Palazzetto Venezia). Their attempt to invade 
the building was only prevented by the intervention of the police. The following day, 
they gathered again in Piazza Venezia, and a group of around twenty of them tried to 
approach the ANC headquarters, again with hostile intentions. Once more, however, the 
police blocked their way.156 Further north, in Forlì (Romagna), veterans suffered fascist 
aggressions at the end of January 1925.157 In Pavia, fights between anti-fascist and 
fascist veterans took place on several occasions, while fascists were carrying out a 
campaign to affiliate veterans to the PNF.158 In the province of Verona, the fascists 
attacked some veterans who were members of the Italia Libera or even ANC 
members.159 However, physical attacks against persons were not common, unless they 
took place against veterans clearly considered to be socialists or anti-fascists. 
The ANC establishments were the objectives of the fascist violence, rather than 
the veterans themselves. In Tuscany, this kind of attacks became more systematic than 
in other areas. The first violent explosion took place in Florence on 31 December 1924, 
when a fascist gathering ended with the destruction of several centres of the anti-fascist 
middle class, for example the printing press of the combatants’ weekly Fanteria.160 At 
the end of February, in the province of Pisa, the ANC offices of at least three localities 
were devastated, and this strategy continued into March until several fascists were 
charged and arrested.161 Coercion seems, however, to have worked, since many veterans 
joined the new UNCi sections created in Tuscany at around this time (see Map 2). It 
was in the province of Lucca that conflicts reached a peak. By the end of February, the 
84 ANC sections registered 8,300 members in this province, whereas the 55 pro-fascist 
UNCi sections numbered 5,000.162 On 1 March, after a UNCi meeting, there was a 
veterans’ parade; some fights took place, and the fascists attempted to occupy the ANC 
headquarters. In light of these clashes, the prefetto opted to close them down. Finally, 
                                                
156 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Roma e provincia, ex combattenti autonomi, f. Roma città; L’Idea 
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157 Avanti!, 29 January 1925. 
158 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Pavia. Avanti!, 5 
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159 I Combattenti, 23 January 1925.  
160 Cremona Nuova, 1 January 1925; Fanteria, 6 December 1924 was the last issue. 
161 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces (II), f. Pisa. 
162 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Lucca. 
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the fascist leader Carlo Scorza demanded control of the premises, arguing that the UNCi 
section had already exceeded the numbers of the ANC. In reality, the fascists had 
subjugated the veterans through a series of arson attacks, aggressions, occupations and 
robberies committed against several local ANC headquarters all throughout the 
province.163 The objective was to take over the organizational structures of the ANC. 
The fascists seemed to be looking for a confrontation. The ANC national 
congress was arranged for 5 March in Viareggio. With this meeting, some ANC leaders 
headed by Viola wanted to gather veterans’ support, probably in order to proclaim a 
strong opposition to the fascist government. However, the pro-fascist UNCi leaders 
called the veterans to a national congress in the same town. In the last days of February, 
the UNCi threateningly expanded all throughout Italy; its leaders stated that they 
wanted ‘just to show their forces’.164 The prefetto and the Ministry of Interior, fearing 
the consequences of this showdown, disposed 400 soldiers and 200 carabinieri ready to 
intervene in Viareggio. Many interpreted the situation as a fascist attempt to silence 
veterans’ criticism (Image 23). When the ANC decisive congress was moved to Rome, 
the UNCi correspondingly summoned their veterans to Rome.165 It was very clear that 
an agreement between the two factions would not work. Luigi Russo, a pro-fascist 
member of the Comitato Centrale, had resigned from his position, declaring that no 
compromise was possible.166 Russo and Host-Venturi blamed the Comitato Centrale for 
having abandoned the mission of social assistance; the ANC was not fulfilling its 
duties.167 It was also said that Freemasonry had infiltrated the ANC.168 On the basis of 
these allegations, some sections started to clamour for government intervention.169 Two 
days before the ANC congress in Rome commenced, this meeting was banned by the 
prefetto of Rome and, crucially, Mussolini made use of his powers to decree the 
dissolution of the ANC Comitato Centrale.170 
 
                                                
163 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, Affari generali, f. Lucca. 
164 (‘fare semplicemente una dimostrazione delle proprie forze’) Il Giornale dei Combattenti. Organo 
dell'Unione Nazionale Combattenti, 28 February 1925. 
165 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, Affari generali. Il Popolo d’Italia, 6, 28 February 
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166 Il Popolo d’Italia, 8 February 1925. 
167 Il Popolo d’Italia, 20 February 1925; L’Idea Nazionale, 1 March 1925. 
168 Il Popolo d’Italia, 28 February 1925; Roma fascista had since 1924 suggested this connection, see also 
7 and 9 March 1925. 
169 Il Popolo d’Italia, 26 February 1925. 




Image 23: ‘How can be said that today there is no freedom of meeting in Italy?’ (I Combattenti, 
1 March 1925) 
 
Mussolini’s decree of 2 March 1925 dissolved the central administrative organs of the 
ANC, and entrusted a triumvirate with the temporary mission of administering the 
association. This action was the result of the previous fascist campaign of slander, 
coercion, disturbance and political disintegration at the local level, which encouraged 
groups of veterans to mobilise against the Comitato Centrale. As a foreign observer 
noted, this was a ‘new coup de force of Mussolini, carried out under the pressure of the 
extremist elements’.171  
The fascist manipulative manoeuvre had succeeded. When the decree came, it 
was alleged that more than a half of the veteran sections had stated their position for the 
government and against the ANC. The leaders of the Comitato Centrale were only able 
to maintain certain zones under control, like Genoa, Alessandria or Naples. Their anti-
fascist reaction came far too late. By contrast, the fascists were reaping their rewards for 
having cultivated the support of the veterans since the beginning of Mussolini’s 
government. After the decree was passed, the symbolic and economic measures taken in 
regard to veterans were recalled once more in the fascist press.172 Fascism had fostered 
the perception that it had placed great value on the victory (valorizzato la vittoria); that 
                                                
171 (‘il s’agit d'un nouveau coup de force mussolinien, exécuté sous la poussée des éléments extrêmistes’) 
Report of the special commissary in Menton (5 March 1925), AN, F/7/13456, Italie. 
172 Il Popolo d’Italia, 5 March 1925,  
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apoliticità should be the expected attitude of veterans; and that the fascists really cared 
about veterans. 
Despite its significance as a political move, the dissolution of the ANC Comitato 
Centrale roused little indignation, or even interest, among most Italians. The prefetti, 
thoroughly questioned by Federzoni, answered in almost all cases that the population 
was widely indifferent. For many, the measure gave ‘an inevitable, logical solution to 
an unsustainable situation’.173 But the veterans harboured a wide variety of feelings. In 
some places, they met after the decree to declare their support for the government. In 
Cremona, the fascist veterans were very satisfied with the resolution. By contrast, in 
some zones, like Rome and Campania, veterans raised protests, and remained 
supportive of the position of the Comitato Centrale, trying to stay united and keeping 
contact with politicians from the opposition. However, neither anti-fascist 
reorganization, nor challenges to the public order were in sight.174 Throughout the rest 
of March, the fascist press published articles justifying the decree, and introducing to 
the public to the mission of the renewed ANC. But the process of fascistization, 
however, was not yet complete. 
 
Completing fascistization 
The triumvirato appointed by Mussolini was composed of Amilcare Rossi, Luigi Russo 
and Nicola Sansanelli (Image 24). Only Luigi Russo had been a leader of the ANC 
before; he and Sansanelli were also MPs. During the congress of Assisi, Russo had 
demonstrated his commitment with the fascist government, supporting an enhancement 
of the ANC social assistance tasks. Sansanelli had some experience in resolving internal 
disputes inside the provincial Fasci. Amilcare Rossi, the key figure in the triumvirato, 
was a war veteran, a lawyer and a professor, and a holder of the prestigious Gold Medal 
as the result of his actions during the war. Rossi was known in Rome’s aristocratic 
nationalist circles, in the Roman section of the ANC, and also in the PNF, of which he 
was a member since 1923. His most important position was as a member of the leading 
triumvirato of the Gold Medal Group (Gruppo Medaglie d’Oro al Valor Militare 
d’Italia), which endorsed Mussolini. Rossi had expressed his views on the veterans’ 
question during the summer 1924, saying that all the veterans should be disciplined and 
                                                
173 (‘soluzione logica inevitabile di una situazione insostenibile’) ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. 
Combattenti, Affari generali, fasc. Arezzo. 
174 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, Affari generali; L’elmetto. Trimensile dei 
combattenti di Terra di Lavoro (Caserta), 20 March 1925. 
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maintain their loyalty towards Mussolini.175 With this leadership, it is not surprising that 
the first actions of the triumvirato were exclusively related to a very prosaic social 
assistance, detached from any political stance. The fascist hierarchies were satisfied. 
The PNF would not tolerate treachery like that of the dissolved Comitato Centrale; the 
fascists ‘did not want enemies inside the ANC’.176 
 
 
Image 24: The fascist ANC triumvirato. Rossi, Russo, Sansanelli (the three men with medals 
on, Rossi in the centre). Amilcare Rossi, Figlio del mio tempo. 
 
The veteran crisis of 1925 also reinforced the political position of Mussolini as dictator. 
After the decreed fascistization of the ANC a number of local veteran sections from 
across the country sent telegrams to Mussolini giving him their support, thus 
demonstrating the extent to which ‘consent’ towards Fascism had spread (Map 7 shows 
where the telegrams were sent from).177  
 
                                                
175 An insight into the character of Amilcare Rossi can be found in his autobiography, Amilcare Rossi, 
Figlio del mio tempo. Prefascismo, fascismo, postfascismo, Roma, 1969; Il Combattente d’Italia, 5 
September 1924; Nicola Brancaccio et allii: Le Medaglie d'Oro (1833-1925), [1925]. 
176 (‘Nell’Associazione dei Combattenti non vogliamo nemici’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 7 March 1925. 
177 Il Popolo d’Italia, 12-14, 20 March 1925. 
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Map 7: origin of veterans’ telegrams expressing support to Mussolini (March 1925) 
 
The reliability of this source is only relative, but we should concede some value to this 
data. In some provinces (Varese, Isernia, Bari) a large number of sections joined in the 
initiative, probably at the behest of the provincial fascist leaders. However, we can see 
that large parts of the south, the north and Sardinia still did not manifest any support for 
the fascist Duce. It can be argued that in some zones, the veterans’ ‘consent’ was due to 
fascist coercion. In contrast, the more homogenously spread geographical origin of 
these messages also suggests that Mussolini —after his apparently firm role in the 
crisis— had a wider popularity than the PNF among the Italian veterans.  
Indeed, the fascistization of the Italian veterans was incomplete. After the 
decreed dissolution of the ANC Comitato Centrale, further measures including violence 
and persecutions were needed to marginalize the anti-fascist veteran groups. In 
Alessandria, whose provincial section remained committed to the spirit of the ordine del 
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giorno of Assisi,178 several violent incidents were reported between April and August 
1925, until all resistance was finally extinguished.179 In the province of Genoa, the 
unrepentant ANC headquarters resisted to the fascist attacks until August 1925.180 
Ettore Viola and the rest of the dissolved Comitato Centrale had been forced to transfer 
their powers to the new triumvirato, something that took place peacefully immediately 
after the decree.181 Yet during the spring and summer 1925, Ettore Viola continued his 
activism trying to create new independent veteran organizations against Fascism.182 He 
and his followers were closely watched by the police, and harassed by the fascists; in 
the Parliament, according to Viola, he and the fascists Bottai and Giunta came to 
blows.183 However, as the prefetto of Bari informed, the anti-fascist veteran leaders 
attracted little support, and armed resistance seemed unlikely.184 
In order to definitively submit the veterans to fascist control, different strategies 
were employed. For example, violent fascist attacks served as an excuse for the prefetti 
to order the closure of the veteran sections. Following these closures, a fascist 
commissario took over the section, ‘fascistizating’ it. Even in Lucca the claims of ANC 
leaders regarding the anti-Bolshevik, heroic and monarchist past of their sections did 
not serve to save them from fascistization.185 Moreover, pro-fascist leaders blackmailed 
veterans, threatening to leave them unprotected if they maintained an anti-government 
stance. In a meeting of disabled veterans in Belluno, 28 April 1925, some veterans 
reported the persecutions they suffered because of their political opinions, but the 
president bluntly answered that ‘the ANMIG was able to intervene, impose respect and 
protect its members only when these members do not adopt any charge or attitude 
confronted with the politics of the government’.186 These procedures served to enforce 
the veterans’ submission to Fascism everywhere in Italy. 
In the south, ending the veterans’ crisis proved more difficult than in the north. 
The fascistization of the ANC was reached by employing a persuasive propaganda, 
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179 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Alessandria. 
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ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 111, f. ‘Mutilati e invalidi di guerra’, sf. Belluno. 
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violent tactics, and deepening the collaboration between the state authorities and the 
fascist veterans. A latent war between veterans took place during the spring and summer 
of 1925 in some places of the Mezzogiorno, where the majority of veterans were anti-
fascist peasant ex-soldiers (contadini combattenti). Fascists behaved aggressively and 
were helped by the prefetti to bring the ANC sections under control. In several places 
and on several occasions, the fascists fired shots in veteran meetings, causing panic 
among the audience; they provoked numerous fights and disturbances.187 These 
conflicts not only broke the veterans’ resistance, but also provided an excuse to the state 
authorities to dissolve the ANC sections. Thus, in Lazio, where the majority of veterans 
had barely supported Fascism, the prefetto solved the crisis: between April and June 
1925, he closed down a set of ANC sections. Later, in October-November 1925, once 
the fascist ANC had been reorganized, he allowed the sections to form again, since they 
would now have a ‘neatly national colour’.188 In the south, the fascist discourse of 
apoliticità and the authoritative actions of the prefetti were decisive in fully realising the 
fascistization of the ANC. Thus, the organization was transformed into a kind of annex 
of the PNF. 
After the summer of 1925, the crisis finally ended with the rehabilitation of a 
profoundly fascistized ANC, which implied in many cases the transformation of the 
veterans into PNF members. In Lecce, veterans began to meet again in the local Fascio. 
In Bari, the UNCi section with its 60 members decided to return to the ANC, since the 
association had ‘recovered its initial programme of patriotism’.189 In Caserta, near 
Naples, the enrolment of all the veterans into the PNF section took place in April 
1925.190 In Lecce, after a long struggle, the renewed ANC section met at the end of 
August. In the meeting, it was stated that  
 
only Mussolini’s government strived to give value to the Italy of Vittorio Veneto, and 
impose the respect and gratitude towards the veterans, who had been despised in 1919 
[…] that no different views or aims exist between the ANC and the PNF, and that both 
                                                
187 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, ff. Avellino, Bari, Lecce, 
Palermo, Taranto and Trapani; f. Arditi d’Italia, sf. Lecce; ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 111, Mutilati e invalidi 
di guerra, ff. Bari, Napoli and Messina. 
188 (‘intonazione prettamente Nazionale’) ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 108, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, Roma e 
provincia. 
189 (‘ripresso quel programma iniziale di patriottismo’) ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. 
Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, ff. Bari and Lecce. 
190 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Caserta. 
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the qualities of veteran and fascist are compatible and possible to be hold at the same 
time. 
 
The members of this section declared their complete and unconditional support 
(adesione) for the PNF, and they took the decision to enrol all the veterans into it.191 In 
Naples, in June 1925, the arditi —duly invited by the fascists— joined the PNF and the 
MVSN. Many arditi were already affiliated to the PNF in the centre and north of 
Italy.192 Converting veterans into members of the PNF was an old fascist aspiration that 
now was becoming true. 
By the autumn of 1925, Rossi, Russo and Sansanelli, the fascist triumvirate in 
charge of the ANC, were, after a few months of activity, in a position to demand 
complete control of war veterans in Italy. They asked the prefetti that all independent 
veteran organizations stop their activities.193 By the end of 1925, therefore, any real 
possibility of maintaining an independent veteran movement or association had been 
destroyed. When in 1926 the fascist provvedimenti per la difesa dello Stato were 
approved, none of the veteran leaders who had tried to oppose the process of 
fascistization dared to contradict Mussolini.194 The dictatorship had consolidated its 
control over the ANC and the ANMIG, through which Fascism maintained a tight grip 
on the Italian veterans of the First World War. 
In conclusion, the process of fascistization of the Italian war veterans during 
1925 was not easy; it was long and difficult. In the first phase, propaganda, local 
political manoeuvres, and coercion created an appropriate climate for the decree of 2 
March 1925. In this phase, there was also pressure from below, carried out by groups of 
fascist veterans in the provinces. Most likely, these groups were not very large, and they 
emerged from the local and provincial Fasci rather than from the ANC sections. In any 
case, this movement was successful in gathering enough support to take over an 
important number of ANC sections, thus justifying the intervention of the government. 
After the decree of 2 March 1925, the second part of the process consisted of the 
gradual isolation of anti-fascist veterans’ leaders and the submission of the ANC 
                                                
191 (‘soltanto il governo di S E Benito Mussolini seppe valorizzare l’Italia di Vittorio Veneto, ed imporre 
il rispetto e la gratitudine verso i Reduci dalla trincea, dileggiati nel 1919 […] che nessuna divergenza di 
vedute e di finalità esiste tra l’Associazione Nazionale Combattenti ed il Partito Naz. Fascista, e che le 
due qualità di Combattente e di Fascista sono compatibili e cumulabili […]’) ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, 
Ass. Naz. Combattenti, fascicles by provinces, f. Lecce. 
192 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Arditi d’Italia, fascicles by provinces, ff. Genova, Modena, Napoli. 
193 ACS, MI PS, 1925, b. 107, Ass. Naz. Combattenti, Affari generali. 
194 Ettore Viola, Combattenti e Mussolini, p. 53. 
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sections all over Italy to fascist rule. Propaganda, violence, and the help of many prefetti 
were the key instruments in achieving the final success. This was the historical reality of 
the relationship between veterans and Fascism between 1924 and 1925, but in other 
countries veteran organizations remained largely unaware of the conditions in which 
fascist control had been achieved. 
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Chapter 4 
Veterans and Fascism: Consolidation and European Expansion (1925-1929) 
 
The second half of the 1920s was the time of a trans-continental circulation of 
discourses and myths about the fascist veterans, as I will analyse in this chapter. These 
years have passed into history as a period of stabilization for the European continent. 
After the turbulence of 1923, which had made evident the failure of the status quo 
orchestrated in Versailles, the international powers sought a new settlement. The United 
States and Britain were interested in resolving the Franco-German dispute and in 
attaining the financial security that would assure their geopolitical influence. The arrival 
of Herriot to the presidency in France, after the victory of the French left (cartel des 
gauches) in the elections of May 1924, facilitated an international agreement on the 
basis of the Dawes Plan to reshape the reparations issue. At the end of 1925, the treaties 
of Locarno constituted the ‘real peace’ settlement in postwar Europe, inaugurating a 
phase of political and economic stability.1 France abandoned its intransigence regarding 
its security concerns, and Germany was integrated into the international system, joining 
the League of Nations in 1926. In this year, both the French and the German foreign 
ministers, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann, were awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize. However, in these European countries, ‘recasting bourgeois Europe’ implied not 
only the promise of peace and the neutralization of the leftist threat, but also the 
weakening of parliamentarianism and a shift towards corporatism. The class struggle 
may have lost its preponderance as a political issue, but social structures remained 
unchanged.2 Meanwhile, the culture of consumption developed. On the fringes of 
Europe authoritarianism advanced: in 1926, dictatorships were imposed in Poland 
(Pilsudski) and Portugal (Salazar). 
 In Italy, the evolution of the fascist dictatorship responded to this context, and at 
the same time exerted an influence on it. After the dictatorship was officially imposed, a 
series of legal and institutional measures constructed a totalitarian regime.3 Although 
the moderate Augusto Turati replaced the radical Farinacci as the Secretary General of 
the PNF in March 1926, the Provisions for the Defence of the State (Provvedimenti per 
                                                
1 Patrick O. Cohrs, ‘The First “Real” Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United 
States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925’, Contemporary European History, 12, 1 
(2003), pp. 1-31. 
2 Charles S. Maier, Recasting bourgeois Europe: stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the 
decade after World War I, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975. 
3 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, II; Philipp Morgan, Italian Fascism, pp. 96-124. 
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la Difesa dello Stato, the so-called leggi fascistissime) in November 1926 assured the 
repression of any non-fascist political force. These legal measures institutionalized 
violence against political enemies. The PNF purged its ranks, and around 60,000 early 
fascists and squadrists were expelled from the party in 1928-1929. The party was 
submitted to the authority of the state, and fascist syndicalism faded. The Chart of 
Labour (Carta del Lavoro), published in April 1927, talked about ‘class collaboration’ 
and reflected the conservatism of the corporatist system. Mussolini and the fascist 
leaders were determined to transform the press and the schools into an ‘instrument of 
the regime’.4 The fascists perceived these years with optimism, even if there were 
plenty of internal political struggles and intrigues among them, and the living standards 
of the Italian population did not considerably improve. 
 Consolidation pushed the fascists to stretch their tentacles abroad. There were 
important reasons for this policy. The total number of Italian emigrants in the mid 
1920s probably surpassed 9 million. From the end of the war until 1926, the traditional 
flows of Italian emigration had not abated, but rather increased due to the migration of 
anti-fascist political exiles (fuoriusciti). France was the main European destination, 
particularly the south-eastern regions and Paris.5 Many Italian migrants in France and 
other countries deplored Fascism, but from 1921 on, and especially after the March on 
Rome, little cells of the fascist movement had proliferated in several European (and 
indeed non-European) cities. Usually, their founders were Italian war veterans. These 
Fasci all’estero (Fasci abroad) were officially organized into a centralized structure 
during 1923. By 1925, its leader, Giuseppe Bastianini, dreamed of a fascist international 
organization that would unite different European fascist movements. Groups such as the 
NSDAP in Germany were enthusiastic regarding this project.6 But Mussolini was more 
cautious and did not permit the establishment of contacts with any foreign movement. 
The Fasci all’estero enjoyed very little autonomy.7 Probably, rather than the Fasci 
all’estero, the ANC cells in foreign countries were the main link between the Italian 
migrant veterans and their fatherland. Well before its fascistization, the ANC had 
become aware of the importance of assisting the Italian communities abroad.8 The 
                                                
4 (‘strumento del Regime') ACS, SPD, CR, b. 29, f. ‘Situazione generale interna e internazionale (1927)’. 
5 Pierre Milza (ed.), Les italiens en France de 1914 à 1940, Roma, École française de Rome, 1986. 
6 Völkischer Beobachter, 2 May 1925. 
7 Luca De Caprariis, ‘“Fascism for Export”? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani all'Estero’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 35, 2 (2000), pp. 151-183; Emilio Franzina and Matteo Sanfilippo (eds.), Il 
fascismo e gli emigrati. La parabola dei Fasci italiani all’estero (1920-1943), Roma, Laterza, 2003. 
8 Bruno Biagi, ‘I combattenti all’estero’, I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 14 June 1923.  
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social and patriotic activities of the ANC cells constituted an asset for the ‘peaceful 
penetration and expansion of Italy’.9 As the ANC was placed under fascist control, the 
Italian veterans residing in foreign countries went through the same process of 
fascistization as those in the mother country.10 Thus, the fascists gained a new and fully 
elaborated structure through which they could exert influence and operate outside Italy.  
In this chapter, I will show that the war veterans were a decisive element for the 
dissemination of the fascist idea in Europe during the mid and late 1920s. On the one 
hand, in the realm of discourses and representations, different political and veteran 
groups abroad absorbed and reworked the Italy-born myth of the fascist veterans. In the 
cases of France and Germany, the fascist-veteran symbolic complex was synthesised 
into ideologies and political parties. I will analyse the two most important expressions 
of this transfer: the French Faisceau, and the German Stahlhelm, though these 
organizations did not eventually succeed in their political objectives. On the other hand, 
with the fascistization of the ANC, the fascists entered the FIDAC, an international 
veteran association through which Fascism, as we will see, exerted an international 
influence. In this context, Italian Fascism continued transforming veteran discourses 
and organizations towards a totalitarian goal. 
 
The myth of the fascist veterans in France: the Faisceau 
The political myth of fascism as an ideology of war veterans was most clearly adopted 
in France by the earliest precursors of French fascism. In France, perceptions of Italian 
Fascism had overemphasized the participation of the war veterans in the movement. The 
French extreme right was very pleased with this effective anti-leftist reaction. Yet 
fascism was not needed, since the French conservative government acted firmly in 
foreign policy to defend the convenient status quo of Versailles. This situation changed 
at the end of 1923, when the quest for a more equitable international order commenced, 
and especially when the cartel des gauches won the elections of May 1924, while 
simultaneously the value of the French currency tumbled. The first French fascist 
movement, the Légion, was created in June 1924 by a war veteran and ex-officer, 
Antoine Rédier. Between July and December 1924, a group of war veterans and young 
men set up another organization, the Jeunesses Patriotes, led by the ex-captain Pierre 
                                                
9 (‘penetrazione e l'espansione pacifica dell'Italia’) I Combattenti. La Nuova Giornata, 11 May 1924. 
10 See for example, the case of Barcelona in Claudio Venza, ‘El consulado italiano de Barcelona y la 
comunidad italiana en los inicios del fascismo (1923-1925)’, Investigaciones Históricas, 17 (1997), pp. 
265-283. 
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Taittinger. Both groups mobilized middle-class war veterans who were opposed to the 
politics of Herriot and the cartel des gauches.11 Also, at the end of 1924, some 
intellectuals started to propagate political theories that became the ideological basis of 
the Faisceau.  
How was the Italian fascist model transferred to French politics paving the way 
for these fascist groupings? In the first place, the visits of French veterans to Fascist 
Italy in many cases reinforced formerly-constructed perceptions. In January 1924, a 
group of Action Française members arrived in Italy in order to get a first-hand 
impression. Georges Valois —the Action Française specialist on economic matters— 
participated in the visit; he was introduced to Mussolini by Curzio Malaparte.12 This 
contact did not immediately produce any imitation fascist movement in France; after his 
return from Rome, Valois continued writing about purely economic issues, such as the 
monetary crisis.13 Yet the conception of a new political force maturated slowly in the 
mind of George Valois. He was a decorated war veteran, ex-junior officer who had 
spent 25 months at the front. This experience had reinforced his nationalism and anti-
pacifism. The Italian example mirrored some of the thoughts that Valois had developed 
since the war, particularly the consideration of the ‘social’ organization of the army as 
the mould for a flawless productive and hierarchic society.14 Similarly, another writer in 
the orbit of Valois, Jacques Arthuys, visited Fascist Italy in 1924.15 That year, Valois’ 
publishing house, the Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, translated a book by Pietro 
Gorgolini into French, who described the ‘revolutionary’ work of Fascism as a 
movement composed of ‘veterans, students, artists […]’.16 However, no proto-fascist 
party was launched in France while Italy went through the Matteotti crisis. 
                                                
11 Robert Soucy, French Fascism: The First Wave, pp. 27-86. Rédier Légion was incorporated into the 
Jeunesses Patriotes in July 1925. 
12 Didier Musiedlak, ‘L’Italie fasciste et Georges Valois’ in Olivier Dard (ed.), Georges Valois, itinéraire 
et réceptions, Berne, Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 205-214. 
13 Georges Valois, ‘La crise monetaire et financière. Le problème de l'action’, L’Action Française, 16 
January 1924. 
14 Georges Valois, D'un siècle a l'autre. Chronique d'une génération 1885-1920, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie 
Nationale, 1921, pp. 263-293; Jean Norton-Cru, Témoins, Nancy, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 2006, 
(first edition 1929), pp. 478-479; Allen Douglas, From Fascism to Libertarian Communism. Georges 
Valois against the Third Republic, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, University of California Press, 1992. 
15 Jacques Arthuys, Les Combattants, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1925, pp. 13-16. 
16 (‘revolutionnaire’, ‘d’anciens combattants, d’étudiants, d’artistes’) Pietro Gorgolini, La Révolution 
fasciste. Avec le texte intégral des principaux discours de Benito Mussolini, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie 
Nationale, 1924, pp. viii, x. 
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 Alongside the political tourism in Fascist Italy and the new publications praising 
the achievements of Mussolini,17 the political situation in France during 1924 and early 
1925 witnessed the escalation of the veterans’ protests and the radicalization of the 
right. There were contacts between the UNC and anti-communist groups such as the 
Jeunesses Patriotes.18 In 1924, given the rise of the cost of living, the celebration of the 
armistice in Paris was marked by a demonstration of more than 30.000 disabled 
veterans in favour of an increase of their pensions.19 Later, when the ashes of Jean 
Jaurès —the socialist politician assassinated in 1914 because of his pacifism— were 
transferred to the Pantheon at the end of November, the nationalist right was outraged. 
While the working class celebrated this ceremony, L’Action Française depicted the 
official cortege as a parade of anti-patriots (antipatriotes) and revolutionaries with red 
flags ‘insulting the army and the fatherland’.20 This symbolic confrontation reminds us 
of the Italian disputes of 1919-1922 around the meaning of the war and the victory. But 
now the situation of 1919 appeared to be inverted. In 1924, while in Fascist Italy the 
religion of the fatherland was imposed and veterans entered the Chamber in significant 
numbers, in France the socialists dominated the Chamber, and pacifism and 
internationalism were publicly expressed. 
In France, as in Italy, the protagonists of the outburst against non-nationalist or 
socialist pacifism manipulated the symbols of the dead soldiers and the veterans, in 
order to pursue radicalized political aims. During late 1924 and early 1925, the 
conservative veterans’ organizations (UNC) and the extreme right stepped up their 
appeals to the veterans to intervene in the civic and political life, talking about a 
‘mutilated victory’.21 In their attacks against the leftist government, they employed an 
array of representations of the veterans and the fallen soldiers that recalled the Italian 
experience of 1919-1922. Three examples shall illustrate this point. Firstly, the image of 
a soldier (in this case dead), standing defeated in front of a rally of politically victorious 
leftists who were waving red flags, was deployed in the Action Française circles (Image 
25, compare with Image 11 in chapter 1, and Image 17 in chapter 2). 
 
                                                
17 See also Giuseppe Prezzolini, Le fascisme, Paris, 1925. 
18 Chris Millington, From Victory to Vichy, pp. 34-37. 
19 Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 1, pp. 94-97. 
20 (‘qui insulte l’armée et la Patrie’) L’Action Française, 23 November 1924. 
21 Ernest Pezet, Combattants et Citoyens. Les Combattants dans la Cité branlante devant la Victoire 
mutilée, Paris, [1925]. 
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Image 25: ‘The vanquishers’, L’étudiant français. Organe bi-mensuel de la Fédération 
Nationale des Étudiants d’Action Française, 1 January 1925. 
 
Secondly, conservative veterans used the myth of the helpless and impoverished —
though decorated— disabled war veteran begging on the street (Image 26, compare with 
Image 16 in chapter 2), during the so-called ‘battle of pensions’ (bataille des pensions). 
 
 
Image 26: ‘Six years later!’, La Voix du Combattant, 13 December 1924. 
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And thirdly, the masses of dead soldiers in heaven, watching from above and lamenting 
that their sacrifice had served for nothing (Image 27), were represented by supporters of 
an authoritarian Republic —such as Gustave Hervé. 
 
 
Image 27: ‘– Died for nothing!... We died for nothing!...’ La Victoire, 2 November 1925. 
 
Although the portrayal of the masses of dead soldiers was a traditional and transnational 
symbolic reference that had originated in the war, now it conveyed the need of giving a 
new value to the victory of 1918. Among the members of the Jeunesses Patriotes, these 
kinds of perceptions and representations of veterans and dead soldiers served to justify 
their political project.22 For many, fascism was the solution.  
Some commentators, indeed, asserted that France was on the verge of 
disintegration, and that only two outcomes were possible: bolshevism or fascism. The 
first option was presented as a threat to civilization that swooped down on France in 
1924, as it did in Italy during 1920. Fascism, on the contrary, was depicted as the 
veterans’ solution originating from Italy: a form of political order, the religion of the 
                                                
22 Pierre Taittinger, Les Cahiers de la Jeune France, Paris, 1926, passim. 
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fatherland. Fascism had been ‘born from the rage of the veterans’.23 On the contrary, in 
France, so this argumentation continues, the veterans had been swindled, and they did 
not enjoy the fruits of their victory, nor their rights to lead the country. The chamber of 
1924 —it was argued— had expelled the veterans of 1919, giving way to a number of 
deserters and traitors. But now, the time of the veterans had come. 
Georges Valois and his group of collaborators, having broken with Action 
Française, took advantage of all this discursive and symbolic background to develop a 
new political movement: the Faisceau. Initially, at the end of 1924 and the beginning of 
1925, a set of publications paved the way for the movement. Georges Valois’ book La 
Révolution Nationale laid the guidelines for his new ideological project. The motivation 
for Valois’ manifesto was the decadence he saw in all the sectors of French society, and 
the menace he perceived to the very existence of the nation. The cause of this bleak 
situation was, according to Valois, the removal of the veterans from public affairs. The 
victory had been nullified, not just by Herriot, but also by Poincaré. ‘We should have 
assumed command of France the day of the armistice’, Valois wrote. Now, the solution 
was national revolution. Criticising the bourgeois spirit, Valois advocated the ‘heroic 
spirit’, for the ‘spirit of the victory’. The veterans should throw out all the deserters and 
shirkers who had taken the power. The veterans would organize ‘the recovery of the 
victory to create the French greatness’.24 It is astonishing how the veteran discourses 
and representations employed by the French fascists matched the arguments and 
symbols developed since 1919 by the Italians. 
The next relevant publication was Jacques Arthuys’ book, Les combattants. 
While Valois was a modernist inspired by fascist syndicalism, Arthuys was rather a 
traditionalist; but the anti-parliamentarian spirit of the ‘combatants’ was an important 
point common to both.25 Arthuys talked about the essential differences that the war 
experience had engendered between those who had fought at the front and those who 
had not. If the soldier had become a warrior, the non-combatant had stayed a simple 
patriot. After the war, however, the predominant notion that the veteran was a former 
                                                
23 (‘Le fascisme est né de la colère des combattants’) Camille Aymard, Bolchevisme ou Fascisme?... 
Français, il faut choisir!, Paris, Flammarion, 1925, pp. 188, 273-279. 
24 (‘Nous aurions dû prendre le commandement de la France au jour de l’armistice’, ‘l’esprit héroïque’, 
‘l’esprit de la victorie’, ‘embusqués’, ‘la récupération de la victoire pour fonder la grandeur française’) 
Georges Valois, La Révolution Nationale, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924, pp. 10, 189-190, 
passim. This book was written between August and September 1924, and was published with occasion of 
the November armistice commemoration. It inaugurated the collection ‘Les Cahiers de la Victoire’. 
25 Samuel Kalman, ‘Georges Valois et le Faisceau: un mariage de convenance’, in Olivier Dard (ed.), 
Georges Valois, pp. 37-53. 
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combatant transformed into a civilian had facilitated the veteran associations’ sole focus 
on material claims. Furthermore, according to Arthuys, the Cartel des gauches had 
placed France in the worst situation possible; she was exposed to every kind of danger. 
He said that the veterans must reverse this situation. Arthuys agreed with Valois: ‘soon 
after the war, the veterans should have taken the power’; the ‘veteran spirit’ should 
dominate the state; this was their mission. The means for the seizure of power were very 
simple: ‘organized force’.26 
The group formed by Valois, Arthuys and other collaborators launched the 
newspaper Le Nouveau Siècle on 26 February 1925 —only two weeks after the French 
veterans succeeded in their ‘battle of pensions’. The paper benefited from the financial 
support of some industrialists. This younger generation of activists lamented the 
passivity of Action Française, from which they separated to progressively become 
avowed rivals.27 Their chief ideological novelty was the full use of a new discursive and 
symbolic system, rooted in Italian Fascism, at the core of which were the veterans. They 
went far beyond the old conservative notion of ‘the combatant’s share’. From the 
beginning, they expressed the intention of enforcing the unrecognised political rights of 
the veterans (Image 28).28 This was particularly explicit in the ‘Appeal to the 
combatants’ (Appel aux combattants’), published on 16 April 1925. This was a clear 
call to construct a fascist reaction, led by the veteran spirit that brandishes a sword 
(Image 29).29 It was envisaged as the ‘dictatorship of the veteran’.30 The veterans were 
pitted against politicians and embusqués, in order to restore the victory.31 These 
combative representations of the veteran, appealing to his aggressive will to take 
power,32 coexisted in the paper with the more conservative representation of the 
veterans’ spirit of sacrifice and work, bulwarks against leftist revolutionaries (Image 
                                                
26 (‘les combattants, aussitôt après la guerre, auraient dû prendre le pouvoir’, ‘l’esprit combattant’, ‘la 
force, organisé’) Jacques Arthuys, Les combattants, pp. 43, 143, 220, passim. This book appeared in 
January 1925, and it was the number 2 of the collection ‘Les Cahiers de la Victoire’. 
27 Zeev Sternhell, ‘Anatomie d'un mouvement fasciste en France: le faisceau de Georges Valois’, Revue 
française de science politique, 1 (1976). pp. 5-40. 
28 Le Nouveau Siècle. Journal de la Fraternité Nationale, veut la politique de la Victoire (Paris), 26 
February 1925. 
29 Le Nouveau Siècle, 16 April 1925. 
30 (‘La dictature du combattant’) Georges Valois, La politique de la victoire, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie 
Nationale, 1926, pp. 16-21. 
31 Georges Valois, ‘Le combattant et l’embusqué’, Le Nouveau Siècle, 14 May 1925. 
32 Georges Valois, ‘Légionnaires’, Le Nouveau Siècle, 2 April 1925. 
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Image 28: ‘Under the Arc du Triomphe. – And now, give way to the unknown combatant’, Le 
Nouveau Siècle, 26 February 1925.  
 
                                                
33 Pierre Arthuys, ‘Valeur du sacrifice’, Le Nouveau Siècle, 21 May 1925. 
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Image 30: ‘The horde threatens... The veteran. – Don’t move, I am here.’ Le Nouveau Siècle, 30 
April 1925. 
 
After this phase of propaganda, on 11 November 1925 —Armistice Day— the Faisceau 
was born. However, the organization suffered financial difficulties; Le Nouveau Siècle 
was unable to transform from a weekly into a daily newspaper. Although the Faisceau 
reached 10.000 members in February 1926, and during this year several big fascist-style 
ceremonies were organized, the communists sabotaged many of the Faisceau activities, 
attacking its paramilitary branch —the Légions.34 Despite its efforts, the movement was 
unable to attract many veterans from the associations. At the peak of its activity, when a 
meeting was organized in Reims on 27 June 1926, the UNC and the Jeunesses Patriotes 
for the first time sent a group of militants to hear the fascist orators.35 Though Le 
Nouveau Siècle talked about an attendance of 14.000, in reality the fascist sympathizers 
in Reims numbered no more than 4.000 and the anti-fascist counter-demonstration was 
equally numerous.36 In contrast, on 11 July 1926, the French veteran movement 
                                                
34 Allen Douglas, ‘Violence and Fascism: the case of the Faisceau’, Journal of Contemporary History, 19, 
4 (1984), pp. 689-712. 
35 Report of 1 July 1926, AN, F/7/13212, ‘Notes sur le Faisceau’; see also Cahiers des États Generaux. 
Première Assemblée Nationale des Combattants, des Producteurs et des Chefs de Famille tenue à Reims 
le 27 juin 1926 sur l'initiative du Faisceau des Combattants et des Producteurs. Compte rendu des 
travaux de l'assemblée, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1926. 
36 AN, F/7/13210, ‘Manifestation Fasciste de Reims’. 
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gathered 20.000 men in Paris during a protest against the governmental accords with the 
United States for the payment of the French debts.37 As the Italian fascists had 
previously done, the Faisceau tried to capitalize on the veterans’ movement potential.  
Once the veteran associations organized a giant inter-associational meeting in 
Versailles —les États generaux de la France meurtrie— on 11-13 November 1927, the 
Faisceau increased its propaganda and attracted new members.38 Many in France and 
even in Italy expected that this veterans’ meeting would result in the creation of a kind 
of fascist unifying movement, but they were disappointed.39 Still, the Faisceau leaders 
ordered the members of the Légions to join the veteran associations, in order to 
convince them to embrace the fascist ideology.40 However, if the veterans’ attempt to 
create a unified platform in Versailles did not completely crystallized, the Faisceau was 
incapable of significantly growing or imposing its doctrine on the veterans. In time, the 
Faisceau came to appeal, not only to veterans, but also to ‘producers’ (producteurs), 
workers, civil servants, heads of families.41 The erstwhile preponderance of the veteran 
mystic diluted into a more diversified fascist project. Still, regarding the veterans’ 
associations, many in France believed that ‘the fascist spirit, the spirit of dictatorship 
have little by little penetrated them’.42 
 What were the role and the perceptions of the Italian fascists in this process? It 
can be argued that the fascist discourses and representations of the veterans were 
transferred into the French rightist political culture, while the fascist and ANC cells in 
France did not directly intervene. Although there are only a few pieces of evidence to 
demonstrate that members of the Parisian Fascio provided some funding for Le 
Nouveau Siècle,43 initially, the Italian fascists were pleased to see the emergence of 
fascist organizations in France, the prominence of the veterans and the ‘politics of the 
Victory’. If at the end of 1923 the fascist theorists had underlined the essentially Italian 
character of Fascism, at the beginning of 1926 they argued about its universality.44 
Valois’ articles in Le Nouveau Siècle were translated into Italian.45 However, the Italian 
                                                
37 Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 1, p. 100-101. 
38 Reports of 28 November and 6 December 1927, AN, F/7/13212, ‘Notes sur le Faisceau’. 
39 La Stampa, 16 November 1927. 
40 ‘Notes sur le Faisceau’ (report of 8 December 1927), AN, F/7/13212. 
41 Georges Valois, Le fascisme, Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1927. 
42 (‘L’esprit fasciste, l’esprit de dictature les a peu a peu pénétrées’) François Berry, Le fascisme en 
France, Paris, 1926, pp. 41-45, quote in p. 45. 
43 Report signed on 18 November 1925, AN, F/7/13208, ‘Le Nouveau Siècle 1925-1926’. 
44 Alessandro Pavolini, ‘Le cose di Francia e l’universalità del Fascismo’, Critica fascista, 15 January 
1926; see also Roger Giron, ‘Il compito delle “Jeunesses Patriotes”’, Critca fascista, 1 October 1926. 
45 Georges Valois, Il fascismo francese, Roma, 1926, preface by Mario Carli. 
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fascists soon realised the incapacity of the Faisceau to gain momentum. A very critical 
article published in Roma fascista ironically noted that the March on Paris was always 
in development; where was the will of action and violence required to conquest the 
fatherland?46 The Faisceau lacked what was essential for the rise of Fascism: not the 
veterans —though Valois and his men believed they were the keystone— but political 
violence and the possibilities of exerting it with impunity. 
 In the end, the Faisceau faded. Its collapse was mainly due to the change of 
government. In July 1926 the Cartel des gauches succumbed to the financial crisis, and 
Poincaré became Prime Minister. The political right in the government managed to 
overcome the economic difficulties. Thus, the reasons for the existence of fascism in 
France diminished considerably. Although the Action Française and the Jeunesses 
Patriotes lived on, the first wave of French fascism receded from 1927 on. Different 
structural, political and social reasons explain this failure.47 In respect to the veterans, 
the power and diversity of their associative movement was another obstacle for their 
absorption into the fascist movement. It was in 1928 that the veteran movement entered 
into a more assertive phase. But the time of exposure to fascist discourse had 
consequences as well, and Italian Fascism continued to be considered an example either 
to admire or to analyse for French veterans of different political tendencies.48  
 Clearly, the myth of the fascist veterans, originated in Italy and communicated to 
France, was a key factor for the emergence of the French fascists groups, especially the 
most important of them —the Faisceau. In the first phase, the insistence on the political 
role of the veterans in this party even outweighed the importance that Italian fascists 
had given to the veteran identity during 1919-1923. Yet the Faisceau just reworked, 
adapted and applied a whole cultural device that had been gradually developed in Italy. 
These discourses and representations persisted. As we will see, myths about war 
veterans had a longer shelf-life than political organizations. 
 
The myth of the fascist veterans in Germany: the Stahlhelm and the NSDAP 
The German developments during the mid-1920s in the realm of veteran cultures and 
organizations reveal some points in common with the French case, such as the influence 
of Italian Fascism. In the aftermath of November 1923, after the anti-republican plot 
                                                
46 Manilo Pompei, ‘Cher monseiur Valois…’, Roma fascista, 27 March 1926. 
47 See Robert Soucy, French Fascism: the First Wave, pp. 217-232. 
48 See the first issue of La Revue des vivants. Organe des générations de la guerre (Paris), February 1927, 
devoted to the topic ‘L’Italie et nous’. 
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had been defeated, some republican and leftist groups adopted a defensive stance. On 22 
February 1924, in Magdeburg, a group of social democrats and republicans founded the 
Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (Reichsbanner Black-Red-Gold). It was a republican 
defence league for war veterans.49 Four days later, the trial against Hitler began; in 
April, he was condemned to four years of prison. The NSDAP had to survive 
clandestinely, as did other paramilitary rightist organizations such as the Frontbann —
founded by Ernst Röhm in May 1924. In contrast, the KPD recovered its legal status. As 
violence between the communists and the extreme right continued, the communists 
created another defence organization theoretically composed of war veterans: the Rote 
Frontkämpferbund. While in the autumn 1924 the republican Reichsbanner probably 
reached almost 1 million members throughout Germany, the communist veterans’ group 
proliferated only in the KPD strongholds, with a maximum 15,000 members by 
February 1925.50 As regards the Stahlhelm, it was obliged to moderate its public 
attitude, and adopt legalist strategies. It declared its non-partisan position 
(Überparteilichkeit), but at the same time it tried to influence politics. The Stahlhelm 
was internally divided between moderate (Seldte) and radical (Duesterberg) leaders. 
The rivalry and competition between different anti-republican groups during this period, 
the Stahlhelm included, made it very difficult to create stable platforms uniting all these 
splintered organizations.51 They were incapable of imposing their views in spite of their 
numbers. For example, at the end of August 1924, the Reichstag ratified the Dawes 
plan, which the nationalist veterans disliked.52 
 Despite this disadvantageous situation, anti-republican ideas remained popular 
among some German veterans, and reinforced in part by the perceived good health of 
Italian Fascism. The example of Italy roused the curiosity of travellers and scholars in 
these circles.53 The conviction that Fascism had been ‘constructed by Italian war 
veterans, by the representatives of a tragic-heroic way of life’, solidified also in 
                                                
49 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations, pp. 60-ff. 
50 Kurt G. P. Schuster, Der Rote Frontkämpferbund. 
51 James M. Diehl, ‘Von der “Vaterlandspartei” zur “Nationalen Revolution”: Die “Vereinigten 
Vaterländischen Verbände Deutschlands (VVVD)” 1922-1932’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 33. 
Jahrg., 4. H. (1985), pp. 617-639. 
52 Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm, pp. 55-101; Alessandro Salvador, La guerra in tempo di pace. Gli 
ex combattenti e la politica nella Repubblica di Weimar, Trento, Università degli Studi di Trento, 2013, 
p. 43. 
53 See, for example, Fritz Schotthöfer, Il Fascio. Sinn und Wirklichkeit des italienischen Fascismus, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1924; Adolf Dresler, Mussolini, Leipzig, 1924. 
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Germany.54 The intellectual Oswald Spengler, author of the influential Der Untergang 
des Abendlandes, talked about the combative character of Fascism; he would visit 
Fascist Italy in early 1925.55 The jurist and Stahlhelm member Rudolph Schaper 
travelled to Italy to gather impressions too.56 These men reconsidered their memories 
from the time of the defeat and the revolution, not only in the light of the failures of 
1923, but also in light of the Italian fascist example. It was in these circumstances that 
the so-called soldierly nationalism (soldatische Nationalismus) developed.57 
 The case of Helmut Franke is representative. He was a Stahlhelm leader and a 
former Freikorps volunteer. In 1924, his book Staat im Staate gathered together 
published and unpublished writings from the years 1918 to 1921, representing his 
militaristic political views as a front officer (Frontoffiziere). The earliest version of 
these writings had talked about the army as an exemplary entity, embodied by its front 
officers and independent from capitalists or socialists: a ‘state within the state’ (Staat im 
Staate). In 1921, Franke had also fantasized about a revolution starred by front soldiers 
and front officers.58 Nevertheless, in his 1924 book, he introduced new political 
concepts previously absent. In a letter of 16 April 1920, supposedly sent to a Stahlhelm 
leader and published in his 1924 book, Franke talked about the foundation of a front 
soldiers party (Frontsoldaten-Partei).  He wondered: ‘why is the formation of the party 
of veterans not successful in all countries, like in Italy, the party of those who have bled 
for the state, of those who have the preference before everyone else to form and to 
dominate the state for which they have sacrificed themselves?’.59 Even if references to a 
government of frontline soldiers had not been uncommon among Freikorps members 
and Kapp-putsch supporters in 1920, the mention of Italy was in all probability 
introduced later, after the rise of Italian Fascism. Furthermore, at the end of his 1924 
book, Franke employed another political concept: the Frontsoldatenstaat (the veterans’ 
                                                
54 (‘von den Schützengrabenmenschen gebildet wurde, von den Vertretern einer tragish-heroischen 
Lebensanschauung’) J. W. Mannhardt, Der Faschismus, München, 1925, p. 186. 
55 Michael Thöndl, Oswald Spengler in Italien. Kulturexport politischer Ideen der ‘Konservativen 
Revolution’, Leipzig, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010, pp. 108-109. 
56 Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm, p. 76. 
57 This ideological trend can be understood as part of the so-called Conservative Revolution; see Armin 
Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1994 (1st ed. 1949). 
58 Helmut Franke, Staat im Staate. Aufzeichnungen eines Militaristen, Magdeburg, 1924; cfr. the series 
‘Altes und neues Heer’, in Die Grenzboten, Zeitschfit für Kunst, Politik, Literatur (Berlin), 80. Jahrgang 
(1921), which containes the articles later republished in Staat im Staate. 
59 (‘Warum erfolgt nicht in allen Ländern, wie in Italien, die Gründung der Partei der Frontsoldaten, der 
Partei jener, die für den Staat geblutet haben, die das Vorrecht vor allen anderen haben, den Staat zu 
formen und zu beherrschen, für den sich geopfert haben?’) Helmut Franke, Staat im Staate, p. 164. I have 
introduced the cursive. 
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state). He suggested that such a new regime must be realised by the veterans, in the 
name of the fallen soldiers. In line with French representations of the dead soldiers at 
that time, Franke evoked ‘the dead, the dead!’, who watched from the heaven and did 
not rest in peace wondering ‘for what did we die?’.60 The roused memory of the dead, 
and the concepts of a veterans’ party and a veterans-led state appeared in Germany at 
the same time as in France, both driven by the inspiration of Italian Fascism. 
 In the first half of 1925, Franke’s ideas became the ‘spirit’ of the Stahlhelm 
(Stahlhelmgeist). After having abandoned the violent path of 1919-1923, in the new 
stage of the struggle, realising the state of the front soldiers (Der Staat den 
Frontsoldaten) required technique and organization. Thus, the example of Fascist Italy 
was carefully studied through academic research and personal visits. Franke also 
travelled to Italy.61 Regarding the fascist model, he stated that the Stahlhelm members 
‘should hear, try, criticize, examine, learn and —what is useful—, adopt’. Fascism and 
the Stahlhelm, despite acting in different conditions, shared a common goal: ‘the seizure 
and penetration of the state through the front soldiers’.62 
 Ernst Jünger, a young ex-officer with an intense war experience, was the author 
that best represented the soldatische Nationalismus. His political awakening came late, 
but it was in some measure influenced by Italian Fascism, as I will point out. Jünger 
first started a literary career, writing about his own war experiences, embellished with a 
posteriori philosophical reflections. In Im Stahlgewittern (1920), he presented war as an 
interior experience that transcendentally transformed individuals into hardened soldiers. 
Reading Nietzsche, Jünger interpreted war as a way of life, as a Dionysian fight for life 
and death. Spengler and probably Barrès were among his other intellectual influences. 
He had a brief contact with a Freikorps unit, but he focused on his studies. During 
1923, in Munich, he heard of Hitler and Ludendorff. Thus, his first political article, 
talking about a völkisch revolution that was coming soon, was published in the Nazi 
newspaper —Völkischer Beobachter— in August 1923. The failure of the putsch was 
                                                
60 (‘Die Toten, die Toten!’, ‘Wofür starben wir?’) Helmut Franke, Staat im Staate, p. 248. 
61 Alois Klotzbücher, Der politische Weg des Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten in der Weimarer 
Republik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ‘Nationalen Opposition’ 1918-1933, Ph. D. dissertation, 
Friedrich Alexander-Universität zur Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1964, p. 73. 
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Ergreifung und Durchdringung des Staates durch den Frontsoldaten’) Helmut Franke, ‘Der Stahlhelm 
marschiert…’, Der Stahlhelm. Organ des 'Stahlhelm', Bund der Frontsoldaten (Berlin), 1 February 1925; 
Helmut Franke, ‘Das System des Faszismus’, Der Stahlhelm, 7 and 14 June 1925; G. D.: ‘Das Werden 
des Faschismus’, Der Stahlhelm, 9 August 1925. 
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surely a big disappointment for him. He did not publish any other political article until 
April 1924, when he talked for the first time about ‘we front soldiers’.63 
 It was in August 1925 that Jünger published a new political article, ‘Revolution 
and front soldiers’, in the national conservative review Gewissen. Jünger attacked the 
revolution of 1918, denouncing the fact that the front soldiers had been disregarded and 
held in contempt. The best men, the young front officers, had been left aside, in contrast 
to what had happened in the Russian revolution of 1917. The motive was, according to 
Jünger, that the German revolution of 1918 completely lacked ideas. The revolution 
‘lacked the race, the martyrs, the dramatic development’. For Jünger, front soldiers were 
not just those men forced to be at the front, but also those who fought for ideals; 
therefore, the German young men that matched this spirit were accepted into the front 
soldiers community. Young officers and front soldiers had joined the Freikorps, the 
only worthy endeavour at that time in Jünger’s view. But this service had not been 
appreciated either. Jünger wondered whether the front soldiers should have acted 
differently, as the fascists in Italy. However, in Germany, the front soldiers did not find 
men like Mussolini, even if the forces were available. Jünger regretted that they lacked 
a ‘genuine party of the front soldiers’. They had to find a political leadership, in order to 
make a real revolution.64 
 When this article was published, the collaboration of Jünger with the Stahlhelm 
review directed by Helmut Franke had already been agreed. It is known that Jünger 
wrote a letter to Spengler, on 7 August 1925, announcing that he wanted to write in Der 
Stahlhelm about ‘the front soldier and his duty’; he wanted to make a call for a 
‘conscious politics’.65 The interest of Jünger, Franke and Spengler in Fascist Italy, as 
well as their perception of Italian Fascism as a state led by war veterans, is clear. 
 In September 1925, Jünger inaugurated a series of articles in Der Stahlhelm new 
ideological supplement, Die Standarte.66 In these radical texts, politics was —inverting 
Clausewitz’s aphorism— ‘the continuation of war by other means’. First of all, Jünger 
clarified his conception of the front soldier: as already mentioned, it was not an 
exclusivist notion empirically based on the war ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis). Instead, 
                                                
63 (‘uns Frontsoldaten’) Helmut Kiesel, Ernst Jünger. Die Biographie, München, Siedler, 2007. 
64 (‘es fehlte an Rasse, an Märtyren, an dramatische Entwicklung’,  ‘eine ausgesprochene Partei der 
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66 Ernst Jünger, Politische Publizistik. 1919 bis 1933, Stuttgart, Klett-co, 2001. 
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being a front soldier was a matter of ‘character’ (Charakter). A front soldier was every 
man that felt himself to be so, ready to fulfil his national duties. The class of the front 
soldiers —Frontsoldatentum— was a fighting community —Kampfgemeinschaft. Its 
members were not characterised by their past, but by their present and future.67 
Mussolini was presented as an exemplary leader whose followers were officers and 
workers together.68 The front soldiers were considered as neither reactionaries nor 
pacifists; they harboured a revolutionary potential, but their revolution was not of the 
same type as that of 1918.69 However, when it came to defining the political strategy of 
the war veterans, Jünger did not signal one unequivocal path; he pointed to two possible 
options. On the one hand, a legalist position, recognising the Weimar state. On the other 
hand, the revolutionary path, conquering the state and making real the ‘national ideals’. 
Certainly, the goal of both paths was the ‘national dictatorship’.70 
The Stahlhelm made the choice of walking legalist paths.71 Initially, in the first 
half of 1926, there was a period where the movement seemed inclined towards a violent 
seizure of power. Some of Jünger’s views were implemented, for example opening the 
Stahlhelm membership to men who had not experienced the war. Later, however, the 
ideology expressed in the pages of Die Standarte seemed too revolutionary and 
inconvenient, so the supplement ceased publication in April 1926. From this point on, 
Jünger and Franke published their radical nationalist texts in other journals, such as 
Arminius —named after the Germanic hero of ancient times. This review adopted, as its 
cover, a more aggressive symbol than the Stahlhelm helmet —the sword (Image 31). 
The rupture with the Stahlhelm took place in terms of doctrine as well. In a bitter article, 
Franke resignedly stated that after seven unsuccessful years they would never again 
believe in the front soldiers as the vanguard for the conquest of the state. The ‘new 
nationalism’ (neue Nationalismus) that they would continue to preach would target 
other forces, for example, young men.72 The myth of the fascist veterans was thus 
abandoned. 
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Image 31: Arminius. Kampfschrift für deutsche Nationalisten. 
 
For its part, the Stahlhelm adopted the motto ‘Inside the state’ (Hinein in den Staat), and 
inaugurated a legalist strategy based on negotiations with the rightist parties, contacts 
with Marshal Hindenburg (the new Reich president since May 1925 who was a 
venerated honorary member of the Stahlhelm), and yearly mass demonstrations —‘Day 
of the Front soldier’ (Frontsoldatentag)— which served to publicize political programs. 
They talked about Frontsozialismus, which described an allegedly patriotic common 
experience of the trenches, considered as the base of the Volksgemeinschaft.73 At this 
time, the Stahlhelm visual representation of the veteran was always that of a virile front 
soldier with the steel helmet, an image conveying conservative and authoritarian values 
(Images 32 and 33). However, the Stahlhelm was not politically successful, and the 
hypocrisy of its allegedly non-partisan nature (Überparteilichkeit) was evident. After 
the disappointing results of the 1928 elections, certain Stahlhelm sectors embraced once 
more an acutely anti-republican attitude. 
 
                                                
73 Der Stahlhelm, 10 October 1926. 
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Image 32: ‘The Stahlhelm. League of Front Soldiers. VIII Reichsfrontsoldatentag Berlin’, May 
1927. Image 33: ‘Stahlhelm. Hamburg 9th Frontsoldatentag’, June 1928, BArch Plak 002-033-
040. 
 
The Stahlhelm’s stance regarding Italian Fascism soon became evidently contradictory; 
the sustained exaltation of Fascism collided with the Südtirol question.74 As the fascist 
oppression against the German-speaking minority in this region continued, the 
Stahlhelm was moved by its nationalism to react. The veterans combined admiration 
and condemnation. On 21 February 1926, when the Stahlhelm journal published a 
translation —commented by Franke— of the fascist syndicalist law, on the long front-
page of the same issue Mussolini was harshly attacked for his most recent declarations 
about Südtirol. This article contained at once a threat and an overture: while saying that 
in Germany there existed the same patriotic youth than in Italy —ready to defend the 
Germans of Südtirol—, it was said that Mussolini should not seek a confrontation with 
them, but desert France and Britain —countries lacking that kind of patriotic young 
men— to find an understanding with the Germans.75 This ambivalent attitude would be 
maintained in the years that followed,76 while the attraction of authoritarianism and 
                                                
74 For a general overview on the Südtirol question see BArch, R 72/891. 
75 F. W. Heinz, ‘Antwort an Mussolini’, and Helmut Franke, ‘Ehre der Arbeit’, both in Der Stahlhelm, 21 
February 1926. See also Nachrichtenblatt des Gaues Postdam des 'Stahlhelm' Bund der Frontsoldaten 
(Postdam), num. 3 (March 1926). 
76 For example, see Der Stahlhelm, 11 March 1928. 
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Fascism did not abate. In the Stahlhelm organ, the fascist-inspired Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship was described with praise, and democracies were scorned.77  
While there was a partial and conflictual fascistization of the discourses, 
representations and political aims of the nationalist veterans in Germany, the Nazi 
movement was much slower to develop a symbolic and discursive frame to approach 
war veterans. The Nazis were rather reluctant to appeal directly to the front soldiers. 
The NSDAP was relaunched in February 1925, after Hitler’s release from prison in 
December 1924. For this new stage, Hitler abandoned the idea of a March on Berlin, 
inaugurating a course of legality. In fact, Mein Kampf, the book he conceived in prison, 
did not include any passage in which the veterans were clearly presented as the 
instrument for the conquest of the state. As is widely acknowledged, Hitler exalted the 
heroism of the soldiers of the First World War; he understood himself as a former 
soldier, and he wanted to instil the fighting mentality into his SA. However, Hitler did 
not assign any specific political role to the veterans. In Mein Kampf, we can only find a 
set of common stereotypes: the front ‘heroes’ versus the ‘deserters’ of the revolutionary 
soldier councils, and the insulted and spat-upon veterans whose decorations were torn. 
These unoriginal representations justified the restoration of the Army’s honour, but 
there were no evocations of a future state of the front soldiers.78  
In this period marked by the growth and expansion of the NSDAP, the myth of 
the fascist veterans played no role at all. Since 1925, the Völkischer Beobachter had 
included a supplement entitled Der deutsche Frontsoldat, but it was largely devoted to 
military politics and technical questions. In the NSDAP meetings, Hitler often 
introduced himself as soldier who had fulfilled his duty for ‘four and a half years’, and 
he used to address the audience as though it were composed of equally self-sacrificing 
ex-soldiers; the target of his diatribes were the Jews and traitors of the home-front, who 
had stabbed the heroic soldiers in the back.79 However, there were no appeals to the 
veterans to seize power, nor depictions of the front soldiers as the elite of the nation. 
Furthermore, the leftist NSDAP group in northern Germany, represented by the Strasser 
brothers and Joseph Goebbels, ascribed no relevance to the veteran identity. For the 
Nazis, the front soldiers embodied a set of values: ‘spirit of duty’, ‘sacrifice’, 
                                                
77 See the section ‘Auslandrundschau’ in Der Stahlhelm, 8, 22 May 1927, 12, 19 June 1927 
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‘patriotism’, ‘comradeship’, ‘subordination’, as Georg Strasser put it. But even for this 
ex-officer and ex-Freikorps member, neither the veterans nor the front soldiers 
personified the national socialist ideology.80 
Recently, Nils Löffelbein has argued that Front soldiers and war victims 
(Kriegsopfer) were dominant themes in NSDAP propaganda before 1933;81 but this 
assertion should be nuanced by taking into account chronology. From 1924, the 
national-socialist representative in the völkisch bloc in the Reichstag, Hans Dietrich, a 
severely mutilated ex-soldier, defended the disabled veterans and war victims in some 
of his public interventions; but this course of action was far from prominent. For the 
Reichstag elections of May 1928, Hitler and the Nazis invoked the front soldiers’ 
support through speeches and electoral posters. It was even said that they represented 
the Germany of the future, which would be governed ‘by the representatives of the 
front-troops’.82 (Note that he referred to the representatives and not to the front-troops 
themselves). Yet this propaganda was not original either discursively, or 
iconographically (images 34 and 35). Representations and slogans scarcely differed 
from those formerly employed by the Stahlhelm. In any case, the electoral results were 
very poor for the Nazis. Up to the early 1930s, the Nazis did not develop any substantial 
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Image 34: ‘National-socialist. Otherwise the victims were for nothing’, BArch Plak 002-042-
017, May 1928. Image 35: ‘2 million dead! For nothing? Never! Front soldiers! Adolf Hitler 
shows you the way!’, BArch Plak 002-039-013, May 1928. 
 
Different reasons explain why the Nazi movement did not absorb the myth of the fascist 
veterans. In Germany, due to the 1918 revolution, the front soldiers —rather than the 
veterans in general— became the group idolized by the nationalist extreme right. They 
were believed to have crushed the Spartacist uprising and the short-lived communist 
Räterepublik of Bavaria. But organizations such as the Stahlhelm, not the NSDAP, had 
assumed the political representation of these men. Hitler’s credentials as a front soldier 
allowed him to state that he had fulfilled his duty, but not much more. In the case of 
Goebbels, it was evident that he had not served as a soldier in the First World War, due 
to his leg disability. The Nazis were conscious that some Jews also represented 
themselves as front soldiers. In fact, the Nazis pointed out the difficulties in clearly 
defining who was a front soldier.83 Furthermore, when the fascist veterans myth was 
being transferred into Germany and France during 1924 and early 1925, the Nazi 
movement had been dismantled. Subsequently, to enhance its membership, the NSDAP 
primarily targeted not the veterans, but the working class, the unemployed and the 
youth. Meanwhile, the preponderance of the veteran mystic among the anti-republican 
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groups generally receded. In contrast, the pacifist memory of the war persisted through 
the ‘No more war!’ (Nie wieder Krieg!) movement and the activities and publications of 
republican veterans.84 It was not that the Nazis did not copy ideological and behavioural 
patterns from the Italian fascists. Despite of the absence of fascistized discourses about 
the veterans, the Nazis paid a lot of attention to Italian Fascism. However, the 
knowledge about Fascist Italy grew more complex and nuanced; people realised that 
Mussolini’s regime was much more than a veterans’ state.  
If the Nazis progressively took interest in the veterans’ political mobilization 
and indoctrination, it was after the precedent set by those around the Stahlhelm. The 
transmission of ideas from the soldatische Nationalismus to the NSDAP is beyond 
question in the second half of the 1920s, yet it was also inconclusive. In 1926, Ernst 
Jünger sent some of his works to Hitler, and the Führer read them, becoming interested. 
However, a planned personal meeting between them never took place.85 In 1927, the 
Völkischer Beobachter created a new section —‘The New Front’ (Die neue Front)— 
where the soldatische Nationalismus trends were commented from the Nazi point of 
view. In its first issue, Jünger, who had just broke with Der Stahlhelm, wrote an article 
about the ‘new nationalism’ (neue Nationalismus). There, the category of the front 
soldier was absent from the argumentation, though the example of Mussolini and 
Fascist Italy remained. Now, meaningfully, the key protagonist was the ‘class of 
nationalistic workers’.86 In the late 1920s, Ernst Jünger was active in establishing these 
contacts with the Nazi movement, especially with its leftist branch; but the 
preponderance of the front soldier in his writings gave way to the exaltation of the 
worker (Arbeiter).87 As with Jünger’s writings, the Stahlhelm concept of 
Frontsozialismus was also known and discussed by the Nazis, but they did not adopt 
it.88 Many Nazis had been soldiers or/and ex-Freikorps volunteers; therefore they were 
not impermeable to the myth of the fascist veterans conveyed by Jünger and others. 
Indeed, the autobiographical book of Ernst Röhm, published in 1928, was ‘dedicated to 
the front soldiers’, whom ‘the SA comrades should emulate’. The declared goal of 
Röhm was ‘to give the veterans through acts of combat their due share of the state 
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leadership, and to make sure that the real spirit of the front soldiers is politically 
enforced’.89 Yet in this period Röhm was not taking part in the Nazi movement.90 While 
the renewed SA was mainly set up by men with combat experience, the bulk of its 
membership was composed of younger people who had no direct knowledge of war.91 
The fascist veterans’ myth was not transferred to the NSDAP, but rather to the 
Stahlhelm, as I have shown. The Stahlhelm did not transform into a political fascist 
party (as the Faisceau in France did), but it tried —without success— to influence 
German politics. This history recalls the trajectory of the ANC in Italy before its 
fascistization. Also, the relationship between the NSDAP and the Stahlhelm during the 
second half of the 1920s resembled that of the fascist movement and the ANC in the 
Italian early postwar period. The Nazis, particularly the leftist group of Gregor Strasser, 
paid attention to the Stahlhelm veterans, but in the end, their relationship was defined by 
a profound rivalry.92 However, once the Stahlhelm had been the platform for the 
development of new political discourses rooted in the fascist veterans myth, these 
representations freely circulated, and the Nazi movement was not indifferent to them in 
the long term.  
By 1927, echoes of the highly fascistized political discourses and representations 
of the German veterans had reached back to Italy. In April 1927, the new Stahlhelm 
demonstration in Berlin was described in Italy as a revolutionary albeit peaceful ‘march 
on Berlin’. This information attracted Mussolini’s interest, although the Italian 
ambassador in Berlin told him that ‘a peaceful march on Berlin without arms makes no 
sense’.93 A report about the German veterans’ organization was prepared for the Duce, 
where the fascist inspiration of the Stahlhelm was described. The question of the 
Südtirol, however, seemed an important obstacle between the fascists and the German 
veterans. In contrast, Hitler was establishing indirect contacts with Mussolini, and 
making explicit that the Südtirol would never represent a hurdle to reaching an 
                                                
89 (‘Dem deutschen Frontsoldaten gewidmet. […] Kameraden der S.A., die den Frontsoldaten nacheifern 
sollen’, ‘Ziel meiner Politik ist, dem deutschen Frontkämpfer den ihm gebührenden Anteil an der Leitung 
des Staates zu erkämpfen und dem idealen und realen Geist des Frontkämpfertums auch in der Politik 
Geltung zu verschaffen’) Ernst Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters, München, 1934 (1st edition 
1928), p. 10; see also a book review in Völkischer Beobachter, 14/15 October 1928. 
90 Eleanor Hancock, Ernst Röhm. Hitler’s SA Chief of Staff, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 
83-104. 
91 Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, pp. 45-77. 
92 Alessandro Salvador, Il nazionalsocialismo e la destra nazionalista tedesca: 1925-1933, PhD. 
dissertation, Università degli Studi di Trento, 2009, pp. 84-105. 
93 (‘marcia su Berlino’, ‘Né una ‘marcia su Berlino’ pacifica e senza armi ha alcun significato’) AMAE, 
Affari Politici 1919-1930, Germania, b. 1174, f. ‘Congresso “Stahlhelm” “elmi d’acciaio” a Berlino’. 
 209 
understanding between the Nazis and fascist Italy. In any case, the myth of the fascist 
veterans had greatly helped to establish this circuit of ideological and political dialogue 
and exchange. 
The main origin of these discourses and representations was Fascist Italy, where 
a set of transnational elements had first politically synthesised. The rise of Italian 
Fascism had been understood as the seizure of power by a party of veterans, which had 
restored the victory, redeemed the neglected, smashed communism, and given the 
veterans their deserved leading role in the state. This was the fascist veterans’ myth. As 
I will demonstrate next, the fascists were active propagators of this legend in the 
international sphere. 
 
The fascist veterans and the FIDAC 
The Fédération Interalliée des Anciens Combattants (FIDAC) had been created by 
conservative French veterans in late 1920. The initial core of this association had been 
French, Belgian, British, North American and Italian veterans, while Czechoslovakian, 
Yugoslavian, Polish, Romanian and Portuguese representatives progressively signed up 
in the years that followed. In the beginning, the FIDAC strived to strengthen the ties 
between ex-allied veterans. By doing so, it expected to exert an international political 
influence, in order to improve the war victims’ social benefits and to preserve the peace. 
In a somewhat contradictory policy that clashed with this goal, and in contrast to other 
international veteran platforms, the FIDAC openly excluded the former enemy veterans. 
This discriminatory position, zealously held by the three-times-re-elected president 
Bertrand, was reaffirmed in the FIDAC congress of Brussels in September 1923, where 
the opinions of the French and Belgian leaders predominated. However, by this year, 
the international instability began to resonate also in the FIDAC. The Italian 
representatives were unable to join the congress, because the transformation of the ANC 
into a state organization contradicted the expected political independence of the FIDAC 
members.94 However, the Italian veterans would soon recover and increase their 
influence. 
In 1924, when the international peace settlements were being restructured, the 
debates inside the FIDAC became heated. Between March and April 1924, Mussolini 
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and the British Legion vice-president Colonel Crosfield had arranged the return of an 
Italian delegation to the FIDAC.95 Thus, in September, the ANC reappeared inside this 
organization. In the wake of the London conference on the reparations issue, the FIDAC 
representatives met in the same city. Meanwhile, in Italy the Matteotti crisis had 
developed and was still unresolved. Ettore Viola personally headed the Italian 
committee, and this participation can be viewed as further evidence of Viola’s intention 
of making the ANC an influential institution independent from the fascist government. 
The association did not ask the fascist government to adhere to the congress. 
Nonetheless, the Italian ambassador in London received instructions from Mussolini to 
show interest in the veteran gathering.96 
Even though the London meeting had little impact on the British and 
international public, it was important for the FIDAC trajectory, as well as for Fascism. 
At the congress, the French veterans’ intransigent viewpoint was thwarted by the more 
open opinion of the British representatives, who suggested that German veteran 
associations should be invited to join the FIDAC. Faced with the difficulties reaching an 
agreement on this question, Viola’s conciliatory proposal for an intermediate resolution 
resolved the impasse. The congress approved the Italian suggestion of permitting an 
inquiry about the German veteran associations as the first step towards potential 
voluntary contacts between the FIDAC and the ex-enemies. In addition to this success, 
the Italian delegation had the opportunity to boast about the favourable fascist 
legislation for the disabled. As a result, the rest of the national representatives agreed to 
urge their governments to develop similar measures. Furthermore, it was decided that 
the next FIDAC congress would be celebrated in Rome; a decision to which Mussolini 
gave his acquiescence after being consulted from London through the Italian 
ambassador.97 
 Most probably, all these facts constituted another reason for Mussolini and the 
fascists to unleash the final fascistization of the ANC. The representation of the Italian 
veterans in the international sphere should not be left in the hands of non-fascists. The 
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expeditious purge of the ANC and the absolute exclusion of Viola and the anti-fascist 
veteran leaders (see chapter 3) would be completed just on time before the next FIDAC 
congress in Rome. In April 1925, the ANC triumvirate member Nicola Sansanelli met 
in Paris the FIDAC international representatives, and convinced them of the legitimacy 
of the fascist government measures regarding the ANC.98 By September 1925, the 
Italian veteran organizations offered a fully fascist united front to the international 
veteran delegates who gathered in the Italian capital. The list of the Italian 
representatives spoke for itself: Amilcare Rossi, Luigi Russo, Nicola Sansanelli, Adolfo 
Schiavo, Aldo Bertelè, Angelo Zilli, Bruno Biagi and other fascists, none of them 
present in the previous FIDAC congress, composed the Italian host delegation. The 
fascists had so thoroughly prepared the event, that the foreign veterans were delighted. 
Among the visitors were the FIDAC president —the North American Thomas W. 
Miller—, and French veterans like Marcel Héraud (UF), Paul Vaillant (UF), Charles 
Bertrand (UNC) and Jean Goy (UNC).99 
 During the congress, the fascist veterans managed to conduct the discussions 
towards topics and conclusions that matched their interests. When the question of 
international migrations was approached, the Italians requested to the North American 
delegates that a higher number of Italian veterans be allowed to emigrate to the United 
States. The fascists also requested to the French delegates that the Italian veterans in 
France enjoy preference in being hired in agricultural and construction work. Talking 
about organizational matters, the fascists proposed that in the hypothetical case that 
veteran associations obtained the official recognition of a State —as had happened in 
Italy—, no other association from that country should be admitted into the FIDAC. 
Regarding the sensitive inter-allied debts issue, the Italians —endorsed by the North 
Americans— pointed out the necessity of a solution (since Italy was a debtor country). 
Yet the French succeeded in subordinating the revision of the inter-allied debts to the 
payment of reparations by the ex-enemies. In the conclusions of the congress, it was 
stated that communist propaganda was an international threat; the FIDAC leaders 
defined the solidarity of their associations as ‘the greatest enemy of communism’. The 
FIDAC, following the demands of Polish and Czechoslovak representatives, denounced 
German militarism; but this anti-German stance included a positive assessment of 
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Mussolini’s intransigent attitude regarding the Alto Adige question. Besides these 
discussions, the congress attendees visited Roman sights, paid tribute to the Milite 
Ignoto, and met fascist leaders such as Farinacci. All this propaganda paved the way for 
the FIDAC to send a message of support to Mussolini, calling him ‘saviour of Italy’, 
when he survived an assassination attempt in November 1925.100 
 The next FIDAC congress was held in Warsaw and Krakow, in September 1926, 
being the British Colonel Crosfield the president of the association. Earlier, during the 
spring, Crosfield had travelled through Fascist Italy, visiting Genoa, Turin, Milan, 
Naples and other cities; he had paid visit to the Milite Ignoto monument, raising his arm 
in roman salute.101 The FIDAC congress in Poland came only three months after 
Pilsudski’s coup d’état, and this situation mad it necessary to eliminate certain delicate 
issues from the agenda.102 The Italian committee sent to Poland was headed by Nicola 
Sansanelli, and composed of Gianni Baccarini, Angelo Zilli, and other fascists, 
including Mario Dessaules, leader of the ANC in France. In this congress, the division 
at the heart of the FIDAC was acute, since now the British position close to the Locarno 
spirit contrasted the French attitude of diffidence to Germany. Those French veteran 
associations that preferred a rapprochement with the Germans, such as the UF, paid 
more attention to their own international conference in Geneva (CIAMAC). In contrast, 
when the FIDAC finally agreed to invite German associations to the next meeting in 
Luxemburg in competition with the CIAMAC, some French representatives abandoned 
the sessions in protest.103 The planned Luxemburg meeting would imply a grave crisis 
in the CIAMAC-FIDAC relations.104 Thus, while the real advances towards European 
peace took place rather in the CIAMAC than in the FIDAC, the latter organization 
became more and more influenced by the fascists. The fascist veterans within the 
FIDAC did let any opportunity pass ‘to show to their comrades how lucky their country 
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was to have a war veteran as the head of state’.105 As a result, the international veterans 
made for potentially easy converts to the fascist veterans’ myth. 
 The FIDAC review, published in English and French, became another organ for 
the diffusion of the fascist discourse and policies regarding the war veterans. The 
veteran organ described, for instance, Italian veterans’ visits to the Duce, and their 
mutual declarations of admiration and loyalty. In this way, veterans of all the ex-allied 
countries learnt that the bearers of the Gold Medal in Italy were addressed by the Italian 
president himself as the ‘flower of your race, the real aristocracy of the generation 
which on land, on sea and in the sky has achieved acts of prodigious heroism’.106 
Mentioning the circular to the prefetti sent by Mussolini in January 1927, it was said 
that the Italian veterans were considered ‘the Aristocracy of the Victory’:107 
 
Italy, writes Mr. Mussolini, contrary to some countries, has known how to guard in its 
ex-service men’s associations the incomparable inheritance of victory. The mothers and 
widows of the soldiers, fallen on the field of honour, the Association of the Disabled 
and Invalids, the Gold Medals and Blue Ribbons, the National Association of Ex-
Service Men, that of Volunteers and others of less importance, constitute a valuable 
force for the regime. They give it the disinterested and sincere approval of millions of 
Italians. It is these Italians who left hundreds and thousands of their glorious dead on 
the battlefields; it is these Italians who fought and bled during forty months; it is these 
Italians who bear on their bodies the irrevocable marks of sacrifices and duty 
accomplished. 
 
The example of Italy radicalized the political orientation of the FIDAC. It was 
considered natural that the war generation of each country exerted a preponderant 
influence on public affairs: ‘In two of our countries, Italy and Poland, this generation 
already holds the power in its hands’. The FIDAC bulletin exalted both regimes and 
their ‘popular’ leaders Mussolini and Pilsudski, arguing that ‘under these circumstances 
it is difficult to speak of dictatorship’. The FIDAC tinged its pacifism by conveying the 
positive opinions of Mussolini about the war. The new FIDAC president, the French 
Marcel Héraud, travelled to Italy, being magnificently welcomed in Turin by Zilli, in 
Rome by Rossi and Russo (visiting the Milite Ignoto), and in Naples by Sansanelli. 
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Héraud came back to France convinced that ‘the same spirit moved all the veterans’, 
and that in Italy the veterans participated in the management of the public affairs, and 
had ‘the responsibility of power’.108  
The culmination of this evolution was the nomination, at the congress of London 
in September 1927, of Nicola Sansanelli as the president of the FIDAC. This decisive 
accomplishment was achieved in spite of the resistance of some FIDAC members, 
particularly the French representatives from the UF who disliked Fascism. Having 
obtained the presidency of the FIDAC, the fascists had the opportunity to be the official 
representatives of the inter-allied war veterans in Europe and also in the United States. 
In fact, the American Legion leaders, who had visited fascist Rome at the end of 
September 1927, invited Sansanelli to their country for a propaganda trip in the spring 
of 1928. Needless to say, Sansanelli used his travels to publicize not only the FIDAC, 
but also ‘Fascism as a political-social doctrine and as a government system’; in passing, 
he denied the description of the Duce as a dictator. The loyalty and obedience of the 
ANC to Mussolini, as well as the alleged great achievements of the fascist regime in the 
realm of social assistance, were exhibited during this time through the FIDAC.109 
However, during Sansanelli’s presidency, the FIDAC international relevance in 
Western European affairs declined. The FIDAC Luxembourg conferences, where ex-
enemy veterans were invited, cannot be portrayed —in spite of the fascist 
triumphalism— as successful. For example, the FIDAC had sent invitations to the 
Stahlhelm, but it plainly rejected the offer, on the basis of its radical opposition to 
Versailles and to the Dawes plan. The Jungdeutsche Orden joined the conversations 
with the ex-allies, but defended its nationalist views with intransigency. These 
discussions among convinced patriots with completely opposed opinions did not reach 
any consensus at all. At the end of the second Luxembourg meeting, the biggest success 
had simply been maintaining a ‘polite ambiance’. In a sense, as the Nazis shrewdly 
noted, it was a contradiction to organize an international veteran movement if the 
objective was to consolidate peace. Faced with these complications, and having used the 
FIDAC for their interests during some time, the fascist predominance inside the 
organization faded. In September 1928, the president Sansanelli excused his absence 
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from the congress celebrated in Bucharest; he prioritized joining the fascist Gran 
Consiglio. It is not surprising that his mandate in charge of the FIDAC was not 
renewed.110 
  
The fascist ANC 
During the second half of the 1920s, once the fascistization of the ANC had been 
completed, Italian veteran politics experienced a period of relative tranquillity. There 
were also cultural and organizational transformations, as we will see, but the main 
struggles around the Italian veterans had been resolved, and obedience imposed by force 
and censure. In a journal interview, Amilcare Rossi, asked about the recent debates 
about the role of combattentismo, opined: ‘this ugly word do not refer to any real force 
present in our nation: in any case, if this kind of shapeless soul existed —and I doubt 
it— it has forever disappeared’.111 In October 1925, the directors of the veteran news 
review Problemi d’Italia were obliged, in unclear circumstances, to resign.112 Their 
posts were occupied by Umberto Guglielmotti (a nationalist veteran who became head 
of the Roman Fascio at the end of 1926) and Nicola Sansanelli. These fascists changed 
the title and the content of the review in keeping with the regime’s needs.113 Any kind 
of veteran expression was subject to fascist control, so that it makes sense to talk about 
a fascist ANC from this point onwards. 
 This phase was the most stable in Italian veteran politics during the interwar 
period. Social assistance and agricultural reform were the most common activities at 
this time. The ONC was also put under fascist supervision; directed by Angelo 
Manaresi, it sought to reclaim agricultural lands through hydraulic works.114 At the 
same time, it carried out propaganda, through cultural activities such as a travelling 
cinema. All these projects aimed towards the ‘ruralisation of Italy’.115 The ANC, 
enjoying direct funding from the government, conceded limited credits to veterans, 
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distributed agricultural machinery, and contributed to the ‘Battles for Grain’ (Battaglie 
del Grano) that the regime promoted since 1925 to spur production. The association 
also offered healthcare assistance to veterans, and gave subsides to the needy. Thus, it 
pretended to be ‘an instrument for the elevation of the agricultural classes’.116 The goal 
of ruralisation was part of the regenerative mission that Fascism wanted to fulfil, and 
thus, in order to discipline agrarian society, the ideal of the obedient ‘peasant soldier’ 
was employed. However, while there were certain technical and economic 
achievements, neither the ONC nor the ANC resolved important regional and class 
inequalities, and the problems of Italian agriculture persisted.117  
 The fascist ANC consolidated in the second half of the 1920s. Another step in 
this development was the adoption of a new statute, in November 1926. This reform 
coincided with the modification of the PNF statute, which restricted the party autonomy 
and suppressed every kind of electoral process inside it. Conversely, the new ANC 
regulations liquidated the electoral system within the ANC apparatus, with the pretext 
of sparing internal competitions.118 Unsurprisingly, Mussolini nominated the temporary 
triumvirate Rossi-Russo-Sansanelli as the new definitive directing board of the ANC.119 
In this new phase, the ANC consolidated as an effective manager of the veterans’ 
material interests, remaining focused on assistance tasks. Even though the Carta del 
Lavoro had made no mention of the veterans, the ANC successfully defended the rights 
of the veterans to preferentially obtain jobs when unemployment started to steadily rise 
during 1927 and 1928120. In May 1928, having heard the veterans’ concerns, Turati sent 
a memorandum to the PNF federations, reminding the preferential right to work of those 
who had been in the trenches.121 
 The changes within the regime structure saw a major militarization of politics 
and a politicization of the army. It is significant that the dictatorship promoted an 
association of discharged officers (Unione Nazionale Ufficiali in Congedo), whose 
function was maintaining the ties of retired officers with the army and the War 
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Ministry.122 This entity was soon granted the same official status than the other veteran 
associations.123 Thus, Italy was progressively assuming the ‘physiognomy of a warrior 
nation, dynamic, spiritually and physically armed, ready and impatient to affront any 
challenge’.124 According to official data, the ANC reached more than 400,000 affiliated 
in 1927 and continued growing. In this context, some fascist leaders argued about 
stressing the political function of the veterans, through the strengthening of their 
military spirit. It was said that the ANC should go beyond the assistance tasks, and 
transform into a kind of reserve army in close contact with the military. This opinion 
was expressed by Guglielmotti; but it was contradicted by the ANC leaders, who did 
not desire a change in the main role of the association yet. Even so, the expectations of 
some fascists for a deeper involvement of the veterans in the military or economic 
affairs endured.125 
 In general, during the second half of the 1920s, a process of power concentration 
took place in Italy, not only in Mussolini’s hands, but also in the fascist and veteran 
organizations. There was a feeling that the multiple state entities and associations 
should start to fuse, in order to avoid duplicities and to favour discipline and simplicity. 
This question applied particularly to the multiple veteran groups.126 Furthermore, since 
the PNF members dominated the ANC structures throughout Italy, these men 
simultaneously held several positions, as Members of Parliament, leaders of the MVSN, 
directing members of the fascist corporations, etc.127 To give only the most noteworthy 
examples, Augusto Turati presided the ANC federation of Brescia, Italo Balbo the 
federation of Ferrara, and Achille Starace the federation of Lecce. Sansanelli was the 
head of Fascism in Naples, Rossi led the fascist federation of Terni, and Russo was 
appointed to be prefetto of Chieti. By 1928, in many provinces it was impossible to 
make a distinction between the veteran organization and the PNF structures.128 The 
erstwhile diverse and numerous veteran press progressively declined. Even the 
                                                
122 Esercito e Nazione. Rivista per l’ufficiale italiano (Rome), num. 6-7 (June-July 1926), num. 8 (August 
1926), num. 11 (November 1926). 
123 Esercito e Nazione, num. 3 (March 1927). 
124 (‘la fisionomia di una nazione guerriera, dinamica, armata nello spirito e nelle braccia, pronta a tute 
le prove, e impaziente di tentarle’) La Stampa, 16 October 1926. 
125 This debate, through Roma fascista, 12, 19 November, 3 December 1927; Il Popolo d’Italia, 22 
November 1927. 
126 Domenico Montalto, ‘Lo Stato e le organizzazioni - III. Le associazioni minori’, Critica fascista, 1 
June 1928. 
127 Cf. the list of provincial ANC leader annexed in Palo Ceci, I Gerarchi dell’Associazione, and political 
biographies in Chi è? Dizionario degli italiani d’oggi, Rome, 1936 and 1940, ad nomen. 
128 ‘Italia Augusta’. Rassegna dell'Opera Nazionale per i Combattenti (Rome), num. 8 (August 1928). 
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innocuous ‘Italia Augusta’ veteran informative review disappeared at the end of 1928, 
transformed into a purely technical and illustrated monthly publication for the ONC 
propaganda.129 All these steps moved the veteran organizations closer to a totalitarian 
ideal. 
 The discourses, practices and representations of the Italian veterans evolved in 
harmony with this totalitarian drift, while the fascist liturgical system developed and 
consolidated.130 Thus, the official war memory experienced a clear fascistization since 
1925. Commemorative rituals and monuments were the two instruments for the 
imposition of the fascist interpretation of the war and the victory. These factors 
reinforced the symbolic link between the intervention, the victory and the March on 
Rome, in which many veterans believed. 
The veterans were both an agent and a target of these cultural expressions. In 
1926, the ANC leadership gave instructions to make the veterans participate in the 
celebrations of the March on Rome under the orders of the PNF, and also in the local 
commemorations of Vittorio Veneto. In 1927 and 1928, official messages from the 
ANC commemorated simultaneously both concurrent dates. The association sent 
messages expressing loyalty to the King and the Duce for the occasion of the 4 
November. In 1928, the tenth anniversary (decennale) of the Victory featured the 
inauguration of the Mother Home of the Disabled in Rome (Casa Madre dei Mutilati), 
and a big demonstration of veterans. In his discourse, Mussolini stated, as if it were 
true, that the Italian people had desired the war —that the intervention had not been due 
to a foreign unexpected aggression, but to a conscious voluntary act. Mussolini 
addressed thousands of combattenti and mutilati, affirming that in 1922 ‘a handful of 
men issued from the trenches’ had forever restored the victory. The commemoration of 
the Italian intervention in the First World War was another important annual ritual 
introduced by the fascists. In this exaltation of the interventionist spirit, the fascist 
veterans exerted a crucial role. In 1927, there was a meeting in Rome to celebrate the 24 
May, where not only ministers and PNF authorities were present, but also ANC leaders 
and bearers of the Gold Medal. Turati, saluting in the Roman style, reviewed the 
veterans of the ANC, before paying homage to the Milite Ignoto. Disabled veterans, and 
decorated veterans of the Institute of the Blue Ribbons (Nastro Azzurro) —association 
transformed into Ente morale in 1928— sent messages of exaltation and loyalty. And 
                                                
129 ‘Italia Augusta’, num. 12 (December 1928). 
130 Emilio Gentile, Il culto del Littorio, pp. 61-103. 
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veterans abroad also celebrated these commemorations in a sympathetic environment; 
for example, French anciens combattants attended the banquet celebrated for the 
decennale of the victory in Paris.131 
 Inaugurations of new monuments to the memory of the fallen soldiers were 
constant in all the Italian regions during the second half of the 1920s. Probably, the 
most famous of them was the monument to the Victory in Bolzano (in the Alto Adige), 
finished in 1928.132 This construction commemorated the irredentist martyrs of the 
Trentino region, and therefore was a symbol of the oppression of the German-speaking 
population of Südtirol. On this occasion, the yearly congress of the ANC was convened 
in Bolzano too. In this period, rituals around the monuments to the fallen soldiers, as 
well as veteran congresses —erstwhile heated and tumultuous meetings where radical 
and disparate political discussions were held— became routine and elitist meetings that 
once and again declared loyalty to the king and Mussolini.133 Publicly, the fascist 
veterans shared their devotion between both personalities. It is interesting to note, 
however, that during this period, Mussolini commenced to surpass the king as the 
symbolic receptor of the veterans’ and the army officers’ loyalties (Images 36 and 37). 
                                                
131 (‘un manipolo di uomini che venivano dalla trincea’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 25 May, 23, 27 October, 4 
November 1926, 29 October 1927, 23, 24 May, 18 September, 28, 31 October, 4, 6 November 1928; Il 
Popolo di Roma (Rome), 25 May 1927, 27 October, 4 November 1928. For the decennale ceremonies, 
see the film ‘Giornale Luce CCXV’ (November 1928), in www.archivioluce.com (accessed on 28 July 
2013). 
132 Renato Monteleone and Pino Sarasini, ‘I monumenti italiani ai caduti della Grande Guerra’; Vincenzo 
Calí, ‘Il monumento alla Vittoria di Bolzano. Un caso di continuità fra fascismo e post-fascismo’, both in 
Diego Leoni and Camillo Zadra (eds.), La Grande Guerra, pp. 631-662 and 663-670. 
133 Numero unico per l’inaugurazione. Monumento della Vittoria, Bolzano, 1928; 'Italia Augusta', num. 8 
(August 1928); Il Popolo d’Italia, 18 September 1928. 
 220
 
Images 36 and 37: Representations of the king and Mussolini in the veteran press, Italia 
Augusta, num. 1, March 1926. 
 
The stylization and standardization of the fascist identity and aesthetic continued 
throughout these years. There was an interest in defining the model characteristics of a 
fascist person, and in transmitting these traits to the next generation. Put simply, the 
new Italians had to be created in the likeness of Mussolini.134 The fascists extolled 
values such as faith, discipline, sacrifice; and pointed at the exemplary arditi as the 
most desirable figures to imitate. Even bodily attitudes and gestures with a militaristic 
appearance were recommended: ‘a straight and agile posture, rather proud than modest. 
Head held high, straight back […]’.135 Publications of veterans’ memoirs and narrations 
of war heroic deeds served as well to this purpose. The ‘trench’ was represented as the 
‘school of schools’; young children had to learn its meaning.136 In fact, the ANC, its 
                                                
134 Mario Carli, Codice della vita fascista, Roma, 1928, p. 7. 
135 (‘il portamento legero e dritto, piuttosto fiero anzichè modesto. Testa alta, schiena dritta’) Alberto 
Marchese, Vademecum per l’Avanguardista d’Italia, Napoli, 1928, p. 5. 
136 (‘La trincea è la scuola delle scuole’) Giovanni Borelli, ‘Il senso della trincea’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 19 
August 1927. 
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leaders and other fascist veterans actively supported initiatives to reinforce and transmit 
these models of masculinity and political attitude.137 
 All this preoccupation for the fascist education of children and youths was not 
new,138 but it was growing exponentially. The fascist youth organizations were 
expanding. It was an indication that a different era had begun. New generations who 
had not fought the war were reaching their maturity. This required the actualization of 
fascist identity, and particularly the revision of the myths round youths.139 
Subsequently, the myth of the fascist veterans was progressively displaced, although the 
veterans did not lose their political relevance. As we will see, they would assume new 
political functions. At the end of the 1920s, a whole phase of the history of fascism 



















                                                
137 Francesco Pironti, Manuale di cultura fascista. Ad uso delle scuole medie, Roma, 1929, with a preface 
by Amilcare Rossi; Arturo Gallo, Stirpe eroica, Napoli, 1929; Ass. Naz. Combattenti Federazione 
Provinciale di Torino, Canti di guerra. diretti dal Maestro Gaetano Salvadego ed eseguiti da ex 
Combattenti, Torino, 1929. 
138 Tracy H. Koon, Believe, Obey, Fight. Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943, 
London, University of North Carolina Press, 1985. 
139 Bruno Wanrooij, ‘The Rise and Fall of Italian Fascism as a Generational Revolt’, Journal of 











Fascism and Veterans during the 1930s 
 
This section examines the transnational fascistization of veteran politics in Europe 
during the 1930s. A complex web of contacts, cultural transfers, and organizational 
networks of fascist or fascist-friendly veterans reveals the extent to which a 
transnational fascist phenomenon took shape in Europe, in a context marked by the 
increasing confrontation between fascism and anti-fascism and by a series of new wars. 
I show how the fascist model of veteran politics was transferred into Germany by 1933-



































Transnational Fascism and Veterans (1929-1935) 
 
It is very significant that whereas the decade I have discussed hitherto passed into 
history as the ‘Golden Twenties’, the 1930s are remembered as a period of deep crisis 
and wars, starting with the Great Depression. As we know, for many social and political 
groups, and even for war veterans, the ‘Happy Twenties’ were not so pleasant as this 
image may suggest, and the 1930s would be much more distressing. The first half of the 
decade was marked by an unprecedented global crisis of capitalism. Although European 
countries —such as Italy— had shown signs of economic decline earlier, the major 
shock came from the United States and the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, which 
resonated across the old continent. With Weimar Germany deprived of North American 
loans, the reparations schedule and the European financial networks were severely 
disrupted. Industrial production slumped and unemployment rocketed. The affected 
states were obliged to search for new solutions, but in general, protectionist measures 
were implemented, and international trade collapsed. Working class syndicalism gained 
momentum. At the same time, corporatism was further developed in Fascist Italy as an 
alternative economic model and was increasingly regarded as a solution by certain 
lobbies and by political groups abroad. 
The dramatic political consequences of this economic crisis brought a crisis of 
legitimacy in many countries. This situation was the breeding ground for new fascist or 
proto-fascist movements and parties. And now, their evolution was not just influenced 
by Italian Fascism; the German Nazis also inspired them. In the context of the 
Depression, National Socialism grew steadily in Germany. Hitler would obtain power in 
January 1933. This event constituted a further shock to both international and domestic 
affairs in all European countries; in particular, Fascist Italy and the French Republic had 
to reorient their positions regarding the German III Reich.  
Far from disappearing from the political scene, the veterans of the Great War 
became more involved in European politics. The war memory did not fade, rather it was 
substantially transformed. New discourses and representations of the war came to the 
fore in the first half of the 1930s, inaugurating symbolic struggles for the signification 
of the war experience, in which the veterans of different countries would be heavily 
involved. Fascism continued to monopolize the political and cultural expression of the 
Italian veterans, and a process of Nazification of German veteran politics and discourses 
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took place. All these developments had an important transnational dimension across the 
continent, as fascist and non-fascist veterans constructed international networks and 
were the agents of cultural transfers. 
This chapter analyses this multifaceted historical process, in order to discern 
what role war veterans played. In the first section, I show that the years 1929 and 1930 
initiated a new phase in the historical evolution of the relationship between veterans and 
Fascism, marked by a set of changes that took place in Italy and elsewhere. In the early 
1930s, the relationship between fascism and veterans took very different forms, as an 
examination of Spanish and French fascist groups will reveal. In Germany, as I will 
discuss in the third section, a process of Nazification of the German veterans ended 
circa 1934. In the last section I will focus on the contacts and relations between fascist, 
French and Nazi veterans until 1935, highlighting the consequences of this transnational 
process. I will argue that the fascist veterans constructed a wide and complex network 
that had an impact on the overall evolution of international affairs. As a result, the 
fascist idea further expanded in Europe, heightening international tensions, and making 
the outbreak of new wars more likely. 
 
New directions: 1929-1930 
For several reasons, 1929-1930 can be considered as a pivotal year. It was the end of 
one historical period, and the beginning of another for both the European continent and 
Fascist Italy. In this section I shall discuss the substantial changes that took place in the 
realm of fascist veteran politics; namely, the irruption of the Italian fascist veterans as 
active participants onto the scene of European international relations, and the 
emergence of transnational entanglements regarding veteran discourses and 
organizations, in both cultural and political terms. As we will see, this transnational 
process also marked the beginning of the development of a National-Socialist model for 
war veterans in Germany. 
 
Fascist veterans and the leap into Europe 
In a sense, the consolidation of the fascist dictatorship culminated with the Lateran 
Pacts of February 1929, whereby a concordat regulating the relations between the 
Vatican and the fascist state was reached. Taking advantage of the prestige that this 
accord gave to Mussolini, an electoral plebiscite took place in March 1929. Italians 
were given the opportunity to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the list of deputies drafted by the 
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Grand Council of Fascism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to the conditions and the 
context of the voting, very few of the more than 8 million electors voted against the 
fascists. After this magnificent success, the national leaders of the ANC sent a public 
message to Mussolini, mentioning how the veterans had participated in the elections: 
‘ranged like battalions’ to renovate their ‘oath of loyalty’ to the Duce.1 There were 
many fascist veterans among the new members of the Chamber; Amilcare Rossi himself 
was one of them.2 The victory in the plebiscite can be seen as a signal of the complete 
stability of the regime, and as the beginning of the years of the so-called ‘consensus”’ 
(consenso).3 The fascist veterans had contributed greatly to this. 
 As a symptom of the propitious moment that the fascist veterans and the ANC 
were enjoying, a new press organ was launched in May 1929: L’Italia grigio-verde, 
based in Rome and directed by Ugo Trombetti (a fascist veteran from Bologna). It 
aspired to be the national newspaper of the Italian veterans. In the journalists’ words, it 
was the newspaper of the ‘fascist combattentismo’ (combattentismo fascista). By this 
time, the ANC had reached more than 400,000 affiliated (tesserati) in Italy. As can be 
understood by observing the provincial provenance of the ANC members (Map 8), their 
presence throughout the territory was not homogeneous, even if this uneven regional 
distribution was to some extent due to an unequal population density and to the greater 
human contribution of the northern regions to the war effort. It is not surprising that the 
bulk of the members came from the north of Italy, and from the biggest cities. Still, the 
total membership of the ANC was a small fraction of the huge number of Italian men 
who fought the Great War —around 10%.  
 
                                                
1 (‘inquadrati come battaglioni’, ‘giuramento di fedeltà’) Bollettino Associazione Nazionale Combattenti 
(Pavia), 30 April 1929. 
2 Bollettino della Federazione Provinciale di Terni dell’Associazione Nazionale Combattenti, num. 1-2-3, 
January-March 1929. 
3 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936, Torino, Einaudi, 1974; Simona 
Colarizi, L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime 1929-1943, Roma, Laterza, 1991, p. 31. 
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Map 8: Number of ANC members by province by April 1929 
 
However, if in the early postwar period the basis of the veterans’ movement had been 
the peasantry of the Mezzogiorno, now the fascist ANC was a rather urban 
phenomenon, close to the centres of political and economic power (Rome and Milan). 
The regions with the highest rate of veteran affiliation to the fascist ANC were Tuscany 
(above all, Pisa), and Lombardy (particularly the northern provinces). The lowest 
affiliation rates were in the South: Abruzzi, Campania, Puglia, Calabria, and the islands. 
An interesting phenomenon that should be highlighted is the growth of the affiliation 
abroad: by 1929, the ANC counted more than 12,000 members in foreign countries.4 
                                                
4 Affiliation data in L’Italia grigio-verde. Periodico di disciplina nazionale (Rome), 24 May 1929. Cf. 
Ministero della Guerra. Ufficio stadistico, La forza dell'esercito. Statistica dello sforzo militare italiano 
nella guerra mondiale, Roma, 1927; Istituto Centrale di Statistica del Regno d’Italia, VII censimento 
generale della popolazione. 21 Aprile 1931, Roma, 1933-1934. See also Bollettino della Federazione 
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According to the fascists, the main reason for the sharp rise in affiliations, which 
numbered 500,000 at the end of 1929, was the ‘spiritual factor’, rather than the work of 
social assistance carried out by the ANC.5 However, there undoubtedly were material 
motivations for the increase, since the association reached several agreements for the 
preferential employment of veterans in some provinces. In the summer of 1929, while 
the deterioration of economic conditions provoked the first strikes of the period,6 the 
Confindustria, the fascist industrial syndicates and the ANC decided to give preference 
on the labour market to veterans from fascist syndicates that were affiliated to the 
ANC.7 Later, the Minister of Corporations, Bottai, confirmed these benefits, which were 
extended to all branches of production. In addition, the president of the National Board 
of the ANC obtained the right to sit on the High Council of Corporations.8 The prestige 
of the veterans association increased within the regime. 
The fascist veterans reinforced their presence within the state institutions. In 
September 1929 a new government was formed. Not only fascist personalities who had 
fought the Great War such as Dino Grandi (Minister of Foreign Affaires), Italo Balbo 
(Minister of Aeronautics), Giuseppe Bottai (Minister of Corporations), Giacomo 
Acerbo (Minister of Agriculture) or Michele Bianchi (Minister of Public Works) 
conserved much power in their hands, but also others like Angelo Maranesi (president 
of the ONC until now) and Araldo di Crollalanza (former ANC leader) were nominated 
to the position of Undersecretary of State. 
 When the VI National Council of the ANC was celebrated in Rome a few days 
later, Mussolini attended the meeting, and outlined his vision for the political future of 
the war veterans. ‘Fascism and Combattentismo —Mussolini said to the veterans— are 
two bodies and one soul, but tomorrow, when the day of the final test arrive, Fascism 
and Combattentismo shall be one body and one soul’.9 This prophecy, as we will see, 
would shape the development of the veteran organization. Although there was no 
explicit exegesis for that sentence, it was rooted in the long-held but frustrated fascist 
                                                
Provinciale Valtellinese dell’Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (Sondrio), num. 6 (August-September 
1930). 
5 (‘fattore spirituale’) Bollettino della Federazione Provinciale Mantovana dell’Associazione Nazionale 
Combattenti (Mantova), num. 3 (January 1930). 
6 Simona Colarizi, L’opinione, p. 39. 
7 L’Italia grigio-verde, 15 July 1929. 
8 L’Italia grigio-verde, 20 January 1930. 
9 (‘Fascismo e Combattentismo sono due corpi e un’anima sola, ma domani, nel giorno della prova, 
Fascismo e Combattentismo saranno un corpo solo e un’anima sola’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 17 September 
1929; L’Italia grigio-verde, 15 September 1929. 
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desire that Fascism would be the unique expression of the veteran identity, both in 
ideology and organization. In this sense, it is interesting to note that, in organizational 
terms, a project for the fusion of all the Italian veteran associations had already been 
sponsored by Ugo Trombetti in the paper L’Italia grigio-verde. A debate about the 
possibilities of the formation of a Green-grey Federation (Federazione Grigio-verde), 
embracing all kinds of veteran groups, was prolonged during 1930.10 From the point of 
view of the clandestine Italian Communists, Mussolini’s words were another proof of 
the drift towards war; the ‘fascist-bourgeois regime’ was the ‘regime of war’.11 
The year 1929 was also marked by a major change in the fascist stance toward 
the rest of Europe. Fascism began trying to expand its influence abroad. This new 
orientation contrasted with the previous focus on internal consolidation and with the old 
affirmation of the purely Italian and non-exportable nature of Fascism. If now the 
fascists looked beyond the borders, it was a result of the need to give new national goals 
to the youth,12 and a consequence of the fascist quest for international prestige, 
leverage, territorial expansion, and imperial domination.13 The perceived good health of 
the regime inside the country allowed the fascists to dream of a fascist Europe. During 
1928-1929, Mussolini had supported the Austrian Heimwehr, a paramilitary league 
composed of voluntary home guards of demobilized soldiers.14 The new will to 
intervene in European politics, and to combat the ‘democratic, communist ideas’ that 
according to the fascists dominated the European spirit, was keenly represented by the 
new review Antieuropa, directed by Asvero Gravelli, a fascist leader who had 
experienced the Great War as a teenager, later joining the Fiuman endeavour.15 It is true 
that moderation prevailed in Italian foreign policy until 1932, but Mussolini himself 
would gradually implement a fascistization of foreign affairs.16 His brother, Arnaldo 
Mussolini, director of Il Popolo d’Italia, published a set of articles arguing that the 
moment for the fascists to fulfil ‘their responsibility’ regarding Europe had come.17 And 
                                                
10 L’Italia grigio-verde, 25 July, 25 November 1929, 20 November, 15 December 1930. 
11 (‘il regime borghese-fascista, che è il regime della guerra’) L’Unità (clandestine edition), 1929, num. 
1. 
12 Michael Arthur Ledeen, Universal Fascism. The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 
1928-1936, New York, Howard Fertig, 1972. 
13 Aristotle Kallis, Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945, 
London/New York, Routledge, 2000. 
14 H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, pp. 48-51. 
15 Antieuropa. Rassegna mensile (Rome), num. 1, April 1929.  
16 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I., pp. 323-533. 
17 (‘la nostra responsabilità’) A. m. (Arnaldo Mussolini), ‘Il dovere’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 3 July 1929. 
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what is more interesting here, the fascist veterans intensified their foreign activities in 
accordance with the new political guidelines. 
As the veterans had to fulfil a European mission, Amilcare Rossi devoted time to 
reinforcing the ANC abroad. His trip to France and Switzerland on the occasion of the 
24 May celebration in 1929 served that purpose.18 In both countries, the fascist activities 
developed in a hostile environment where anti-fascism predominated. By 1930, three 
dozen members of the Fasci all’estero had been killed, and two hundred had been 
injured by anti-fascist actions.19 Seemingly, only loose connections existed between the 
Fasci all’estero and the ANC cells abroad. The activities of the latter were 
characterized by a generic patriotism, and it was the figure of the king —rather than that 
of Mussolini— that they most exalted in their bulletins.20 (Still, within Italy, at the 
inauguration of new monuments to the fallen soldiers, the fascists employed the same 
reverential monarchical discourse).21 But this reality did not contradict the fact that the 
fascists sought to politically exploit the veterans inside and outside the country. This 
was particularly true in France, where more than 400 events with veterans were 
celebrated during 1930.22 As a cartoon published in Il Popolo d’Italia symbolically 
suggested, the Italian veterans served as an amplifier for Fascism (Image 38). The 
fascistization of the ANC and the veterans in foreign countries, which had begun as 
early as 1925, was unrelenting. 
                                                
18 L’Italia grigio-verde, 5 and 15 June 1929; Amilcare Rossi, Figlio del mio tempo, pp. 98-100. 
19 Fasci italiani all’estero, Trentacinque morti. Duecentododici feriti, [Roma], 1930. 
20 Bollettino dell’Associazione Nazionale Combattenti per la zona del nord (Nord, Pas-de-Calais e 
Somme) (Lille), March 1930. 
21 Le Celebrazioni della Patria. Orazioni dell'On. Nicola Sansanelli pronunziate in presenza di S. M. il 
Re, [1930], Naples. 
22 L’Italia grigio-verde, 20 April 1931. 
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Image 38: ‘The bell of the victory’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 5 November 1929. 
 
In short, during 1929 veterans acquired a decisive role in the expansion of Fascism, 
paving the way for a set of new contacts and transfers between actors in the 
international sphere. This reality transcended the previous unilateral visits and the mere 
circulation of stereotypes and myths about fascist veterans that had characterized the 
mid-1920s. Besides, in 1929, the fascist stance regarding the FIDAC changed, for these 
inter-allied meetings seemed obsolete to them.23 Now, Italy embraced an integrationist 
attitude towards the ex-enemies. Yet the fascist veterans’ propaganda inside the FIDAC 
persisted. In 1930, Amilcare Rossi represented Italy in the FIDAC congress in 
Washington, where he tried to rebut the ‘calumnies’ against the fascist regime.24 The 
Italian veterans presented themselves more openly as fascists, and those residing abroad 
were required to follow the ANC programme. When the French veteran leader Henri 
Pichot admonished the Italians not to present themselves in the FIDAC as fascists but 
                                                
23 Telegram from Belgrade (place of the FIDAC congress) to Rome, 3 September 1929, AMAE, Società 
delle Nazioni 1919-1930, b. 66, ‘Federazione interalleata ex-combattenti FIDAC’. 
24 Amilcare Rossi, Le tappe gloriose, Rome, 1933, pp. 65-93; Id., Figlio del mio tempo, pp. 101-104. 
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just as veterans, the fascist veterans replied restating the oneness of combattentismo and 
Fascism.25 A new phase of fascist veteran diplomacy had started. 
 
Transnational entanglements: veteran politics and culture 
As the fascist veterans erupted onto the international scene, they also became a 
symbolic actor in the entangled politics of Europe. It is important to note that the 
interest in setting up an organizational structure in foreign regions was not an exclusive 
feature of the Italian veterans; by 1929, the German Stahlhelm had also created cells in 
a dozen different countries, particularly in Latin America.26 The Stahlhelm cell in 
Oporto (Portugal) was the most active; following its example, in January 1929, the 
Stahlhelm sent to its branches instructions about how to carry out nationalist and anti-
republican propaganda abroad.27 Fascist and nationalist German veterans were, by this 
point, ready to establish contacts. 
In 1929 and 1930, German veterans from the Stahlhelm came to Italy and 
opened up lines of communication with the Italian fascists. There were many Stahlhelm 
members that clearly sympathized with the fascists, even if the Italians had been the 
enemy during the Great War, and in spite of the Südtirol question. The members of the 
Stahlhelm group in Venice enthusiastically heralded the appearance of a ‘German 
Mussolini’, and placed their hopes on an agreement between the Stahlhelm and the 
NSDAP, which had not yet been achieved.28 Within the veteran association, however, 
there were sectors that criticised any rapprochement to Italy. In November 1929, when a 
group of Stahlhelm members travelled to Italy, they had to do so in an unofficial 
manner, and they were obliged to justify their behaviour by publicly saying —first— 
that it had been just a leisure trip, and —later—  that it was necessary and convenient to 
get first-hand knowledge about Fascism.29 Many members of the Stahlhelm reasonably 
feared that establishing political contacts with an ex-enemy country would discredit the 
organization. In fact, the satirical German review Simplicissimus mocked the contact 
between fascists and Stahlhelm members by bringing up the contradiction between this 
German-Italian fraternization and the situation in Südtirol (image 26). The Stahlhelm 
leadership had to send an internal memorandum to clarify what the official conduct of 
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its members who made trips abroad should be: if political contacts were to be 
established, they needed the prior approval of the political Stahlhelm counsellor.30 
 
 
Image 39: ‘Visit of the Stahlhelm to the fascists. – All right, Tirolean. As interpreter you are 
allowed to speak German!’, Simplicissimus (Stuttgart), 2 December 1929. 
 
Important events taking place in Germany during 1930 would contribute to furthering 
the fascistization of German veterans. At that time, both the Stahlhelm and the NSDAP 
were sincere admirers of Fascism, and both tried to be on good terms with the fascist 
representatives in Germany.31 In fact, since the beginning of 1929, the group of Nazi 
MPs had been in contact with the fascist authorities, in order to prepare a study trip to 
Italy. As the Nazi MP Robert Ley explained in a letter, they desired to get first-hand 
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knowledge from all sorts of political, economic, social, cultural and military aspects of 
Fascist Italy, including the ‘treatment of disabled veterans’.32 In Germany, as the social 
and economic conditions quickly worsened, the anti-republican forces gathered support, 
presenting a front of opposition to the payment of reparations scheduled by the Young 
plan. In March 1930, a new government was formed. It was headed by the chancellor 
Heinrich Brüning, who was a decorated ex-officer of the Great War. For this reason, 
Seldte and other Stahlhelm leaders saw the new government positively as a frontline 
soldiers’ cabinet (Frontsoldatenkabinett).33 The NSDAP, instead, maintained an 
intransigent position in its violent quest for power, and it prohibited its members from 
being simultaneously members of the Stahlhelm.34 As the economic crisis provoked 
drastic reductions in the war victims’ pensions system, the Nazis realised that this 
section of society was potentially a source of NSDAP votes. The Völkischer Beobachter 
condemned the so-called ‘Front combatants cabinet’ (Frontkämpferkabinett) for 
purportedly humiliating the disabled veterans (Kriegsbeschädigten); the Nazis also 
disparaged the allegedly Marxist-inspired assistance to war victims.35  
This tougher political stance of the Nazis was better rewarded by the German 
voters. In September 1930, the NSDAP achieved great success in the elections to the 
Reichstag, increasing to 104 seats in the Parliament, even if Brüning retained power. In 
this situation, the Stahlhelm veterans, who had been supporters of Hugenberg’s DNVP, 
radicalized themselves in order to also exploit the Nazi breakthrough. A few weeks after 
the elections, the Reichsfrontsoldatentag in Koblenz (very close to the Rhine border 
with France) was a paramilitaristic and aggressive demonstration that shocked many 
Frenchmen and as the source of much interest among the Italian fascists.36 The ranks of 
veterans paraded with a fascist-like salute. That a PNF representative and other fascists 
joined this Stahlhelm ceremony was another factor to cause panic about an anti-French 
threat.37 This was a turning point in international veteran politics. 
The Nazi success and the Stahlhelm demonstration had repercussions in France. 
The French associations of the CIAMAC, presided by Henri Pichot, contacted the 
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moderate, non-revanchist German veterans.38 In contrast, French nationalist groups 
scorned any rapprochement effort. Since 1929, the Croix de Feu had been hardliners 
regarding foreign policy. Now, taking the demonstration of the Stahlhelm as typical of 
the alleged overall German threat, they made no distinctions and condemned any 
politics of rapprochement or pacifism.39 This issue fuelled the Croix de Feu dynamic of 
radicalization during the next years. However, French veterans were reluctant to 
establish contacts with the nationalist German organizations. 
This notwithstanding, the impressive advance of German radical nationalism 
also paved the way for sectors of the French right to become open to a profound 
revision of Versailles. Gustave Hervé, after seeing the imposing Stahlhelm 
demonstration, suggested that the Croix de Feu and the French veterans should adopt 
the same attitude as the Germans. They had many things in common —such as anti-
communism. Moreover, Hervé suggested that an understanding between the German 
and French veterans should be the first step towards the rapprochement between both 
nations. He publicly made an overture to Seldte and Hitler, asking their opinions about a 
potential bilateral agreement that would recognize many of the German nationalists’ 
territorial claims. This accord would allegedly save Europe from war and Bolshevism. 
Initially, the Stahlhelm leader Franz Seldte did not disregard the idea of furthering the 
union of veterans from different nations; he stated ‘Front soldiers of the world, unite’ 
(Frontsoldaten aller Länder, setz euch zusammen). But later, Seldte declined Hervé’s 
proposal, since the French would not accept the abolition of the Versailles clause about 
German responsibility for the war. For the same reason, Hitler rejected Hervé’s 
revisionist offers as well. Not even the Croix de Feu and other French groups were keen 
about Hervé’s project. Besides, these debates took place at the same time as the 
anniversary of the March on Rome was celebrated, and Mussolini took this opportunity 
to express his own revisionist intentions regarding the Versailles’ status quo. As can be 
seen, in Italy, Germany and even France, tendencies towards a possible veterans-led 
international agreement appeared. Yet both the Stahlhelm and the Nazis were much 
more inclined to reinforce their ties with Italy than with France.40 
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Taking into account that inclination, it is not surprising that, in November 1930, 
Stahlhelm members travelled to Italy again. The trip was organized in collaboration 
with the Italian Commerce Chamber in Berlin; or in other words, in contact with Major 
Renzetti, Mussolini’s agent in Germany.41 The Stahlhelm members laid a laurel wreath 
on the Altar of the Fallen Fascists (Ara dei Caduti Fascisti) in the Campidoglio (near to 
the Milite Ignoto), and were received on 13 November by Mussolini, to whom they 
gave a Stahlhelm insignia. Henke, the leader of the group, declared that the ‘fascist idea’ 
was the ‘cornerstone’ of his organization.42 All these actions and statements aroused 
indignation and criticism not only among republicans, but also among German 
nationalists such as those of the Jungdeutscher Orden. There were protests of Stahlhelm 
members who were not eager about making friends in the former enemy country; their 
memory of the war and their ‘feeling of solidarity’ with the ‘fallen comrades’ were still 
vivid.43 Because of this inappropriate visit, the Stahlhelm came under attack from all 
sides again. Once more, the national leaders had to send an official memorandum 
rebuking Henke’s group and its supposedly unauthorized political manoeuvres in Italy. 
This reprimand was half-hearted because —after all— the Italian government seemed to 
adopt a pro-German stance as a consequence of the visit. In reality, as was recognised in 
a private letter sent to Renzetti, the Stahlhelm national leaders had considered the 
underlying idea of the trip ‘correct’.44 In spite of the controversy, the Stahlhelm not only 
did not stop, but even increased the frequency and importance of the contacts with the 
fascists; Major Renzetti would be a key person in this relationship. 
Apart from the reinforcement of the political communication between Fascist 
Italy and Germany through the Stahlhelm and from the newly-acquired preponderance 
of the NSDAP in the anti-republican politics within Germany, these events also suggest 
the increasing weight of this country in the renegotiation of the European status quo. At 
that time, the conflicts and cleavages within the Weimar Republic came to epitomise the 
multiple political and social fractures that riddled other European regions. German 
cultural wars influenced the conflictive reshaping of the war memory that took place in 
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the European societies during the early 1930s. Former combatants of the First World 
War were active actors in this process. 
Erich Maria Remarque’s novel Im Westen nichts Neues was first published in 
serial form by the Vossische Zeitung between November 1928 and January 1929. 
Immediately, it was published as a book and became an overwhelming international 
bestseller —the English version All Quiet on the Western Front appeared 
simultaneously. Since then, much has been said about the crude depiction of warfare, 
and about the pacifism —rather than anti-militarism— of the novel.45 Remarque, a 
writer who had fought the war, transmitted the point of view of the common front 
soldier. He introduced his work neither as an ‘accusation’ nor as a ‘confession’, but just 
as an account of ‘a generation that was destroyed by war’.46  
In this period, the description of war through autobiographical or semi-
autobiographical accounts, written by veterans who shared the sense of belonging to a 
generation, was a transnational phenomenon. In France, the idea of a ‘génération du 
feu’ was widely diffused, as a decade seemed a proper time for many veterans to 
reconsider their war experience.47 Remarque’s book also revived debates about the 
objectivity or subjectivity of his work and of war novels in general. This question was 
similarly approached in France, through the well-known study of Jean Norton Cru, 
Témoins (1929). This work systematically analyzed French war literature, in order to 
discern whether they were reliable or not. As in Remarque’s case, Norton Cru had the 
objective of avoiding a new war by transmitting the reality of warfare.48 Remarque’s 
novel was partially responsible for the subsequent transnational wave of war literature: 
a great number of veterans wanted to publish their opinions and memories. This 
phenomenon also reached Spain. Ramón J. Sender’s novel Imán (1930), set during the 
Moroccan war and the disaster of Annual, conveyed the same pacifist message as 
Remarque. However, this vast literary production was not uniform when it came to the 
writers’ opinions about war; roughly two polarized positions can be identified: on the 
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one hand, the pacifists, and on the other hand, those who still highlighted the alleged 
positive values of war by employing the nationalist and patriotic discourse born of the 
war experience. The war veterans were the only authoritative participants in this wide 
debate, which was not only literary, but also political.49 As a matter of fact, in Germany 
the patriotic and conservative literary war accounts outnumbered the pacifist ones,50 
even if Remarque’s novel was more widely read.  
This controversy contributed to the rising awareness of the Nazis about the 
convenience of developing a more consistent and distinctive veteran politics. After the 
electoral victory, this strategy was possible. In mid-November 1930, Gregor Strasser, 
National Organizational Leader (Reichsorganisationleiter) of the NSDAP, transmitted 
to all the Nazi local leaders that Hitler had decided to found a party department 
dedicated to this matter.51 Now, disabled veterans and war victims attracted the Nazis’ 
attention, as they were a potential pool of votes in the context of the crisis. Hans 
Oberlindober, a war veteran and NSDAP member since October 1922, was appointed 
head of this new organization. On 30 November 1930, in a meeting of the 
Kyffhäuserbund, Oberlindober made public the Nazi programme for the war victims’ 
care, basically consisting in the rejection of Weimar’s pensions system.52 But the Nazis 
decided to carry out their struggle for the war veterans’ support also in the cultural 
sphere. 
It is well known how the Nazis attacked the exhibition of the film Im Westen 
nichts Neues.53 Joseph Goebbels, who considered the book to be ‘nasty’ and 
‘dangerous’,54 was responsible for the series of disturbances and demonstrations that 
took place in Berlin in December 1930 to protest against the projection of the American 
film of Remarque’s novel. This Nazi campaign was above all motivated by Goebbels’ 
political strategy regarding internal developments within the NSDAP. The movie was 
despised as a ‘Jewish’ production. The Nazi attacks were based on accusations about 
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the film ‘insulting the honour of the German soldier and particularly the heroic youth of 
Langemarck’.55 The Stahlhelm also demanded the prohibition of the film. As the 
German government yielded to the pressure and banned the film, despite the 
Reichsbanner’s protests, the Nazis were exultant. This victory marked the beginning of 
a more direct appeal to the myth of the front soldier in the Nazi political propaganda, 
but the Nazi discourse about the veterans still lacked originality. 
At this moment of anti-Remarque reaction, the similarity between Hitler’s 
veterans-related discourse and Mussolini’s long-established concept of trincerocrazia 
was noticeable. Rationalizing the Nazi fusion of Nationalism and Socialism, Hitler 
boasted about his condition of front soldier; this quality was the justification to defend 
this synthesis. The soldiers had fought the war neither for the Proletariat, nor for the 
Bourgeoisie, but for the entire nation (Volk). As Hitler stated in his speech on 11 
December 1930, the soldiers had ‘discovered in the battlefields the synthesis between 
Nationalism and Socialism’.56 Yet this claim, most likely inspired by Hitler’s readings 
about Italian Fascism, did not imply elevating the veterans as the aristocracy of the new 
Germany. Even though Hitler prefaced Hans Zörbelein’s Der Glaube an Deutschland, 
this answer to Remarque did not approach the veterans as protagonists; it simply 
introduced patriotic justifications for the murderous reality of warfare.57 Something 
similar can be said about Ernst Von Salomon’s autobiographical novel about the 
Freikorps, published in January 1930. There, the returning front soldiers were 
aesthetically represented as hardened warriors, profoundly divorced from the non-
combatant world. Von Salomon despised the ‘Soldiers Councils without soldiers’ of the 
hated 1918 revolution; instead, he glorified the Freikorps, the real essence of the front 
soldiers.58 This ideal of the ‘eternal soldiers’ (ewige Soldaten) was much liked by the 
Nazis, but it had nothing to do with the challenges and experiences of the German war 
veterans. 
In contrast, Remarque’s next novel, Der Weg zurück, firstly published in the 
Vossische Zeitung between December 1930 and January 1931 as the sequel of Im 
Westen nichts Neues, directly approached the experiences of the war veterans as the 
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main topic. Remarque reinforced his pessimistic and pacifist point of view.59 In this 
novel, mainly set in postwar Germany in the year after the armistice, the misfortunes 
and tragic fate of a group of returning front soldiers were vividly depicted, and their 
feelings and emotions —strangeness, disappointment, isolation— profoundly 
characterized. No clear political orientation was ascribed to them: they were essentially 
sceptical and mistrustful of the revolution that was taking place in their country. The 
story line of the novel was, however, the process of disintegration of the mythical 
comradeship (Kameradschaft) of the trenches. While the group of veterans tried to 
maintain their unity, idealizing the past experience of brotherhood, the harsh reality on 
the ground fatally undermined their hopes. This outcome was, nevertheless, conveyed 
as something inevitable and necessary. The surviving protagonists recovered their 
individual identity, while maintaining their friendship. In the last part of the novel 
(probably set in the early 1930s), Remarque offered a direct criticism to the activities of 
paramilitary groups that were trying to militarily educate younger generations (i.e.: the 
Stahlhelm) and making a new catastrophe likely. 
In Italy, the hostility of Fascism towards the pacifist depiction of warfare 
conditioned the reception of Remarque. As we know, since the early postwar period, the 
fascists had struggled against and suppressed the representation of the war as a senseless 
massacre. It is not surprising that the reviews of Remarque’s book published in Italy 
were in general negative and cold.60 It was said that the stunning commercial success of 
the novel was a ‘bluff’, and that the book’s description of war was ‘erroneous’, because 
it ignored the alleged reality of battle as the origin of ‘heroic values’ and ‘self-
improvement’.61 The news about the prohibition of the sale of Remarque’s book inside 
Fascist Italy soon circulated in Europe.62 The Italian translation of Der Weg zurück 
would not be allowed to be sold in either the kingdom of Italy or its colonies.63 
Nevertheless, many in Italy managed to read these novels, and Mussolini himself 
privately recognized that people were more receptive to this kind of discourse than to 
the patriotic accounts of officers and generals.64 
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Although pacifist war novels did not proliferate in Italy at that time, other kind 
of war accounts appeared. Since 1929, for example, in the pages of Benedetto Croce’s 
review La Critica, the historian and war veteran Adolfo Omodeo earnestly analysed a 
set of diaries and letters of Italian fallen soldiers of the Great War. His work, however, 
served as a refutation of Remarque’s interpretation of the war as ‘mere horror’, by 
conveying, instead, ‘the breath of poetry, of hope, of justice’ that had animated the 
Italian soldiers at the front.65 The transmission of positive values attributed to war was 
also the background theme of several war novels published in Italy at that time. 
Although the atrocities and some injustices of the war were expounded on and 
recognised, these books made neither moral nor political judgments. On the contrary, 
they often expressed a positive valuation of sacrifice.66 On some occasions, as in Adolfo 
Baiocchi’s book Generazioni, the experience of the front was connected with the 
postwar experiences of the demobilized soldiers. The alleged veterans’ reaction against 
revolutionaries, organized through the early fascist movement, was narrated as a 
continuation of the patriotic service of achieving the victory in the war.67 Fascist literary 
critics described this literature with the explicit name of ‘Antiremarque’.68 
This kind of literary works formed part of the cultural background on which a 
‘fascist art’ was forged during the 1930s.69 From this point onwards, both Italian 
Fascism and Nazism developed a culture in which war literature was included. The 
target of these accounts was not only the literate, culture-consuming war veterans, but 
also the younger generations. Discourses about the war experience contributed to shape 
the idealized model of warrior that both Fascism and Nazism would employ later. 
 
Different paths through the crisis 
The role of war veterans in the historical evolution of transnational fascism in Europe 
was far from unidirectional during the early 1930s, and a simultaneous study of the 
cases of France and Spain helps to understand the versatility of the relationship between 
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veterans and fascism. Although fascist and proto-fascist movements now emerged in 
different European countries, Italy remained the only fascist dictatorship established on 
the Continent until 1933. Even after Hitler’s seizure of power, the main western 
democracies —Britain, France and republican Spain— still resisted the fascist or 
authoritarian surge. However, in these countries, the presence or absence of war 
veterans as ambiguous or open representatives of fascism conditioned domestic politics.  
In this section, I will examine the path towards totalitarianism that the Italian 
veterans walked during the early 1930s, contrasting it with the cases of Spain and 
France. In the latter countries, there were attempts to consolidate an anti-democratic, 
fascist-inspired reaction —relying on war veterans or not—. In particular, I will 
examine the Spanish organizations that converged into the fascist party Falange 
Española y de las JONS, as well as the case of the French Croix de Feu. Thus, I intend 
to demonstrate that, despite the entangled nature of the fascist phenomenon in Europe, 
the symbolic link between veterans and fascism was established in very different —
often paradoxical— ways, conditioning the trajectory and capabilities of different 
fascist movements. This analysis will facilitate the understanding of the complexity of 
the wide network of cross-cultural transfers and cross-border contacts in the realm of 
fascist veteran politics. 
  
The transforming model of Fascist Italy 
In Italy, the fascist veterans were a consubstantial part of the dictatorship in its sustained 
progression towards totalitarianism. After Achille Starace became Secretary General of 
the PNF, in September 1931, the institutionalization of the fascist liturgy culminated, 
and its aesthetics were refined.70 The Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista, inaugurated in 
October 1932 for the celebration of the decennale (10th anniversary) of the March on 
Rome, was the epitome of the fascist aestheticization of politics. Accordingly, the 
fascist veterans refined their external appearance to match the official visual displays: 
the use of black shirts and helmets among the veterans participating in ceremonies and 
parades was regulated between 1931 and 1932.71 For the decennale, the ANC ensured 
that many war veterans were able to join the fascist rituals.72 Starace attended several 
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ANC provincial congresses during 1932, and he was in contact with the fascist veteran 
leaders.73 As a consequence of this evolution, a new ANC statute was published in 
February 1933, whereby the association reinforced its ritualistic and commemorative 
functions, without losing its social assistance tasks.74 With this transformation, the 
triumvirate that had controlled the ANC since 1925 was dissolved, but its members 
remained in the new directing body: Amilcare Rossi was now the President of the new 
Central Committee (Comitato Centrale).75 During the economic depression, a 
combination of fascist ceremonies and the management of benefits characterized the 
ANC activities, aiming not to enhance the life conditions of the people, but to reinforce 
the veterans’ loyalty to the king and the Duce, and to tighten the control over the masses 
of veterans.76 
 If the veteran organization kept the pace of the regime’s thrust towards 
totalitarianism, the evolution of the fascist discourse about the veterans also reflected 
changes in this direction. The context of the economic crisis rendered the old ways of 
appealing to the veterans insufficient. At the grass-roots level, the ANC offices in the 
Italian cities were constantly crowded by veterans, their widows and orphans, who 
turned to the ANC for help, in the face of unemployment and hardship. The veteran 
leaders, incapable of resolving the people’s problems, encouraged them to apply the 
comradeship of the trench to their daily life; the fascists appealed to endurance and 
patience, confidence and discipline, virtues allegedly issued from the trench 
experience.77 Whilst they vigorously defended the assumed equation between Fascism 
and combattentismo as an unquestionable historical fact, the fascists now emphasized 
the need for ‘iron discipline’. The economic crisis was seen as a new war, and the way 
to reach victory was the ‘subordination of everyone to the reason of state’. Logic —it 
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was said— dictated that Fascism absorb the spirit of combattentismo, and thus, it was 
right that Fascism monopolize also the veteran organization.78 
 The veterans in Fascist Italy during the early 1930s played new roles that added 
to the repertory of political functions that Fascism had attributed to them since its birth. 
This evolution sat comfortably with the changes of the regime and of the PNF. For 
example, the propaganda campaign ‘verso il popolo’ (towards the people) that sought 
the regime’s rapprochement to the lower classes was matched by measures specifically 
designed for veterans, particularly in the framework of the ONC, or through the ANC 
sections’ social activities. The same can be said about the development and 
consolidation of the fascist symbolic and liturgical universe, into which the fascist 
veterans were inserted. Yet Italian Fascism was the exception, not the norm, in the 
European environment. 
During the early 1930s, the symbol of the war veteran was a shared commodity 
in the complex phenomenon of transnational fascism, yet there were different ways in 
which the fascist movements used this symbol. As Italian Fascism has reached the stage 
of the exercise of power (its fourth stage according to Paxton’s categorization), the 
position of the fascist veterans within the Italian regime could not be simply copied and 
transferred by still-growing fascist movements in other European countries. These other 
fascist movements, often newly born (still in the first or second stage of Paxton’s 
model), had two options: either mimicking the old mythical role of the veterans in the 
rise of Italian Fascism —albeit a decade later and adapted to their own domestic 
national environments—; or developing an idiosyncratic model for the veterans’ 
mobilization, in order to destroy the left, suppress democracy, and pursue ultra-
nationalistic aims. As we will see, these contemporary European fascist movements 
chose the second option —the development of a self-produced model—, even if they 
could not completely ignore the Italian example. In the early 1930s, historical 
conditions in countries such as Spain, Germany and —to a considerably lesser extent— 
France, seemed to present an opportunity for the destruction of the liberal order, similar 
to the Italian context of 1919-1922. But in the early 1930s, it was not historically 
possible for the veterans to exert the role they had played in the Italian fascist reaction. 
In the Spanish case, there were no veterans of the Great War. For the German and 
French societies, the war experience, the frustrations of the demobilization, the culture 
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of war, and other postwar elements that Italian Fascism had capitalized on, lay far in the 
past. How then would they employ the symbol of the veteran? Next, I will go deeper 
into the cases of Spain and France. There, the anti-democratic reaction —fascism 
included— was still unsuccessful, and veteran politics partially conditioned this failure. 
 Before delving into the specifics, a brief exploration of peripheral European 
fascist movements during the early 1930s is needed. This will allow us to make a 
preliminary assessment of the veterans’ role in transnational fascism at that time. New 
fascist parties that were built neither on the myth of the fascist veterans, nor on the 
direct exploitation of the First World War experience, appeared in Europe. In Britain, 
the financial crisis had culminated in the abandonment of the gold standard in 
September 1931. Oswald Mosley, an aristocratic British ex-serviceman, founded the 
British Union of Fascists (BUF) after a visit to Mussolini’s Italy. The party would 
receive secret financial support from Fascist Italy. As Mosley’s chief preoccupation was 
Britain’s economic and imperial decline, his main sources of inspiration were fascist 
Corporatism and the fascist potential to rally the youth against the ‘Old Gang’ of 
decadent politicians. Although he was a veteran and his movement attracted some ex-
officers, Mosley’s thought was not focused on the war experience. Rather, the 
motivation of his followers was to avoid a new European massacre. In the BUF 
program, the attention to ex-servicemen was marginal.79 At the eastern fringe of Europe, 
in Romania, the Iron Guard was created in 1931 by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu based on 
the previous Legion of the Archangel Michael. Yet, Codreanu had not been a soldier 
during the Great War and the Romanian veterans were not the main constituency for 
Romanian fascism. Religious and patriotic mysticism, as well as anti-Semitism and the 
mobilization of the youth, were the key features of the Romanian fascist movement.80 It 
is true that the BUF and the Iron Guard, as well as several other minor fascist 
organizations in other European countries, remained somewhat marginal. These 
movements demonstrate, however, that the war veterans —either in membership and 
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organizational terms or in the discursive and symbolic sphere— were not essential for 
the foundation of a fascist movement. 
 
Spain and Falange Española 
It is interesting to see how the creators of Spanish fascism compensated for the absence 
of veteran organizations and the inexistence of a Spanish veteran mystic. In Spain, the 
authoritarian dictatorship of Primo de Rivera had collapsed in 1929. In April 1931 the 
king Alfonso XIII renounced the throne, and the democratic Second Republic was 
established amidst the enthusiasm of a great part of the middle and working classes. 
Very soon, however, while the state tried to implement profound social and economic 
reforms, monarchists and traditionalists reorganized their opposition to democracy. At 
the beginning of this process, Catholic fundamentalism was the mobilizing force against 
the secular Republic. Many military officers were involved in anti-republican activities, 
but as a report sent to Mussolini in March 1930 stated, Spanish NCOs and troops were 
absolutely outside of politics.81 In this context, small fascist groupings appeared. In 
October 1931, the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (JONS) were founded, 
adapting fascist and national-socialist concepts into the Spanish environment. This 
group was the result of a fusion between certain ultraconservative Castilian 
organizations —led by the Catholic propagandist Onésimo Redondo—, and the more 
radical group of the review La Conquista del Estado, represented by Ramiro Ledesma 
Ramos —a student inspired by Italian Fascism. Ledesma Ramos had collaborated with 
the intellectual Ernesto Giménez Caballero, whose writings had become increasingly 
political after his trip through Italy in 1928.82 
 The promoters of Spanish Fascism adopted a set of attitudes and ideas rooted in 
the Italian and German experiences. While Giménez Caballero, profoundly inspired by 
the imperial myth of Rome, worked to produce an abstract, Catholic ‘general theory of 
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Fascism’,83 Ledesma Ramos was more concerned about making a ‘national revolution’ 
(revolución nacional), and Onésimo Redondo exalted the use of violence for counter-
revolutionary purposes. Ledesma Ramos despised the peaceful ‘electoral revolution that 
had brought about the Second Republic because it had lacked ‘blood’ and ‘audacity’.84 
Ledesma Ramos —who studied German philosophy, particularly Heidegger— seemed 
to echo in the Spanish context the opinion once held by Jünger regarding the 1918 
German revolution, and in all probability, had read some of Jünger’s works.85 There 
were no Spanish front soldiers to make the national revolution, though, and Ledesma 
Ramos rejected ‘pseudofascist’ organizations like the civic guards. Therefore, he turned 
wholeheartedly to the myth of the youth, and to the exaltation of violence. Even if he 
recognised that in Spain there was no communist threat, his appeal to the Spanish youth 
implied advocating a ‘combative conscience, a warrior spirit, assault spirit’. Spanish 
young men would give way to ‘combat, to heroism and to war sacrifice’.86  
In spite of this kind of discourse, the groups of Spanish fascists remained small. 
The anti-democratic threat growing in Spain during 1931 and 1932 took the shape of a 
more traditional military plot, and maintained an essentially Catholic and conservative 
inspiration, even if Mussolini promised support to its leaders.87 In Spain, the main 
paramilitary potential was that of the traditionalists —the Carlist Requeté—, rooted in 
the memory of the nineteenth-century dynastic civil wars. After the failure of General 
Sanjurjo coup d’état in August 1932, the Republic enjoyed some months of political 
stability, and the Catholic opposition assumed a legalist posture. Yet, the rightist 
paramilitary agitation and social unrest, including armed insurrections of the 
revolutionary left, thwarted a more permanent stabilization. Nonetheless, it was Hitler’s 
seizure of power in Germany that most encouraged the political right during 1933. Over 
the course of this year, Spanish anti-republican politicians and intellectuals observed 
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and praised the new Nazi Germany;88 meanwhile, they prepared the recovery of the 
Spanish right in the elections of November 1933. 
In October 1933, José Antonio Primo de Rivera —the son of the deceased ex-
dictator—, after a personal visit to Mussolini in Rome, created the Falange Española —
another fascist party.89 A set of journalists and writers —Giménez Caballero and 
Sánchez Mazas among them— constituted the entourage of Primo de Rivera, and 
designed the Falangist aesthetics through symbols, hymns and rhetoric that were mainly 
inspired in Italian Fascism. The Falange directly sought supporters among bourgeois 
students, and among the working class, employing violent speeches about ‘fists and 
guns’.90 It was a rhetoric full of references to military and religious topics. However, no 
veteran ‘mystique’ appeared, not even referring to the war experience of Morocco.91 
This element was not necessary for Spanish fascism. As a Spanish book about Italian 
Fascism suggested, the veterans —particularly ex-officers— had been important in the 
origins of the movement. However, many of the members of the squadre —it was 
argued— had been ‘younger than twenty years old’. This fact demonstrated that no 
impediment existed for the emergence of a fascist movement if similar political 
circumstances concurred. Only ‘moral factors’ were needed: ‘vigour, audacity, spirit of 
sacrifice, submission to a discipline of iron, patriotism, desperation’.92 As this example 
demonstrates, the ethos of the fascist paramilitary fighters, having roots in the symbolic 
appropriation of the anti-Bolshevik veteran, had been transferred to Spain, as part of a 
long and wide circulation throughout Europe. 
For the increasingly fascistized monarchist sectors, represented by the party 
Renovación Española and the review Acción Española, the lack of war veterans to 
achieve the conquest of the state had to be compensated as well. As the leader José 
Calvo Sotelo wrote in February 1933, Italy, Germany, Portugal and Poland had been 
able to get rid of Parliamentarianism thanks to a ‘visceral factor: the war veterans’. The 
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veterans were a ‘mass, and also a spirit, capable of everything, even dying while killing, 
against the enemy of the Fatherland, either external or internal’. Calvo Sotelo argued 
that Spain had lacked excombatientes until 1931, when the Second Republic had started 
—according to him— to victimize the people. Now, organized ‘in phalanxes, in 
disciplined and courageous human columns, these outraged Spaniards would be, in 
Calvo Sotelo’s words, the combatants necessary to conquer the state against democracy 
and Marxism.93 It is crucial to note that Calvo Sotelo had visited Fascist Italy in the 
same month, trying to obtain financial support from Mussolini and Italo Balbo; 
hereafter, he wrote press articles exalting Fascism.94 
It was the Catholic political option that gathered the greatest number of 
parliamentary seats in the elections of November 1933; the fascist and monarchist 
tickets obtained poor results, even if Primo de Rivera and Calvo Sotelo were elected to 
the Parliament. The subsequent trajectory of Falange was marked by its fusion with the 
JONS in February 1934, but the resulting party Falange Española de las JONS was no 
more successful. Even so, the diffusion of fascist newspapers inaugurated a spiral of 
street violence. By September 1934, a report written for the fascist regime by an Italian 
observer said that the falangist action squads numbered around 6,000 members, 
including some veterans of the Moroccan war.95 (The poet and veteran of the Morocco 
war Luys Santamarina became leader of the Catalan Falange). The Spanish political left 
was on the defensive, since a broader process of fascistization and paramilitarization of 
the Spanish political right was taking place. The socialist insurrection of Asturias in 
October 1934 must be understood in this context. To crush this revolutionary attempt, 
the Spanish army, with its anti-democratic, ‘Africanist’ officers and generals (i.e.: 
Franco) intervened. Thus, rather than the young Spanish fascists —groups of combat-
inexperienced employees, practitioners and students who assisted the army during the 
repression—, it was the military who were viewed by the upper social classes as the 
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exceptional recourse to neutralise the left and eventually dissolve the Second 
Republic.96 
 
France and the Croix de Feu 
The Third French Republic was a far more solid democratic regime than the Second 
Spanish Republic or the German Republic of Weimar. In the early 1930s, therefore, the 
Third French Republic was not threatened by any anti-republican military or 
paramilitary plots, as was the case in Spain. France did not witness the rise of any 
powerful fascist movement as had happened in Germany. Physical violence did not 
significantly characterize French politics, at least until 1934.97 Nevertheless, fascism 
remained a latent force inside French politics at that time. Taking into account the 
relevance of the veteran myth among the French fascist groups of the 1920s, it is 
interesting to observe certain veteran discourses and organizations of the early 1930s —
namely the Croix de Feu and its veteran ‘mystique’— which were seen as fascist by 
many contemporaries and are considered as such by some historians today. 
Historians have extensively debated the question as to whether the Croix de Feu 
was a fascist organization, as part of the scholarly discussions about the existence and 
importance of French fascism.98 The patent lack of consensus is mainly due to the 
difficulty of employing ‘fascism’ as a label to statically categorize and classify political 
phenomena.99 Furthermore, in the case of the Croix de Feu, the ambiguity about its 
fascist nature was characteristic of the movement since the beginning, and it can be 
argued that this ambiguity was one of the keys to its success. Here, I will point out how 
the veteran element was a fundamental part of the vagueness of the Croix de Feu as a 
fascist movement, and I will describe its process of radicalization. 
The Croix de Feu was created as an association for French decorated veterans in 
1927, but its origins cannot be understood without taking into account precedents like 
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the Faisceau. Indeed, the patron of the original cell of the Croix de Feu, François Coty, 
a rich entrepreneur and director of the journal Le Figaro, had previously backed Valois’ 
party. Marcel Bucard, a war veteran organizer of the Faisceau paramilitary branch, was 
also involved in the creation of the Croix de Feu. Another of its principal leaders, 
Maurice Genay, was a military officer of the Jeunesses Patriotes. The first president of 
the Croix de Feu, Maurice d’Hartoy, a member of the Association des Écrivains 
Combattants, maintained a rather conservative agenda. But his group soon provoked 
accusations of ‘fascism’ from the left. This is scarcely surprising, since even the 
emblem of the association was charged with ambiguity: a skull with flames —recalling 
the arditi symbology— on top of a cross with swords typical of the French war medals 
(Image 27). In the beginning, the organization grew very slowly, gathering support 
among the Parisian middle class, the military, and aristocrats like Joseph Pozzo di 
Borgo. The Colonel François de La Rocque, an officer who had served for an extended 
period in Morocco, entered these circles in 1929. As the moderate d’Hartoy lost the 




Image 40: The Croix de Feu emblem 
 
Can the Croix de Feu be considered a fascist organization? The answer largely depends 
on the conceptualization of fascism in use. If we consider that a certain style of self-
representation that enhanced the identity of the veteran was characteristic of the origin 
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of fascism, the Croix de Feu might be considered as fascist movement, though its 
discourse simultaneously maintained more conservative elements. In the first manifesto 
of the Croix de Feu, published in the first issue of their journal Le Flambeau, they 
exalted the spirit of comradeship and discipline to fight against the internal enemy; they 
wanted to be a ‘great anti-revolutionary and anti-defeatist force’. Yet there were no calls 
for the veterans to seize power, nor to impose a veteran government. Their own position 
regarding Fascism was unclear. They claimed to be ‘fascists’ if this epithet meant to 
‘defend the honour and prosperity of their beloved country’, to be ‘supporters of order 
and discipline’, and enemies of ‘vain agitations’. At the same time, they plainly denied 
being ‘fascists’ if that implied being ‘supporters of the brutal repression, […] and of the 
perpetual militarisation of the nation’. Another intermediate stance was that despite 
their readiness to ‘civic’ defensive action, there was no incitation to violent 
aggression.101 
If we assume a definition of fascism that stresses its transnational nature, and 
gives value to the transfers, entanglements and contacts, an ambiguous image of the 
Croix de Feu also emerges. It is important to note that —as far as we know— the Croix 
de Feu did not establish direct contact with the Italian fascists. La Rocque publicly 
disavowed those in France who turned towards Mussolini, and he argued that the 
French culture and thought were rich enough to render unnecessary the borrowing of 
‘expressions and ways of doing’ from the others.102 The main ideological inspiration for 
La Rocque was the French army general Lyautey who, in 1891, had written an essay 
about the social role of the officer.103 In 1930, Croix de Feu members travelled to Italy 
to participate in a ceremony for the Unknown Soldier, but this was an unexceptional 
activity done together with many other veteran associations, not to establish political 
relations.104 However, it has been demonstrated that Croix de Feu members were 
interested in learning fascist practices.105 Even though the Croix de Feu tried to 
accentuate its purely French nature, Italian Fascism undoubtedly was a secondary fount 
of inspiration. 
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Historical circumstances prevented the collusion of the Croix de Feu with the 
international network of fascist veterans, but the league did represent a fascist threat 
within France. As we saw earlier, the radicalization of the Croix de Feu was mainly due 
to the perception of the German menace embodied by the Stahlhelm. Later, the rise of 
Hitler reinforced these fears. Yet a growing anti-pacifism, anti-communism and 
xenophobia characterized the association from 1931, when La Rocque consolidated his 
leadership and took over the presidency. The organization grew substantially (28,903 
members in January 1933), and developed its own personality, the so-called Croix de 
Feu ‘mystique’, based on civic parades and patriotic celebrations. Much like the 
original Italian fascist movement or even the Stahlhelm, the Croix de Feu became open 
to non-combatants, such as sons of the members. From the end of 1933, the anti-
parliamentarian agitation increased, so that at the beginning of February 1934, the Croix 
de Feu was willing and ready to join the violent demonstrations that were going to 
jeopardize the stability of the Third Republic. 
In general, the radicalization of the Croix de Feu was part of a broader process: 
the beginning of the ‘second wave’ of French fascism.106 If the Croix de Feu was not 
fascist in and of itself, it contained many elements (persons, entities, ideas, symbols, 
etc.) that either were entangled with French fascism, or could easily approach it in a 
process of fascistization. The scenario for such an evolution was possible after the left 
organized a new Cartel des Gauches, and won the elections of June 1932. The veteran 
associations did not welcome this political change, radicalizing their stance against 
Herriot’s government, as he attempted to reform the pensions system.107 This 
government fell within six months. French politics started a phase of instability and 
ineffectiveness. Thus, in 1933 new fascist organizations appeared: the Francistes 
created by Marcel Bucard, the Green shirts of Henry Dorgères, and Solidarité 
Française, founded by François Coty. Personal and ideological continuities existed 
between these groups and the previous ones. For example, the persistence of the veteran 
‘mystique’, not exclusive to the Croix de Feu. Paramilitarism and French fascism, 
however, now had another source of inspiration outside of Mussolini: Nazi Germany. 
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The Third Reich 
The process by which the Nazis seized power and imposed a totalitarian dictatorship in 
Germany is one of the most investigated topics in modern European history. 
Accordingly, questions such as the role of the Stahlhelm in the last years of the Nazi 
struggle for power (Kampfzeit), the use of the front soldiers symbol in Nazi propaganda 
before and after 1933, or the fate of the German veteran organizations within the Third 
Reich, have been widely studied.108 For this reason, the process of Nazification of the 
German veterans that took place between 1931 and 1934 will be succinctly described 
here. The main purpose of this section is to show the relevance of the veterans in 
ensuring an important role for Italian Fascism in this process, as well as the high level 
of entanglement and the numerous cross-border contacts that marked the consolidation 
of the Nazi dictatorship and its model of veteran politics. 
 The rise of the NSDAP in Germany implied the assimilation of other rightist 
sectors into the Nazi movement, including war veteran organizations. As we have seen, 
the Stahlhelm was one of the spearheads of the anti-republican reaction during the early 
1930s; it was a competitor of the NSDAP. In October 1931, the rally of Bad Harzburg, 
organized by the German nationalists together with the Nazis, presented an allegedly 
united national front against Weimar. The Stahlhelm, the DNVP, the NSDAP and other 
‘patriotic’ organizations would participate. Yet this attempt was a failure, as the 
uncooperative attitude of Hitler only deepened the existing divisions.109 Hitler was not 
willing to establish an alliance. As a consequence of this division, the Stahlhelm 
nominated its leader Theodor Duesterberg as a candidate for the two-rounds presidential 
election of March-April 1932, in competition with Hitler and Hindenburg. While the 
conservative Hindenburg was re-elected as president, and the second-ranked Hitler 
obtained more than 13 millions votes; Duesterberg was defeated in the first round, with 
roughly 2.5 million votes —even less than the communist candidate Ernst Thälmann. 
When it was disclosed that Duesterberg had Jewish ancestors, this völkisch veteran 
leader was completely discredited. Rabidly attacked by the Nazis, the Stahlhelm 
reinforced its ties with the DNVP, but its political agency decreased.110 
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Furthermore, in the struggle to gain supporters, the NSDAP began to win out at 
the expense of the Stahlhelm. Apart from the aggressive attitude of the SA towards the 
Stahlhelm, the main cause for this membership transfer was the Stahlhelm’s doctrinal 
rigidity.111 The Stahlhelm restrictive concept of Frontgemeinschaft (Front Community) 
had less political success than the Nazi ideal of Volksgemeinschaft (National 
Community).112 As the Stahlhelm was essentially an organization of war-experienced 
men, the younger generation had much less prominence within the Stahlhelm than 
within the Nazi movement. As a result, many young men abandoned the veteran 
organization to join the more attractive Nazi movement. During these years, the massive 
growth of the SA was parallel to the sustained decline of the Jungstahlhelm 
organization.113 Young people without war experience, inspired by the myth of the 
heroic front soldier, flocked to the SA, where more than 70% of the organizers were ex-
soldiers, particularly ex-officers. 
The SA was sociologically similar to the fascist squadre, but the input of 
veterans in the SA was much more reduced. As Sven Reichardt’s comparative research 
on the fascist combat-organizations has shown, the Italian squadrists of 1921-1922 and 
the German SA-men of 1930-1932 were almost identical in their average age, despite a 
historical gap of a decade between both phenomena.114 In the early 1930s, the German 
veterans were perhaps too old (between 30 and 40 years old) to be involved in political 
street fighting; their proclivity to join the NSDAP was not greater either, since the 
average age of the NSDAP members was only a few years older than that of the SA. It 
is true that Nazism was a product of the Great War, and that many of its main leaders 
had fought at the front. Even many Stahlhelm members and German veterans probably 
voted for Hitler and his party. But the majority of Nazis were younger people raised in 
the home-front, therefore marked by the patriotic propaganda and often by the loss in 
combat of a father or brother, not by actual soldierly experience. By 1933, most 
probably, the mass-basis of the Nazi movement was not predominantly composed of 
war veterans. Membership of these violent political groups, therefore, was not primarily 
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determined by the combat experience, but by myths about such experiences, like the 
myth of the fascist veteran. 
Taking into account these facts, the self-representation of the NSDAP as a front-
soldiers movement during the early 1930s should be understood above all as a 
propagandistic strategy, which responded to the need to widen the party’s mass support 
during the numerous elections of this period. The sudden, not to say opportunistic, rise 
of the Nazis’ veterans-related activities and policies during the early 1930s sharply 
contrasts with the limited importance that this question had within the NSDAP before 
1929. Hitler’s crafted image as a self-sacrificing disabled front soldier was 
systematically employed for the first time during the presidential elections of 1932, but 
it was swiftly abandoned after Hitler’s seizure of power.115 Certainly, the effects of the 
insistent appeals to the front soldiers to vote for Hitler, through electoral posters for 
example, should not be underestimated. Due to this campaign, not only an indeterminate 
number of ex-combatants and disabled veterans were converted into Nazis, but also a 
characteristically Nazi political discourse about the war veterans, and an original Nazi 
policy for war victims, slowly took shape. However, this was a protracted process that 
gained momentum only after 1933, and the antecedent of Italian Fascism was the 
original matrix of it, as I will demonstrate. 
Before 1933, the Nazis were very cautious in their contacts and relationship with 
Italy, as being publicly identified with Fascism would jeopardize the NSDAP’s rise to 
power. The French authorities feared an agreement between Italy and the Nazis, for 
such an understanding would be clearly detrimental for France.116 In fact, just like 
Mussolini and Hitler, many fascists and Nazis showed mutual sympathy. They were 
prospective allies, but premature fraternization might be problematic. Hence, the direct 
influence and contacts between the SA and the Italian fascists were sparse and not 
encouraged by the NSDAP leadership.117 At the end of 1931, the head of the NSDAP 
Foreign Service (Auslandsabteilung) Hans Nieland travelled to Italy.118 The objective 
was to bring the German Nazi sympathisers in Italy under the party’s control. The 
subsequent establishment of a NSDAP organization in Italy, which was not devoid of 
internal controversies, was principally motivated by the desire to stop uncontrolled 
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NSDAP members to come to Italy.119 Hitler wished to meet Mussolini, but this visit was 
not possible yet. Although it was difficult to deny the lure of Italian Fascism among the 
Nazis, direct and overtly political contacts and transfers encountered important strategic 
obstacles. 
In contrast, during the final crisis of the Weimar republic, an elite of nationalist 
war veterans furthered the introduction the fascist model of politics into Germany. The 
transfer of political ideology in this direction was constant. Stahlhelm members did not 
conceal their admiration for Mussolini. Franz Seldte and other Stahlhelm leaders 
maintained contacts with the Duce, who they visited in Rome, for example, on the 
occasion of the Reale Accademia d’Italia congress in April 1932; they sent him an 
adulatory and thankful message while crossing the border back into Germany.120 In 
April 1932, the Stahlhelm leader Heinrich Mahnken reported his research findings on 
the military education of the Italian youth, and on the methods of fascist politics. He 
affirmed that the Italian model had an important meaning for the Stahlhelm, regarding 
not only ‘fundamental concepts but also immediate practical measures’.121 Particularly, 
on the basis of the Italian example, Mahnken suggested that the NSDAP should 
mobilize the German students. Even if the Nazis were reluctant to appear as debtors of 
Italian Fascism, the permeability of the boundaries between the NSDAP and the 
Fascist-inspired Stahlhelm contributed to the adoption of fascist commodities by the 
Nazis. 
Linked to the nationalist veteran groups, certain anti-republican personalities set 
up cultural institutions in order to systematize the study of Italian Fascism, and these 
Fascist-friendly circles included several notable or would-be Nazis. In December 1931, 
the Society for the Study of Fascism (Gesellschaft zum Studium des Faschismus) was 
created. Its president was Charles Eduard, Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who had 
lost his nobility with the arrival of Weimar, and had been involved in anti-republican, 
paramilitary activity. The director of this cultural society was the Major Waldemar 
Pabst, one of the culprits of the Liebknecht and Luxemburg killings, and later an 
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organizer of the Austrian Heimwehr.122 The Gesellschaft aimed to investigate the fascist 
model of state and economy, in order to offer this knowledge ‘to the future leaders of 
the coming Germany’.123 The membership, initially limited to 100 people, was 
composed of several Stahlhelm leaders, ex-officers and generals, including Theodor 
Duesterberg, the Nazi Hermann Göring, the erstwhile Freikorps leaders Wilhelm 
Faupel and Rüdiger von der Goltz, and the militaristic writer Franz Schauwecker. The 
lectures that this group held were also joined and promoted by Renzetti, whose ‘Italian 
Reports’ publicized Fascism among the Germans at the time.124 Through his constant 
contacts with the Nazis and the Stahlhelm, Renzetti worked to realise his project of 
‘transforming the Stahlhelm into Hitler’s party militia’.125 Renzetti’s activity 
contributed to the amalgamation of the German anti-republican forces that favoured the 
NSDAP, while laying the foundations for a future Italian-German alliance after the 
imminent arrival of the Third Reich.126 
After Hitler was nominated Chancellor on 30 January 1933, the Nazi veterans-
related politics, discourses and representations experienced a remarkable acceleration. 
In the first Nazi government, Franz Seldte was appointed Ministry of Labour. Stahlhelm 
members enthusiastically saluted Hitler’s government, and collaborated with the SA in 
political manoeuvres to entrench the Nazis in power.127 The Third Reich was presented 
as inheriting the spirit of the front; it was declared that ‘the right of the front soldiers’ 
would be enforced, that the ‘gratitude of the fatherland’ owed to the former soldiers 
would be finally a reality. The Nazi project of transforming the disabled veterans into 
the ‘First Citizens of the State’, reinforced by Strasser through the NSDAP sections, 
resulted in the creation of the National Socialist War Victims’ Care organization, 
Nationalsozialistische Kriegsopferversorgung (NSKOV), in July 1933. The NSKOV 
undertook the militarization of the disabled veteran politics, and strived to mobilize the 
veterans, through propaganda rallies and meetings.128 
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Fascist Italy was an inspiration for the NSKOV project. In February 1933, the 
Nazi review for disabled veterans, Deutsche Kriegsopferversorgung, devoted a long 
article describing the Italian war-pensions law. Apart from denigrating the socialist and 
pacifist approach to the war victims’ care, the Nazis argued that the legislation for 
disabled veterans reflected the national spirit of each country. In Italy, Mussolini had 
introduced legislative innovations that were praised by the Nazis; namely, the better 
consideration of the disabilities caused by service on the front.129 The Italian disabled 
veterans of the ANMIG embraced these positive comments with enthusiasm. When 
Hermann Göring, Ministry of Aviation of the Third Reich, made an official trip to Italy 
in April 1933, he also visited the Casa Madre del Mutilato in Rome. Shortly after, 
another article in the NSKOV review described these friendly contacts, and exalted ‘the 
spiritual bond’ of Mussolini with the disabled veterans.130 This ambience of Italian-
German veterans’ understanding went along with the private and public display of 
friendship between Hitler and Mussolini, and with the numerous trips by Nazis to 
directly study Fascist Italy.131 
 Meanwhile, in Germany the war veterans’ organizations were going through a 
process of Nazification, which recalls the fascistization of the ANC a decade before. 
The Nazi exaltation of the Frontsoldaten concealed the actual subjugation of the 
German veterans: new medals and public homage went hand in hand with the 
destruction of liberties and diversity. These ‘contradictory signs’ led the Jewish veterans 
of the Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten to wrongly think that they could continue to 
live their lives without fear under Nazism.132 The Stahlhelm was compelled to 
relinquish its influence to the benefit of the SA, and Seldte placed the organization 
under the control of Hitler. The accusation that the Stahlhelm was admitting ‘enemies of 
the NSDAP, masons, half-Jews’ as new members only helped Nazification.133 Röhm, 
the leader of the SA, was expanding its paramilitary power,134 while the Nazis 
monopolized, step by step, the symbol of the front soldier. In December 1933, during a 
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talk to the diplomatic corps, Röhm declared that ‘the roots of National Socialism lay in 
the trenches of the Great War’.135 By 1934, this brutal way of understanding and 
representing the war experience was deeply ingrained in the minds of many Nazi 
veterans, as the collection of early Nazis’ autobiographies assembled that year by 
Theodor Abel demonstrates.136 Despite some resistance from the Stahlhelm members to 
losing their particular identity, the Nazification of discourses and organizations was 
unrelenting. In early 1934, the SA brown shirt replaced the green-grey Stahlhelm 
uniform. In April 1934, the Stahlhelm was transformed into the National Socialist 
German Front Soldiers Association (Stahlhelm) (Der National-Sozialistische Deutsche 
Frontkämpferbund – Stahlhelm).137 In short, the German veterans’ Nazification process 
was swifter, deeper and farther-reaching than the Italian veterans’ fascistization. 
 What is most interesting here is to acknowledge the role that the Nazis bestowed 
on the German veterans in the realm of international relations. In this question, the 
Nazification of discourses and organizations had the same mid-term purpose that 
fascistization in Italy: utilizing the veterans as an instrument for the dictatorship’s 
foreign policy. The Third Reich yearning for ‘vital space’ (Lebensraum), Nazi 
militarism and imperialism, and Hitler’s own ideology, made the probabilities of war 
against France very high, even if the Third Reich first needed to consolidate within 
Germany, and then rebuild a powerful army. The growing German menace, threatening 
to absorb Austria as one of the first steps towards hegemony in Europe, frightened her 
Italian ideological ally. Hitler and Mussolini, in their first meeting of Venice in June 
1934, did not reach any agreement. Finding a balance of power in Europe would be very 
difficult. So, in order to gain time for rearmament, Hitler’s official attitude was that of 
striving for European peace. The discourse of peace helped the Nazis to succeed in the 
German elections of November 1933, and therefore allowed Hitler to obtain dictatorial 
powers. Talking about peace was useful against the French, when a plebiscite about the 
future of the Saar region as either a province of Germany or a part of France took place 
in January 1935.138 
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Why were the veterans the instrument of this peace strategy? This choice can be 
better understood by taking into account transnational factors. For these dynamics of 
veteran rapprochement could not have worked without the turning point of French 
politics on 6 February 1934. As is well known, the evening of this day was marked by a 
massive demonstration by the French conservative veterans (mainly UNC) and extreme 
right groups (including the Croix de Feu) on the Place de la Concorde in Paris, ending 
in a violent attempt to invade the French Parliament. In the clashes that ensued, fourteen 
protesters died.139 Through the German embassy in Paris, the Nazis were aware of the 
dramatic irruption of the French veterans into politics. That month, Oberlindober argued 
for the first time about the convenience of the mutual understanding among veterans 
from different countries.140  
Yet to start these contacts, the NSDAP needed to complete the monopolization 
of German veteran politics, in which Röhm and the SA had attained too much 
independent leverage. Hitler’s need to maintain internal order, and to tighten ties with 
the German army, led to the violent purge of the SA during the Night of the Long 
Knives (30 June – 2 July 1934), including the assassination of Röhm. Shortly after, 
Hitler’s Deputy Führer Rudolph Hess, during a speech in Königsberg, invoked the 
allegedly proverbial discipline and loyalty of the veterans who, on that basis, had 
complied with Hitler’s ruthless measures. Moreover, Hess also made an appeal for 
peace ‘to the front soldiers of the whole world’. He argued that the front fighters 
(Frontkämpfern) would be the only group able to establish peace, the ‘peace of the front 
soldiers’.141 From the summer of 1934 on, the Nazi Propaganda Ministry would 
implement this rapprochement. As we will see, all these events were key moments of an 
important phase of transnational contacts, entanglement and transfers between fascist, 
national socialist and French veterans. 
 
The veteran connection Italy-France-Germany 
The series of cross-border contacts among veterans that began in 1934 were a result of 
the particular historical conjuncture after the establishment of Hitler’s dictatorship. The 
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new German regime complicated the state of affairs, for Italy was no longer the 
undisputed lodestar of the European extreme right. Fascist Italy saw that one of its 
pupils, Nazi Germany, threatened to surpass it. During 1933, debates between those 
defending the essentially Italian, untransferable nature of Fascism, and those 
highlighting the necessity to exporting it, came again to the fore.142 In July 1933, after a 
long theoretical debate, the Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (Comitati 
d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma – CAUR), a kind of fascist international, were 
created.143 Eugenio Coselschi, an ex-officer, erstwhile collaborator of D’Annunzio in 
Fiume, and organizer since 1919 of the small pro-fascist War Volunteers Association 
(Associazione Volontari di Guerra), was entrusted with the direction of the CAUR. By 
February 1934, the fascists were striving to enhance the originality of Italian Fascism, 
underlining the imitative nature of ‘analogous foreign movements’.144 Yet the 
attractiveness of Fascist Italy had not decreased; instead, the grandiose propaganda and 
architectural endeavours of Mussolini, particularly in Rome, blended with the touristic 
magnetism of the country to bring even more foreign visitors.145  
 If the idea of basing international collaboration in Europe on the war veterans 
was not new, French veterans now turned to it with renewed interest. André Gervais, a 
writer, veteran and UF member, was the initiator of these contacts. In early 1933, he had 
travelled to Germany in order to research the German veteran organizations, thus 
exploring the general mood for establishing peace-oriented German-French contacts.146 
His conversations with Seldte and other German leaders had only uncovered important 
obstacles for an understanding. Gervais discovered the troubling reality that the German 
youth was being systematically told about the allegedly positive values of war. (Gervais 
also noticed the lack of originality of Hitler’s programme for the veterans).147 Soon, 
Gervais’ proposal of furthering contacts with the German republican veteran 
organizations became absolutely outdated, as Hitler obtained power shortly thereafter. 
But Gervais did not stop his study trips. At the beginning of 1934, he visited Fascist 
Italy. After meeting several fascist leaders, he was received by the Duce. The interview 
was published only two days before the events of 6 February. Mussolini told Gervais 
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that the education of the youth in pacifist values was useless. Asked whether he thought 
the veterans should contribute to create a kind of ‘European spirit’, Mussolini replied 
‘they should, unquestionably!’. And further questioned whether he was partisan of the 
international collaboration among veterans, Mussolini stated ‘obviously!’.148 
Mussolini’s support for this veteran connection was not self-motivated, but it 
encouraged the French veterans’ impulses to engage with the Italian fascists.  
 The constructed image of the fascist regime and the Duce epitomized the long-
standing political desire of French conservative and nationalist sectors, let alone the 
French fascist groupings. In France, there was an ongoing radicalization towards 
authoritarianism, and the veteran organizations were not an exception.149 The events of 
6 February were not only a result, but also another catalyst of this process. In their 
immediate aftermath, Daladier government resigned, and it was replaced by a 
conservative cabinet headed by Gaston Doumerge. While the 6 February mutiny 
became a mobilizing myth for the right, the left considered it a kind of coup d’état 
attempted by French ‘fascism’. In fact, after this political crisis, the veteran 
associations, and also the Croix de Feu, clearly radicalized their programmes and 
discourses. In the case of the UNC, new leaders incarnated this trend; Georges Lebecq 
and Jean Goy endorsed the formation of paramilitary sections —the Action 
Combattante. Furthermore, now there was another example of ‘national restoration’, 
that of Germany. The French veterans observed with a certain envy the new Nazi 
legislation for the German ‘generation du feu’.150 Yet Italy was the principal referent. 
 Organizations, direct contacts, and publications were the base for the 
understanding between French and Italian fascist veterans. Towards mid-February 1934, 
the monthly review Le Trait d’Union appeared in Italy (Turin), as the organ of the 
Federal Union in Italy of the Veterans’ Associations (Union Fédérale en Italie des 
Associations Françaises d’Anciens Combattants). The groups of French veterans who 
resided in Italy had fused in this single organization, with the aim of maintaining a 
relationship of ‘comradeship and fraternity’ with the Italian veterans, and thus 
improving Italian-French relations. As the review’s leading writer, the ex-captain Henry 
Miraucheaux, made clear from its first issue, this publication highlighted the examples 
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of ‘national renovation’ that should be the guide to save France.151 The visit of a group 
of around 500 French veterans to Fascist Italy definitely strengthened the connection 
between the French and the Italian fascist veterans. This political-tourism trip took place 
between the 30 March and the 7 April 1934, including visits to Turin, Rome, Naples, 
Rome, Venice and Milan. There was also a ‘pilgrimage’ to battlefields of the Carso. 
André Gervais led this mission, welcomed by fascist veteran leaders such as Carlo 
Delcroix and Amilcare Rossi. Mussolini received them as well, in a climate of warm 
comradeship.152 In the following weeks, as noted in a confidential report sent by the 
French police in Nice, the ‘manifestations of French-Italian friendship’ in Italy boosted 
greatly.153 
 Correspondingly, the activities of the fascist veterans in France stepped up. 
Around the symbolic date of 24 May 1934, fascist ceremonies took place, for example, 
in Lyon, Metz and Toulouse.154 Celebrating the Italian intervention recalled the 
friendship between France and Italy, so leaders of the PNF and the ANC fraternized 
with the French UF and UNC representatives. The most important rituals were in Paris. 
There, a homage to the Italian fallen soldiers included igniting the flame dedicated to 
the French Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe. Under the cover of a Garibaldian 
celebration, representatives of the Associazione Volontari di Guerra, and fascists such 
as the president of the CAUR Eugenio Coselschi were able to express their ‘Italian and 
fascist enthusiasm’ in the French capital.155 These public activities developed in a 
context of rising anti-fascist mobilization of the French working class; leftist counter-
demonstrations ended in anti-fascist chanting and shouting, stone throwing, and, in the 
case of Paris, fights between leftists and policemen.156 Fears of fascistization were not 
unfounded. 
 In June 1934, the French veterans, members of the Italian-based Union 
Fédérale, organized a congress in Milan. This meeting was intended to be another 
opportunity to reinforce the Italian-French friendship. Around 300 people participated, 
joined by prominent fascist veteran leaders, such as Giovanni Baccarini. In his speech, 
                                                
151 (‘redressement nationale’) Le Trait d’Union. Revue mensuelle publiée par l'Union Fédérale en Italie 
des Associations Françaises d'Anciens Combattants (Turin), February 1934. 
152 Le Trait d’Union, March, April 1934; La Nuova Italia. L’Italie Nouvelle (Paris), 12 April 1934; 
L’Italia grigio-verde, 10 April-5 May 1934. 
153 (‘manifestations d'amitié franco-italiennes’) Report dated in Nice, 20 April 1934, AN, F/7, 13465, 
Italie. 
154 See several reports in AN, F/7, 13465, Italie. 
155 (‘entusiasmo italiano e fascista’) La Nuova Italia. L’Italie Nouvelle, 31 May 1934. 
156 L’Humanité, 21 May 1934. 
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the French ex-ambassador Henry de Jouvenel, a pro-fascist journalist, stated that ‘the 
time of the veterans, which already came to Italy and other countries, is going to come 
to France’. The fascist-friendly climate of the meeting meant that the expected 
projection of the 1932 film Les Croix de Bois (based on the homonymous novel of 
Roland Dorgelès) were suspended because of the anti-German passages of the movie.157 
 The relations between French and Nazi veterans were not so easy. At the end of 
June 1934, the shocking news of the Nazi purge of the SA temporarily chilled the 
enthusiasm towards Hitler of some French sectors.158 For this reason, they cautiously 
received the above-mentioned Hess’ suggestion for international veterans meetings. 
Gustave Hervé was among the few enthusiasts.159 Henri Pichot, whose previous 
relations with the German republican veterans had been frustrated, understood the 
contacts with the Nazis as the only way to continue his campaign for peace.160 Yet 
Pichot still had faith in the League of Nations, and when his first meeting with 
Oberlindober took place in Baden-Baden, August 1934, there was no agreement. For his 
part, the UNC leader Jean Goy was more open; he straightforwardly affirmed that a 
direct German-French veterans’ contact was ‘infinitely desirable’; he said that Hitler’s 
and Heß’ offers should not be overlooked.161 Finally, during November and December 
1934, conversations took place between, on the one hand, Hitler and Oberlindober, and, 
on the other hand, Goy and Pichot. Regardless of the satisfaction of some, such as 
Gustave Hervé,162 French public opinion was divided on the topic of this 
rapprochement. Many realized that the Nazi propaganda was using the French veterans, 
and this was an entirely correct perception.163 
 This French-German connection must be put in relation with the French-Italian 
link that veterans had established. For the French fascists observed this entanglement as 
the key to European peace. Marcel Bucard, the leader of the Francistes, put it clearly in 
                                                
157 (‘l'heure des anciens combattants qui a sonné depuis longtemps en Italie, et dans bien d'autres pays, 
va sonner en France’) Report ‘Anciens combattants français en Italie’ (12 June 1934), AN, F/7, 13465, 
Italie; Le Trait d’Union, num. 5, June 1934; Il Popolo d’Italia, 16 June 1934. 
158 Dietrich Orlow, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe: German Nazis, Dutch and French Fascists, 
1933-1939, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 56. 
159 La Victoire, 10 July 1934. 
160 Claire Moreau Trichet, Henri Pichot et l’Allemagne, pp. 145-147. 
161 (‘infiniment souhaitable’) Le Petit Journal (Paris), 17 and 18 September 1934; Völkischer Beobachter, 
19 September 1934. 
162 La Victoire, 2 and 22 December 1934. 
163 Claire Moreau Trichet, ‘La propagande nazie à l’égard des associations françaises d’anciens 
combattants de 1934 à 1939’, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 205 (2002), pp. 55-70; 
Dietrich Orlow, The Lure of Fascism, pp. 73-74; Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 1, pp. 177-
178. 
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an interview published in Völkischer Beobachter. According to him, a French-German 
accord must be reached, and for that, France needed an understanding ally; this was the 
reason why they strived for an alliance with Italy: on the basis of this alliance, the 
German-French accord must be born and substantiated.164 Were the veterans realising 
the imaginary fascist Europe that Mussolini had predicted in 1929? 
 Undoubtedly, the belief in the imminent consolidation of a kind of peaceful 
fascist-led international system, based on the mutual understanding between veterans, 
was a misguided hope. In fact, rather than looking for a triple fascist connection 
between Italy, France and Germany, the leaders of the pro-fascist French veterans in 
Italy were trying to consolidate an alliance along traditional lines, namely between the 
allies of the Great War, Germany remaining as an isolated threat.165 Furthermore, the 
Nazi coup in Austria and the murder of the chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss disturbed the 
relations between Germany and both Latin countries. In December 1934, the 
international fascist conference of Montreaux, organized by the CAUR, was a congress 
of fascist movements’ representatives from different nations, but the Nazis refused to 
attend it. Although an international commission for the fascist international was created, 
this project soon declined.166 This would not be the actual mission of the fascist 
veterans abroad. The ultranationalist agendas of the main European fascist movements 
excluded an international understanding.  
Moreover, the falsity of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s peace discourses became clear 
at the end of 1934 and during 1935. In Italy, September 1934, important measures were 
taken to reinforce the citizens’ military education: the avowed aim was to create ‘a 
military and warlike nation’.167 Mussolini’s verbal threats to Abyssinia followed. The 
alleged veteran comradeship facilitated these dangerous steps towards war. It is telling 
the way in which the Franco-Italian agreements of Rome, January 1935, between the 
French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval and Mussolini, were surrounded by fascist veteran 
rituals.168 This veterans-praised accord was a French concession faced with Italian 
imperial aspirations. The French expected to ensure the Italian friendship in the face of 
the German threat. For the French veterans, the conference of Stresa in April 1935 
‘reignited the old Latin friendship between France and Italy’. Immediately, around 
                                                
164 (‘Aus dieser Alliance muss der deutsche-französische Akkord geboren und erhärtet werden’) 
Völkischer Beobachter, 30/31 December 1934. 
165 Le Trait d’Union, num. 11, December 1923, pp. 12-13. 
166 Michael Arthur Ledeen, Universal Fascism, pp. 115-131.  
167 (‘nazione militare e guerriera’) Il Popolo d’Italia, 20 September 1934. 
168 See, for example, Le Trait d’Union, num. 1, January 1935. 
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1,700 French veterans (mainly UNC members) once more visited the fascists in Italy, 
celebrating their comradeship.169 But the ‘Stresa front’ to contain Germany while giving 
free rein to Italy would fail. 
In Germany, shortly after the incorporation of the Saar into the Third Reich, 
militarism surfaced again. While the rumours of the Italian preparation for a military 
attack on Abyssinia circulated, Hitler re-imposed military service in Germany. On this 
occasion once more, the ideal of international veteran comradeship was an argument for 
the Nazis to justify their rearmament. Asked during an interview what the reaction of 
foreign veterans would be, Oberlindober argued that they should accept that their 
German ‘comrades’ had the same right to security as they had.170 During 1935, the Nazi 
strategy of talking of peace to foreign veterans continued, and thus the encounters 
persisted; even the British Legion visited Nazi Germany in July 1935.171 Similarly, over 
the course of that year, and for the years to come, the contacts between French veterans 
and Italian fascists continued. If the goal of this relationship was the maintenance of 
peace, as many French veterans sincerely believed, their expectations would be 
completely frustrated within months. After the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 
1935, the French veterans’ Union Fédérale en Italie supported this aggression, and 
adopted a bitterly critical stance against the sanctions imposed on Italy by the League of 
Nations.172 In November 1935, the instrumental nature of the Nazi exaltation of the 
veterans became all too clear when, after Hitler had fully rebuilt a German army, he 
ordered the dissolution of the Nazified Stahlhelm. Seldte simply obeyed, saying 
‘Mission fulfilled!’.173 
At the end, while the League of Nations was mocked, the hypocritical diplomacy 
of the veterans only served to the fascist and Nazi interests. It can be said that, by the 
end of 1935, the myth of the fascist veterans, born in Fascist Italy and largely circulated 
throughout Europe, reworked and reinforced by Nazism, had fulfilled one of the 
missions it had in the wider international sphere: preparing the ground for the military 
expansion of the fascist regimes. In 1929-1930, Mussolini had decided to use the 
veterans abroad, in order to advance towards a fascist Europe. When a fascist-inspired 
regime was actually imposed in Germany, the panorama substantially changed. The 
                                                
169 (‘resceller l'antique amitié latine’) Charles Vilain, Le voyage des combattants français en Italie (15-22 
Avril 1935), Rouen, 1935. 
170 (‘Partnern’) Völkischer Beobachter, 19 March 1935. 
171 Niels Löffelbein, Ehrenbürger der Nation, pp. 385-393. 
172 Le Trait d’Union, num. 11, November 1935. 
173 (‘Aufgabe erfüllt!’) Der Stahlhelm, 10 November 1935. 
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veterans continued to be an instrument in foreign policy, but the Rome-centred project 
of a fascist Europe had vanished in the advent of the Third Reich. The subsequent 
veteran diplomacy only served the interest of the fascist powers, and was, in the end, 
detrimental to the French. 
However, the Italian-French veteran friendship was a major source of inspiration 
for the authoritarian political trends within France. The works of André Gervais, 
especially his book on the Italian veterans under Fascism, conveyed an extremely 
positive impression of Fascism. This ideology that was understood as the soul of the 
veterans.174 Consequently, Gervais developed his own theories about a kind of French 
veteran spirit. His ideas were clearly inspired in the Italian example, although he sharply 
differentiated the French ‘veteran mystic’ from the French ‘fascist mystic’.175 And yet, 
French veterans also adopted the cult of the leader. Marshal Pétain, appointed Minister 
of War after the 6 February 1934, became one of the most acclaimed political figures in 
the veteran press.176 Since 1934, the interaction between the veterans’ organizations, 
such as the UNC, and the French extreme right leagues, including the Croix de Feu and 
its successor the Parti Social Français, is well known.177 As has been demonstrated 
here, this political evolution of the French veterans was rendered possible by the 
powerful attractiveness of the fascist veteran myth, and by the symbolic appropriation 
of the veteran that the Italian fascists had successfully implemented since 1921. A 
misleading belief in a naturally-produced orientation of the war veterans towards 
Fascism was nourished by multiple contacts with the Italians, yet it was also the key 










                                                
174 André Gervais, Les Combattants à l’ombre du faisceau, Paris, 1935. 
175 (‘mystique combattante’, ‘mystique fasciste’) André Gervais, L’esprit combattant, Paris, 1934, p. 66. 
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Veterans between Fascism and Anti-Fascism, War and Peace (1935-1940) 
 
From the fascist military invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 until the Nazi aggression 
against Poland in September 1939 there was hardly a moment of total peace for Europe. 
It is not mistaken to state, as some historians do, that the outbreak of the Second World 
War took place with the beginning of the Ethiopian war.1 Indeed, armed confrontation 
in the former Abyssinia did not stop when the Italian troops entered Addis Ababa and 
Mussolini ‘founded’ the Italian Empire in May 1936.2 And only two months after this 
event, the coup d’état of a group of Spanish officers against the Second Republic 
brought civil war to the Iberian peninsula, which became quickly internationalized. 
When the Spanish Civil War came to an end in April 1939, Europe was already set on 
the path towards another great war, which would officially start within a few months. 
These three sequential wars were the product of different but highly interconnected 
dynamics driven by fascism. Therefore, the circle of violence that emerged from the end 
of the Great War and led to a new international armed conflict can be considered closed 
by 1935-1936. In the previous chapters I have explained the role of the relationship 
between veterans and fascism in closing this circle.  
 There are two principal justifications for continuing our analysis beyond this 
period and into the early 1940s. First, the Ethiopian war allows us to see how the long 
relationship between Italian Fascism, at the height of its power, and the war veterans 
reached its peak in organizational and symbolic terms. I will assess whether Italian 
Fascism successfully perfected a totalitarian definition of its relationship with the 
veterans in the ideally-fascist context of war, which began with he conflict in Ethiopia 
and was extended with the war in Spain. As these ‘fascist’ wars amplified the 
transnational confrontation between fascism and anti-fascism, I will also examine the 
anti-fascist attempts to break the supposed fascist monopoly of veteran politics in 
Europe in the second half of the 1930s. At that time, the fascist veterans continuously 
manipulated the transnational symbol of the ex-soldier, while trying to influence the 
political orientation of veterans within the non-fascist countries (i.e.: France) through 
new international veteran organizations and contacts. 
                                                
1 Zaude Hailemariam, ‘La vera data d’inizio della seconda guerra mondiale’, in Angelo Del Boca (ed.), 
Le guerre coloniali del fascismo, Bari, Laterza, 2008, pp. 288-313. 
2 Angelo Del Boca, La guerra d’Abissinia 1935-1941, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1965; Matteo Dominioni, Lo 
sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008. 
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 The second justification for this chapter is that by 1939 and 1940, the fascist 
model of veteran politics was effectively transferred, with adaptations, to two countries: 
Spain and France. This outcome was the culmination of the long history of the fascist 
use of the myth of the fascist veteran in foreign affairs, and the result of the free 
circulation of this myth throughout Western Europe. The established relationship 
between veterans and fascism not only led to war, therefore; it also significantly 
contributed to the establishment of new fascist or authoritarian regimes in other 
European countries. 
 
The fascist veterans and the Ethiopian war 
The Ethiopian war was, first and foremost, a fascist war for empire.3 It was fought by 
more than 200,000 Italian soldiers, who arrived in the region and successfully waged 
their campaign there thanks to a huge logistical operation. Fascism attained its military 
objectives within seven months, due to the Italian troops’ technical superiority, and to 
the employment of modern war weapons —such as poison gas— with no regard for an 
enemy considered barbarian in racist terms. This war seemed an important victory in 
foreign policy for the fascist regime,4 although it was a ‘hollow success’ that brought 
new problems and international tensions.5 The League of Nations condemned the Italian 
aggression and imposed a set of economic sanctions. Yet, instead of impeding Italy’s 
ability to wage war, the international sanctions contributed to heightening the emotional 
climate of nationalist, warlike exaltation, and totalitarian mobilization that characterized 
the country at the time. 
 The role of the Italian fascist veterans in the origin, development and aftermath 
of the Ethiopian war was crucial. They not only helped to create a favourable foreign 
opinion about the war, particularly among French veterans —as we saw—, but also 
contributed substantially to the war propaganda, and discretely to the military effort. 
New fascist and colonial functions were assigned to the fresh batch of veterans from the 
Ethiopia war. And the ritualized demobilization of the troops shows us how Fascism 
continued to use the image of the victorious soldier, at that particular moment of the 
fascist evolution towards totalitarianism. 
                                                
3 Nicola Labanca, Una guerra per l’impero. Memorie della campagna d’Etiopia 1935-36, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 2005. 
4 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I., p. 642. 
5 H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, pp. 125-144. 
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Propaganda was the main field of activity of the fascist veterans during the war. 
Immediately after the campaign started, the journal of the ANC changed its title to 
L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde (‘The fighting Italy’), and more importantly, 
all the rest of provincial ANC newspapers were suppressed.6 Offering as a justification 
the necessity to restrict consumption, this further limitation of the veterans’ expression 
was another step towards totalitarianism. The ANC journal became basically one more 
megaphone fore the regime’s war propaganda. The ANC main leader, Amilcare Rossi, 
was appointed director of the journal, and his numerous articles, written in an obscure, 
convoluted rhetoric, would echo the regime’s propagandistic discourse. Now, the 
veteran association changed its activity, and started collecting gold and medals from its 
members to be donated for the war effort. One of the first measures was asking the 
veterans to return the old Inter-Allied medal, deemed to have been lost its moral value 
after the League of Nations introduced the sanctions.7 The ANC leaders also revoked 
war insurance policies for the veterans, in order to make a contribution to financing the 
war. Thus, in a few months, more than 7 million Lira were transferred from the ANC to 
the Duce; and one year after the beginning of the war, the total amount collected by the 
ANC in form of veterans’ war insurance policies was 16 million Lira.8 If in the previous 
decade the ANC had basically assured medals and benefits to the Italian veterans, now 
they were forced to return this capital to the regime. Furthermore, the ANC provincial 
leaders made sure that veterans joined demonstrations of enthusiasm and support for the 
combatant troops.9 There were also veterans from the association among those who 
were fighting in the campaign. 
Embodying the Fascism-driven closed circle of war violence from 1919 to 1935, 
some Italian veterans of the Great War fought again in Ethiopia. It is known that the 
soldiers that Mussolini sent to conquer the empire came from the oldest classes, since 
the regime did not want to debilitate the army in the Italian peninsula.10 Only a portion 
of the military contingent was voluntary, and unemployment and poverty were common 
reasons to volunteer. Yet members of the fascist militia, the MVSN, joined the 
campaign. One of the fascist military units, the ‘Tevere’ Division, was composed of 
four legions; one of veterans, another of war disabled, and two more with members of 
                                                
6 L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde (Rome), num. 20-21, 15-30 November 1935. 
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8 L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde, num. 1-2, 15-30 January 1936; num. 18, 15 October 1936. 
9 L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde, num. 5, 15 March 1936. 
10 Nicola Labanca, Una guerra per l’impero, p. 59. 
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the Fasci all’Estero. The total number of veterans that enrolled for the fascist war is 
difficult to assess. It was claimed that one of the two battalions that composed the 
veterans’ legion of the ‘Tevere’ Division included 524 ex-soldiers of the Great War.11 
Even if the total number of veterans serving in Oriental Africa numbered a few 
thousands (66,000 according to subsequent fascist propaganda),12 this was a very small 
group in relation to the total military contingent during the campaign, and in 
comparison with the figures of ANC members, not to mention the comparison with the 
vast numbers of Italian Great War veterans. 
Even though the participation of veterans in the Ethiopian war was reduced, a 
seven-month war was enough for Fascism to forge a new stock of experienced 
combatants. Mussolini wished to create ‘new men’ out of the fascist war, though reality 
did not match this expectation. Only certain elites of fascist soldiers understood and 
experienced the Ethiopian war in line with fascist ideology. Former squadrists and 
fascist cadres believed they were continuing the fascist revolution in Africa.13 But, in 
any case, the men who either remained in the conquered land or returned to Italy 
became instruments of the fascist regime.  
 
 
Image 41: ‘The heroes’, Il Popolo d’Italia, 24 May 1936 
 
After Mussolini’s grandiose proclamation of the empire, the heroization of the 
victorious soldiers followed, through a set of discourses and rituals. The combatants of 
Ethiopia were represented as renewing the spirit of the equally triumphant Great War 
                                                
11 VI. Divisione Camicie Nere 'Tevere'. Il 219. battaglione cc. nn. in Africa Orientale, Roma, 1937. 
12 L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde, num. 23, 31 December 1940. 
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soldiers (Image 41).14 In fascist rhetoric, ‘the fallen soldiers, disabled veterans and ex-
combatants of the African enterprise’ had ‘avenged the sacrifice and realized the hope 
of the 670,000 dead, 470,000 mutilated and 3 million fighters of the Great War’.15 From 
the beginning of July 1936, the returning troops that arrived to the ports of Naples, 
Livorno or Genoa, or to the train stations of Rome or Florence, were welcomed by 
cheerful, deferential crowds, hymns, flowers and bunting, and by the authorities who 
depicted them as heroes.16 In the climate of enthusiasm, the PNF decided to offer party 
membership to some returning volunteers.17 
Taking into account all this pride-inducing rhetoric and political measures, one 
might ask why the veterans from Ethiopia did not form any new particular veteran 
organization. The historian Nicola Labanca has advanced some arguments to explain 
this absence.18 According to him, the few months of Ethiopian war experience were not 
comparable with the long-term sufferings of the Great War soldiers. Traditionally, the 
Italian colonial campaigns in Africa had not produced any veteran movement. 
Furthermore, Labanca recognizes that Mussolini would not have been interested in any 
renewed veteran movement at that time, since the regime desired to reinforce the 
threatening image of fixed bayonets, not old ex-combatants. But the actual destiny of 
the Ethiopian veterans under Fascism has remained rather unknown by historians until 
now. 
The truth is that the veterans from Ethiopia were incorporated into the ANC, and 
therefore were symbolically amalgamated with the Great War veterans. The regime 
took this decision in October 1936, after a request from ANC leaders.19 It was in 
consonance with the ‘unitary and totalitarian function of the ANC’ that the veterans 
from ‘all victories’ would be part of the same organization.20 With this absorption, the 
fascists wanted to check the proliferation of uncontrolled veteran groups. The insistence 
in the instructions of the ANC leaders in this respect shows that they pursued this goal 
very seriously. They made sure that the new veterans had devotedly served, even 
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obtained some distinction in combat (medal, injury or mutilation), before being 
admitted to the association. The ANC also stipulated that the combat volunteers were 
allowed to wear the emblem of the arditi.21 In contrast, the ANC refused to affiliate 
those labourers who had gone to the Horn of Africa and come back to Italy without 
combat experience.22 Non-combatants might envy the privileged position of the 
returning soldiers, even though there is evidence to believe that, by July 1937, the 
problem of unemployment still affected many of the veterans.23 The combat veterans 
from Ethiopia gained access to benefits and privileges by joining the fascist ANC. But 
in the fascist plans, the war-experienced men were expected to continue serving 
Fascism, and the fascist leaders assigned further functions to them. 
In the fascist colonial dreams, Ethiopia was a new and fertile land that should 
provide agricultural products for the autarchic empire; the veterans were seen as the 
archetype of the colonizer. The military conquerors of the region were viewed as 
settlers, and indeed many of the soldiers were Italian southern peasants aspiring to own 
land. At the beginning of July 1936, the Army’s High Command in Africa decreed that 
the soldiers —from the 1911 class and older— who found employment in Ethiopia 
would be immediately discharged.24 They were also obliged to join the MVSN at the 
same time. Thus, the regime expected to give employment to 100,000 veterans, while 
maintaining an armed force in the colony. After his return from Ethiopia in June 1936, 
the fascist leader of the ANC, Amilcare Rossi, who had gone to war with the ‘Tevere’ 
Division,25 elaborated a vague colonizing project. According to him, the veterans would 
assume a new mission: the expansion of the Italian nation in Ethiopia, and the 
agricultural exploitation of this land. In November 1936, during the X National Council 
of the ANC celebrated in Littoria, Rossi talked about the wealth and vastness of the new 
territory, predicting that Italian peasants would slowly colonize it. For this reason, the 
next ANC National Council should be celebrated there. In reality, however, the 
colonization through peasant-soldiers was doomed to failure. According to the fascist 
statements, of the 12,000 ‘volunteers’ of the ‘Tevere’ Division, 5,000 requested to 
remain in Eastern Africa.26 Yet of the more than 200,000 veterans from Ethiopia, only 
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13,881 decided to stay in the Empire. The result of the project was a failure, and the 
resistant Ethiopians constantly raided settlements.27 
 
Veterans and the crisis of anti-fascism and pacifism 
One of the consequences of the Ethiopian war was a period of disorientation and 
demoralization for anti-fascists and pacifists in Italy and France. It is important to note 
that anti-fascism and pacifism were never interchangeable concepts, despite the 
numerous links between them. Pacifism should not be confused with non-violence, nor 
with anti-militarism. In France, after the First World War, a traditional conception of 
pacifism understood as the international rule of law had been progressively eclipsed by 
a more radical, integral view of pacifism.28 In this country, during the second half of the 
1930s, more than 200 pacifist organizations maintained diverse approaches to the 
question of peace.29 To complicate this panorama, when the fascists invaded Ethiopia, 
traditionally bellicose political sectors such as Action Française declared themselves to 
be pacifists, not because they opposed this war, but rather because they very much 
supported it. The French extreme right accused the left and the supporters of the League 
of Nations of wanting to provoke a war against Italy.30 Obviously, this right-wing 
attitude was opportunistic and hypocritical. But also genuinely anti-fascist and pacifist 
organizations made a differentiation between internal anti-fascism and external 
pacifism, therefore giving free rein to fascist and Nazi expansionism.31 
 This double crisis of anti-fascism and pacifism was the origin of renewed 
attempts to redefine the symbol of the war veteran in both pacifist and anti-fascist terms. 
The confusion that riddled the French pacifists and anti-fascists can be detected in Italy 
as well. The sudden and dramatically successful campaign in Ethiopia and Italian 
popular enthusiasm puzzled and temporally discouraged the clandestine opposition.32 
Nonetheless, the communists directly appealed to the Italian war disabled and veterans 
to organize the resistance against the new war; they questioned the alleged fascist 
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convictions of the volunteers, and even called on them to fraternize with the 
Ethiopians.33 Paradoxically, the new fascist aggression, with all its exaltation of the 
soldier and the veteran, seems to have led these anti-fascists to place their hopes in the 
Italian veterans’ anti-war feelings as the detonator for a popular reaction against 
Fascism.34 As the available evidence suggests, however, these hopes were quixotic. 
Nevertheless, the use of the veteran symbol with anti-fascist and pacifist objectives is 
worthy of analysis. During the second half of the 1930s, and especially after the Spanish 
Civil War broke out, the fascist symbolic appropriation of the war veteran came under 
attack from certain groups. 
 Different initiatives in this direction came from Italians abroad. In November 
1935, a group of Italians residing in New York launched a call for the formation of an 
‘Association of Anti-fascist Italian Veterans of New York and Surroundings’. They 
introduced themselves as men who had ‘worn the green-grey’ uniform, and had 
promised that the sacrifices and horrors of war would never be repeated. Now, a ‘mad 
governor’ in their country had ‘dishonoured’ the Italian ‘race’ by attacking a free 
people. They, the veterans, rebelled against this, aspiring to a great fraternity of all men. 
They had fought and confronted dangers and horrors on the battlefield, and now they 
were ‘the vanguard of the international army that demanded peace, justice and liberty’. 
Recalling the memory of 600,000 dead soldiers, they invoked ‘Peace, Peace, Peace!’.35 
This rhetoric reminds us of the fascist and Mussolinian discursive repertory (‘race’, 
invoking the fallen soldiers, ‘the vanguard of…’, etc.), but they introduced key pacifist 
and democratic elements (‘liberty’, ‘fraternity’, etc.) to make an anti-fascist appeal. As 
we know, mythic narratives about the veteran were likely to be reworked to serve 
different aims, and this is exactly what some anti-fascist veterans were doing now. 
 This kind of small and splintered groupings of pacifist or anti-fascist veterans 
began to proliferate in France, joined by Italian exiles and migrants. The pacifist Silvio 
Schettini was the leader of an Italian Association of Veterans based in Paris. A similar 
cell appeared in Brussels, in January 1936, with a distinctive leftist orientation. This so-
called Belgian-Italian Association of Veterans (‘Association Belgo-Italienne des 
Anciens Combattants’) counted about 30 members, and held weekly meetings. They 
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were veterans who ‘loved their country’ and wanted to overthrow Fascism, in order to 
establish ‘a proletarian government’. (Anarchist exiles rejected the invitation to join this 
organization, since they did not want to take part in an organism that remembered the 
war). The fascist authorities monitored this Belgian group, and noticed that they had 
contacts with the anti-fascist veterans in France.36 Confronting the wide network of 
fascist veterans, a web of contacts among anti-fascist veterans was trying to emerge. 
 The struggle over the symbol of the veteran, complexly linked to the idea of 
peace, was determined by the rapidly evolving European context. During the Ethiopian 
war, the climate of civil confrontation progressively worsened in France, while in Spain 
the political situation became extremely polarized and agitated.37 In January 1936, the 
French government decreed the dissolution of some paramilitary leagues, and, shortly 
after, the pro-Italian Prime Minister Pierre Laval was obliged to resign. In February 
1936, the Spanish republican and leftist coalition known as the Popular Front (Frente 
Popular) won the national elections, and a period of social agitation followed. The 
Spanish fascist party Falange Española grew significantly, while the anti-republican 
military conspired to prepare a coup d’état. In May 1936, it was the turn of the French 
Popular Front (Front Populaire) to win the elections. At virtually the same time, Italian 
troops entered Addis Ababa. 
It is interesting to track the French veterans’ political evolution during this 
period of change. One of the first measures of the Front Populaire was the dissolution 
of the Croix de Feu. At that time, the UNC, lured by the fascist-inspired mystic, had 
multiple friendly contacts and interactions with this extreme right league,38 and the 
pages of the UNC journal exalted the fascist empire.39 Hence, the UNC’s aggressive 
attitude against the Front Populaire is not surprising. UNC veterans joined the Parti 
Social Français (PSF) —the new party that the Croix de Feu leader, Colonel La 
Rocque, founded in reaction to the ban on the Croix de Feu. The PSF would rapidly 
become the largest party in France. Unsurprisingly defined as fascist by the left, the PSF 
was an important threat to the main democracy of the Continent, though in fierce 
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competition with other extreme right parties.40 On the other hand, in the case of the UF, 
there were no clear connections with the extreme right. Rather, the UF was involved in 
the struggle for international peace. Not only its leader Henri Pichot, but also the 
influential intellectual René Cassin —a delegate at the League of Nations—, were fully 
committed to this ideal. Nevertheless, the ‘patriotic pacifism’ of the UF veterans cannot 
be considered as anti-fascist, much as they bitterly criticised the fascist breach of 
international law.41  
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War complicated the profound realignment of 
politics in France and Spain, two countries within Fascist Italy’s sphere of geostrategic 
interest. At the end of July 1936, after the swift request of Franco —one of the rebel 
leaders—, both Hitler and Mussolini decided to send military help. German and Italian 
aircrafts allowed the Spanish rebels to initiate a military offensive towards Madrid. On 
both sides of the divided country there were hundreds of political assassinations. The 
rebels, assisted by falangist volunteers, imposed a bloody regime of terror. In Catalonia 
and other parts of the country, revolutionaries held power, and the Republican 
authorities lost control of the situation for several months. While nothing really 
impeded the Nazi and fascist support for the rebels, the initial intention of the French 
Prime Minister Leon Blum to help the Spanish republicans was thwarted by the bitter 
opposition of the right. The long Spanish war constituted another source of division in 
French society.42 In general, the French veteran movement would advocate non-
intervention, and therefore narrowed the scope of its pacifism to the maintenance of 
peace within France. In contrast, the French anti-fascists would advocate intervention in 
Spain in the name of international peace. 
 At this crucial international conjuncture, the fascists and the Nazis turned once 
again to the veteran connection to exert influence abroad, employing pseudo-pacifist 
discourses. During the months prior to the Spanish Civil War, while the Italians 
conquered their empire, the Nazi veterans had publicly declared their commitment to 
peace. Through this policy, the Nazis were taking advantage of the French veterans’ 
priority of maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with Germany. Following this 
course of action, during the first half of 1936, Henri Pichot, the leader of the UF, met 
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and corresponded with Hans Oberlindober, the leader of the NSKOV. The Germans 
also paid a visit to London, meeting the British Legion, and thus, enhancing the 
germanophile stance of the British veterans. These kinds of contacts led to the 
international meeting on the former battlefield of Verdun, in mid-July 1936. There, the 
Nazi veterans, together with French, British, and comrades from other countries, ‘swore 
to conserve and to desire peace’.43 The Nazi commitment to this oath, taking into 
account the date of the partisan German intervention in the Spanish Civil War, lasted 
roughly ten days.  
 Just as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy coincided in their masked albeit 
indisputable intervention in Spain, they also harmoniously entangled their veteran 
foreign politics. The Nazi veterans maintained their hypocritical discourse of peace, and 
continued receiving, over the following months, friendly visits of French veteran 
leaders, such as Pichot and Béraud.44 The Italian fascist veterans dedicated themselves 
thoroughly to the same discursive strategy. Moreover, the fascists decided to create a 
new organization to control the veterans’ international contacts. In this fashion, they 
tried to monopolize the proliferating discourses about peace. It is important to note that 
this manoeuvre took place shortly after the creation of the Non-Intervention Committee. 
This committee was designed to isolate war within Spain, but only served to suffocate 
the Spanish republicans, while the fascist powers continued assisting the rebels. 
 The first fascist step in this direction was to regain influence over the existing 
veteran international organizations. As we know, since 1929 the FIDAC has ceased to 
represent the real fascist interests in foreign policy. During September 1936, both the 
FIDAC and CIAMAC congresses took place. First, the FIDAC congress was held in 
Warsaw, in Pilsudski’s Poland, with the participation of the ex-allied nations’ 
representatives. (The French travelling to Poland used the occasion to pay another visit 
to the NSKOV leader Hans Oberlindober). In the congress, an anti-leftist and 
conditional understanding of peace prevailed. The most important consequence of the 
congress was that the fascist Carlo Delcroix, leader of the ANMIG, was elected new 
president of the FIDAC.45 (It was the second time during the inter-war period that the 
presidency of the FIDAC fell to a fascist member). Furthermore, the delegates agreed to 
continue their conversations in Rome during the following month, outside of the 
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framework of the FIDAC and the CIAMAC, and with participation of German 
representatives.46 All these unprecedented decisions aimed towards rapprochement with 
the German ex-enemies, an outcome that fully corresponded with fascist interests. Thus, 
it is not surprising that the Italian disabled veterans openly ignored the CIAMAC 
conference in Copenhagen, as did the Germans and Austrians; this international 
organization was deemed to be dominated by a ‘prevalent socialist-mason tendency’.47 
Obtaining control of the FIDAC had been an important move. 
 At the same time, the Non-Intervention Committee held its first inaugural 
meeting in London, although soon it became clear that it would not serve to stop the 
internationalization of the Spanish War. The Soviet Union withdrew from the 
committee. Anti-fascist and communist volunteers from different parts of the world, 
mainly from France, were arriving to Spain, where the carnage continued. 
As a proof of the widespread belief that the European expansion of fascism 
could only be stopped by armed force, the foreign anti-fascist volunteers in Spain 
composed the International Brigades, supported by the Komintern. The total number of 
volunteers has been calculated in 35,000.48 According to George L. Mosse, a romantic 
myth of the war experience inspired these fighters.49 This idealistic understanding of the 
Spanish war represented a counter-model to the fascist glorification of war in and of 
itself. It demonstrates that, by 1936, the heroic image of the combatant did not pertain 
exclusively to the fascists or right-wing nationalists. In this sense, it is interesting to 
note that, motivated by an anti-communist version of the idealization of war, only 
around 1,000 or 1,500 international volunteers came to Spain to fight for Franco.50 
However, if anti-fascism contested the symbol of the combatant, were the fascists able 
to keep their transnational symbolic hegemony over the veterans? 
 With the objective of dominating veteran politics, the fascists employed the 
same old tactic of discursive manipulation and organizational guile that they had always 
used. In the strained international conjuncture, the fascists reacted swiftly. The next key 
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event was the veterans’ meeting in Rome, on 7 November 1936.51 By that date, in 
Spain, the troops of Franco had arrived at the gates of Madrid. A few days later, the 
International Brigades experienced combat for the first time, successfully defending the 
Republican capital. Meanwhile, Mussolini had received in Palazzo Venezia the 
veterans’ representatives from 14 European nations, including Germany and the United 
States. The veterans’ encounter was the occasion to launch a new ‘Permanent 
International Committee of Veterans’ (Comitato Permanente Internazionale dei 
Combattenti), presided by Carlo Delcroix. The representative of Nazi Germany on the 
Committee was the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, who had been appointed by Hitler as the 
head of the surviving German veteran associations. For the first time, an international 
organization of First World War veterans was bringing together the fascist and Nazi 
veterans, under the hegemony of Fascism. 
 The fascists and the Nazis hastened to put the Permanent International 
Committee of Veterans to work for their interests. Rapidly, Carlo Delcroix prepared the 
statutes of the new institution secretly destined to supplant the old international veteran 
platforms.52 The declared aims of the Permanent Committee were, first, to strengthen 
the relations among veterans from all the nations; second, to ensure that the veterans’ 
moral force would serve the rapprochement and collaboration of the different nations; 
and, finally, to promote in all nations ‘the spirit of comprehension and solidarity which 
is the basis for the maintenance of peace’.53 In record time, another congress was 
organized, this time in Berlin. On 15 February 1937, Goering welcomed more than fifty 
international delegates, whom he unoriginally reminded that, since they knew the 
horrors of warfare, the veterans were the guarantors of peace. The poet Carlo Delcroix 
was more imaginative; he argued that if war was necessary, it was sacred, but if it was 
avoidable, it was a crime.54 Unsurprisingly, the delegates confirmed Delcroix as 
president. As Amilcare Rossi later reported, some opposition from certain delegates of 
democratic nations arose, but they were overcome and thus the institution consolidated 
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on a ‘totalitarian basis’.55 Then, the delegates went to visit Hitler in Berchtesgaden, and 
they publicly declared the necessity of defending peace.56 
The Permanent Committee became the barefaced instrument of the Rome-Berlin 
Axis, while the war in Spain continued successfully for the fascist powers. The next 
meeting of the Committee took place again in Rome, in April 1937. There, Delcroix 
dared to say that, until then, the institutions for maintaining peace had, in fact, 
exacerbated the misunderstanding between nations.57 Some weeks later, in Spain, the 
German Condor Legion bombed Guernica.58 By this point, the Italian ‘voluntary’ troops 
that Mussolini was sending to Spain since January 1937 numbered 50,000 men.59 In 
Francoist Spain, there was a process of amalgamation of anti-republican sectors, leading 
to the formation of the fascist unified party, Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las 
JONS (FET-JONS). Within the Spanish Republic, in contrast, the internal disputes 
provoked violent clashes between communists and anarchists in Barcelona. By now, it 
was clear that the Non-Intervention Committee was a complete farce. Similarly, the 
Permanent Committee of Veterans only benefited the fascist powers, as it became clear 
on a number of occasions. 
In October 1937, the congress of the FIDAC confirmed that the responsibility 
for advancing towards an international entente was now in the hands of the fascist-
dominated Permanent Committee. At this point, the main concern of the FIDAC was 
just to maintain friendship among the ex-allied countries. In his speech, the outgoing 
FIDAC president Delcroix justified his efforts to realize rapprochement with the ex-
enemies. He also described the kind of peace that the veterans should construct; neither 
a peace that repudiated sacrifice, nor one of oppression that ignored the necessities of 
other nations; instead, Delcroix praised a ‘militant’ peace ‘of dignity and justice’ after 
‘having set the conditions for its existence’.60 Implicitly, Delcroix was talking of a 
peace conditioned by the priority of the fascist powers’ imperial and territorial 
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expansion. The idea of peace that the fascists were defending in the international 
veterans’ meetings was one subservient to the idea of international justice,61 though this 
conception of justice was concealing the intention of redesigning the map of Europe and 
the World in accordance with the fascist and Nazi wishes. Some weeks later, the fascists 
would have yet another opportunity to defend their position in an international veterans’ 
meeting. 
Held in Paris between November and December 1937, the first official congress 
of the Permanent Committee marked an important victory for the fascist veterans. 
Among the French delegates were Henri Pichot and Jean Goy, while Oberlindober was 
part of the German delegation.62 The representatives of the United States were the only 
ones to decline to participate, correctly understanding that the meeting corresponded 
with the interests of the dictatorships. Carlo Delcroix, in his confidential report written 
for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considered that the withdrawal of the 
American Legion was a consequence of Jewish pressure. But in general, Delcroix was 
delighted with the good result of the congress. The French government, unenthusiastic, 
had been unable to oppose it, and ‘for the first time the German flag had appeared in a 
parade through the streets of Paris’. Delcroix judged ‘useful that in the capital of 
masonry, Judaism and Socialism, the spirit and style of fascism were affirmed, in a 
meeting of veterans from across Europe, to whom we have taught to what extent and in 
which tone the soldiers may talk about peace’.63 As the messages sent to the French 
authorities at the end of the meeting captured the fascist views on peace, Delcroix 
celebrated that, in only one year, they have succeeded in affirming the principles, 
methods and style of fascism in veteran diplomacy. In the congress, there had even been 
cordial conversations about the need to ‘suppress every other organization, starting with 
the [FIDAC]’.64 And the fascists also prepared the terrain to make sure that the next 
president of the Permanent Committee would be the Duke of Saxe-Coburg —the Nazi 
representative. Thus, this organization should not ‘escape from the hands of its 
founders, in order to prevent the moral force of the veterans from becoming subjugated 
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to the socialist politics of the so-called democracies’.65 The fascists not only continued 
trying to monopolize the symbol of the veterans in the international sphere, and to 
control the organizations; they were also misappropriating the discourses about peace. 
 A few days after this meeting in Paris, Mussolini announced to the world that 
Italy was withdrawing from the League of Nations. The Duce had recently visited 
Germany, and now the foreign policies of both countries started to clearly and publicly 
converge. As we have seen, the veteran connections played a role in the evolution 
towards the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The developing anti-French military 
threat, coming from Germany and Italy, was fairly clear for the French left, and the 
terrible events taking place in Spain corroborated this. During this time, for most French 
leftists, war and fascism fused into the one menace, and fighting against fascism in 
Spain meant fighting for peace and democracy. 
In spite of these disheartening events, sectors of anti-fascism did not renounce to 
the symbol of the veteran. However, anti-fascist and pacifist veterans in France were not 
united. In November 1937, the French League of Pacifist Veterans, headed by the 
socialist MP and veteran Camille Planche, launched an appeal to the Italian veterans in 
order to create a unique anti-war and anti-fascist veteran front. Actually, this new 
initiative competed against the communist-inspired veteran associations. In any case, 
the chief concern was to divest the Italian veterans of their fascist stigma. One of the 
final lines of the call stated: ‘It is false to say that all Italian veterans want to support the 
fascist regime!’.66 Similarly, during 1938, the anti-fascist Association Franco-italienne 
des Anciens Combattants issued important propaganda to attract Italian veterans to their 
ranks, questioning the fascist promises to the veterans.67 However, all these anti-fascist 
efforts precisely show the extent to which Fascism had monopolized the symbol of the 
veteran by 1938. 
 
Fascist Italy, Francoist Spain and the culmination of the model 
The first case in which the fascist model of veteran politics was transferred into another 
country, contributing to the establishment of a dictatorship, was Spain. The Civil War 
experience entailed the arrival of fascist politics on the Francoist side, and the 
                                                
65 (‘non sfugga dalle mani di coloro che l'hanno costituita per impedire che la forza morale dei 
combattenti restasse asservita alla politica societaria delle cosidette democrazie’), Ibidem. 
66 (‘È falso che tutti gli ex-combattenti italiani vogliano sostenere il regime fascista!’), ACS, MI, PS 
(G1), b. 320, f. 1225 ‘Associazione franco-italiana ex combattenti’. 
67 ACS, MI, PS (G1), b. 315, f. 1169: ‘Ass. Franco-italiana excombattenti antifascisti’. 
  
 287 
discourses and organizations for war veterans were no exception. Now, as a ‘total’ war 
experience was ending, Spanish fascism could construct a mass support base composed 
of many men with combat records. In this section I will show how fascist veteran 
politics was a fundamental element for the incorporation of Francoist Spain into the 
wider phenomenon of transnational fascism. War, and the formation of the Axis were 
the key historical occurrences in this process, in which Fascist Italy’s model of veteran 
politics reached its peak. 
During the war, the fascist influence in Spain was not only military, but also 
political. Since the end of 1937, it became evident that Soviet help was not enough to 
sustain the Republican counterattacks, and that German and Italian military aid to 
Franco was permitting him to slowly win the war. This reality ensured the fascist 
powers had a great reputation among the combatants of the rebel side. In March 1938, 
the Francoists published a fundamental programmatic text, the Fuero del Trabajo, 
clearly inspired by the Italian regime.68 In this text, it was stated that, after the war, the 
new Spain would give ‘positions of work, honour and command’ to the heroic young 
combatants. The persistence of conservative military men in the power structures 
notwithstanding, the renewed fascist party —the FET-JONS—, was attaining an 
important position of power. The ideological evolution of the anti-republican coalition 
during the war can be perfectly understood as a process of fascistization.69 And the 
falangists showed great interest in instilling their ideology into the combatants, 
something that was particularly evident in their own militia units. These combating 
soldiers were told about the ‘National-Syndicalist Revolution’ (Revolución 
Nacionalsindicalista), yet loyalty to Franco —the Caudillo— was the key point.70 
Franco had nominated himself head of the FET-JONS, while the founder of Falange, 
José Antonio Primo de Rivera, had been earlier executed in a Republican prison. 
Around 1,200,000 men fought in the Francoist army. While the military preferred to 
protect their soldiers from an excessive politicization, the FET-JONS saw in them a 
potential group of trustworthy supporters.71 Veterans would be agents of the Spanish 
fascistization. 
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 Meanwhile, the war evolved towards a Francoist victory. The fate of the Spanish 
Second Republic was not so much decided on the battlefields, as it was in the 
international conference of Munich, September 1938. Earlier, in March 1938, the Nazis 
had annexed Austria to the Third Reich, while German air support facilitated the 
Francoist sweeping offensive on the front of Aragon. Now, faced with the Nazi 
intention to absorb the German-speaking portions of Czechoslovakia, France and 
Britain decided to maintain their policy of appeasement. Together with Mussolini, they 
signed the Munich pact on 30 September, thus allowing the Germans to proceed with 
the occupation. Opposition from the democratic countries would have probably meant 
war, and it was said that the agreement ensured peace. However, for the Spanish 
Republic, it was a death sentence, since it could no longer expect a general European 
conflict between democracies and fascist powers —this scenario would have allowed 
them to receive military help against Franco. Nothing hampered the constant inflow of 
support from the fascist powers to Franco, while the International Brigades had been 
earlier withdrawn from Spain on the poor advice of the farcical Non-Intervention 
Committee.  
 In early 1939, the contacts between the falangists and the fascists stepped up, 
whilst the Spanish Republic lay on its deathbed. These connections transcended the 
meetings between a few important personalities, and largely helped to shape Francoist 
veteran politics. The FET-JONS created a network of headquarters abroad, to maintain 
relations with the Nazis in Germany and with the fascists in Italy.72 Collaboration was 
closer with the latter country. In a climate of fascist friendship, some of the Italian 
soldiers of the Corpo di Truppe Volontarie became members of the FET-JONS during 
their stay in Spain.73 Among them, there were a few old veterans of the Great War, who 
thus embodied the fascist ideal of eternal combatant.74 Furthermore, relevant political 
representatives of the Francoist coalition visited Fascist Italy during the war. For 
example, during 1938, Millán Astray, the co-founder —with Franco— of the Spanish 
Legión, and then leader of the Francoist organization of disabled veterans (the 
Benemérito Cuerpo de Mutilados de Guerra por la Patria), travelled to Italy along with 
José María Pemán, a conservative writer who developed the exalting mystic about the 
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‘provisional’ junior officers (alféreces provisionales) of the Francoist army.75 Likewise, 
an important number of FET-JONS leaders visited Italy, learning first-hand about the 
functioning of a fascist regime. For example, José Antonio Girón, a young falangist 
from Valladolid, who was a commander of fighting militia units, spent the last months 
of the Spanish Civil War in Italy, as part of a political mission.76 After the war, he 
would become the main leader of the falangist organization for war veterans. Evidently, 
all these contacts contributed much to the institutional and political construction of the 
Franco regime, including the organizational structure for the Spanish Civil War 
veterans. 
 In ideological terms, the closeness to Fascist Italy resulted in a clear 
incorporation of fascist discourses into the Franco regime. As we know, since the early 
1920s, some promoters of Falange, such as Rafael Sánchez Mazas and Ernesto Giménez 
Caballero, had admired Mussolini and the Italian fascists, and emulated fascist culture. 
Both intellectuals would be figures of reference for the regime during the early 1940s. 
Falangist rituals and discourses of war were sourced in the fascist heritage; therefore, 
during the war, the exaltation of youth, the sacralization of violence, the cult of sacrifice 
and death, became important elements of the falangist ideology. Consequently, the 
Francoists also turned to the fascist model of discourses to approach the war veterans. 
Since 1938, the Francoist trench newspapers published articles insisting that the 
soldiers, after the war, had the obligation to maintain their loyalty to the Caudillo, and 
to transform themselves into obedient and selfless workers.77 Not only the 
organizational structure, therefore, but also the discourses employed to approach the 
war veterans in Francoist Spain had their origins in Fascist Italy. 
 The European context marked this long process of transfer, ending with the 
consolidation of the National Delegation of Veterans of the FET-JONS (Delegación 
Nacional de Excombatientes – DNE) —the key Francoist veteran organization.78 On 1 
April 1939, with the Republic defeated, Franco announced the end of the war, and a 
period of military and fascist celebrations followed. The Francoist authorities paid 
friendly homage to the German and Italian troops, and Spanish emissaries accompanied 
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them on their return home. They were welcomed with great pomp and ceremony in 
Germany and Italy, in a climate of soldierly brotherhood between the three countries. It 
was at this time that the Nazis and the fascists signed the Pact of Steel. The displaying 
of victorious combatants parading through Spanish, German and Italian cities was a 
warning to the rest of Europe. When Franco formed a new government in August 1939, 
the fascists of the FET-JONS obtained important positions of power, and some sectors 
of the army fused with them. The falangist military officer Agustín Muñoz Grandes was 
appointed Secretary General of the party. It was at this moment when José Antonio 
Girón became the leader (Delegado Nacional) of the new falangist organization for the 
war veterans.79 Francoist veteran policy was designed in a context of intense 
entanglement between the European fascist powers.  
 The setting up of the DNE was slow, but it was fully in line with the Italian 
example. If in Italy, in November 1938, both the ANC and the ANMIG had been 
officially subordinated to the PNF,80 in Spain, the DNE was directly born as a 
dependent organism of the FET-JONS. The Spanish army kept the disabled veteran 
organization under control, but the organizational duality between war disabled and war 
veterans was comparable in Italy and Spain. (The Nazis followed the same principle in 
Germany, after Hitler decided, in March 1938, that all veteran organizations apart from 
the NSKOV were fused into a national-socialist ‘Kyffhäuser’).81 The Spanish DNE was 
a totalitarian structure, based on local and provincial cells subordinated to the national 
leadership, the same as the Italian ANC. As for the leaders, ex-officers coming from 
bourgeois background predominated in both the Spanish and the Italian organizations. 
Moreover, the Spanish regime developed a system of material privileges for the 
veterans, reserving for them an important quota of job vacancies, as had been the norm 
in Fascist Italy. In conclusion, the Francoist system of management of veterans’ benefits 
with political objectives had a precedent in Fascist Italy. 
 The most striking similarities between the DNE and the ANC regard the political 
discourse employed at that time. Both organizations insisted on the blind loyalty of the 
veterans to the Caudillo and the Duce. Both organizations exalted the military virtues of 
the veterans: obedience, the will to sacrifice. The Italian fascists had employed this kind 
of discourse before, for example during the worst years of the economic depression. In 
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Spain, the economic conditions in the aftermath of war were no better, and the situation 
of the defeated was appalling, suffering both hunger and political persecution. Apart 
from certain political elites who occupied positions of power at the local and provincial 
level, the great majority of Francoist veterans were told to return silently to work. As 
was written in the main falangist journal, Arriba, the veterans should ‘return to work 
wherever they were ordered, without any other demand than being the vanguard of this 
distressing moment’.82 In Italy, Amilcare Rossi had employed exactly the same kind of 
discourse to explain what the duty of the veterans was: ‘to work and to shut up’, in the 
line with the fascist consign ‘believe, obey, fight’.83 These discourses acquired 
prominence with the outbreak of the Second World War. 
 The Italian fascist model of veteran politics culminated during the period 
between the beginning of the Second World War and the Italian intervention of June 
1940. The fascist model became, at this point, totalitarian in nature. What marked the 
context of this final development was the entanglement with Nazi Germany, including 
the fascist veterans’ week-long visit to the III Reich in June 1939,84 and the friendship 
with the Spanish Falangists, exemplified by the huge metal wreath that Mussolini sent 
to Spain for the funeral of José Antonio Primo de Rivera in November 1939.85  
The fascist model of the political organization of war veterans can be described 
as totalitarian, since it implied the elimination of the boundaries between the category of 
veteran and that of member of the fascist party. This happened both in Spain and Italy, 
almost simultaneously. The Spanish party FET-JONS was first in taking the significant 
decision of opening the party membership to all the ex-combatants who had fought the 
war. On 4 December 1939, the FET-JONS Secretary General Agustín Muñoz Grandes 
signed a memorandum that awarded this right to those veterans who applied for it.86 
Soon afterwards, in Italy, Mussolini took the equivalent decision of awarding the right 
to become members of the PNF to all the Italian veterans if they applied for it. On 7 
December 1939, the ANC leaders had visited the Duce to declare the immutable loyalty 
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of the Italian veterans and to request that they be admitted to the PNF.87 Mussolini 
immediately accepted. Significantly, the veterans would obtain the quality of PNF 
member with seniority dating back to 3 March 1925, the date of the ANC fascistization. 
Thus, Fascism was reaching the long-awaited symbolic and real fusion between the 
fascist and the veteran. According to the fascists, this amalgamation demonstrated that 
‘war and Fascism [were] two inseparable terms and factors’.88 
What was the meaning of the direct integration of the veterans into the fascist 
parties? First, it was a measure coherent with the radicalization of politics within the 
fascist regime and the Spanish dictatorship, as well as a reflection of the fascist 
ideological worldview. The fascists explained the adhesion of the war veterans from all 
the Italian ‘victories’ to the PNF as a ‘truly totalitarian’ measure.89 In a pamphlet 
probably written by Amilcare Rossi, it was said that there could not be combattentismo 
outside Fascism, and that the true combatant was necessarily fascist. Fascism was, in 
fact, ‘a real army’, the expression of the best of the nation; for that reason Fascism must 
embrace the veterans. The inscription of veterans into the PNF matched all the 
requirements of morality and security, because the fascists considered the veterans, not 
only ‘excellent citizens’, but also ‘faithful fascists’.90 In their explication of the 
measure, the fascists recalled the veterans’ role in the origin of Fascism. Yet the fascists 
had not undertaken the direct integration of veterans into the PNF until now. It was only 
after nearly twenty years of propaganda and political violence when the fascists felt safe 
enough to consider any war veteran as a potential fascist militant without further 
scrutiny. By 1940, the fascists were fully convinced of the veterans’ trustworthiness. 
The fascists had other reasons to take the decision of considering all veterans as 
potential fascist militants. This measure was not only a recognition of the fascist 
credentials of the veterans, but also a mechanism to attract more veterans to the fascist 
creed. Of course, being a member of the party implied benefits and privileges, and 
therefore, material interests probably motivated thousands of Italian veterans who 
joined the PNF at that time. In Italy, by 24 May 1940, the fascists claimed that more 
than 1 million veterans had requested to join the PNF.91 At a moment when the state 
                                                
87 La Stampa, 7 December 1939. 
88 (‘Guerra e Fascismo sono due termini, due fattori inscindibili’), Il Popolo d’Italia, 9 December 1939. 
89 (‘veramente totalitaria’), Angelo Amico [Amilcare Rossi], Il significato dell’ammissione dei 
combattenti nel Partito, Caltanisetta, 1940. 
90 (‘ottimo cittadino’, ‘fedele fascista’) Ibid. 
91 L’Italia combattente. L’Italia grigio-verde, num. 10, 31 May 1940. 
  
 293 
imposed the rationing of food,92 being a member of the fascist party could be useful to 
survive. This situation was particularly decisive in Francoist Spain.93 There, starving 
veterans often begged the falangist leaders for help.94 The practically totalitarian control 
of media that characterized these fascist dictatorships makes it extremely difficult to 
examine the real opinions of the veterans, but the fascist organizational structures were 
able to perform their duties without regard to the intimate feelings of their members. 
The fascist veteran discourse, both in Italy and Spain, was created and delivered by a 
very restricted elite of fascist leaders, who were, in the end, mere megaphones for the 
regime’s official discourse. Even in Nazi Germany, the veterans would be utilized for 
propaganda purposes during the war.95 The war veterans were perhaps fully fascistized 
in Italy, Spain and Germany, but this fascistization converted them, by and large, into a 
purely symbolic reference, ready for the war propaganda, a mute pawn on the hands of 
fascist regimes.  
Finally, merging fascists and veterans helped to bridge the gap between one war 
and another, creating the society constantly ready for war for which the fascists yearned. 
Fascism was creating a system in which war service was rewarded in such a way that 
new sectors of the population would be prepared and willing to become combatants in 
subsequent wars, even if not necessarily sharing the fascist ideology. The whole fascist 
regime, with its multiple organizations and efforts for the military education of the new 
generations, served this purpose, and the role of the fascist discourses and organizations 
for the war veterans can be considered a crucial instrument to reach these goals. The 
actual extent to which the regimes succeeded in this objective was neither total nor 
insignificant, but rather somewhere in between. In June 1940, Italians went to war 
again, and according to the fascists more than 140,000 former veterans of the Great War 
served militarily once more.96 However, most of them were obliged to do so. In June 
1941, when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, the FET-JONS organized a Spanish 
military unit to join the Russian campaign: the Blue Division. Thousands of falangist 
young men joined it, thus obtaining the coveted condition of excombatiente following 
their eventual return.97 Still, many Spanish soldiers were forced to fight in Russia, and 
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hundreds of former leftists joined the endeavour in order to expiate an inconvenient 
political past.98 All these nuances notwithstanding, the veterans had become a necessary 
symbolic link for the reproduction and military expansion of fascism. 
 
Fascist and French veterans and the path towards Vichy France 
France was the second case in which fascist veteran politics substantially contributed to 
the establishment of a dictatorship. On 17 June 1940, after the French III Republic had 
collapsed in the face of the overwhelming German invasion and the opportunistic Italian 
attack, Marshall Pétain, in his message to the French citizens, offered himself as the 
new governor of the country. Pétain invited the French to cease the resistance against 
the invaders, while stating that he was ‘sure of the support of the war veterans whom he 
had the honour of commanding’.99 The French veterans, organized in the Légion 
Française des Combattants, would become one of the pillars of the new collaborationist 
regime of Vichy. Even if both the Spanish and the French republics were destroyed by 
war, the historical process by which a dictatorship was established in France was very 
different to the Spanish path towards a fascist-inspired regime. Correspondingly, the 
role of the veterans in this French evolution, if fundamental like in Spain, was also quite 
distinct. Yet one key factor operated in both cases: the influence of Fascist Italy, and in 
the case of France the fascist veterans had a particular role. 
 My chief argument here is that without the precedent of Fascist Italy and without 
the previous numerous contacts and exchanges established between relevant veteran 
elites from France and Italy, it would not have been possible to establish in 1940 an 
authoritarian collaborationist regime in France with the participation of war veterans. 
This introduction of fascist-inspired veteran politics to France presents many 
particularities, for it was not only an adaptation, but also the end of an endogenous 
French evolution.100 Therefore, the transfer did not imply the creation of veteran 
structures that would be directly equivalent to the Italian system, as had been the case in 
Spain. The French precedents for unsuccessful veteran attempts of organizational 
unification, comparable to the unification processes of British and American veteran 
groups, must be taken into account. Yet saying that the LFC was the natural and long-
awaited culmination of the French veterans’ desires for unification would be a fully 
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teleological explanation not sustained by comparative or transnational analysis. The 
origin of the LFC cannot be understood without the Italian fascist factor, and, as an 
organization and political entity, it had much more to do with the fascist veteran 
associations than with the British or American Legions. However, the transfer that we 
are uncovering took place also in the realm of discourses, practices and representations.  
It may be surprising that the adaptation of the fascist model of veteran politics to 
France culminated amidst a full rupture between the French and the Italian fascist 
veterans. The status of the bi-lateral relations between France and Italy provoked this 
break. In the advent of the Front Populaire, Italian-French relations had clearly cooled. 
With the intervention in Spain, the Italian-German alliance took shape, while Italian ties 
with her ‘Latin sister’ loosened. During 1937, the meetings between French and fascist 
veterans on French soil became occasions to reveal profound divergences, particularly 
with the UF. Even though the UF leader Henri Pichot, maintained cordial relations with 
the Nazi Oberlindober, the French veteran was very critical of the totalitarian style of 
politics.101 In contrast, the UNC still tried to maintain friendly relations with the fascist 
veterans.102 
Then, other international events worsened the situation. The German Anschluss 
pushed the Italians to focus on the Mediterranean as their main, if not only, sphere of 
influence and expansion. And in this region, the fascists clashed with French and British 
interests. The German annexation of Austria had been a clear defeat for the traditional 
interests of Italy on its northern border, but the Italian alliance with Germany was 
unquestionable. A friendly visit of 500 Nazi veterans to Rome shortly after the 
Anschluss served to confirm it.103 And while Mussolini reached a favourable agreement 
with the British regarding the Mediterranean, relations with France deteriorated further. 
In May 1938, the London meeting of the Permanent International Committee of 
Veterans ended with the withdrawal of the French representatives (Pichot, Goy and 
Desbons) who understood that the Nazi representative —the Duke of Saxe-Coburg— 
had been appointed the new president as a result of the fascist plan, in spite of open 
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French opposition.104 This was a serious obstacle for the French-Italian friendship. Even 
the Italy-based Union d’Anciens Combattants France-Italie, led by Henri Mirauchaux 
was unable to maintain the unity of French and the fascist veterans. Yet the admiration 
of French veterans for Fascist Italy did not really fade. In February 1938, the last 
amicable meeting of the Union took place, with a banquet, a speech given by Delcroix, 
and with André Gervais’ praise of the fascist motto ‘believe, obey, fight’ in the name of 
the French veterans.105 As we will see, the end of the fraternal relationship did not imply 
the abandonment of fascist discourses among certain groups of French veterans. 
The Munich pact momentarily satisfied the pro-Italian sectors of the French 
veterans who still believed in the friendship with the fascists,106 but the final rupture 
came just a few weeks later. Until then, with certain incredulity, fascist-friendly French 
veterans had observed the increasing Italian verbal attacks on France.107 Still, it could 
not have come as a total surprise that, at the end of December 1938, following orders 
from the PNF, the fascist veterans abandoned the Union d’Anciens Combattants 
France-Italie.108 (As we know, the Italian veterans’ organizations had been submitted to 
the authority of the PNF in November 1938). By then, as Henri Mirauchaux regretfully 
wrote, the international action of the war veterans was ‘dead’.109 Within a few months, 
Mirauchaux saw his own organization disappear. During 1939, the official position of 
the fascist veterans became frankly hostile to the French, and this reality shows the 
extent to which the ANC and its newspaper had become mere tools of regime 
propaganda.110 Veterans such as Mirauchaux, and probably also Delcroix, regretted the 
bringing to an end of their long-lasting friendly relationship, but the decision of the 
fascist regime prevailed, and not even a last farewell encounter between French and 
Italian veterans —planned for in Sardinia in January 1939— was allowed to take 
place.111 An exchange of reproachful letters between, on the one hand, Delcroix and 
Rossi, and on the other hand, Gervais, Mirauchaux and the French representatives of the 
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FIDAC, did nothing but confirm the official bitter rupture between the fascists and the 
French veterans.112 
Despite the severed ties with Italy, the French veteran organizations were set on 
adopting authoritarian traits. The French UF had started to transform its organizational 
structure in a way that brought it ideologically closer to the UNC.113 In other words, the 
largest French centre-left veteran organization acquired right-wing qualities. The leader 
Henri Pichot, despite his republican and democratic convictions, began to strive for the 
formation of a new national government, to concentrate all the forces of French society. 
Hence, on 20 April 1938, Pichot made a call for the formation of a government of 
‘public safety’ formed by the veterans.114 Recognising that parliamentary democracy 
was exhausted, he proposed that the veterans help form a capable government. On this 
basis, the rapprochement between the UF and the UNC was easier, and, after the pact of 
Munich, both associations converged in a common campaign of ‘civic action’.115 In an 
international context where the security of France was in danger, both associations 
began to collaborate. After the proposal of Henri Pichot, Jean Goy and the UNC joined 
this project of ‘national reconciliation’.116 Both veteran leaders, supported by other 
minor associations, launched a joint programme of ‘national concentration’ 
(‘rassemblement national’), which implied working for the rearmament of France and 
the preparation for its defence.117 Finally, as a consequence of this convergence, on 12 
November 1939, both the UF and the UNC founded the Légion des Combattants 
Français. This was a reflection of their shared desire of ‘moral revival’ and ‘economic 
resurrection’.118 Meanwhile, the French Confederation of Veterans Associations 
gathered the rest of organizations in a similarly-named platform, the Légion Française 
des Combattants. Yet the most important historical development was, in short, that the 
two main French veteran associations had moved together towards authoritarianism.119 
Although the political orientation of the main French veteran associations during 
this period cannot be defined as fascist, it seems clear that the calls for the veterans’ 
participation in the government of France cannot be understood without the precedent 
of Fascism. Deeply ingrained beliefs about the leading role that the war veterans had 
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allegedly attained in Fascist Italy and even Nazi Germany —the old myth of the fascist 
veterans— had long since become part of the French veteran worldview. This 
preconception operated in the minds of French veteran leaders who, furthermore, had 
direct and frequent contacts with both fascists and Nazis. It was largely thanks to the 
fascist example that the possibility of practicing authoritarian politics was part of the 
veterans’ horizon of expectations. However, despite the French veterans’ disposition 
towards authoritarianism, these political projects still lacked clear fascist-inspired traits. 
It would be only after June 1940 that French veteran politics would be reshaped in a 
manner which incorporated more clearly fascist characteristics, both in organizational 
and discursive aspects. 
Does the prominence of veteran politics in Vichy allow us to speak about 
fascism? The answer is not straightforward. The regime of Vichy was the opportunity to 
put into practice a ‘National Revolution’ in which the war veterans would play a key 
role. This project in theory matched the fascist experience. Nevertheless, if authoritarian 
tendencies had undoubtedly motivated Petain’s call for the veterans’ support, it is also 
true that, by June 1940, the real influence of the veteran movement over the country had 
substantially diminished.120 Demanding that the war veterans be the basis of a new 
France did not have the same connotations that such an appeal would have had in the 
aftermath of the Great War. Veterans were far from the only group rallied to Pétain; 
many other sectors of society backed the new collaborationist regime, built on the ruins 
of a discredited Republic.121 The new Légion Française des Combattants (LFC), 
created by the law of 29 August 1940 signed by Pétain, would channel this popular 
support into a structure under the control of the regime, yet this organization implied 
leaving aside the option of a single-party.122 Xavier Vallat, a one-eyed veteran and 
former member of the Faisceau and the Croix de Feu, was appointed head of Vichy’s 
general secretariat for war veterans, and was the principal mind behind the organisation 
of the LFC. (Later, he would become the general commissary for the Jewish question, 
being responsible of the persecutions of the Jews under the regime.)123 Yet if important 
personalities of the veteran movement composed the leading cadres of Vichy, the main 
leaders of the French fascist leagues remained in German-occupied Paris during the 
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war. When compared with the fascist powers, the role of the French veterans in Vichy 
seems to represent simultaneously a commonality and a distinguishing feature. 
 However, Vichy endowed the LFC with duties and functions that in some 
aspects matched those of the fascist veterans in Italy. The fundamental point in common 
was the declared obedience and loyalty to the leader of the nation. In the French case, 
this charismatic figure was Marshall Pétain, who also became the honorific head of the 
veteran organization. As the LFC assumed the functions of a single-party, the position 
of Pétain was homologous to that of Franco and Mussolini. Meanwhile, Xavier Vallat, 
as secretary general for the war veterans, played in France the role that the secretary 
general of the FET-JONS and the PNF respectively played in Spain and Italy. (Later, 
Vallat appointed ass head of the LFC the anti-communist officer Georges Loustaunau-
Lacau, who would soon be replaced by Émile Meaux). The legionnaires had to be the 
‘partisans of the National Revolution’.124 A rhetoric insisting on the sacrifice and 
selfless work of the legionnaires was the most common expression of this allegedly 
revolutionary task, thus paralleling the Spanish and Italian cases. Apart from these 
aspects, the members of the LFC, with their uniforms and martial symbology, were 
omnipresent in the militaristic and fascist-inspired rituals of the regime. From 
November 1941, in a typically fascist organizational development, the LFC accepted 
members without war experience, organized within the ‘Volunteers of the National 
Revolution’. Furthermore, an armed militia was created out of the LFC. At its peak, the 
LFC would reach 1.4 million members in Vichy France, including the colonies.125 
Moreover, the construction of the LFC cannot be fully understood without the 
precedent of the fascist veterans’ organizations and discourses. The emblem of the 
organization had a clearly fascist aesthetic, particularly as it introduced the sword into 
the traditional symbology of the French veterans (Image 42). The LFC, a highly 
centralized and hierarchical structure, was set up, turning on many occasions to the 
same former leaders of the veteran movement, particularly the UNC, or former leagues 
like the Croix de Feu and the Jeunesses Patriotes.126 In fact, most of the political 
discourse and doctrine of Vichy came from the PSF, the heir of the Croix de Feu.127 
                                                
124 (‘partisans de la Révolution nationale’), La Légion. Organe officiel de la Légion Française des 
Combattants (Vichy), 20 November 1940. 
125 Jean-Paul Cointet, La Légion Française des Combattants. 
126 Jean-Paul Cointet and Michèle Cointet, ‘Contribution a une socio-politique de l'État français: la 
Légion française des combattants dans la Vienne (1940-1943)’, Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine, 20, 4 (1973), pp. 595-618. 
127 Sean Kennedy, Reconciling France, pp. 225-ff. 
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Moreover, other characteristics of Vichy’s political organization for the anciens 
combattants had their origins in the long friendship between conservative French 
veterans and the fascists. 
 
 
Image 42: Emblem of the Legión Française des Combattants 
 
The case of André Gervais is perhaps the most significant. As we know, he had been 
one of the leading figures of the friendship between French and fascist veterans. 
Particularly during 1934-1935 several of his publications in French and Italian had 
praised the Italian model of veteran organization. In 1936, Gervais, a member of the 
UF, had written a programmatic text for the new youth section of this association. This 
organizational development recalls, for example, the youth section that the Stahlhelm 
had created during its fascist-inspired evolution. In fact, André Gervais had underlined 
the need for a national ‘mystic’ for the French youth, similar to the spirit of the Italian 
fascists and the German national-socialists.128 When the LFC was created, Gervais 
became a departmental leader and continued publishing his writings in the LFC 
organs.129 For him, the LFC was the hope of France.130 In 1942, Gervais’ book L’esprit 
légionnaire synthesised his thoughts about renewing the spirit of the Great War 
combatants, in order to reconstruct France at the orders of Pétain.131 This was an 
attempt to create an original doctrine for the LFC, although Fascist Italy was an 
influential precedent impossible to ignore. 
                                                
128 André Gervais, Jeunesses, Paris, 1936, p. 19. 
129 See, for example, La Légion. Revue Mensuelle Illustrée publiée par la Légion Française des 
Combattants (Vichy), num. 3 (August 1941). 
130 André Gervais, Légion, espoir de la France, Paris, 1941. 
131 André Gervais, L’esprit légionnaire, Paris, 1942. 
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 For all these reasons, it is not surprising that historians have described the LFC 
as part of the fascist ‘temptation’ in France.132 Whether the LFC represented only a 
‘temptation’ or a fully-fledged French fascist phenomenon is a matter of discussion, as 
part of the wide scholarly debate about the existence and relevance of fascism in France. 
Here, I have underlined the fact that such a political evolution of the French veteran 
movement would have been impossible without the imposing precedent of Fascist Italy. 
France was not ‘allergic’ to fascism, but rather she was a country in which ample social 
and political sectors had assumed the fascist style of politics and fascist political 
programmes such as the ‘National Revolution’, by direct contagion from the original 
source —Italy. And this contagion, as I have demonstrated here, was partially caused by 
the long history of friendly relationships between French and Italian fascist veterans, 





















                                                










This PhD dissertation has examined the historical relationship between war veterans and 
fascism during the European interwar period from a transnational point of view. Such a 
line of inquiry had never before been explored with the range and depth of scope and 
the amount and diversity of empirical evidence, that this work has sought to provide. In 
this conclusion, I will summarize the findings of my research, explaining how it 
contributes to historical knowledge, and then reflect on how this piece of research helps 
us to better understand fascism as a transnational phenomenon. 
 
Fascism and veterans 
Historians have discussed on many occasions the link that there seemingly existed 
between individual ex-combatants, veteran groups and organizations, and the origin of 
the fascist movements in Italy, Germany and even France. Scholars assumed that, as the 
conspicuous cases of Hitler, Mussolini, Röhm, Balbo, Heß, Bottai and many others 
suggest, the fascists and the Nazis had very often been former soldiers, having served in 
the trenches of the Great War, or joined paramilitary formations after November 1918. 
Such realities would reveal the ‘brutalizing’ effect that, according to George L. Mosse, 
the Great War had on a generation. However, specialists on the history of the veteran 
movements recalled that, as the examples of Henri Pichot, René Cassin, Erich Maria 
Remarque, Emilio Lussu, Erich Kuttner, Ferruccio Parri and many others demonstrate, 
ex-combatants of the First World War predominantly became committed pacifists and 
democrats. If we concede the utility of Mosse’s notion, we can say that one side of the 
coin included the fascists and national-socialists, and the other those internationalists 
and pacifists that avoided, or were not responsive to, ‘brutalization’. Yet in reality, the 
number of people that served as soldiers during the First World War was so high that, 
by the same token, we might find examples of war veterans involved in any facet 
human activity, whether political or not, during the interwar period. And furthermore, 
thousands of people without combat experience became leading fascists and national-
socialists. It is true that the veterans’ know-how was a coveted asset for the fascists in 
their violent quest for political power, but veterans could also put their combat skills 
against the fascists, as they did in Italy (arditi del popolo) and Germany (Rote 
Frontkämpferbund). Put simply, it is misleading to categorize war veterans into defined 
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ideologies or political sectors, to affirm that veterans were more inclined to have a 
certain behaviour or mind-set. 
 Whereas it is true that many war veterans shared a set of common experiences 
related to mass warfare —and therefore they showed in different societies a rather 
similar tendency to spontaneously create associations and defend their material 
interests—, there was no unity of feelings and ideals that defined them. Even in those 
countries where veteran associations mobilized hundreds of thousands of men, the 
majority of people who actually had been soldiers during the First World War never 
joined these groups or did so without a real commitment. It was not only the typical 
young, bourgeois, nationalist war volunteer —a figure common to France, Britain, 
Germany and Italy— who had the right to be labelled a ‘veteran’. Illiterate peasant 
servicemen also were veterans, and their opinions and emotions often differed much 
from those of their officers. Moreover, the political diversity of the veteran associations 
in the aftermath of war is impressive. Only as time passed, when the transnational 
symbol of the veteran acquired certain meanings —as this dissertation has shown—, the 
veteran organizations in Europe became more homogeneously patriotic, nationalistic, 
and right-wing, and less democratic, pacifist and orientated to the left than before. The 
pacifist and republican combatant writer Henri Barbusse, a famous figure in early 1919 
among European veterans, was gradually eclipsed by fascist-veteran ‘stars’ during the 
1920s, to end up relegated, as a symbol of the veterans of the world, to ostracism. This 
evolution was, however, by no means preordained. 
 In addition, the very notion of the ‘veteran’ could embody significantly different 
meanings depending not only on the nation-state, but also on the language. What was a 
war veteran? Even before the concept was officially defined by legislation, historical 
actors had already endowed it with implicit, subjective connotations that varied 
according to the language employed. It was not exactly the same to say, as in Britain, 
ex-servicemen, as to use the more aggressive word combattenti, as in Italy. Nor was it 
neutral to call them Kriegsopfer (‘war victim’) or Frontkämpfer (‘front-fighter’), as the 
Nazis sometimes did, instead of naming them Ehemalige Kriegsteilnehmer (literally, 
‘former participant in war’). In this dissertation, I have utilized the concept of ‘veteran’, 
most common in the United States, as the most unbiased option available to analyse this 
part of European history. 
 Having recognised the constructed nature of the category of veteran, a 
substantial part of my dissertation has been devoted to explaining the transnational 
 305 
process of symbolic appropriation of the idea of the war veteran by nationalist, 
counterrevolutionary and fascist forces. Symbolic appropriation was the core reason 
why, despite the fact that millions of European ex-soldiers did not become outright 
warmongers but rather instinctive pacifists during the interwar period, people easily 
associated the image of the fascist with the symbol of the veteran. 
I have argued that it was in Italy during the early post-war period that the 
process of symbolic appropriation was most consequential. In Italy, the controversy 
about the meaning of the war was particularly serious, given the bitter confrontation 
between interventionists and neutralists. The inception of Fascism, therefore, must be 
understood in its context. Only by taking simultaneously into account Mussolini’s 
particular ideological position during the war, the precedent of the Russian revolution, 
and the anxieties after Caporetto, can the connection between the symbol of the veteran 
and the new emerging ideology of Italian Fascism be fully understood. After 1917, 
preventing the transformation of the soldiers into socialist revolutionaries became an 
urgent task in the main belligerent countries, and even more so in Italy. Yet, whereas in 
a France enthused by victory, the conservative, patriotic and nationalist forces embodied 
by Clemenceau partially succeeded in maintaining both practically and symbolically the 
republican allegiance of the masses of soldiers;1 in a crisis-ridden Italy ex-combatants’ 
opinions were much more fragmented and inclined to extremes. By the end of 1919 in 
Italy, after violent physical and discursive confrontations, it was not only the symbol of 
the arditi, but also the symbol of the veteran, that had acquired a strong anti-Bolshevik 
bias. Paradoxically, the still-unsuccessful fascist movement would go on to be the main 
beneficiary of this process. Significantly, Italo Balbo wrote in his 1922 diary that 
‘without Mussolini, three-quarters of the Italian youth returning from the trenches 
would have become Bolsheviks’.2 
The precedent of paramilitary formations crushing revolutions in central Europe 
became an important element of the transnational process of symbolical appropriation 
of the veteran in an anti-Bolshevik sense, yet in Germany the connection between 
veterans and proto-fascist movements and ideologies is not so clear as is often 
supposed. The conservative Stahlhelm slowly defined a political stance regarding 
Weimar. By the time Hitler started his political career in the DAP (later NSDAP), the 
                                                
1 See Pierre Vilar, ‘Reflexions sur les années 20’, in: VV.AA., Piero Gobetti e la Francia. Atti del 
colloquio italo francese, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1985, pp. 15-25. 
2 Italo Balbo, Diario 1922, Milan, 1932, p. 6. 
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symbolic appropriation of the veteran by the Italian fascist movement was already 
crystallizing. In early- and mid-1921, the stereotype of the ‘fascist veteran’ (commonly 
a patriotic, young, decorated ex-officer with front experience willing to restore ‘victory’ 
and exterminate socialism) was already circulating from Italy to Switzerland, Austria, 
France, Spain and Germany, particularly Bavaria. I have argued that this 
communicative process, disregarded by historians until now, illuminates the 
transnational formation of non-Italian fascisms, including the German case. Even in 
Italy, real ex-soldiers started to positively believe that Fascism was the archetypical 
expression of the veteran spirit, thus reinforcing the nascent stereotype. The self-
fulfilling prophecy of Mussolini’s trincerocrazia was becoming true, not only in Italy, 
since it was not a hermetically-isolated country. 
After the March on Rome, not just a stereotype, but an outright political myth 
boosted the transformation of fascism into a transnational phenomenon. The myth of the 
fascist veterans, drawn from the self-representation and self-stylization of the fascists as 
veterans and heirs of the fallen soldiers, stimulated the proliferation of fascist-inspired 
political groups in some of the closest European regions to Italy. Whereas under 
Mussolini’s government the veteran organizations were ruthlessly forced to accept PNF 
control and the preponderance of the fascist discourse, symbols, and commemorative 
framework, in France and Germany fascistization was not initially imposed from above. 
Legends about the Italian regime and the alleged good life veterans enjoyed under 
Mussolini’s leadership led to the progressive fascistization of veteran organizations like 
the Stahlhelm, or to the foundation of fascist parties of self-nominated ex-combatants 
such as the French Faisceau. Not even the main international organization of veterans 
(the FIDAC) was immune to fascist myths. In this context the fascist regime could even 
further reinforce its monopoly over the symbol of the war veteran, advancing towards 
new totalitarian goals.  
During the 1930s, the fascist veterans acquired new symbolic and practical roles, 
as the European context fundamentally changed. The Nazi movement irrupted onto the 
scene, while the Stahlhelm became the main German interlocutor of Italian Fascism. 
New actors also played a role in this international scenario; in particular, French and 
Spanish fascist movements that had to define a position regarding the transnational 
symbol of the fascist veteran. This symbolic reference was actually personified by 
active fascist politicians, such as Carlo Delcroix and Amilcare Rossi, around whom a 
network of contacts between European fascist-friendly veterans and would-be fascists 
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was built. It was a period of wide intellectual struggles around the meaning of the past 
war experience, but as an important backlash replicated the great success of Remarque, 
fascism continued to be the most influential political option in veteran politics. With the 
coming of the Third Reich, Germany experienced an upsurge in the special treatment 
given to honour war veterans, while the veteran organizations were Nazified. Nazi 
Germany defined its veteran politics following the model of Fascist Italy. Even in 
France, around 1934, the essentially-republican veteran associations moved towards 
authoritarianism and paramilitarism. The events in Paris on 6 February 1934 must be 
put in relation, not only with these processes, but also with the subsequent fascist and 
national-socialist attempts to construct a fascist European entente, in which veterans had 
a prominent position. However, geostrategic issues left this dream unfulfilled. 
In the end, the persisting transnational identification between the war veterans 
and fascism in the symbolic realm contributed much to bringing war to Europe once 
more. If the Italian attack on Ethiopia shocked many citizens across the world into 
realising the fascist threat to peace, veteran politics remained an instrument through 
which Italian Fascism could reinforce its power and influence both within Italy and in 
the international sphere. Pacifism and anti-fascism suffered a long crisis throughout the 
Ethiopian conflict and the Spanish Civil War. The anti-fascists’ attempts to divest the 
transnational symbol of the veteran of its ultra-nationalist, aggressive and anti-
democratic connotations were not successful. People across the world denounced the 
clear relation between fascism and war, but the struggle of international groups of 
pacifist veterans ultimately failed. The fascists’ and the Nazis’ cunning political 
manoeuvres fundamentally undermined the functioning of the transnational networks of 
veterans, whose supposed objective was the preservation of peace. 
Finally, in 1939-1940, when war waged against democratic states resulted in the 
imposition of fascist and authoritarian dictatorships in Spain and France, the long-
developed fascist model of veteran politics was transferred to these countries. This 
process, however, was not without selection, adaptation, and transformation. It is 
reasonable to state that the Spanish and the Italian fascist models of veteran 
organization evolved in parallel over the course of some months. Both the FET-JONS 
and the PNF decided, at the same time —December 1939— to promote the 
transformation of all veterans into members of the party. Veterans had almost identical 
symbolic roles in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Francoist Spain. After June 1940, it 
is not surprising, therefore, that Pétain required the French veterans to support the 
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‘National Revolution’ that Vichy was attempting to enforce. At that time, in the minds 
of millions of Europeans, the symbol of the fascist and the symbol of the veteran had 
coalesced. 
I have surveyed the main findings of my dissertation, but, what does the 
transnational history of the relationship between veterans and the fascist movements and 
regimes teach us about the overall phenomenon of fascism? On the one hand, this 
dissertation has shed light on the essential link between fascism and war. On the other 
hand, my research has advanced towards a new transnational definition of fascism. 
 
Fascism and war 
The focus on the war veterans has allowed us to deeply explore connections between 
the experience of war and the origin and evolution of fascism. Even though during the 
interwar period contemporaries still lived in too close a proximity to the past war 
experience as to fully realize the historical essentiality of war as the main causal and 
driving force of fascism, there were many early commentators who pointed out that 
fascism derived from war. And during the 1930s, one of the key arguments of the 
transnational anti-fascist movement was its assertion of the equation between war and 
fascism. The fascists themselves had no interest in hiding that correlation; rather they 
boasted about it. Piero Bolzon, a prominent fascist ex-ardito, wrote in 1930: ‘Fascism 
without war would be a subtle fraud, grotesque bragging, a wordy exegesis, an empty 
expression of the fatherland’.3 Although Hitler deceived many Europeans, his 
discourses about ‘peace’ were just a smokescreen for the flagrant rearmament and 
militarization of Germany during the Third Reich. Since there was no actual war during 
most of the period of the existence of fascism in most European regions between 1919 
and 1939 —if we disregard political violence, persecutions and social exclusion—, 
fascism embraced war above all in the symbolic sphere. Discourse, rituals and 
symbology were the elements that primarily materialized the idealised marriage 
between warfare and fascism. This is the reason why cultural analysis must be 
introduced to understand the relationship between fascism and war; the spheres of 
culture, social practice and politics cannot be separated. 
 After decades focusing on other factors, such as economic crisis, class 
struggles, incomplete modernization, cultural and intellectual developments, historians 
                                                
3 Quoted in Bollettino della Federazione Provinciale Mantovana dell’Associazione Nazionale 
Combattenti, num. 7, June 1930. 
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have turned, in recent years, to highlight the crucial elements of violence and war in 
their explanations. Yet the cultural perspectives on the relationship between war and 
fascism have seldom eluded the controversial Mossean paradigm. By describing the 
typical viewpoint of the fascists as regards the war experience, George L. Mosse was 
probably right in pointing at the ‘myth of the war experience’ as a key feature that did 
not survive 1945. However, the war veterans, alleged agents of such ‘brutalization’, did 
not play the role they are often ascribed. War veterans as a whole were not ‘brutalized’ 
by the war experience. ‘Brutalization’, I suggest, is a concept with an exclusively 
descriptive potential, since it serves only to denote the ‘brutal’ political behaviour of 
people that might have or might not have been ex-combatants. ‘Brutalization’ has no 
analytical capacity to explain why some war veterans exerted political violence after the 
war; empirical research often highlights different causes for that outcome. It is not the 
case that in Italy and Germany war veterans were normally ‘brutalized’ —by war or by 
‘defeat’—, while in France, Britain or elsewhere they were not. ‘Cultures of victory’ 
and ‘cultures of defeat’ do not explain the complexity of the long relationship between 
war and fascism in the interwar period. The relationship between, on the one hand, war 
and veterans, and on the other hand, fascism, cannot be explained on that conceptual 
basis. 
As I have argued in this dissertation, it was the manipulation of discourses and 
symbols that produced the fascist notion of ‘war veteran’ during the interwar period. 
Indeed, by simply looking at the post-war constructed stereotype and myth of the fascist 
veterans, the historian can gain a deep insight into the relationship between veterans and 
fascism. This cultural approach allows us to reach conclusions that correlate with the 
historical reality. The truth is that in the some regions, particularly in Italy, the symbol 
of the veterans acquired certain meanings linked to a particular political behaviour —
fascism. This constructed ideal circulated, was transferred, reworked and adapted by 
historical actors in different regions outside Italy. After this symbolic appropriation, 
therefore, there was a process of transnational political communication. Thus, the 
mythical construct transformed into extended social and political practices in different 
European countries. This was the reason why ‘fascist veterans’ emerged in distant 
places, founding fascist or fascist-like movements and parties.  
Hence, we can conclude that the ex-soldiers of the Great War, by and large, were 
not really transmitters of the war experience to the rest of society. A tiny portion of the 
whole mass of veterans deliberately strived to exert that role. However, a transnational 
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constructed notion of the ‘veteran’ did become a fundamental tool for fascism to pursue 
the politics of war in interwar Europe; I have shown in detail how fascism fabricated 
and wielded this instrument of politics. Moreover, the multiple versions of the mythical 
construct of the fascist veteran clearly served the purpose of militarizing society. These 
conclusions, therefore, are my key contribution to understanding the essential 
relationship between fascism and war. 
 
Transnational fascism 
Further insight into the history of fascism can be drawn from the transnational study of 
fascist veteran politics. We saw that when the fascist model for the veterans’ 
organization and political discourse consolidated in Italy, it became a platform for the 
expansion of fascism on the continent. Contacts between Italian fascist veterans and ex-
combatants from other countries, particularly Germany and France, as well as networks 
of veteran associations, reveal the transnational dimension of fascism. I have 
demonstrated how fascist veterans’ networks and encounters paved the way for the 
transfer of the fascist model of veteran politics not only to the Third Reich, but also to 
the new Spanish and French dictatorships as late as 1939-1940. Fascist veteran politics, 
therefore, was crucial in transforming an initially Italian phenomenon into a truly 
transnational one. 
In my view, it is more accurate to talk about ‘transnational fascism’ than 
‘generic’ fascism. In the historian’s debates on the nature of fascism, there has been a 
central division between those who defended the idea that fascism was a ‘generic’ 
ideology, and those who underlined the national, incomparable character of both Italian 
Fascism and German National-Socialism. But even among the former, ‘generic’ fascism 
was seen as something composed of different ‘national’ variables or permutations. 
Moreover, general works on ‘generic’ fascism normally succumbed to the necessity of 
analysing separately the different national ‘paths’ towards fascism (or totalitarianism), 
in order to compare them and draw lessons from the resulting picture. Historians 
designed tables to statically categorize the different national examples of ‘fascist’ or 
‘authoritarian’ regimes. By doing so, historians produced the impression that ‘fascism’ 
had appeared rather independently in distant parts of Europe and even the World, at 
roughly the same time, as a result of the fears deriving from the experience of crisis.  
Instead, this dissertation has tried to stress that fascism had a unique origin, 
which can be clearly situated in space and time. While pointing to the importance of the 
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symbol of the veteran in that inception process, I have argued that fascism was the 
creation of Mussolini and his entourage in the context of Italy 1917-1919 —even if 
transnational factors must be taken into account. Nevertheless, the process of the rise 
and the maturation of Italian Fascism as an extreme-right movement in Italy during 
1921 was paralleled by its transformation into a transnational phenomenon. I have 
focused on the role of the stereotype of the fascist veteran, and then on the myth of the 
fascist veterans, to explain what I call the process of transnationalization of fascism. 
I affirm that there existed, since 1921, and particularly since October 1922, a 
process of transnational fascistization of veteran politics in Europe, key to 
understanding the formation of fascism as a transnational phenomenon. I do not deny 
that other aspects of Italian Fascism and its ideology and style could become even more 
influential than veteran politics, and therefore contributed to this transnationalization. 
Yet my point here is that no other fascism in the interwar period can be understood 
without taking into account the Italian original model. Not even the NSDAP, in spite of 
its many particularities —as the case of veteran politics demonstrates. Besides, 
transnational fascistization implied that Italian Fascism also introduced new features 
inspired or provoked by what was happening abroad, particularly during the second half 
of the 1930s when it followed the model of the assertive Nazis. Once the 
transnationalization of fascism was set in motion, it was a process working in different 
directions. 
Networks of individuals and organizations, political tourism, diplomacy, 
transfers of knowledge, etc., featured the transnationalization of fascism during the 
interwar period. At the beginning, accounts of the fascist actions in Italy helped to 
attract the attention of political actors from different countries to the emerging and 
unprecedented political movement. Thus fascism spread out beyond its original core in 
central and northern Italy. Firstly, encapsulated in narratives and images, it passed 
through neighbouring regions such as Switzerland and Austria, reaching more fertile 
pastures where it would take root, such as Bavaria. Groups emulating fascism appeared 
there, trying to re-enact the March on Rome (Hitler’s 1923 putsch can be seen as a 
failed example of that). Later, fascism was replicated throughout Germany, in Paris, 
across France, on the Iberian Peninsula, in Britain, in Eastern Europe… And as Italian 
Fascism consolidated, different political structures worked to create a kind of fascist 
international. Even if this objective never materialized, transnational fascism did. 
During the 1930s, as we have seen through the history of the veterans’ networks, 
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fascism performed in a transnational political space that was not delimited by borders, 
but by social practice, discourse and symbols. Transnational fascism might be mapped 
in continental terms, indeed, not looking at national histories, but rather at the web of 
contacts, transfers and relations which the fascists from many European regions created. 
This dissertation has shown how the perspectives of transnational history may 
contribute to explaining fascism differently, while revealing processes that had been 
nearly completely disregarded until now. Such a historiographical endeavour has 
required the examination of new subjects of research like networks, transfers and 
contacts, adopting a more flexible working concept of fascism, better understood as a 
transnational notion that historical actors themselves manipulated to pursue their 
objectives. My transnational perspective led me to merge the cultural analysis of 
discourse, symbols and myths, with an approach to empirical evidence and facts that is 
typical of other historiographical practices, such as social history and international 
relations history. This dissertation has sought to stress that the spheres of culture and 
society are hardly divisible. Moreover, analytical perspectives based on the nation-state 
were transcended, to place the explanation of transnational fascism within a different 
sort of spatial framework. Accepting the innovative concept of ‘transnational fascism’ 
has meant breaking free from essentialisms and rigid categorization. Also, my 
dissertation has aspired to be an example of how transnational empirical analysis can be 
done, overcoming the difficulty of employing multiple languages in a single-author 
investigation, and surmounting the additional troubles that may result from drawing on 
very diverse ‘national’ historiographical traditions. It was my desire that my explanation 
would become acceptable and understandable for any historian from any part of our 
globalized world. 
This research agenda, which tends to focus on transnationalism and 
globalization, has shaped my research interests for the future. This desire to break free 
from the customary periodization and geographical framework could have further 
application in the fields of transnational fascism and the history of the war veterans. The 
next step, therefore, would be to move beyond the limits of an European perspective to 
understand fascism as a global network. Investigating the globalization of veteran 
politics after 1945 would also help to discern whether or not the stereotype and myth of 
the fascist veterans vanished during the Cold War period, and if yes, how this was 
possible. However, such ambitious projects, though an exciting challenge for future 
research, go far beyond the boundaries of this dissertation. This thesis has, hopefully, 
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achieved its central goal and served to demystify the conundrum that was the historical 
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